UC-NRLF 


SB    72    M7S 


REPORT  ON 


MOBILIZATION 


OF  THE 


ORGANIZED  MILITIA 


AND 


NATIONAL  GUARD 


OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


1916 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1916 


REPORT  ON 

MOBILIZATION 


OF  THE 


ORGANIZED  MILITIA 


AND 


NATIONAL  GUARD 

OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

1916 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1916 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

MILITIA  BUREAU, 

Washing  ton,- D.  C.,  December  19, 1916. 
Issued  by  the  Militia  Bureau  by  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

WM.  A.  MANX, 
Brigadier  General,  General  Staff, 

Chief,  Militia  Bureau. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


In  the  following  pages  the  recent  mobilization  is  discussed  under 
the  headings  which  appear  in  the  table  of  contents. 

Many  letters,  telegrams,  memoranda,  opinions  of  the  judge  advo- 
cate general,  etc.,  are  quoted  which  set  forth  the  policy  of  the  War 
Department  on  the  subjects  dealt  with.  In  themselves  they  supply 
answers  to  many  important  questions  relating  to  the  National  Guard. 

To  publish  the  report  of  a  single  inspector  or  mustering  officer  or 
even  those  of  several  would  fail  to  give  an  accurate  picture  of  con- 
ditions found  at  mobilization  camps  for  the  reason  that  conditions 
vary  greatly,  the  preparedness  in  some  States  being  far  in  advance 
of  others. 

Then,  too,  the  same  condition  of  affairs  will  not  impress  two  ob- 
servers in  exactly  the  same  light.  The  method  pursued  therefore 
has  been  to  scrutinize  carefully  all  reports,  extracting  therefrom 
matter  falling  under  such  various  headings  as  "  Recruiting-,"  "  Physi- 
cal examinations,"  etc.,  in  order  that  by  noting  the  reports  on  these 
subjects  as  observed  in  the  National  Guard  of  States  from  Maine 
to  Arizona,  a  fair  general  view  may  be  presented  to  the  reader.  The 
reports  of  a  few  observers  might  give  a  view  too  much  biased,  but 
the  considerable  number  whose  reports  are  quoted  and  whose  rank 
ranges  from  that  of  major  general  to  first  lieutenant,  all  of  whom 
have  had  more  or  less  experience  in  ma,king  inspection  of  troops,  can 
hardly  fail  to  present  a  fairly  truthful  estimate  of  conditions  existing 
in  the  National  Guard. 

Extracts  have  been  made  from  the  reports  of  inspector-instructors 
on  their  work  during  the  muster  in  of  the  State  forces,  to  which 
especial  attention  is  invited.  In  all  there  were  TO  officers  who  sub- 
mitted reports,  10  each  from  the  Cavalry  and  Artillery,  7  from  the 
Medical  Corps,  and  the  remainder  from  the  Infantry.  A  large  num- 
ber of  officers  employed  representing  all  the  mobile  arms  and  Medical 
Corps  of  the  Army  tends  to  eliminate  bias  and  prejudice,  and  the 
whole  presents  to  the  reader  a  composite  view  of  this  element  of 
national  defense  which  is  believed  to  be  fair  and  just. 

Between  July  14  and  August  15  a  general  inspection  of  all 
National  Guard  camps  on  the  border  was  made  by  the  assistant  chief 
of  staff,  Maj.  Gen.  T.  H.  Bliss,  consolidation  of  whose  reports  is 
here  presented.  Later  a  systematic  inspection  was  made  by  the 
Inspector  General's  Department  on  lines  suggested  by  the  Chief  of 
the  Militia  Bureau.  The  main  features  of  the  reports  of  these  in- 
spections have  been  condensed  for  presentation  here.  The  views  of 
several  of  the  department  commanders  are  also  given. 

Finally  the  above  is  followed  by  matter  on  this  subject  collected 
from  miscellaneous  sources. 

3 

349130 


4  INTRODUCTOBY. 

The  call  of  June  1&>  1916,  .followed  so  close  upon  the  passage  of 
the  act  of  June  3,  1916,  that  there  had  not  been  enough  time  for  the 
thorough  consideration  by  the  War  Department  of  the  new  law  in 
all  of  its  bearings.  The  operation  and  effects  of  the  new  law  in 
respect  to  mobilization  and  muster  in  were  still  less  well  known  to 
mustering  officers  and  State  officials.  Some  mistakes  were  made  but 
as  a  rule  where  quick  decisions  had  to  be  made  by  mustering  officers 
correct  judgment  was  displayed. 

The  second  call  was  made  to  include  both  the  National  Guard  and 
the  Organized  Militia,  since  the  latter  had  not  in  all  cases  been  con- 
verted into  the  former  and  as  it  was  held  that  the  old  law  had  not 
been  superseded  or  impaired  by  the  new  law  in  respect  to  the  obli- 
gations contracted  under  the  old  to  perform  Federal  service  under  a 
call  of  the  President.  Under  this  ruling  members  of  the  Organized 
Militia  were  held  to  service  under  the  call  regardless  of  whether  or 
not  they  had  taken  the  new  oath.  A  few  mustering  officers  and  State 
officials  made  the  mistake  of  assuming  that  a  member  of  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  might  release  himself  from  service  under  the  call  by  re- 
fraining from  taking  the  new  oath. 

Some  confusion  was  caused  by  efforts  made  to  change  State  mobili- 
zation points  after  the  call  was  made.  Experience  also  shows  that 
a  number  of  mobilization  points  were  not  well  suited  to  the  purpose. 
The  small  number  of  distributing  points  for  quartermaster  supplies 
caused  congestion  and  delay  in  the  delivering  of  quartermaster  sup- 
plies at  mobilization  points,  but  the  greatest  handicap  was  the  lack 
of  reserve  supplies  from  which  to  equip  the  militia.  Sufficient  funds 
had  never  been  appropriated  to  completely  equip  the  militia  and  ac- 
cumulate a  reserve  necessary  for  mobilization.1  The  Ordnance  De- 
partment, however,  had  on  hand  sufficient  arms  and  equipment  to 
meet  the  demand  except  in  the  matter  of  machine  guns. 

The  demand  for  additional  troops  on  the  border  being  urgent,  de- 
partment commanders  were  directed  to  expedite  the  muster  in,  and 
to  send  organizations  to  the  border  as  soon  as  they  could  be  made 
ready.  This  injunction,  along  with  the  desire  of  the  National  Guard 
officers  and  men  to  make  a  good  showing  caused  some  undue  haste. 
The  necessary  physical  examinations  after  muster  in  were  slighted 
in  some  organizations,  and  it  is  reported  that  the  first  units  to  arrive 
on  the  border  were  incompletely  equipped  and  almost  destitute  of 
proper  records.  The  muster-in  process  was  unduly  prolonged  in 
other  States  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  recruits  necessary 
to  fill  up  organizations  to  the  required  minimum  strength.  The  list- 
ing of  property  and  its  transfer  from  State  to  Federal  service  and  the 
preparation  of  the  necessary  rolls  and  records  pertaining  to  muster 
in  were  difficult  problems  for  all  concerned.  The  difficulties  were  in- 
creased through  the  inability  of  the  War  Department  to  supply  the 
necessary  blank  forms  when  required. 

The  duties  and  work  incident  to  muster  in  and  the  distractions  at 
and  near  mobilization  camps  were  unfavorable  to  good  instruction, 
and  little  was  accomplished  except  in  the  matter  of  recruit  instruc- 
tion. Upon  arrival  at  the  border,  instruction  was  undertaken  in  a 
serious  and  systematic  way  under  the  direction  of  district  com- 

1  See  remarks  of  Quartermaster  General,  U.  S.  A.,  under  heading  of  "  Shipment  of  re- 
serve supplies  to  mobilization  points." 


INTRODUCTORY.  5 

manders.  Regular  officers  were  detached  from  their  own  commands 
as  instructors  and  drill  schedules  were  adopted  calling  for  instruc- 
tion periods  of  from  four  to  six  hours  daily.  Some  advance  was 
made,  but  the  lack  of  proper  individual  training  and  the  limitations 
of  the  National  Guard  officers  were  serious  obstacles  to  progress. 

The  transportation  of  the  National  Guard  to  the  border  by  rail 
was  accomplished  expeditiously  and  without  serious  accident,  incon- 
venience, or  privation  to  those  transported.  Up  to  date  156,414  have 
been  transported  to  the  border  and  47,707  have  been  returned  for 
muster  out.  Reported  instances  of  lack  of  food  and  water  on  troop 
trains  have,  when  confirmed,  been  found  to  be  due  to  the  inexperi- 
ence of  National  Guard  officers  in  taking  care  of  their  own  men.  A 
few  cases  were  reported  of  depredations  committed  by  members  of 
the  National  Guard  at  stopping  places  along  the  route. 

Inspections  of  National  Guard  organizations  in  the  Federal  service 
were  begun  early  in  the  mobilization  period  for  the  purpose  of  ob- 
taining exact  data  as  to  the  composition  and  state  of  training  of 
these  units.  All  the  reports  have  not  been  received,  but  data  has 
been  obtained  from  this  source  which  may  be  considered  as  important 
evidence  concerning  the  merits  of  the  National  Guard  system. 

The  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  and  its  dispatch  to  the 
border  was  a  great  accomplishment,  involving  a  multitude  of  details 
and  the  cooperation  of  numerous  officers,  agents,  and  officials,  who 
gave  to  the  task  their  best  efforts.  Whatever  mistakes  were  made 
were  those  of  judgment  and  not  of  purpose.  Undoubtedly  the  imme- 
diate purpose  of  the  call  was  attained.  It  may  not  be  too  much  to  say 
that  the  knowledge  and  experience  gained  from  the  mobilization  are 
incidental  advantages  worth  the  cost. 

The  mobilization  was  the  outcome  of  a  national  emergency  de- 
manding extra  military  service  beyond  that  which  could  be  furnished 
by  the  Regular  Army.  The  call  for  the  National  Guard  occurred 
just  in  time  to  put  in  operation  the  provisions  of  the  new  law  under 
which  the  National  Guard  is  to  be  paid  in  time  of  peace  by  the  Fed- 
eral Government,  and  is  to  be  relied  upon  for  Federal  service  when- 
ever that  service  may  be  required.  Under  the  law  the  National  Guard 
had  precedence.  The  Regular  Army  on  the  Mexican  border  could 
be  reenforced  in  no  other  way. 

The  physical  examination  at  the  muster  in  to  Federal  service 
eliminated  the  physically  unfit.  The  muster  also  disclosed  that  a 
very  considerable  number  of  men  failed  to  respond  to  the  call.  The 
unfit,  and  the  unwilling  who  failed  to  appear,  were  numerous 
enough  to  seriously  deplete  the  strength  on  the  rolls  at  the  date  of 
call,  but  more  than  enough  new  recruits  were  found  to  take  the 
places  thus  made  vacant.  This  accession  of  men  unwilling  to  join 
the  National  Guard  in  time  of  peace  and  impelled  to  enlist  through 
the  prospect  of  a  war  has  given  to  the  National  Guard  in  the  Federal 
service  a  good  deal  of  the  character  of  a  volunteer  force. 

Reluctance  to  serve  when  confronted  with  the  realities  of  military 
life  was  quickly  shown  in  the  large  number  of  resignations  of  offi- 
cers and  applications  for  discharge  by  enlisted  men.  The  desire  for 
release  from  the  service  became  so  extensive  that  a  general  rule  of 
denial  of  such  requests  had  to  be  adopted  by  the  War  Department  in 
spite  of  the  hardships  on  individuals  which  it  was  known  such  a 


6  INTRODUCTORY. 

course  entailed.  The  fact  that  many  individuals  desired  to  be  re- 
leased on  account  of  the  losses  of  position  and  pecuniary  sacrifices 
which  their  military  service  imposed  upon  them  is  less  a  criticism 
of  the  individual  than  it  is  of  the  voluntary  plan  of  military  service. 
While  faithful  service  by  the  National  Guard  has  been  the  rule, 
there  is  much  evidence  to  snow  that  the  duty  on  the  border  was  con- 
sidered irksome,  and  that  many  believed  that  they  had  not  been 
fairly  treated.  The  outspoken  ones  have  assumed  to  judge  and  to 
declare  that  the  emergency  requiring  their  presence  on  the  border 
was  past  and  that  it  was  an  injustice  to  retain  them  longer  in  service, 
forgetting  that  the  duty  of  a  soldier  is  to  perform  the  task  that  is  set 
before  him,  whatever  it  may  be,  and  that  military  ends  are  frequently 
attained  more  by  the  demonstration  than  by.  the  actual  exercise  of 
military  force. 

W.  A.  MANN, 
Brigadier  General,  General  Staff, 

Chief,  Militia  Bureau. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Page. 

Introductory 3 

Text  of  calls  of  the  President  of  May  9  and  June  18 9 

Progress  of  mobilization 12 

Recruiting  for  the  National  Guard;  before  and  after  mobilization. . 12 

Mobilizations  points;  changes  in  mobilization  points  after  the  President's  call, 

etc 21 

Shipment  of  reserve  supplies  to  mobilization  points 25 

The  effect  on  the  personnel  of  oath  required  by  new  defense  act;  legal  effect  of 

refusal  or  neglect  to  take  oath  prescribed  in  new  defense  act 30 

Effect  of  mobilization  on  inspectors  of  small-arms  practice,  Organized  Militia. .  33 
Discharges  from  service  after  mobilization  by  governors  or  State  officials,  and 

failures  to  respond  to  call 34 

Discharge  from  service  after  mobilization  on  account  of  dependent  relatives 40 

Release  from  service  of  students  of  educational  institutions 43 

Discharge  from  service  of  Government  employees  and  employees  of  firms 

engaged  in  fabrication  or  supply  of  munitions 44 

Discharge  from  Federal  service  effects  a  complete  separation  from  the  National 

Guard,  State  as  well  as  Federal  service 45 

Resignations  of  officers 46 

Status  and  disposition  of  National  Guard  reservists  created  by  national  defense 

act;  decisions  of  Judge  Advocate  General 47 

Advantages  of  divisional  organization ^ 48 

Traveling  facilities  supplied  troops  en  route  to  border;  reply  to  complaints 52 

Physical  examinations 53 

Appointment  of  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  to 

commissions  in  the  National  Guard 58 

Report  of  inspection  by  the  assistant  chief  of  staff 59 

Animals  and  means  of  transportation  for  the  National  Guard 64 

Smallpox  vaccination  and  typhoid  prophylaxis 70 

Reports  of  inspectors  general 71 

Deductions  from  statistical  data  secured  by  inspectors  general 94 

Engineers 97 

Signal  troops 99 

Sanitary  troops 99 

Camp  sanitation  and  health  of  the  National  Guard 102 

Notes  of  inspector-instructors  on  work  of  National  Guard  officers  during  mobili- 
zation    103 

Evidences  of  inefficiency 104 

Laxity  in  physical  examinations 106 

Lack  of  training  and  unfitness  for  active  service 114 

Necessity  for  additional  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  at  mobiliza- 
tion points 

Lack  of  knowledge  of  forms,  books,  returns,  etc 

Objections  to  sightseers  and  noncombatants 119 

Value  of  correspondence  schools 119 

Excessive  amount  of  paper  work 

More  time  needed  for  mobilization 122 

Commendation 123 

Reports  of  department  commanders,  etc 125 

Table  of  all  organizations  called  out  and  strength  of  same 143 

Instruction  of  the  National  Guard : - 145 

MISCELLANEOUS. 

List  of  property  short 147 

Muster  out 148 

National  Guard  at  war  strength 149 

What  constitutes  "first-line  troops " 150 

Report  on  National  Guard  along  the  border 151 

Statistics 153 

Extracts  from'  act  of  June  3,  1916 156 

7 


MOBILIZATION    OF   THE    ORGANIZED    MILITIA    AND 
NATIONAL  GUARD  IN  1916. 


The  average  reader  will  perhaps  better  understand  this  subject  if 
divested  of  some  of  its  legal  and  technical  terms,  and  if  we  go  back 
and  refer  briefly  to  the  constitutional  authority  and  to  certain  of  the 
laws  relating  to  this  subject. 

The  principal  constitutional  provisions  are  as  follows : 

A  well-regulated  militia  being  necessary  to  the  security  of  a  free  State,  the 
right  of  the  people  to  keep  and  bear  arms  shall  not  be  infringed.  (Art.  II, 
amendments. ) 

The  Congress  shall  have  power     *     *     * 

To  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union, 
suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions. 

To  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  the  militia  and  for 
governing  such  part  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  reserving  to  the  States,  respectively,  the  appointment  of  the  officers  and 
the  authority  of  training  the  militia  according  to  the  discipline  prescribed  by 
Congress.  (Art.  I,  sec.  8.) 

The  President  shall  be  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  militia  of  the  several  States  when  called  into  the 
actual  service  of  the  United  States.  (Art.  II,  sec.  2.) 

Pursuant  to  this  constitutional  authority,  Congress  in  1792  en- 
acted the  first  militia  law,  which  was  until  1903  the  only  law  relating 
to  the  militia.  It  was  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  however,  in  many 
of  its  provisions  a  dead  letter. 

In  1903  an  act  was  passed  by  Congress  "  to  promote  the  efficiency 
of  the  militia,  and  for  other  purposes,"  popularly  known  as  the  Dick 
bill.  This,  while  falling  short  of  being  an  ideal  law  on  this  subject, 
was  a  long  and  very  decided  step  toward  placing  this  important 
factor  of  our  national  defense  on  a  proper  footing.  By  this  act  the 
militia  was  divided  into  two  classes : 

The  Organized  Militia  to  be  known  as  the  National  Guard  of  the  State,  Terri- 
tory, or  District  of  Columbia,  or  by  such  other  designations  as  may  be  given 
them  by  the  laws  of  the  respective  States  or  Territories ;  the  remainder  to  be 
known  as  the  Reserve  Militia. 

The  subject  of  national  defense  and  "  preparedness "  having  in 
1915  and  1916  become  the  main  issue  of  the  day,  Congress  by  act 
approved  June  3,  1916,  provided,  in  what  is  known  as  the  national 
defense  act,  for  a  complete  reorganization  not  only  of  the  Regular 
Army  but  of  the  Organized  Militia  as  well. 

By  the  terms  of  this  act  the  militia  consists  of  all  able-bodied  male 
citizens  of  the  United  States  and  all  other  able-bodied  males  who 
have  or  shall  have  declared  their  intention  to  become  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  who  shall  be  more  than  18  years  of  age  and,  except 
as  provided  in  the  act,  not  more  than  45  years  of  age,  this  militia 
being  divided  into  three  classes — the  National  Guard,  the  Naval 
Militia,  and  the  Unorganized  Militia. 


10  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED    MILITIA,    ETC. 

The  National  Guard  by  the  terms  of  this  act  consists  of  the  regu- 
larly enlisted  militia  between  the  ages  of  18  and  45  years,  organized, 
armed,  and  equipped  as  provided  in  the  act,  and  of  commissioned 
officers  between  the  ages  of  21  and  64  years.  No  officer  or  enlisted 
man  of  the  National  Guard  of  the  several  States  can,  however,  be 
recognized  as  a  member  of  the  National  Guard  until  he  shall  have 
taken  the  Federal  oath  provided  in  the  national  defense  act.  Until 
this  Federal  oath  was  taken  these  State  forces  were  known  as  the 
Organized  Militia. 

The  national  defense  act  is  referred  to  so  frequently  in  the  follow- 
ing pages  of  this  report,  and  its  exact  wording  is  at  times  so  neces- 
sary to  a  correct  understanding  of  the  subject  under  discussion,  that 
so  much  of  this  law  as  refers  to  the  militia  will  be  found  appended 
to  this  report. 

There  were  two  calls  issued  for  this  mobilization,  viz.  first,  that 
known  as  the  first  call  and  contained  in  telegram  sent  to  the  gover- 
nors of  the  States  of  Texas,  Arizona,  and  New  Mexico  May  9.  1916, 
as  follows: 

Having  in  view  the  possibility  of  further  aggression  upon  the  territory  of  the 
United  States  from  Mexico  and  the  necessity  for  the  proper  protection  of  that 
frontier,  the  President  has  thought  proper  to  exercise  the  authority  vested  in  him 
by  the  Constitution  and  laws  and  call  out  the  Organized  Militia  necessary  for 
that  purpose.  I  am,  in  consequence,  instructed  by  the  President  to  call  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States,  through  you  the  Organized  Militia  of  the 
State  of  [State  designated],  which  the  President  directs  shall  be  concentrated 
at  the  places  designated  by  the  commanding  general,  southern  department, 
now  at  El  Paso,  Tex.,  and  which  he  has  been  directed  to  communicate  to  you. 
Upon  arrival  of  the  Organized  Militia  at  the  designated  places  of  rendezvous 
they  will  be  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  by  officers  of  the 
Regular  Army  designated  for  that  purpose.  Acknowledge. 

NEWTON  D.  BAKER, 

Secretary  of  War. 

Second,  that  known  as  the  second  call,  and  contained  in  telegram  of 
June  18,  addressed  to  the  governors  of  all  States  except  Texas, 
Arizona.  New  Mexico,  and  Nevada,  and  in  form  as  follows: 

Having  in  view  the  possibility  of  further  aggression  upon  the  territory  of 
the  United  States  from  Mexico  and  the  necessity  for  the  proper  protection  of 
that  frontier,  the  President  has  thought  proper  to  exercise  the  authority  vested 
in  him  by  the  Constitution  and  laws  and  call  out  the  Organized  Militia  and 
National  Guard  necessary  for  that  purpose.  I  am,  in  consequence,  instructed 
by.  the  President  to  call  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  forthwith, 
through  you,  the  folowing  units  of  the  Organized  Militia  and  National  Guard 
of  the  State  of  [State  designated],  which  the  President  directs  shall  be  as- 
sembled at  the  State  mobilization  point  [location  named]  for  muster  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States  [units  designated]. 

Organizations  to  be  accepted  into  Federal  service  should  have  the  minimum 
peace  strength  now  prescribed  for  Organized  Militia,  the  maximum  strength 
at  which  organizations  will  be  accepted  and  to  which  they  should  be  raised 
as  soon  as  possible  is  prescribed  in  section  2,  Tables  of  Organization,  United 
States  Army.  In  case  any  regiment,  battalion,  or  squadron  now  recognized  as 
such  contains  an  insufficient  number  of  organizations  to  enable  it  to  conform 
at  muster  to  Regular  Army  Organization  Tables  the  organizations  necessary 
to  complete  such  units  may  be  moved  to  mobilization  camp  and  there  inspected 
under  orders  of  the  department  commander  to  determine  fitness  for  recogni- 
tion as  Organized  Militia  by  the  War  Department.  Circular  19,  Division  of 
Militia  Affairs,  1914,  prescribes  the  organizations  desired  from  each  State  as 
part  of  the  local  tactical  division,  and  only  these  organizations  will  be  accepted 
into  service.  It  is  requested  that  all  officers  of  the  Adjutant  General's  Depart- 
ment, Quartermaster  Corps,  and  Medical  Corps,  duly  recognized  as  pertain- 
ing to  State  headquarters  under  table  1,  Tables  of  Organization,  Organized 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  11 

Militia,  and  not  elsewhere  required  for  duty  in  State  administration,  be  ordered 
to  camp  for  duty  as  camp  staff  officers.  Such  number  of  these  staff  officers  as 
the  department  commander  may  determine  may  be  mustered  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of  proper  camp  administration,  and  will 
be  mustered  out  when  their  services  are  no  longer  required.  Where  recognized 
brigades  or  divisions  are  called  into  service  from  a  State  and  the  staff  officers 
pertaining  to  these  units  under  Tables  of  Organization,  United  States  Army, 
will  be  mustered  into  service,  and  also  the  authorized  inspectors  of  small-arms 
practice  pertaining  thereto.  Except  for  these  two  purposes  of  mobilization- 
camp  service  and  of  the  prescribed  staff  service  with  tactical  units,  officers  of 
State  headquarters  under  table  1,  above  mentioned,  will  not  be  mustered  into 
service  at  this  time.  If  tactical  divisions  are  later  organized,  the  requisite 
additional  number  of  staff  officers  writh  rank  as  prescribed  for  divison  staff 
will,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  called  into  service  from  those  States  which  have 
furnished  troops  to  such  divisions.  Acknowledge. 

NEWTON  D.  BAKER, 

Secretary  of  War. 

In  making  these  calls  the  units  were  selected  with  reference  to  the 
making  up  of  complete  divisions  after  arrival  at  the  border  concentra- 
tion camps.  Therefore  not  all  the  State  troops  were  designated; 
those  left  behind  were  mostly  Infantry.  The  call  included  practically 
all  the  serviceable  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  and  auxiliary  troops, 
these  being  the  branches  in  which  the  State  troops  are  relatively 
weak. 

As  the  States  were  called  upon  to  furnish  so  many  units — regi- 
ments, for  instance — it  naturally  fell  to  the  governors  to  select  the 
particular  units  which  were  to  respond  to  the  call. 

In  some  cases  the  most  efficient  units  were  thus  called  out,  but  in 
others  those  named  were,  as  shown  by  the  records  of  the  Militia 
Bureau,  the  least  efficient. 

The  excitement  at  the  moment  was  high,  and  the  desire  to  get  to 
the  front  was  general,  and  w<here,  due  to  local  or  political  considera- 
tions, any  but  the  most  efficient  units  were  called  out,  the  result  was 
disappointing,  not  only  as  a  discouragement  to  those  of  the  better 
organizations  not  mobilized,  but  the  Federal  Government  thus  failed 
to  get  the  best  the  State  was  able  to  produce.  This  is  mentioned  as 
simply  one  of  the  many  disadvantages  inherent  in  a  system  of  dual 
control,  the  Federal  Government  being  the  loser. 

Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  United  States  Mustering  Regula- 
tions of  1914,  mustering  districts  were  established  by  the  War  De- 
partment each  consisting  of  a  State  within  which  the  place  of 
mobilization  previously  designated  by  the  War  Department  the 
militia  were  sent  to  be  examined,  organized,  and  mustered  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States. 

For  each  geographical  department  a  chief  mustering  officer  and  the 
necessary  assistant  mustering  officers,  together  with  such  officers  of 
the  medical  and  other  staff  departments  as  were  required,  were  de- 
tailed by  the  department  commander  who  has  by  paragraph  454, 
Army  Regulations,  charge  of  all  matters  pertaining  to  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  the  Organized  Militia  in  his  territorial  department  and  has 
as  a  member  of  the  department  staff  an  officer  in  charge  of  militia 
affairs,  and  by  the  regulation  above  quoted  all  officers  on  militia  or 
college  duty  in  a  State  affected  by  the  call  automatically  come  under 
the  orders  of  the  department  commander,  and  were  available  there- 
fore for  detail  as  mustering  officers. 


12 


California 2,  090 

Connecticut 1,  764 

Illinois 4,  608 

Kansas 1, 151 

Maine 1,  043 

Massachusetts 5,  636 

Missouri 1,  641 


PROGRESS  OF  MOBILIZATION. 

The  first  militia  organization  of  the  call  of  June  18  to  reach  the 
border  was  the  First  Illinois  Infantry,  which  left  Springfield  10.15 
p.  m.  June  28  to  12.20  a.  m.  June  29,  arriving  at  San  Antonio  5.30 
p.  m.  June  30  to  12.15  a.  m.  July  1. 

At  midnight  July  4  troops  from  the  following-named  States  had 
reached  their  border  stations: 

New  Jersey 1,  552 

New  York 3,  388 

Oregon 1,  415 

Pennsylvania 1,  613 

Utah 148 

Vermont 906 

Washington 205 

The  longest  distance  was  traveled  by  Connecticut  troops,  2,916 
miles.  The  shortest  distance  was  traveled  by  Louisiana  troops,  608 
miles. 

When  we  remember  that  the  air-line  distance  from  Paris  to  Berlin 
is  only  about  650  miles,  we  are  afforded  a  means  of  comparison  be- 
tween distances  connected  with  our  recent  concentration  and  those 
which  obtain  abroad. 

RECRUITING  FOR  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD;  BEFORE  AND  AFTER 

MOBILIZATION. 

In  August,  1915,  recommendation  came  from  the  adjutant  gen- 
eral of  one  of  the  States  recommending  that  the  War  Department 
"  prescribe  and  require  a  certain  method  of  recruiting  in  time  of  war 
to  be  adopted  by  the  militia  while  they  are  still  a  State  force,  and 
further  to  outline  and  put  into  effect  a  plan  to  be  folloAved  when  the 
militia  becomes  a  United  States  force." 

Much  of  this  problem,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  time  of  war,  was  subse- 
quently solved  in  the  law  embodied  in  section  79  of  the  act  of  Con- 
gress approved  June  3,  1916,  which,  under  certain  conditions,  directs 
that  a  draft  be  made  on  the  unorganized  militia  for  the  purpose  of 
keeping  reserve  battalions  at  the  proper  strength  with  the  ultimate 
purpose  of  transferring  men  from  these  battalions  to  organizations 
in  the  field  that  the  latter  may  be  maintained  at  war  strength. 

This  provision,  however,  is  inoperative  except  in  time  of  war — dur- 
ing all  other  conditions  it  is  still  a  problem  to  be  dealt  with. 

A  memorandum  on  "  Recruiting  for  the  Organized  Militia  *'  was 
(Aug.  25,  1915)  prepared  for  the  Chief  of  Staff  by  the  Chief  of  the 
War  College  Division  and  referred  to  the  Chief,  Division  of  Militia 
Affairs,  for  comment.  This  comment  by  the  Chief,  Militia  Bureau, 
was  given  in  a  letter  (Sept.  4,  1915)  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  covers 
the  views  held  in  the  Militia  Bureau  so  completely  that  it  is  here 
given  in  full : 

1.  The  memorandum  on  the  above  subject  prepared  by  the  Chief  of  the  War 
College  Division,  under  date  of  August  25,  1915,  having  been  referred  to  me 
for  comment,  I  beg  to  submit  the  following : 

2.  The  War  Department  now  sets  up  certain  standards  in  matters  of  organiza- 
tion, armament,  and  discipline,  and  requires  the  Organized  Militia  to  conform  to 
these  standards  in  order  to  be  entitled  to  certain  funds  appropriated  by  the 
Federal  Government.    The  War  Department  sets  up  other  standards,  to  which  it 
advises  the  States  to  conform,  without  exacting  any  penalty  for  noncompliance. 


MOBILIZATION   OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  13 

3.  The  adjutant  general  of  Massachusetts  writes  that  his  State  law  provides 
for  a  State  recruiting  system  that  he  considers  unsatisfactory.     He  says  that, 
notwithstanding  this  State  law,  he  can  put  into  effect  any  recruiting  system 
required  by  the  War  Department.    It  is  believed  he  has  reference  to  a  provision 
of  Massachusetts  law  providing  for  general  conformity  to  Federal  standards. 

4.  Aside  from  this  Massachusetts  case,   it  is  desirable  that  the  Organized 
Militia  be  instructed  now  in  the  recruiting  system  they  will  have  to  adopt  when 
called  into  the  United  States  service.     It  is  desirable  that  the  system  used  in 
State  service  be  as  much  like  this  Federal  system  as  possible.     If  the  War  De- 
partment publishes  now  an  order  explaining  the  recruiting  system  to  be  put 
into  effect  when  the  Organized  Militia  is  in  the  United  States  service,  it  is  be- 
lieved that  the  States  will  voluntarily  adopt  such  system,  as  far  as  practicable, 
for  use  for  State  purposes. 

5.  It  is  the  understanding  of  this  office : 

(a)  That  the  Organized  Militia  is  in  the  United  States  service  from  .the  time 
of  its  appearance  at  the  place  of  company  rendezvous.  (See  Opinion,  Judge 
Advocate  General,  June  18,  1915.) 

(&)  That  while  the  Organized  Militia  is  in  the  United  States  service,  recruit- 
ing is  conducted  not  by  the  State  but  by  the  War  Department. 

(c)  That  existing  orders  providing  for  the  recruitment  of  the  Regular  Army 
do  not  fully  provide  for  conditions  that  may  arise  in  the  recruitment  of  the 
Organized  Militia  in  the  United  States  service. 

6.  As  illustrating  the  character  of  recruiting  problems  to  be  solved,  the  fol- 
lowing situations  are  presented  : 

(a)  With  the  appearance  of  each  unit  at  its  company  rendezvous,  recruiting 
to  war  strength  will  presumably  begin.  Federal  blank  forms  will  be  needed. 
How  will  these  be  supplied  and  how  will  the  recruiting  officers  be  instructed  in 
their  use? 

(&)  In  view  of  the  large  number  of  recruits  to  be  secured,  it  will  probably 
be  necessary  for  each  company  of  a  regiment  to  do  its  own  recruiting.  A.  R. 
840  provides  for  recruiting  by  regiment  or  post  only. 

(c)  If  a  unit  not  fully  recruited  is  ordered  to  its  mobilization  camp,  will  it 
leave  a  detachment  behind  to  get  additional  recruits?    Who  will  compose  such 
detachment?  How  will  the  recruiting  officer  learn  his  duties?  The  memorandum 
of  the  War   College  Division  suggests  that  these  matters  be  provided  for  in  the 
order  or  proclamation  calling  the  militia  forth.    Would  it  not  be  better  to  give 
these  instructions  now? 

(d)  The  act  of  April  25,  1914,  provides  for  recruit  rendezvous  and  depots. 
Who  compose  the  personnel  of  these  establishments?    What  methods  do  they 
apply  in  regard  to  recruiting,  training  recruits,  disbursing  public  funds,  etc.? 
How  do  they  learn  their  duties? 

7.  It  is  again  recommended  that  an  order  be  issued  covering,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible,  the  details  of  the  recruiting  system  to  be  put  into  effect  when   vol- 
unteers are  raised,  or  the  Organized  Militia  called  into  the  United  States  service. 
Confusion  must  result  if  the  issue  of  these  instructions  is  delayed  until  the 
emergency  occurs. 

8.  It  is  believed  that  the  blank  forms  incidental  to  recruiting  and  muster  in 
should  be  issued  to  the  States  and  the  cost  charged  against  their  allotments. 
And  it  is  thought  that  mobilization  exercises  should  be  frequently  held  as  a 
part  of  routine  armory  training. 

A.  L.  MILLS, 
Brigadier  General,  General  Staff. 

It  was  decided  in  January,  1916,  that  the  United  States  may  pro- 
ceed to  recruit  Organized  Militia  in  the  service  of  the  United  States 
without  reference  to  the  wishes  of  the  individual  States  concerned. 

In  consequence  of  the  above  it  was  decided  that  paragraph  36  of 
the  Mustering  Eegulations  should  hereafter  read  as  follows : 

Where  a  State  fails  to  supply  recruits  necessary  to  maintain  its  militia  organi- 
zations in  the  service  of  the  United  States  at  the  prescribed  strength,  recruits 
may  be  enlisted  or  reenlisted  in  the  manner  provided  for  enlistment  and  re- 
enlstment  in  Section  2  of  the  Volunteer  Army  act  of  April  25,  1914. 

The  object  desired,  of  course,  was  to  get  recruits  promptly  and  with 
as  little  effort  and  expense  as  possible,  and  to  assist  the  States  in 


14  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

this  matter  the  Chief  of  Staff  approved,  on  April  1,  1916,  of  the  rec- 
ommendation of  the  Chief  of  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  that 
there  be  printed  and  issued  to  the  militia  a  circular  to  include  in  one 
pamphlet  all  available  information  on  recruiting  and  on  the  physical 
examination  of  recruits.  This  was  issued  in  the  shape  of  Circular 
No.  5,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  April  6,  1916. 

The  next  step  taken  was  on  May  26,  1916,  when  the  Secretary  of 
War  approved  of  a  plan  for  Federal  recruiting  in  case  of  the  Texas 
National  Guard  then  in  Federal  service,  instead  of  same  being  con- 
ducted by  State  authorities. 

About  a  month  later  (June  23)  the  following  letter  was  addressed 
by  the  Chief,  Militia  Bureau,  to  the  adjutants  general  of  the  several 
States  and  of  the  District  cf  Columbia : 

The  Secretary  of  War  desires  Unit  the  following  loiter  of  May  20,  1916,  to 
the  governor  of  Texas,  which  is  self-explanatory  as  to  its  purpose,  be  brought  to 
the  attention  of  the  governor,  to  the  end  that  prompt  and  practical  measures 
for  recruiting  can  be  at  once  initiated  and  maintained  with  the  cooperation  and 
assistance  of  the  State  authorities : 

"Among  the  problems  confronting  us  in  connection  with  the  induction  into 
United  States  service  of  the  Organised  Militia  recently  called  forth  is  that  of 
their  proper  recruitment  and  maintenance  at  authorized  strength  while  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States. 

"Your  excellency  appreciates,  I  am  sure,  the  legal  questions  and  difficulties 
which  arise  under  such  circumstances.  It  is  practically  impossible  under  the 
existing  system  and  the  existing  law  to  draw  clear-cut  lines  of  demarcation 
which  will  define  in  every  case  the  responsibility  of  the  State  as  contrasted  to 
the  responsibility  of  the  Federal  Government.  The  efficient  administration  of 
troops  requires,  it  seems  to  me,  that  such  questions  lie  approached  and  settled 
in  a  spirit  of  cooperation  between  the  State  and  National  Government,  with  the 
sole  idea  of  securing  efficiency  by  practical  and  prompt  action. 

"  Gen.  Funston,  commanding  the  Southern  Department,  has  telegraphed  to 
the  War  Department  requesting  instructions  as  to  his  proper  procedure  in  order 
to  raise  the  Organized  Militia  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  to  the  desired 
strength.  Appreciating  the  fact  that  your  administrative  officers  are  busily 
occupied  and  that  State  agencies  for  recruiting  would  no  doubt  need  to  be 
organized  anew,  and  with  the  further  desire  to  avoid  unnecessary  expense.  I 
have  directed  that  the  Federal  recruiting  agencies  be  utilized  for  recruiting  for 
the  Organized  Militia  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  and  that  the  necessary 
instructions  be  issued  at  once  to  that  effect,  in  order  that  the  proper  strength 
may  be  promptly  reached. 

"  In  this  connection  it  is  hoped  that  the  State  authorities  may  see  fit  to  lend 
any  assistance  to  the  recruiting  parties  which  may  facilitate  their  efforts. 

"  Trusting  that  we  shall  secure  from  this  action  the  results  we  both  desire,  I 
remain,  my  dear  governor, 

"  Very  truly,  yours.  NEWTON  D.  BAKER, 

"•Secretary  of  War." 

A.  L.  MILLS, 
Brigadier  General,  General  Staff. 

Telegraphic  instructions  on  .July  4  were  issued  as  follows  to  the 
commanding  generals  of  the  Central  and  Southern  Departments : 

Reference  to  telegram  to  you  that  recruiting  for  militia  in  United  States 
service  will  be  conducted  by  Federal  agencies  in  cooperation  with  State  au- 
thorities, it  is  intended,  first,  that  recruiting  shall  be  done  by  officers  in  Federal 
service,  either  Regulars  or  National  Guardsmen  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States;  second,  that  recruits  accepted  shall  take  new  oath,  and  no  further  act 
is  required  to  make  them  members  of  organizations  for  which  enlisted ;'  third. 
that  recruits  shall  then  be  sent  by  recruiting  officers  to"  designated  camps  of 
instruction,  which,  in  some  cases,  will  be  convenient  Army  posts,  with  the  view 
of  saving  transportation  and  utilizing  available  administrative  machinery.  The 
provisions  of  section  79,  national-defense  act,  and  the  methods  to  be  pursued 
when  joint  resolution  242,  authorizing  a  draft,  becomes  effective  have  been 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED    MILITIA,   ETC.  15 

under  consideration  for  some  time  by  the  Judge  Advocate  General  and  you  will 
be  promptly  advised  when  final  conclusion  is  reached  as  to  the  methods  to  be 
pursued.  Pending  this  information  you  may  utilize  the  services  of  such  officers 
and  men  of  the  National  Guard  already  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States  and  still  within  the  limits  of  your  department  for  recruiting  purposes  as 
may  seem  desirable.  Civilian  physicians  may  be  engaged  to  make  the  prescribed 
physical  examinations  when  necessary,  as  indicated  in  paragraph  20,  Mustering 
Regulations,  Organized  Militia. 

MCCAIN. 

The  attention  of  the  Militia  Bureau  having  been  called  by  the 
adjutant  general  of  Georgia  to  the  fact  that  in  his  State  there  was 
already  a  carefully  prepared  plan  of  State  recruitment,  the  Chief, 
Militia  Bureau,  011  July  o  recommended  that  "  plans  already  made  by 
any  State  for  recruiting  for  organizations  before  their  actual  muster 
into  the  United  States  service  should  not  be  disturbed,  subject  to  the 
single  provision  that  officers  and  enlisted  men,  Organized  Militia, 
of  such  recruiting  parties,  must,  under  the  law,  present  themselves 
for'  muster  and  can  not  for  that  reason  be  absent  at  home  station 
on  recruiting  duty  when  the  time  appointed  for  such  muster  arrives." 

The  next  step  taken  was  on  July  11,  when  a  telegram  was  sent  to 
the  adjutants  general  of  all  States  except  Arizona,  Nevada,  New 
Mexico,  and  Texas,  as  follows: 

To  provide  proper  recruiting  agencies  for  the  National  Guard  now  in  tne 
service  of  the  United  States,  adjutants  general  of  States  will  submit  by  tele- 
graph names  of  well-qualified  National  Guard  officers  at  rate  of  three  for  each 
regiment  and  one  for  each  separate  battalion  or  other  separate  unit  now  in 
service  of  the  United  States  with  a  view  to  their  muster  into  United  States 
service  as  recruiting  officers.  Officers  so  named  will  not  be  above  the  grades  of 
major,  they  should  be  willing  to  serve,  and  should  be  active  members  of  the 
National  Guard  exclusive  of  those  already  mustered  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  as  part  of  State's  contingent  under  President's  call. 

Question  having  arisen  as  to  whether  the  services  of  postmasters 
might  as  provided  in  section  27  of  the  act  of  June  3,  1916,  be  utilized 
in  procuring  the  enlistment  of  recruits,  this  was  answered  in  the 
negative,  us  the  law  reads:  "Recruits  for  the  Army.'' 

Several  of  the  inspector  instructors  have  pointed  out  the  fact  that 
recruiting  was  most  brisk  \\hen  companies  were  at  their  home  towns 
and  excitement  was  high. 

After  the  duties  of  recruiting  for  the  National  Guard  were  taken 
over  by  the  Federal  service,  the  number  of  enlistments,  as  shown  by 
the  enlistment  papers  sent  to  The  Adjutant  General's  Office,  was: 

In  June  prior  to  the  second  call 75 

From  June  18  to  July  1 2, 109 

During  the  month  of  July 4,877 

During  the  month  of  August 3,  793 

During  the  month  of  September 1,330 

During  the  month  of  October 2,923 


Total 15,107 

To  go  back  and  cite  a  few  of  the  local  conditions  existing  earlier 
in  the  year: 

In  February  last  it  was  realized  by  those  connected  with  the  Na- 
tional Guard  of  New  York  that  a  call  on  the  National  Guard  was 
probable,  and  strenuous  efforts  were  made,  particularly  in  the  two 
Buffalo  regiments,  to  recruit  to  the  proper  strength.  A  committee  in 
charge  of  the  work  was  maintained  by  the 'recruiting  office  for  more 
than  a  month  in  one  of  the  principal  office  buildings  in  Buffalo. 


16  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

Manufacturers,  business  men,  professional  men,  and  all  newspapers 
supported  the  movement  to  the  fullest  extent,  lending  financial  aid 
and  much  free  advertising  to  the  movement,  which  was  terminated 
by  a  mass  meeting  attended  by  between  4,000  and  5,000  people. 

The  results  of  the  campaign  were,  however,  not  as  satisfactory  as 
was  hoped  for ;  the  Seventy-fourth  Regiment  was  increased  from  649 
on  February  7  to  678  on  March  31,  and  the  Sixty-fifth  Infantry  in 
the  same  period  increased  its  strength  from  469  to  720.  Recruiting 
dodgers  were  widely  distributed  by  the  recruiting  committee,  but 
these  were  met  by  antipreparedness  dodgers  widely  distributed  by 
the  leaders  of  labor  unions  and  Socialists  of  Buffalo,  in  order  to 
combat  the  efforts  of  the  National  Guard  in  their  recruiting  cam- 
paign. The  opposition  of  the  labor  unions  and  Socialists  is  undoubt- 
edly one  of  the  principal  causes  of  the  small  strength  of  the  Buffalo 
regiments. 

Somewhat  later  similar  efforts  were  made  in  Greater  New  York, 
and  .for  the  week  ending  May  13,  443  recruits  were  secured ;  for  that 
ending  May  20,  511 ;  and  for  that  ending  May  26,  538,  making  an 
aggregate  of  1,492,  or  an  increment  of  about  15  per  cent  to  the  en- 
listed strength. 

Another  instance  of  the  strenuous  though  unsuccessful  efforts  to 
secure  recruits  is  shown  by  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Massachusetts, 
where  there  were  on  July  28  no  less  than  20  recruiting  parties,  each 
consisting  of  an  officer.,  a  sergeant,  a  corporal,  and  a  private,  mustered 
in  and  sent  out  to  stations  at  various  points  in  the  State. 

On  August  26,  however,  the  senior  assistant  mustering  officer  in 
Massachusetts  reported  that  they  had  enlisted  only  130  men.  He 
reported  at  the  same  time  that  of  1,000  or  1,100  members  of  the  Or- 
ganized Militia  who  declined  to  take  the  new  Federal  oath,  only  278 
had  reported  for  muster  in  and  100  of  those  had  submitted  applica- 
tions for  discharge  on  account  of  dependent  relatives. 

A  report  from  Capt.  -        — ,  Signal  Corps,  National  Guard  of 

,  who  was  ordered  in  September  from  the  Southern  Depart- 
ment to  —  — ,  for  the  purpose  of  recruiting  men  necessary  to  ex- 
pand his  company  into  a  signal  battalion,  illustrates  the  difficulties 
encountered  in  securing  recruits.  The  following  is  an  extract  from 
his  report: 

I  arrived  in  -  — .  I  found  a  condition  very  unfavorable  to  recruiting. 
Men  who  were  anxious  to  rush  to  the  border  with  troops  on  June  19,  the 
day  the  National  Guard  was  called,  now  considered  the  uncertainty  of  the 
situation  and  refused  to  join.  On  that  date  I  had  several  hundred  experienced 
electricians  and  telegraphers  tentatively  organized  into  signal  companies,  and 
with  prospective  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  assigned.  For  nearly 
two  months  scores  of  these  men  met  each  week  and  drilled.  They  believed 
we  were  going  into  Mexico  and  they  wanted  to  see  service.  September  26 
the  situation  was  entirely  changed.  Public  sentiment,  in  fact,  seemed  to  be 
unfavorable  to  the  military  service  and  especially  as  to  doing  duty  under 
present  conditions  on  the  Mexican  border.  The  newspapers  of  -  — ,  either 
purposely  or  unwittingly,  seemed  to  seek  every  opportunity  to  fire  the  prejudice 
of  the  people  and  especially  the  tradesmen  to  whom  we  were  forced  to  appeal 
for  the  character  of  men  needed  in  the  Signal  Corps.  The  threatened  strike 
of  the  railway  trainmen,  which  had  just  been  settled,  hurt  our  cause.  Nearly 
10,000  National  Guardsmen  had  been  called  from  the  border  when  that  strike 
was  imminent.  Another  strike  at  that  time  was  also  pending.  Then,  too, 
on  the  very  day  I  arrived  in  —  — ,  the  —  -  Infantry,  with  its  home  station 
at  —  — ,  was  mustered  out  and  the  newspapers  carried  great  scare-head 
columns  declaring  that  the  authorities  had  refused  to  transport  these  men 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,    ETC.  17 

from  the  mobilization  point  to  their  homes.  For  days  disgruntled  officers 
and  sore-headed  men  went  ahout  the  streets  and  to  public  places  heroically 
lying  ahout  the  terrible  hardships  they  tried  to  make  people  believe  they 
had  bravely  endured.  Letters  and  interviews  of  this  character  were  published 
in  the  papers. 

However,  after  all  this  effort,  the  authority  for  expansion  of  the 
Signal  Corps  Company  into  a  battalion  was,  by  reason  of 


the  return  of  -  -  troops  from  the  border,  revoked  and  the  men 
recruited  were  ordered  discharged. 

These  unsatisfactory  efforts  at  recruiting  received,  when  the  call 
was  made  June  18,  a  further  setback  by  the  failures  to  respond  to 
the  call  and  by  the  failures  to  pass  the  physical  examination  after 
muster-in,  which  is  discussed  at  length  elsewhere  in  this  report. 

The  requirement  (as  well  as  necessity)  of  increasing  to  war 
strength  all  organizations  called  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States  made  a  still  further  and  very  urgent  demand  for  recruits, 
which  the  Militia  Bureau  attempted  to  meet  by  reserve  battalions 
under  section  79  of  the  act  of  June  3,  1916,  but  the  Judge  Advocate 
General  decided  that  such  units  could  be  formed  only  in  time  of  war. 

The  following,  pertaining  to  the  general  subject  of  recruiting  for 
the  National  Guard,  are  extracts  from  reports  of  inspector-instruc- 
tors. The  brief  extracts  make  somewhat  disconnected  reading,  but 
they  are  interesting  and  valuable  as  throwing  side  lights  on  this  gen- 
eral subject  from  many  trained  observers  engaged  in  mustering  duty 
in  widely  separated  sections  of  the  country. 

These  extracts  convey  also  an  idea  of  the  difficulties  which  the 
mustering  officers  have  experienced  and  the  perplexing  problems; 
presented  for  their  solution  while  working  to  the  limit  of  human 
endurance  in  transforming  State  into  Federal  troops. 

The  troops  in  this  State  have  received  no  encouragement  from  the  local 
newspapers.  Their  articles  have  been  such  as  to  practically  stop  recruiting. 

It  is  believed  that  some  men  who  are  now  absent  without  leave  have  de- 
serted as  a  result  of  the  articles  that  these  papers  wrote  when  these  two 
battalions  were  not  moved  to  the  border  as  soon  as  mustered  in. 

It  is  also  believed  that  desertions  will  be  numerous  unless  they  are  sent 
to  the  border  at  an  early  date. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  U.  M. 
Diller,  Inf.,  inspector-instructor,  N.  G.  of  -  — ,  July  17,  1916.) 

The  State  newspapers  are  telling  the  people  that  the  trouble  with  Mexico 
is  over,  that  the  regiment  will  never  see  active  service  and  may  not  leave  its 
present  camp.  No  recruits  are  presenting  themselves. —  (Extract  from  report 

of  First  Lieut.  James  YV.  Everington,  Inf.,  inspector-instructor,  N.  G.  of , 

July  22,  1916.) 

HARRY  RICE,  SOCIALIST. — Harry  Rice,  a  socialist  street-corner  orator,  engaged 
in  distributing  a  printed  circular  (copy  inclosed),  handed  a  circular  to  Second 
Lieut.  R.  M.  Robinson,  battalion  quartermaster  and  commissary,  First  Infantry, 
on  duty  near  the  St.  Paul  armory  as  recruiting  officer;  Lieut.  Robinson  promptly 
arrested  Rice  and  turned  him  over  to  the  St.  Paul  police;  attorneys  for  the  city, 
State,  and  United  States  are  looking  up  the  laws  with  a  view  to  the  manvs 
punishment.  Later  it  was  learned  that  he  was  being  prosecuted  for  obstructing 
and  interfering  with  a  National  Guard  officer  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty. — 
(Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Col.  Arthur  Johnson,  Inf.,  inspector-instructor 
N.  G.  of  -  — ,  June  21,  1916.) 

[Copy  of  printed  circular.] 

YOUNG  MEN  :  The  lowest  aim  in  your  life  is  to  become  a  soldier.  The  good 
soldier  never  tries  to  distinguish  right  from  wrong.  He  never  thinks;  never 
reasons ;  he  only  obeys.  If  he  is  ordered  to  fire  on  his  fellow  citizens,  on  his 
friends,  on  his  neighbors,  on  his  relatives,  he  obeys  without  hesitation.  If  he  is- 

72031—16 2 


18  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

ordered  to  fire  down  a  crowded  street  when  the  poor  are  clamoring  for  bread, 
he  obeys,  and  sees  the  gray  hairs  of  age  stained  with  red  and  the  life  tide  gush- 
ing from  the  breasts  of  women,  feeling  neither  remorse  nor  sympathy.  If  he 
is  ordered  off  as  a  firing  squad  to  execute  a  hero  or  benefactor,  he  fires  without 
hesitation,  though  he  knows  the  bullets  will  pierce  the  noblest  heart  that  ever 
beat  in  human  breast. 

A  good  soldier  is  a  blind,  heartless,  soulless,  murderous  machine.  He  is  not 
a  man.  He  is  not  a  brute,  for  brutes  only  kill  in  self-defense.  All  that  is  human 
in  him,  all  that  is  divine  in  him,  all  that  constitutes  the  man  has  been  sworn 
away  when  he  took  the  enlistment  roll.  His  mind,  his  conscience,  aye,  his  very 
soul,  are  in  the  keeping  of  his  officer. 

No  man  can  fall  lower  than  a  soldier — it  is  a  depth  beneath  which  we  can  not 
go.  Keep  the  boys  out  of  the  Army.  It  is  hell. 

Down  with  the  Army  and  the  Navy.  We  don't  need  killing  institutions.  We 
need  life-giving  institutions. 

By  JACK  LONDON. 

The  governor  of  the  State  was  without  the  State  on  the  date  of  the  order  for 
mobilization,  but  returned  on  June  20,  1916,  and  took  charge  of  the  recruiting 
for  the  regiment.  This  was  conducted  in  a  very  haphazard  manner.  Officers, 
whose  services  could  have  been  used  at  their  home  stations,  were  ordered  into 

and  then  ordered  back  to  their  home  stations;  other  officers  were  sent 

out  to  other  towns;  in  many  cases  officers  ordered  to  return  to  —  —  within 
24  hours  after  their  arrival  at  the  town  ordered  to.  Civilians  were  given  letters 
of  appointment  as  "  recruiting  officers "  for  the  National  Guard  of  -  — . 
These  men  apparently  proceeded  to  send  in  any  male  who  desired  a  trip  to 
the  mobilization  point. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Garber,  inspector- 
instructor  on  N.  G.  of .) 

So  far  as  I  can  learn  officers  and  men  are  very  pessimistic  as  to  being  able 
to  secure  recruits  for  their  regiments.  Practically  no  recruits  are  being  received 
here  at  present. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  James  G.  Mcllroy,  Inf., 
inspector-instructor,  N.  G.  of ,  August  12,  1916.) 

Seventeen  officers,  largely  physical  rejects,  were  mustered  for  recruiting  duty 
in  this  State,  but  were  soon  mustered  out,  having  accomplished  nothing.  The 
names  of  other  officers  and  men  now  on  duty  with  regiments  here  have  been 
forwarded  to  Central  Department  for  recruiting  duty. —  (Extract  from  report 
of  Lieut.  Mcllroy,  inspector-instructor  on  N.  G.  of .) 

Great  numbers  of  the  men  were  obviously  physically  and  mentally  unfit  and 
should  never  have  been  brought — young,  anemic,  flat-chested  boys,  18  to  20 
years  of  age,  and  weighing  from  95  to  105  pounds. —  (Extract  from  report  of 
Capt.  Grissinger,  M.  C.  on  N.  G.  of .) 

A  great  deal  of  comment  was  caused  during  the  mobilization  by  the  presenta- 
tion for  muster  in  with  the  consent  of  the  State  authorities  of  36  men  con- 
tingently paroled  from  the  Greendale  Reformatory.  These  men  were  not 
accepted  for  service  and  their  status  for  discharge  raised  questions  very 
difficult  for  solution.  They  were  enlisted  under  the  Organized  Militia  oath  and 
brought  to  Fort  Thomas.  There,  with  the  other  men  of  the  company,  they  took 
the  so-called  "  new  oath,"  when  it  was  found  the  mustering  officer  would  not 
accept  them,  new  muster-in  rolls,  with  their  names  omitted,  were  made  by  the 
company  commander  and  the  papers  with  the  new  oath  and  contract  of  enlist- 
ment to  which  they  had  subscribed  destroyed.  Their  status,  therefore,  was 
difficult  to  define.  The  matter  got  into  the  press,  and  was  an  all-around  un- 
fortunate incident. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Gibson,  inspector-instructor 
on  N.  G.  of-  — ,  Sept.  24.) 

As  indicated  in  my  previous  report,  all  attention  has  been  devoted  to  getting 
men  to  fill  the  regiment.  At  least  two  outsiders  have  been  commissioned  as  a 
reward  for  bringing  in  men.  Two  vacancies  in  the  grade  of  captain  nowr  exist, 
and  it  is  possible  that  similar  or  even  less  proper  considerations  will  enter  into 
the  appointment  of  officers  to  fill  these  places.  Such  action  would  have  a  bad 
effect  on  the  personnel.  Such  has  occurred  already,  and  it  is  unfortunate.  My 
relations  with  the  State  authorities  are  such  that  I  have  felt  free  to  advise 
strongly  against  it. 

Muster  in  of  -  -  troops  does  not  progress  in  a  satisfactory  way,  the 
State  authorities  having  largely  discontinued  efforts  at  recruiting  since  comple- 
tion of  regiment.  The  sanitary  detachment  lacks  a  few  men  and  the  band 
lacks  about  20. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  B.  F.  Ristine,  Inf., 
inspector  instructor,  N.  G.  of  -  — ,  July  26,  1916.) 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC.  19 

Since  about  June  1  all  energies  have  been  devoted  to  getting  men.  Officers 
have  been  taken  away  from  the  regiment,  regardless  of  all  other  considerations 
and  interests,  and  have  been  sent  to  scour  the  State  for  men,  even  going  over  into 
Texas.  When  muster  in  of  companies  was  started  it  was  necessary  to  transfer 
men  from  the  other  companies  to  the  company  to  be  mustered,  and  this  has 
been  continued  and  repeated  until  the  situation  has  become  such  that  no  com- 
pany can  be  said  to  pertain  strictly  to  any  given  locality.  This  it  is  con- 
templated to  correct  by  wholesale  transfers  after  completion  of  the  regimental 
organization.  It  means  that  in  no  company,  even  now,  is  there  the  feeling  that 
the  personnel  is  fixed,  and  that  in  each  company  there  are  many  outsiders  in 
whom  no  considerable  interest  need  be  taken.  In  some  cases  it  has  been  neces- 
sary to  reduce  noncommissioned  officers  for  the  purpose  of  transfer,  and  this 
has  not  tended  toward  good  feeling. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Ristine, 
inspector  instructor,  N.  G.  ,  July  5). 

Since  last  week's  report  the  recruiting  officers  for  war  have  been  ordered  in 
and  State  recruiting  offices  opened  up  by  retired  officers  and  others,  who  are  to 
secure  men  and  forward  them  to  this  camp  at  State  expense  for  enlistment  here. 
During  the  week  the  losses  have  equaled  the  gains,  as  they  have  been  eliminat- 
ing the  men  who  should  never  have  been  enlisted.  They  are  also  discharging  men 
who  have  dependent  families. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Everington,  in- 
spector instructor,  N.  G.  of  —  — ,  July  1.) 

The  adjutant  general,  in  conversation  with  me  this  day,  stated  that  there 
would  be  less  trouble  in  getting  the  required  number  of  men  if  these  troops 
could  be  concentrated  at  Fort  Benjamin  Harrison  and  later  sent  to  the  border, 
but  that  if  kept  indefinitely  in  their  home  towns  the  same  recruiting  troubles 
of  the  past  would  be  repeated  and  interest  probably  quickly  lost.  He  also 
stated  that  recent  instructions  regarding  the  acceptance  of  these  troops  at  the 
armory  at  their  home  station  would  also  cause  embarrassment,  since  all  armory 
rentals  had  been  withdrawn,  now  that  the  organized  troops  had  left  the  State, 
and  this  feature  introduced  difficulties  that  could  be  largely  avoided  if  the 
troops  could  be  concentrated.  Aside  from  these  questions,  it  would  seem  impor- 
tant from  a  standpoint  of  training  (particularly  of  new  units)  if  they  could 
be  concentrated  for  that  purpose  alone. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Clar- 
ence Deems,  jr.,  6th  F.  A.,  inspector  instructor,  N.  G.  of  -  — ,  July  31,  1916. ) 

As  the  troops  were  ordered  to  Texas  on  the  26th  of  June,  there  was  not  time 
for  any  instruction  to  speak  of,  and  many  men  were  taken  only  because  they 
were  uniformed.  As  soon  as  the  troops  left  recruiting  began  to  lessen,  and  as 
the  strength  of  the  companies  leaving  here  was  65  taken  and  about  35  remain- 
ing, I  doubt  if  ever  the  companies  will  be  recruited  to  war  strength.  The 
recruits  left  here  in  camp  will  be  sent  to  their  companies  when  uniformed, 
equipped,  and  have  sufficient  training. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut. 
J.  R.  McGinness,  Inf.,  inspector  instructor,  N.  G.  of ,  July  5,  1916. ) 

The  losses  of  the  Third  Infantry  on  account  of  disqualification  and  other 
causes  are  so  great  and  enlistments  are  so  slow  that  I  would  recommend  that 
as  soon  as  all  the  men  who  are  to  be  discharged  are  discharged  the  regimental 
commander  transfer  to  one  battalion  sufficient  officers  and  men  from  the  other 
two  to  bring  that  battalion  up  to  authorized  strength  (peace)  and  then  send  it 
to  the  border ;  the  remaining  battalions  to  be  filled  up  in  the  same  way  as  rap- 
idly as  possible.  This,  I  believe,  will  stimulate  recruiting. —  (Extract  from 

report  of  Capt.  H.  P.  Hobbs,  Inf.,  inspector  instructor.  N.  G.  of ,  July  9, 

1916.) 

After  the  departure  of  the  organizations  and  recruits  for  the  border,  orders 
were  received  to  muster  in  parties  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  for  recruiting 
duty  for  the  National  Guard.  For  this  purpose,  seven  recruiting  parties  were 
mustered  in  for  Connecticut.  Each  recruiting  party  consisted  of  one  officer, 
two  noncommissioned  officers,  and  one  private.  By  the  time  the  recruiting 
parties  had  reached  their  stations  and  were  ready  to  enlist  the  recruits,  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  call  for  troops  was  dead  and  the  recruiting  parties  had  very 
slight  success  in  recruiting  the  troops.  I  questioned  a  number  of  officers  de- 
tailed in  this  duty  as  to  the  reason  of  their  failure  to  secure  recruits,  and  they 
were  of  the  opinion  that  the  large  number  of  physically  rejected  men  was 
responsible  for  the  condition. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Shuttleworth, 
inspector-instructor,  on  N.  G.  of  — : ,  Sept.  19.) 

In  response  to  the  President's  call  of  June  19,  1916,  the  Second  Infantry, 
National  Guard  -  — ,  assembled  at  the  company  rendezvous  on  that  date. 
The  strength  of  the  regiment  was  48  officers  and  912  enlisted  men.  Recruit- 
ing was  commenced  at  once.  On  June  22  the  strength  was  49  officers  and 


20  MOBILIZATION    OF   THE  ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

1,217  enlisted  men.  On  that  date  those  who  were  armed  and  equipped  were 
brought  to  the  mobilization  camp  at  -  — ,  leaving  one  officer,  one  sergeant, 
and  one  corporal  at  each  company  rendezvous  to  care  for  the  recruits  and 
continue  recruiting.  If  there  had  been  blankets  enough  to  care  for  the 
recruits  it  would  have  been  better  to  have  brought  them  to  the  mobilization 
camp  at  this  time.  On  June  27,  all  recruits  and  recruiting  parties  were 
called  in.  The  regimental  strength  was  50  officers  and  1,343  enlisted  men. 
Several  recruiting  stations  had  been  opened  by  the  State  authorities,  but  these 
were  called  in  in  compliance  with  a  telegram  from  the  Eastern  Department 
which  stated  that  future  recruiting  would  be  conducted  from  that  head- 
quarters. This  was  a  mistake,  as  at  that  time  excitement  throughout  the  State 
was  high  and  many  recruits  could  have  been  obtained.  The  new  recruiting 
stations  were  not  opened  until  the  latter  part  of  July.  By  that  time  the 
excitement  had  died  down  and  numerous  letters  to  relatives  and  friends 
from  individuals  in  the  Second  Regiment,  which  by  that  time  was  at  Laredo, 
Tex.,  had  had  their  effect  in  causing  very  few  applicants  for  enlistment. 
Results  would  have  been  better  if  the  State  authorities  had  continued  their 
recruiting  campaign. 

Due  to  the  cooperation  of  the  Maine  Central  and  Bangor  and  Aroostook 
Railroads  with  the  State  authorities,  the  mobilization  was  accomplished 
promptly  and  with  very  little  confusion. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Niles, 
inspector-instructor,  on  N.  G.  of  -  — ,-  Sept.  12.) 

After  the  departure  of  the  organizations  and  recruits  for  the  border,  orders 
were  received  to  muster  in  parties  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  for  recruiting 
duty  for  the  National  Guard.  For  this  purpose  seven  recruiting  parties  were 
mustered  in  for  -  — .  Each  recruiting  party  consisted  of  one  officer,  two 
noncommissioned  officers,  and  one  private.  By  the  time  the  recruiting  parties 
had  reached  their  stations  and  were  ready  to  enlist  the  recruits,  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  call  for  troops  was  dead  and  the  recruiting  parties  had  very  slight  suc- 
cess in  recruiting  the  troops.  I  questioned  a  number  of  officers  detailed  in  this 
duty  as  to  the  reason  of  their  failure  to  secure  recruits,  and  they  were  of 
the" opinion  that  the  large  number  of  physically  rejected  men  was  responsible 
for  the  condition. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Shuttleworth,  inspector 
instructor,  on  N.  G.  of  -  — ,  Sept.  19. ) 

The  following  resum£  of  my  observations  on  the  mobilization  of  the  Or- 
ganized Militia,  State  of  -  — ,  is  submitted : 

Before  the  call  of  June  18,  many  of  the  companies  had  fallen  below  the 
minimum  strength,  and  the  efforts  of  the  company  commanders  after  the  call 
to  recruit  up  to  war  strength  resulted  in  bringing  large  numbers  of  unfit 
men  to  the  mobilization  camp.  I  do  not  believe  this  would  have  been  so  to 
the  same  extent  had  there  been  a  popular  response  to  the  call,  but  it  is  my 
observation  that  in  this  State  at  least  there  was  very  little  general  desire  on 
the  part  of  able-bodied  young  men  to  join  the  colors. 

I  do  not  believe  the  system  of  recruiting  for  the  National  Guard  is  on  the 
proper  basis.  It  would  be  immensely  cheaper  and  far  more  satisfactory  to 
have  50  men  in  a  company  brought  to  the  mobilization  camp,  97  per 
cent  of  whom  would  be  accepted,  than  to  bring  75  men  and  have  to 
return  25  of  them  as  physically  unfit,  with  the  attendant  costs  of  rations, 
pay,  and  transportation,  'and  the  administrative  difficulties  of  discharging 
them. 

Officers  of  the  Medical  Corps  could  be  placed  on  duty  to  make  the  rounds 
of  all  company  stations,  and  no  recruits  should  be  finally  accepted  until 
passed  by  these  officers.  The  views  held  by  Army  surgeons  as  to  the  stand- 
ard required  of  recruits  and  those  held  by  most  civilian  doctors  are  so  wide 
apart  as  to  bear  little  resemblance. 

If  the  States  are  unable  to  meet  the  Army  physical  standards,  it  is  demon- 
strated that  as  a  military  system  the  National  Guard  is  a  failure. 

Discharging  large  numbers  of  men  seems  to  have  a  depressing  effect  on 
enlistments  and  is  bad  in  that  effect  also.  Under  the  present  system  it  takes 
too  long  to  clothe  and  equip  men  who  sire  recruited  after  the  call,  who  are 
not  clothed  and  equipped  at  the  company  rendezvous  and  who  wander  about 
the  mobilization  camp  in  the  most  unkempt  fashion,  waiting  for  the  inven- 
tory of  State  property  to  be  made  and  the  physically  unfit  to  be  designated. 
This  inventory  of  property  is  an  extremely  tedious  process.  At  least  one 
property  officer  to  each  regiment  instead  of  one  to  a  brigade  should  be  pro- 
vided. My  recommendation  where  time  is  the  chief  consideration  would  be  to 
hold  no  inventory  at  all  but  have  the  National  Guard  property  officers  submit 


MOBILIZATION    OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  21 

requisitions  for  their  probable  requirements  and  fill  them  at  once.  The 
report  of  the  preceding  annual  Federal  inspection  with  any  filled  requisitions 
added  thereto  being  taken  as  the  basis  of  settlement  with  the  State  after  the 
troops  were  mustered  out. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Gibson,  inspector 
instructor,  on  N.  G.  of  -  — ,  Sept.  24.) 

Great  difficulty  in  obtaining  recruits,  though  State  has  been  scoured  by  re- 
cruiting parties. 

Company  I,  from  -  — ,  though  not  recognized  by  War  Department,  was 
ordered  to  camp  at  State  expense.  Three  officers  and  13  men  were  found 
physically  -  — ,  and  the  remainder  would  not  enlist  in  other  organizations, 
so  all  men  were  sent  home,  at  an  expense  of  $1,500  to  the  State. —  (Extract  from 
report  of  Capt.  Bates,  inspector-instructor  on  N.  G.  of  -  — ,  July  15.) 

MOBILIZATION  POINTS. 

CHANGES  IN  MOBILIZATION  POINTS  AFTER  THE   PRESIDENT'S   CALL. 

As  far  back  as  June,  1910,  and  to  an  extent  for  several  years  pre- 
viously, the  question  of  the  selection  of  mobilization  points  had 
received  consideration  at  the  War  Department. 

It  was  contemplated  that  such  selection  be  made  after  consulta- 
tion with  the  State  authorities,  and  an  effort  was  made  to  arrive  at 
a  definite  decision  as  to  the  location  of  such  points.  Such  a  step  was 
deemed  an  essential  to  any  mobilization  plan  which  might  be  de- 
vised. 

Points  regarded  as  suitable  were  tentatively  selected  and  the 
views  of  State  authorities  invited.  Blank  forms  were  sent  to  them 
on  which  quite  complete  information  was  collected  on  such  sub- 
jects as  railroads,  side  tracks,  water  supply,  sewerage  system,  store- 
houses, target  ranges,  etc. 

On  this  basis  such  places  were  selected  and  provisionally  listed  at 
the  War  Department  as  State  mobilization  camps  and  letters  written 
(Sept.  11,  1911)  to  the  commanding  generals  of  the  several  di- 
visions directing  that  they  cause  an  inspection  to  be  made  of  such 
of  the  camps  named  as  were  located  within  the  limits  of  their  com- 
mands, and  after  full  consultation  with  the  State  authorities  to  de- 
termine whether  or  not  the  camps  were  suitable  for  mobilization  pur- 
poses. 

It  was  further  directed  that  the  necessary  indicated  data  concern- 
ing each  such  camp  be  obtained  and  kept  up  to  date  by  yearly  inspec- 
tion and  revision.  This  data  included  a  contoured  map  of  the  camp 
ground  on  a  scale  of  6  inches  to  the  mile. 

In  order  that  such  shelters  for  troops  as  might  be  constructed 
should  be  uniform  in  design,  blue-print  plans,  estimates,  etc.,  for 
shelters  of  troops  at  mobilization  camps  were  made.  Copies  of  these 
were  sent  to  each  State. 

Although,  as  will  be  seen  above,  efforts  were  made  several  years 
ago  to  have  mobilization  camps  in  each  State  selected  and  pre- 
pared, this  was  not  always  done  in  a  completely  satisfactory  manner. 

The  policy  of  the  War  Department  on  several  points  in  this  con- 
nection is  indicated  in  an  indorsement  (2125390)  of  April  4,  1914,  to 
the  commanding  general,  Eastern  Departnient : 

1.  It  is  essential  that  each  State  have  a  mobilization  camp  selected  and  pre- 
pared in  time  of  peace,  so  as  to  prevent  delay  in  mobilizing  in  time  of  war.  A 
mobilization  camp  may  or  may  not  be  suitable  for  a  maneuver  site,  and  at- 
tempt should  not  be  made  to  combine  the  two,  when  such  combination  will 
result  in  poor  facilities  for  mobilization  or  increased  expense  for  making  the 


22 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC. 


site  suitable  for  maneuvers.     As  a  rule  it  is  safe  to  treat  the  two  subjects 
independently. 

2.  The  purchase  of  maneuver  sites  and  concentration  camps  for  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  is  not  recommended,  but  it  is  believed  that  each  State  should  ac- 
quire a  permanent  mobilization  camp.    All  such  camps  should  be  so  prepared  in 
peace  time  that  troops  can  be  made  comfortable  upon  their  arrival.     Provi- 
sions for  adequate  water  supply  and  sanitary  arrangements  should  be  made  in 
peace  time,  and  the  systems  actually  installed  and  kept  in  repairs.     Where  a 
State  owns  its  mobilization  camp,  it  will  naturally  take  more  interest  and  pride 
in  the  preparation  and  maintenance  of  the  camp,  with  the  result  that,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  necessities  already  mentioned,  other  facilities,  such  as  storehouses, 
railroad  sidings,  etc.,  will  probably  be  provided. 

3.  Sites  for  mobilization  camps  that  are  only  temporary  will  always  be  sub- 
ject to  change  and  probably  never  in  condition  to  receive  troops.    A  change  in 
the  location  of  a  State  mobilization  camp  means  a  change  in  all  plans  of  the 
War  Department  with  reference  to  supplying  and  equipping  the  troops. 

4.  State  authorities  should  be  encouraged  in  every  way  possible  to  provide 
permanent  mobilization  camps  and  should  be  impressed  with  the  fact  that  they 
alone  will  be  responsible  for  any  discomforts,  suffering,  or  criticism  that  may 
result  from  lack  of  adequate  preparation  in  peace  time  for  such  camps. 

Department  commanders  were  also  directed  to  keep  the  War  De- 
partment informed  by  telegraph  of  any  changes  in  mobilization  sites, 
which  changes  should  not  be  made  without  good  reason,  as  such 
changes  create  confusion  in  supply  departments  where  mobilization 
supplies  are  packed  and  marked  for  shipment  to  mobilization  points 
already  selected.  These  changes  promised  to  create  so  much  confu- 
sion that  on  June  20,  1916,  the  following  telegram  was  sent  to  the 
several  department  commanders: 

Secretary  War  directs  no  change  will  be  made  by  War  Department  from  State 
mobilization  points  designated  in  Circular  19,  Division  Militia  Affairs,  1914, 
except  on  your  telegraphic  request. 

Supplies  are  already  prepared  for  shipment  at  once  to  the  several  State 
mobilization  points  listed  in  circular,  and  if  any  mobilization  points  are 
changed  by  you  without  previous  reference  to  War  Department,  confusion  must 
result. 

Paragraph  455  (b)  Army  Regulations  reads  as  follows: 

Whenever  an  order  or  proclamation  is  issued,  calling  the  Organized  Militia 
or  any  part  thereof  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  the  War  Department 
will  inform  each  governor  concerned  or  the  commanding  general  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  Militia  of  the  maximum  strength  to  which  organizations  will 
be  recruited,  and  the  Federal  supply  departments  concerned  will  ship  at  once 
to  the  senior  mustering  officers  at  the  proper  State  mobilization  camps,  without 
requisition,  sufficient  arms,  equipment,  and  clothing  to  enable  the  organizations 
so  called  forth  to  be  fully  armed  and  equipped  at  the  war  strength  ordered. 

Just  previous  to  the  call  of  June  18  the  mobilization  camp  sites 
for  the  several  States  were  as  follows : 

Mobilization  camp  sites  for  the  Organized  Militia. 


Alabama,  Montgomery. 

Arizona,    Whipple    Barracks     (hasty 
mobilization,  Tucson). 

Arkansas,  Fort  Logan  H.  Roots. 

California,   State  camp  grounds,  out- 
skirts of  Sacramento. 

Colorado,  rifle  range,  near  Golden. 

Connecticut,  Niantic. 

Delaware,     Newcastle      (State     rifle 
range). 

District  of  Columbia,  Fort  Myer,  Va. 

Florida,  State  camp,  Duval  County. 


Georgia,  Macon,  Ga. 

Hawaii,  Honolulu. 

Idaho,  Gem  State  fair  grounds   (just 

outside  Boise). 
Illinois,  Springfield. 
Indiana,  Fort  Benjamin  Harrison. 
Iowa,  Des  Moines. 
Kansas,  Fort  Riley,  Kans. 
Kentucky,  Fort  Thomas. 
Louisiana,  Camp  Stafford,  Alexandria. 
Maine,  Augusta. 
Maryland,  Halethrop,  Md. 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC. 


23 


Massachusetts,   South  Framingham. 
Michigan,  Grayling  (Hanson  Military 

Reservation)  Fort  Wayne  (in  winter). 
Minnesota,  Fort  Snelling,  Minn.  • 
Mississippi,  Jackson. 
Missouri,  Nevada. 

Montana,  Fort  William >H.  Harrison. 
Nebraska,  Lincoln. 
Nevada,  Carson  City. 
New  Hampshire,  Concord. 
New  Jersey,  Sea  Girt. 
New  Mexico,  Las  Vegas  (3  miles  out). 
New  York,  New  Dorp  (Stateri  Island). 
North  Carolina,  Camp  Glenn,  Morehead 

City   (2i  miles). 
North  Dakota,  Fort  Lincoln. 
Ohio,  Columbus,  Ohio. 
Oklahoma,  Chandler. 


Oregon,  Clackamas. 

Pennsylvania,  Mount  Gretna. 

Rhode  Island,  Quonset  Point  (railroad 
station,  Davisville). 

South  Carolina,  Lexington  County, 
near  Columbia. 

South  Dakota,  Huron  (Redfield,  sum- 
mer). 

Tennessee,  Nashville. 

Texas,  Camp  Mabry,  Austin. 

Utah,  Fort  Douglas,  Utah. 

Vermont,  Colchester,  Vt. 

Virginia,  Richmond. 

Washington,  American  Lake. 

West  Virginia,  Terra  Alta. 

Wisconsin,  Camp  Douglas,  Wis. 

Wyoming,  Cheyenne. 


During  the  progress  of  mobilization  the  following  changes  in  sites 
were  made: 


State. 

Original  location  of  mobilization 
site. 

Changed  to. 

Remarks. 

Connecticut 

Niantic 

Tenth  Field  Artillery  mobil- 

Kentucky   

Fort  Thomas 

Earlington 

ized  at  East  Haven. 
Subsequently  changed  back 

Maryland  .  . 

Halethorpe 

Laurel 

to  Fort  Thomas.  These 
changes  caused  a  delay  of 
about  5  days  in  mobil- 
izing the  Kentucky  Na- 
tional Guard. 

New  York 

New  Dorp  Staten  Island 

Oklahoma  

Chandler  (considered  unsatisfac- 

Fort Sill 

West  Virginia.  .  . 

tory  by  commanding  general, 
Southern    Department,    who 
suggests  McAlester.  Approved 
by  Secretary  of  War  May  9). 
Terra  Alta 

Charleston 

Nebraska  

Lincoln 

Fort  Crook 

. 

Similar  changes  were  also  made  in  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  and 
Texas  to  facilitate  supply  and  instruction. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  such  changes,  especially  when  made  at  so 
critical  a  time,  are  annoying  in  the  extreme  to  those  at  the  War 
Department  and  in  the  Federal  supply  departments  who  are  strain- 
ing every  effort  to  secure  a  prompt  and  orderly  mobilization  and  are 
endeavoring  to  get  the  necessary  supplies  to  mobilization  points  to 
equip  troops  at  war  strength. 

An  apt  illustration  of  the  absolute  necessity  for  having  all  prepara- 
tions as  to  mobilization  point  made  beforehand,  and  making  no  change 
after  the  call,  is  shown  by  the  change  which  occurred  during  mobili- 
zation in  West  Virginia,  where  the  mobilization  site  had  been  defi- 
nitely fixed  at  Terra  Alta  and  all  calculations  based  on  a  mobilization 
at  that  point;  but  it  appears  that  the  grounds  were  subsequently 
occupied  by  the  State  as  a  tuberculosis  sanitarium. 

No  report  appears  to  have  reached  the  War  Department  as  to 
either  the  unsuitability  or  unavailability  of  the  site  at  Terra  Alta, 
and  in  the  meantime  the  mobilization  started  at  Charleston,  while  the 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Parkersburg  made  a  strenuous  telegraphic 
plea  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  urging  that  city  as  the  most  accessible 


24  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

point  for  this  purpose.  The  commanding  general,  Eastern  Depart- 
ment, was  asked  how  this  change  came  to  be  made,  and  telegraphed 
back  that — 

this  was  clone  prior  to  the  final  decision  of  the  Secretary  of  War  concerning 
mobilization  point;  an  effort  was  made  to  stop  the  cars  as  soon  as  the  Secre- 
tary's orders  were  received. 

In  the  meanwhile  it  appears  that  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  troops 
had  arrived  at  Charleston,  although  the  supplies  had  properly  been 
sent  to  Terra  Alta.  The  governor  wired  the  Secretary  of  War 
June  28 : 

*  *  *  The  transfer  of  the  troops  now  mobilized  and  ready  for  service  from 
Charleston  to  Terra  Alta  is  regarded  by  us  as  impractical  and  unnecessary 
and  is  a  step  for  which  we  must  of  necessity  refuse  to  accept  the  responsibility ; 
if,  however,  it  is  decided  to  make  this  change,  we  will  be  pleased  to  turn  over 
these  troops  to  the  United  States  Government  at  Charleston. 

Matters  stood  thus  at  a  "  deadlock,"  when  on  July  5  The  Adjutant 
General  of  the  Army  telegraphed  the  commanding  general,  Eastern 
Department,  as  follows: 

Mobilization  point  for  West  Virginia  fixed  at  Charleston.  Direct  all  supplies 
now  at  Terra  Alta  to  be  shipped  immediately  to  Charleston. 

Disregarding  entirely  the  merits  of  the  question  at  issue,  it  should 
be  patent  to  the  most  casual  observer  that  this  case  well  illustrates  the 
dangers  which  beset  any  such  system  of  dual  control  as  now  exists. 

PREPARATION  OF  MOBILIZATION  CAMP  SITES. 

As  stated  above,  blue-print  plans,  estimates,  etc.,  for  shelters  of 
troops  at  mobilization  camps  had  several  years  ago  been  supplied 
State  authorities  so  that  ui  the  event  of  mobilization  such  plans,  etc., 
might  be  at  hand  and  time  thereby  saved.  In  Ohio,  however,  it  ap- 
pears that  the  furnishing  of  these  plans  was  erroneously  construed  to 
authorize  expenditure  of  money,  and  before  the  Federal  authorities 
were  aware  of  it  an  indebtedness  of  $202,000  wTas  incurred  in  the 
preparation  of  the  mobilization  camp  at  Camp  Willis,  Columbus, 
Ohio,  for  occupancy  by  troops  in  the  construction  of  latrines,  shower 
baths,  mess  shacks,  storehouses,  roads,  in  the  introduction  of  gas,  and 
in  the  installation  of  water  and  sewer  systems. 

The  department  inspector  of  the  Central  Department,  who  visited 
the  camp,  expressed  his  surprise  and  indignation  at  what  he  believed 
to  be  money  wasted  in  expending  it  for  the  purposes  above  named, 
and  generally  in  preparing  a  permanent  camping  ground  upon  a 
site  which  in  his  judgment  was  in  no  way  fitted  for  a  mobilization 
camp  and  which  ought  to  be  given  up. 

No  dishonesty  wras  developed,  but  it  seems  unfortunate  that  so 
much  money  should  have  been  spent  without  authority  and  before 
even  formal  leases  had  been  made  for  the  occupancy  of  the  land. 

The  inspector  recommended  removal  of  the  camp  to  Camp  Perry, 
Ohio,  as  soon  as  it  was  practicable  to  do  so.  Camp  Willis  was  va- 
cated September  9. 

To  cover  this,  as  well  as  any  similar  expenditure  which  might  have 
been  made  in  other  States,  Congress  was  asked  to  make  an  appropria- 
tion. As  finally  acted  upon  money  for  this  purpose  was  merged  with 
the  appropriation  for  water  and  sewers  at  military  posts,  $4,000,000 


MOBILIZATION   OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  25 

being  appropriated  in  the  Army  appropriation  bill  for  the  year  1917, 
approved  August  29,  1916,  for  both  purposes. 

Col.  D.  A.  Frederick,  chief  mustering  officer,  Central  Department, 
in  reporting  on  muster  in  of  National  Guard,  Central  Department, 
says: 

The  variations  (in  expenses  connected  with  mobilization  sites)  in  various 
States  in  this  department  have  been  astounding.  In  the  case  of  Ohio,  the  per 
capita  cost  of  mobilization  was  about  one  hundred  times  the  per  capita  cost  in 
the  State  of  Nebraska,  and  the  only  reason  that  can  be  assigned  for  this  dif- 
ference is  lack  of  due  care  and  economy  on  the  part  of  the  State  authorities. 
If  the  State  has  no  State-owned  mobilization  point  the  camp  should  be  located 
on  a  United  States  military  reservation  in  the  State  or  one  nearest  to  same 
having  the  necessary  space. 

SHIPMENT    OF    RESERVE   SUPPLIES    TO    MOBILIZATION    POINTS. 

The  storage  of  all  reserve  supplies  of  the  National  Guard  in  a 
few  depots  proved  to  be  a  failure  on  which  the  chief  of  the  Militia 
Bureau  in  a  letter  of  July  25,  said : 

1.  With  reference  to  the  part  of  this  report  concerning  supplies  and  equip- 
ment where  it  is  stated  that  "  The  mobilization  thus  far  has  demonstrated 
beyond  question,  to  all  who  have  been  charged  with  the  responsibility  of  for- 
warding supplies  and  preparing  troops  to  be  moved  to  the  front,  the  unde- 
sirability  and  shortsightedness  of  storing  the  reserve  supplies  for  the  bulk  of 
the  militia  of  this  department  in  one  depot.     Never  again  should  it  be  possible 
to  permit  so  unsound  an  arrangement  to  be  made."     It  is  stated  that  this  office 
has  consistently  held  that  the  greater  the  decentralization  in  storing  supplies 
necessary  for  the  equipment  of  troops  on  mobilization,  the  greater  the  rapidity 
and  ease  of  issue. 

In  a  communication  of  January  27,  1914,  this  office  stated,  "  The  nearer  we 
can  place  mobilization  supplies  to  the  troops  to  be  supplied,  the  better,  and 
the  points  to  be  considered  in  authorizing  such  decentralization  of  supplies 
are  their  security,  preservation,  and  absolute  control  by  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment until  issued  at  the  outbreak  of  war." 

Again,  on  May  6,  1915,  it  was  stated  by  this  officer,  "  The  general  plan  for 
the  establishment  of  depots  with  reserve  supplies  within  the  areas  in  which 
troops  will  be  mobilized  in  the  event  of  war  *  *  *  is,  in  the  opinion  of 
this  office,  an  excellent  one." 

2.  I  see  no  reason  to  change  my  views  as  herein  expressed,  and  recommend 
the   early   establishment   of   the   six    field    supply   depots   of   reserve   supplies 
already  planned,  and  recommend  further  that  the  question  be  submitted  for 
consideration  by  the  General  Staff  of  the  further  establishment  of  a  field  supply 
depot  in  each  of  the  12  tactical  divisional  districts  outlined  in  Circular  No. 
19,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  1914. 

The  establishment  of  a  divisional  field  supply  depot  would  not  only  assist 
greatly  in  having  on  hand  the  necessary  supplies  on  mobilization,  but  would 
also  greatly  assist  in  the  development  of  the  system  of  ordinary  supply  and 
ordinary  payment  of  National  Guard  troops. 

3.  When  proper  storage  facilities  in  the  form  of  State  storehouses  and  State 
armories  are  available,  these  might  possibly  be  utilized  for  the  storage  of  reserve 
supplies  until  such  time  as  the  complete  scheme  of  field  supply  depots  could 
be  put  into  operation. 

Letter  from  the  chief,  War  College  Division,  to  the  chief,  Militia 
Bureau,  August  14,  1916 : 

In  connection  with  report  of  special  inspector  on  mobilization  camp  at  Sea 
Girt,  N.  J.,  the  Quartermaster  General  in  the  fifth  indorsement,  August  2,  1916, 
on  said  report,  states  in  part  as  follows : 

"  With  special  reference  to  the  recommendation  of  the  inspector  as  set  forth 
in  Paragraph  I,  page  3,  this  office  under  date  of  July  17,  1916,  stated  that  the 
suggestion  to  keep  on  hand  in  armories  or  elsewhere  sufficient  equipment  for 
men  necessary  to  bring  the  units  from  peace  strength  is  worthy  of  careful 


26  MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

consideration,  and  that  if  this  is  not  deemed  advisable  several  supply  points  for 
each  of  the  larger  departments  should  be  considered.  Depots  of  this  character 
should  not,  however,  be  under  the  control  of  department  commanders." 

Memorandum  from  the  Chief  of  the  Militia  Bureau,  for  the  Chief 
of  the  War  College  Division,  September  6,  1916  (Subject:  Mobiliza- 
tion site  to  be  chosen  for  each  division  of  the  National  Guard)  : 

The  question  of  supply  depots  for  the  storage  of  supplies  and  equipment 
necessary  upon  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  for  war  rests  upon  different 
considerations.  Recent  experiences  indicate  that  supplies  and  equipment  of 
every  kind  should  be  kept  at  the  designated  depots,  and  that  the  number  of 
such  depots  should  be  greatly  increased,  but  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  the 
number  should  be  multiplied  to  the  extent  of  having  one  for  each  State.  The 
divisional  plan  of  organization  suggests  a  supply  depot  for  each  divisional  dis- 
trict, which  would  give  12  supply  depots  in  all.  Each  depot  should  be  estab- 
lished at  a  point  suitable  to  the  prompt  and  economical  supply  of  the  State  or 
group  of  States  which  it  is  to  serve.  By  such  an  arrangement  no  depot  would 
have  to  supply  more  than  six  States,  and  probably  in  every  case  supplies  and 
equipment  would  reach  the  mobilization  camps  before  the  troops  for  which 
they  were  intended  would  be  ready  to  receive  them.  For  better  security  and 
control  supply  depots  for  the  National  Guard  might  well  be  established  at 
United  States  military  posts,  arsenals,  or  depots.  A  board  of  officers  is  now 
considering  the  question  of  the  location  of  mobilization  supply  depots. 

Steps  are  being  taken  to  remedy  this  matter  by  the  convening  of  a 
board  of  officers  by  the  following  War  Department  order : 

Paragraph  32,  Special  Orders  177,  War  Dept,  July  31,  1916 :  A  board  of 
officers  to  consist  of  Col.  William  H.  Arthur,  M.  C.,  Col.  Edwin  B.  Babbitt,  O.  D.f 
Lieut.  Col.  Richmond  McA.  Schofield,  Q.  M.  C.,  Maj.  William  P.  Jackson,  I.  G., 
and  Capt.  John  L.  De  Witt,  Q.  M.  C.,  is  appointed  to  meet  in  this  city  at  the 
call  of  the  senior  member  of  the  board  to  submit  a  new  plan  for  the  supply 
of  National  Guard  and  Volunteers  when  mustered  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  and  mobilized.  The  board  will  exclude  from  consideration  the 
principle  of  concentration  of  supplies  for  several  States  in  a  single  depot.  The 
junior  member  of  the  board  will  act  as  recorder. 

This  matter  is  now  in  progress  of  adjustment,  and  instead  of  three 
general  depots  for  reserve  supplies  for  the  militia  the  board  now 
considering  this  matter  will  recommend  11  such  depots,  situated  at 
favorable  points  in  the  country. 

The  following  are  extracts  from  reports  of  inspector  instructors 
and  others  bearing  on  this  subject,  which  point  out  the  defects  of  the 
present  system. 

As  throwing  additional  light  on  this  subject  it  may  be  said  that 
the  shortage  in  equipment  in  Ohio  was  such  as  to  call  for  an  investi- 
gation by  an  inspector,  who  reported  that  he  was  unable  to  fix  re- 
sponsibility upon  any  individual  or  individuals  and  that  the  main 
reason  for  shortages  was  the  inability  of  depots  to  supply  all  the 
articles  of  equipment  C,  and  the  confusion  and  delay  was  caused 
by  the  method  of  forwarding  invoices,  by  shipment  of  property  for 
Ohio  National  Guard  in  cars  destined  for  other  places,  and  by  mis- 
understandings between  the  senior  mustering  officer  and  the  camp 
quartermaster  as  to  property  on  hand  in  the  camp. 

Another  point  to  be  noted  is  the  desirability  of  placing  war  strength  equip- 
ment in  the  hands  of  organizations  to  be  on  hand  at  all  times  rather  than  effect 
this  issue  at  the  time  of  muster  in. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Olmstead, 
inspector-instructor,  on  N.  G.  of  N.  Y.,  Aug.  22.) 

The  greatest  sources  of  delay  in  the  work  of  preparing  troops  for  service  have 
been  the  items  of  equipment  and  physical  examination.  The  troops  came 
equipped  for  a  strength  of  81  enlisted  per  company.  The  remainder  of  equip- 
ment was  obtained  from  Rock  Island  and  St.  Louis.  This  delay  could  have  been 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC.  27 

avoided  if  the  equipment  for  difference  between  war  and  peace  strength  had 
been  stored  at  Camp  Douglas.  I  believe  that  the  property  stored  would  have 
received  excellent  care  from  the  quartermaster  here.  Troops  here  are  examined 
after  muster  in,  and  upward  of  400  per  day  are  now  being  examined. —  (Extract 
from  report  of  Capt.  L.  T.  Richardson,  Inf.,  inspector-instructor,  N.  G.  of  Wis., 
July  2,  1916.) 

States  should  be  required  to  keep  on  hand  at  all  times  blankets,  bed  sacks, 
and  mess  kits  sufficient  for  all  organizations  at  war  strength.  There  should  be 
two  blankets  for  each  man.  The  Montana  regiment  had  about  200  above  mini- 
mum strength.  As  a  result  nearly  this  number  had  no  blankets  or  bed  sacks  or 
mess  kits. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  A.  A.  Hofmann,  Inf.,  inspector- 
instructor,  N.  G.  of  Mont.,  Aug.  16,  1916.) 

Many  supplies  were  unreasonably  slow  in  arriving,  though  the  bills  of  lading 
and  invoices  showed  that  they  had  been  shipped  promptly.  As  I  knew  nothing 
of  what  was  to  arrive,  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  trace  the  shipments  or  to  in 
any  manner  expedite  the  arrival.  The  result  was  that  several  shipments  arrived 
after  the  departure  of  the  troops,  and  certain  of  the  property  had  to  be  shipped 
to  them,  and  other  parts  returned  to  the  depots  from  which  received.  It  is 
thought  that  the  receiving  officer  should  be  informed  at  once  when  a  shipment 
is  made  to  him  and  of  what  it  consists,  as  frequently  it  was  necessary  to  plan 
about  the  distribution.  A  case  in  point  was  that  a  shipment  of  arms  took  10 
days  to  come  from  Springfield  Armory  to  Davisville,  although  shipped  by  special 
express. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  T.  A.  Roberts  on  N.  G.  of  R.  I.,  Sept.  18.) 

Articles  of  clothing  and  equipment  were  slow  in  arriving.  Many  recruits  were 
unable  to  obtain  any  article  of  clothing  for  a  great  many  days  and  were  forced 
to  go  around  in  ragged  and  dirty  undershirts.  It  was  the  usual  thing  for  200  to 
250  men  to  report  each  morning  at  sick  call  to  get  treated  for  severe  sunburns  of 
shoulders  and  arms.  Although  Field  Hospital  Corps  No.  2  and  Ambulance  Corps 
No.  2  had  been  accepted  as  organizations  by  the  Federal  Government  early  in 
July,  they  had  not  at  the  time  of  my  departure,  on  August  1,  received  their  full 
equipment. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  J.  F.  Hall,  Medical  Corps,  on  N.  G. 
of  Mass.) 

The  Ordnance  Department  supplies  not  only  arrived  without  requisition  but 
as  soon  as  the  troops  did,  and  their  requisitions  have  been  completely  and 
promptly  filled.  The  highest  praise  is  due  them  for  this  efficient  service.  The 
troops  of  this  command  would  have  been  able  to  leave  on  July  5  had  the  Quar- 
termaster Department  furnished  the  supplies  which  they  were  expected  to  fur- 
nish without  requisition.  Apparently  they  had  no  idea  of  what  was  required, 
nor  have  they  yet,  and  steps  had  to  be  taken  to  submit  requisitions,  and  even 
these  telegraphic  requisitions  have  not  been  filled  for  the  vital  items  mentioned 
above.  The  first  shipment  of  socks  was  of  an  inferior  grade  and  unfit  for  use, 
and  so  recommended  by  the  Inspector  General's  Department,  an  officer  of  which, 
Maj.  Brady,  was  here.  More  than  half  the  drawers  shipped  here  were  size 
32  inches  in  the  waist  or  under ;  that  is  to  say,  they  were  boys'  sizes.  These 
have  been  ordered  shipped  back  to  the  supply  depot  at  St.  Louis,  though  it  was 
necessary  to  use  some  of  the  socks. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Hughes, 
inspector  instructor  on  N.  G.  of  Tenn.,  July  16.) 

Equipment  consisting  of  quartermaster  and  ordnance  stores  commenced  to 
arrive  by  express  on  the  26th,  and  as  soon  as  possible  the  troops  were  furnished 
•with  their  supplies. 

The  hardships,  confusion,  and  expense  of  mobilization  in  the  future  will  be 
greatly  reduced  if  the  complete  equipment  for  the  National  Guard  is  stored 
within  the  State,  preferably  in  the  storehouses  at  or  near  the  mobilization 
points.  The  necessary  blank  forms  for  mustering  the  National  Guard  into  the 
Federal  service  should  be  with  the  organization,  and  in  large  measure  the  forms 
may  be  filled  out  ready  for  use.  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  colonel  of  the 
regiment  or  the  senior  officer  of  units  other  than  the  regiment  should  muster  in 
their  own  units  into  the  Federal  service.  Later,  when  opportunity  is  afforded, 
the  organizations  should  be  thoroughly  inspected  by  officers  of  the  Inspector 
General's  Department,  and  errors  found  can  then  be  corrected.  Another  essen- 
tial point  to  be  determined  upon  as  a  preparation  for  the  mobilization  of  an 
efficient  National  Guard  is  a  frequent  physical  inspection,  so  that  the  examina- 
tion, if  one  is  to  be  made  at  muster  in,  will  be  of  men  all  of  whom  are  practi- 
cally physically  fit  for  the  duties  of  a  soldier.  At  least  once  each  year  the 
entire  personnel  of  the  National  Guard  should  be  inspected  by  a  medical  officer 
of  the  Army  whose  powers  should  be  such  that  any  found  physically  deficient 
are  at  once  eliminated  from  the  guard. — (Extract  from  report  by  Maj.  Shuttle- 
worth,  inspector  instructor  on  N.  G.  of  Conn.,  Sept.  19.) 


28  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

The  mobilization  camps  of  the  several  States  should  be  relocated  in  some 
cases.  The  Federal  stores  held  by  the  State  should  be  stored  at  or  near  the 
mobilization  camp,  and  its  location  determined  after  its  site  had  been  approved 
by  the  Federal  Government.  Apparently,  in  the  past  mobilization  camps  were 
selected  because  an  area  of  cheap  land  for  use  as  camp  sites  was  available. 
More  attention  must  be  given  to  accessibility  and  the  provision  of  proper  rail- 
way facilities  and  buildings  or  administration  and  the  storage  of  supplies. — 
(Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Shuttleworth,  inspector  instructor  on  N  G  of 
Conn.,  Sept.  19.) 

I  would  suggest  that  instead  of  storing  the  so-called  war  supplies  in  one 
storehouse,  such  as  the  quartermaster  depot  at  Philadelphia  for  several  States. 
that  each  State  provide  a  storehouse  at  the  point  selected  for  the  mobilization 
camp,  and  the  necessary  supplies  be  stored  there.  If  necessary,  the  senior 
United  States  Army  inspector  instructor,  assisted  by  one  or  more  sergeant 
instructors,  could  take  charge  of  this  property,  be  accountable  and  responsible 
for  it,  and  when  mobilization  takes  place  the  property  could  be  placed  in  the 
hands  of  the  organizations  for  which  it  is  intended  in  a  very  short  time.  If  it 
be  impossible  to  obtain  such  a  storehouse  at  the  point  selected  for  a  mobilization 
camp,  it  would  seem  that  the  State  in  nearly  every  case  would  be  willing  to  set 
aside  a  part  of  the  building  now  used  as  a  storehouse  for  the  supply  officer  of 
the  State  in  which  this  property  could  be  kept  apart  from  any  State  property 
and  to  which  only  the  Federal  accountable  officer  could  have  access. —  (Extract 
from  report  of  Capt.  V.  La  S.  Rockwell,  Cavalry  inspector  instructor,  N.  G.  of 
Md.,  Sept.  7,  1916.) 

Equipment. — There  was  a  considerable  shortage  in  cots  and  blankets. 

******* 

Company  I,  Second  Infantry,  is  without  arms  and  equipment.  *  *  * 
Company  D,  Second  Infantry,  has  no  haversacks  nor  canteens,  and  Company  M, 
Second  Infantry,  has  no  haversacks.  *  *  *  Many  rifles  show  evidence  of 
neglect,  particularly  in  Companies  C,  D,  F,  G,  and  L,  First  Infantry,  and 
Companies  G  and  L,  Second  Infantry. 

******* 

Less  than  half  of  the  officers  are  provided  with  field  glasses.  None  of  the 
companies  are  provided  with  Engineer  property,  and  they  only  have  one  flag 
kit  of  the  Signal  property.  The  hospital  stores  of  the  sanitary  detachments  are 
in  bad  shape. 

Clothiny. — Most  of  the  men  had  nothing  but  the  clothing  they  had  on. 
About  75  per  cent  of  the  men  wore  civilian  shoes,  and  about  25  per  cent  fo  the 
Gevernment  shoes  were  unserviceable.  None  of  the  organizations  are  provided 
with  extra  clothing  for  the  surplus  kits. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Simons, 
inspector  general  on  N.  G.  of  .) 

Equipment. — *  *  *  The  hospital  stores  of  the  sanitary  detachment  of  the 
Infantry  regiment  are  in  bad  shape,  but  the  instruments  are  good.  None  of  the 
companies  or  troops  are  provided  with  Engineer  property,  and  they  have  only 
one  flag  kit  of  Signal  property.  None  of  the  organizations  are  provided  with 
identification  tags.  Only  about  one-half  of  the  officers  are  provided  with  field 
glasses.— (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Simons,  Inspector  General,  on  National 
Guard  of ,  July  13.) 

Clothing. — Many  of  the  men  had  nothing  but  the  clothing  they  wore.  The 
shoes  are  practically  all  unserviceable.  The  officers  stated  that  none  of  the 
Government  shoes  were  on  their  papers,  as  they  had  all  been  dropped,  and  that 
many  of  the  men  had  purchased  Government  shoes  themselves.  None  of  the 
organizations  are  supplied  with  the  extra  clothing  for  the  surplus  kits.  There 
were  a  few  cotton  O.  D.  breeches  in  the  command,  but  these  had  been  purchased 
by  the  men. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Simons,  Inspector  General,  on  Na- 
tional Guard  of ,  July  13. ) 

The  enlisted  men  did  not  have  the  articles  required  to  be  packed  in  the  sur- 
plus kit  bags ;  therefore  they  were  badly  in  need  of  underclothes  and  socks  when 
they  left.  It  is  recommended  that  the  reserve  equipment  to  completely  uniform 
and  equip  each  organization  to  war  strength  be  turned  over  to  the  State  and 
that  they  be  required  to  store  it  at  a  place  accessible  to  the  mobilization  camp, 
and  that  they  be  required  to  keep  this  equipment  intact  and  properly  cared 
for. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Niles,  inspector-instructor,  on  National 
Guard  of  Maine,  Sept.  12.) 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,    ETC.  29 

Letter  of  Lieut.  P.  Remington,  Inf.,  inspector-instructor,  Fort  Benjamin  Har- 
rison, Ind.,  July  14,  1916,  reports  lack  of  tables,  typewriters,  pens,  ink,  pyram- 
idal tents,  inarch  kits,  first-aid  packets,  shoes,  underwear,  and  wool  socks. 

Letter  of  Col.  G.  H.  Morgan,  Cavalry,  senior  mustering  officer,  Mobilization 
Camp,  Des  Moines,  Iowa,  July  15,  1916,  reports  a  shortage  of  equipment  in 
tentage,  breeches  (cotton  O.  D.),  campaign  hats,  shirts,  underclothes,  bed  sacks, 
stationery,  and  quartermaster  blank  forms. 

Letter  of  Lieut.  Col.  A.  Johnson,  senior  mustering  officer,  dated  Fort  Snelling, 
Minn.,  June  26,  1916,  reports  the  commands  have  no  equipment  for  those  above 
minimum  strength.  These  numbered  823  men  on  June  26,  1916. 

Letter  of  Maj.  H.  J.  Hunt,  Inf.,  inspector-instructor,  Camp  Glenn,  N.  C.,  July 
9,  1916. — Maj.  Hunt  believes  that  a  reasonable  and  assorted  supply  of  stationery 
should  be  furnished  mustering  officers  with  the  forms  sent  from  the  War  De- 
partment. 

Letter  of  Capt.  R.  L.  Hamilton,  retired,  Lincoln,  Nebr.,  July  15,  1916. — Capt. 
Hamilton  states  that  the  only  defect  in  clothing  shipped  the  Nebraska  Guard  on 
mobilization  was  in  the  shoes  furnished,  which  were  not  of  a  suitable  and  sat- 
isfactory type ;  900  pairs  were  accepted  and  issued ;  the  remainder  of  those 
shipped  were  returned  to  the  parties  from  whom  obtained,  consequently  the 
command  moved  with  such  shoes  as  they  could  secure  at  their  own  expense, 
locally.  Since  departure  of  troops,  the  necessary  shoes  were  received  and 
shipped  to  Mercedes,  Tex. 

Letter  of  Capt.  A.  Greig,  jr.,  C.  A.  C.,  Raleigh,  N.  C.,  July  19,  1916.— Capt. 
Greig  states  many  National  Guard  officers  expressed  the  belief  that  a  proper 
reserve  supply  of  uniforms  should  be  on  hand  at  home  stations  for  use  in  sud- 
den orders  for  mobilization. 

Letter  of  Capt.  W.  N.  Hughes,  jr.,  Inf.,  inspector-instructor,  Nashville,  Tenn., 
July  16,  1916. — Capt.  Hughes  reports  that  when  the  organizations  in  the  Ten- 
nessee Guard  suddenly  swelled  50  per  cent  above  peace  strength  the  quartermas- 
ter supplies  were  totally  inadequate  to  house  and  equip  them.  Blankets,  bed 
sacks,  pyramidal  tents,  and  clothing  were  noticably  short ;  also  ponchos.  The 
Quartermaster  Department  was  unable  to  meet  the  demand,  and  to  date,  though 
repeated  telegraphic  requisitions  have  been  made  and  telegraphic  orders  have 
been  issued  by  the  department  commander  to  rush  supplies  here  by  express, 
there  is  still  a  large  shortage  in  pyramidal  tents  and  ponchos. 

Capt.  Hughes  reports  the  troops  could  not  leave  on  July  5  because  the  Quar- 
termaster Department  had  not  sent  the  supplies  they  were  supposed  to  send 
without  requisition.  He  reports  the  first  shipment  of  socks  of  an  inferior 
grade  and  unfit  for  use,  and  that  more  than  half  the  drawers  were  32-inch 
waist,  or  under,  and  were  sent  back  to  the  St.  Louis  depot. 

Letter  of  Capt.  L.  T.  Richardson,  Inf.,  inspector-instructor,  Camp  Douglas. 
Wis.,  July  2,  1916. — Capt.  Richardson  found  one  of  the  greatest  sources  of  delay 
was  in  the  items  of  equipment.  He  believes  that  the  difference  between  war 
and  peace  strength  equipment  should  be  stored  at  Camp  Douglas,  Wis.,  the 
mobilization  camp. 

In  regard  to  the  subject  of  reserve  supplies  for  the  militia  re- 
ferred to  in  the  introductory  remarks,  the  Quartermaster  General 
remarks  as  follows : 

1.  With  reference  to  the  tenth  paragraph  under  the  head  of  "  Introductory," 
it  should  be  stated  that  the  conclusions  sis  therein  set  forth  are  based  on  facts. 
The  reserve  stock  of  supplies  which  had  been  accumulated  at  Field  Supply 
Depot  No.  1,  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  were  intended  for  use  in  equipping  men  neces- 
sary to  bring  the  militia  from  peace  to  war  strength.  The  total  appropriations 
for  reserve  stock  for  Clothing  and  Equipage  made  by  Congress  amounted  to 
$4,121,533.61,  and  supplies  to  this  extent  were  either  in  Field  Supply  Depot  No. 
1  or  in  depots  as  a  working  stock.  In  addition  to  this  reserve,  there  had  been 
accumulated  as  a  result  of  economies  inaugurated  from  time  to  time,  supplies 
to  the  value  of  approximately  $6,000.000.  The  accumulation  of  the  reserve  did 
not  contemplate  additional  equipment  for  the  National  Guard  called  in  the 
service,  as  paragraph  455  (a),  Army  Regulations,  requires  that — 

"  Governors  of  States  and  Territories  and  the  commanding  general  of  the 
District  of  Columbia  Militia  are  required  at  all  times  to  keep  on  hand,  either 
at  the  various  company  armories  or  in  suitable  storehouses,  a  sufficient  supply 


30  MOBILIZATION    OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

of  arms,  uniforms,  and  equipment  to  completely  equip  for  the  field  the  minimum 
number  of  men  prescribed  by  the  President  for  each  organization,  so  that  on 
being  called  into  the  service,  any  organization  will  be  completely  equipped 
from  the  stores  on  hand  in  the  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia 
without  calling  on  the  War  Department  for  assistance." 

2.  Under  orders  from  the  War  Department,  the  militia  had,  due  to  limited 
appropriations,  previously  drawn  only  such  articles  as  one  hat,  one  coat,  one 
pair  of  breeches,  one  pair  leggins,  one  overcoat,  one  blanket  and  tentage,  leav- 
ing them  short  one  blanket  and  such  articles  as  shoes,  underwear,  sweaters, 
stockings,  cots,  mosquito  bars,  etc.     Therefore,  instead  of  being  able  to  utilize 
what  reserve,  supplies  had  been  accumulated  for  the  purpose  of  equipping  new 
men,  it  became  necessary  to  use  these  articles  in  completing  the  equipment  of 
the  militia  called  into  service,  which  early  exhausted  the  available  stock. 

3.  With  reference  to  extracts  and  comments  under  "  Shipment  of  reserve 
supplies  to  mobilization  points,"  and  particularly  in  regard  to  statements  of 
shortage,  this  condition  is  due  in  the  main  to  the  following  reasons : 

1.  Most  of  the  men  of  the  National  Guard  called  into  the  service  were  not 
completely  equipped  as  required  by  regulations. 

2.  The  department  commanders  designated   the  order   in  which  shipments 
should  be  made  to  the  various  States.     This  resulted  in  those  States  near  the 
bottom  of  the  list  receiving  their  supplies  after  some  delay. 

3.  Many  States  received  supplies  in  excess  of  their  actual  needs,  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  organizations  remained  practically  at  the  minimum  strength, 
which  prevented  other  States  from  getting  all  the  supplies  needed.  This  is 
borne  out  by  statements  of  the  commanding  general,  Central  Department,  under 
the  heading  "  Supplies,"  and  by  the  further  fact  that  the  records  of  this  office 
show  large  quantities  of  supplies  turned  in  by  mobilization  camps  to  depots. 

4.  Due  to  rejections  for  physical  and  other  reasons  the  ranks  of  many  or- 
ganizations were   greatly   depleted,   necessitating  the   complete   equipment   of 
new  men  enlisted  to  replace  them. 

5.  Confusion,  especially  on  the  part  of  the  camp  quartermasters  or  of  the 
officers  in  charge  of  mobilization  points,  is  evidenced  by  an  extract  from  the 
report  of  First  Lieut.  James  G.  Mcllroy,  which  will  be  found  elsewhere  under 
"  Comments   of   inspectors-instructors,    etc."     (See    Evidences   of   inefficiency, 
p.  104.) 

6.  With  reference  to  criticisms  in  consequence  of  the  supply  of  ununiform 
or  inferior  articles,  this  was  a  result  of  an  effort  to  meet  the  unexpected 
demands  due  to  incomplete  equipment  of  the  men  called  into  the  service.     All 
ununiform  or  articles  differing  from  standard  and  specification  requirements 
were  purchased  and  issued  as  a  temporary  expedient  and  were  replaced  as 
rapidly  as  the  regulation  article  could  be  obtained. 

EFFECT  ON  THE  PERSONNEL  OF  OATH  REQUIRED  BY  NATIONAL- 
DEFENSE  ACT  AND  LEGAL  EFFECT  OF  REFUSAL  OR  NEGLECT 
TO  TAKE  FEDERAL  OATH  PRESCRIBED  IN  THIS  ACT. 

When  the  State  troops  were  ordered  out  on  the  second  call  (June 
18),  a  misunderstanding  arose  in  some  quarters  as  to  the  obligation 
under  which  men  were  held  under  the  oath  which  they  had  taken,  and 
also  whether  or  not  they  were  compelled  to  take  the  oath  prescribed 
in  section  73  of  the  national-defense  act. 

This  was  not  unnatural,  for  the  national-defense  act  did  not  be- 
come a  law  until  June  3,  and  as  there  elapsed  but  15  days  before  the 
second  call  was  made,  the  new  law  had  hardly  been  distributed,  much 
less  studied  and  digested,  by  those  affected  by  it. 

A  test  case  having  arisen  in  Massachusetts  during  the  mobilization 
of  the  National  Guard  in  that  State,  it  was  referred  to  the  Judge 
Advocate  General,  whose  views  and  the  policy  adopted  by  the  War 
Department  are  clearly  set  forth  in  the  following  letter  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  War : 


MOBILIZATION    OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  31 

LETTER  OF  AUGUST  8,   1916.  FROM  THE   SECRETARY   OF  WAR  TO  HON.  RICHARD 
OLNEY,   HOUSE   OF   REPRESENTATIVES. 

Hon.  RICHARD  OLNEY, 

House  of  Representatives. 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  I  have  your  letter  of  August  4,  as  to  the  taking  of  the  so- 
called  muster  oath  by  members  of  the  militia,  and  beg  to  inform  you  that 
the  rulings  of  the  War  Department  on  this  subject  have  been  as  follows : 

(a)  It  seems  to  be  well  established  that  a  member  of  the  Organized  Militia 
can  not  exempt  himself  from  service  under  the  President's  call  of  June  18,  1916, 
by  refraining  from  taking  the  oath  prescribed  in  sections  70  or  73  of  the  de- 
fense act  of  June  3,  1916.  Under  the  militia  law  of  1903,  as  amended,  a  sol- 
dier of  the  Organized  Militia  who  fails  to  take  the  oath  prescribed  under  the 
new  defense  act  can  nevertheless  legally  be  held  to  service  for  the  remaining 
period  of  his  enlistment  term  under  his  original  oath  and  contract.  Under  the 
same  law  an  officer  must  present  himself  for  service  until  released  by  the  same 
authority  which  summoned  him  into  the  service  of  the  United  States. 

(&)  The  obligation  to  appear  for  muster  into  Federal  service  was  imposed 
on  the  date  of  the  issue  of  the  President's  call.  A  discharge  issued  subsequent 
thereto  to  a  member  of  the  National  Guard  or  Organized  Militia  by  any  lesser 
authority  than  that  of  the  Federal  Government,  even  if  made  in  ignorance  of 
the  President's  call,  would  necessarily  have  no  validity.  An  individual  of  the 
Organized  Militia  can  not  therefore  through  his  own  volition  release  himself 
from  service  under  the  President's  call,  nor  can  the  State,  wrhich  is  a  lesser 
authority  than  that  which  issued  the  call,  or  any  subordinate  officer  of  the 
State,  undertake  to  excuse  from  service  on  any  grounds  individuals  of  the 
Organized  Militia  included  in  the  President's  call. 

(c)  It  seems,  therefore,  that  the  action  taken  in  Massachusetts,  which  has 
resulted  in  the  release  from  Federal  service  of  certain  members  of  the  Organ- 
ized Militia,  is  illegal. 

Taking  up  the  question  of  a  man  in  the  Organized  Militia  under  the  amended 
Dick  law,  conforming  to  the  new  law  and  assuming  the  status  of  a  member  of 
the  National  Guard,  such  conforming  is  entirely  in  his  own  hands,  and  there  is 
no  compulsion. 

The  call  was  made  to  include  those  who  had  not  conformed,  and  thus  re- 
mained Organized  Militia,  and  those  who  had  conformed,  and  thus  had  become 
National  Guard. 

If  a  man  had  conformed  and  taken  the  new  oath  and  made  the  new  contract, 
he  obligated  himself  for  six  years'  service,  less  the  time  already  served  in  his 
present  enlistment,  and  no  further  oath  or  contract  was  necessary  on  entering 
Federal  service. 

If  he  had  not  conformed  and  retained  his  status  as  a  member  of  the  Organ- 
ized Militia,  he  remained  obligated  to  serve  the  remainder  of  his  original  en- 
listment, and  should  have  presented  himself  under  the  call.  Thereupon  the 
procedure  would  have  been  for  him  to  take  the  muster-in  oath,  but  if  he  did 
not,  he  subjected  himself  to  court-martial,  as  he  also  did  if  he  neglected  to  re- 
spond to  the  President's  call. 

As  to  the  technical  point  presented  by  your  correspondent,  of  his  presenting 
himself  and  being  ordered  by  the  mustering  officer  to  return  home,  requiring  a 
new  call  by  the  President,  it  is  not  thought  that  a  new  call  is  necessary. 

The  mustering  officer  reported  that  men  began  to  muster  in  under  the  Dick 
bill  as  Organized  Militia  on  July  20.1 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  this  call  was  necessarily  made  so  shortly  after  the 
passage  of  the  national-defense  act,  and  before  all  of  its  provisions  could  have 
been  possible  of  fulfillment,  there  has  been  more  or  less  confusion,  but  it  is 
hoped  that  with  patience  and  persistent  endeavor  the  results  of  this  confusion 
will  be  minimized. 

It  is  not  the  desire  of  the  War  Department  to  bring  about  wholesale  courts- 
martial  under  the  circumstances,  but  it  is  plain  that  a  call  by  the  President 
should  be  enforced,  or  chaos  will  result. 
Sincerely,  yours, 

NEWTON  D.  BAKER, 

Secretary  of  War. 

1  Correct  date,  June  20. 


32  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

The  number  of  enlisted  men  of  the  National  Guard  who  have  been 
inspected  is  128,517;  of  this  number  21,884  have  not  taken  the  new 
oath.  This  is  according  >to  latest  information  in  the  Militia  Bureau. 
November  23,  1916. 

One  troop  of  Cavalry  from  -  -  refused  almost  to  a  man  to  take  the  new 
oath,  and  this  delayed  the  muster  in  of  that  organization  until  the  deficiency 
was  made  up  on  the  19th  of  July,  when  it  was  mustered  with  a  strength  of  16 
officers  and  280  enlisted  men ;  also  6  enlisted  men  who  refused  to  take  the  oath. 
These  latter  were  sent  south  with  the  squadron. 

Recommendations:  As  all  the  delays  occasioned  here  were  caused  by  the 
necessity  for  taking  the  oath  to  the  United  States,  and  as  that  condition  can 

no  more  be  found,  it  is  sufficient  to  mention  the  fact.  Good  lawyers  in 

consider  that  the  oath  required  for  the  Organized  Militia  is  quite  as  efficient 
as  that  now  required  on  the  muster-in  roll  or  by  the  national  defense  bill. 
However,  the  new  oath  was  taken  advantage  of  by  a  certain  class,  and  although 
patiently  explained  to  them  in  some  cases  an  explanation  was  not  wanted. 
As  I  understood  at  first  that  it  was  a  condition  precedent  to  muster  in  those 
men  who  refused  to  take  it — in  one  case  an  entire  company ;  they  were  merely 
ignored.  When  your  orders  were  received  to  muster  them  under  the  Dick  law 
the  adjutant  general  of  the  State  was  asked  to  return  them.  He  has  made 
arrangements  to  do  so,  but  has  hardly  had  time  to  get  any  results  so  far.  None 
are  therefore  reported.  A  few  men  of  the  Cavalry  were  in  camp  when  the  order 
was  received  and  they  have  been  sent  to  the  border  with  the  troops — 6  in  all. — 

( Extract  from  report  of  Col.  George  H.  Morgan,  Cav.,  S.  M.  O.,  N.  G.  of , 

July  30,  1916.) 

July  20  the  first  muster  in  under  the  Dick  bill  of  a  member  of  the  Organized 
Militia  who  refused  to  take  the  new  Federal  oath  occurred.  Others  are  ex- 
pected to  follow. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Col.  B.  "B.  Buck,  Inf.,  in- 
spector-instructor, N.  G.  of  -  — ,  July  26,  1916.) 

A  great  deal  of  discussion  arose  over  the  obligations  of  the  new  oath  for 
enlistments  in  the  National  Guard  and  the  muster-in  oath.  Many  telegrams 
were  received  from  prominent  men  in  New  Orleans  advising  the  members  of 
the  batteries  not  to  take  the  oath. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  C.  S.  Blakely, 
Fifth  F.  A.,  inspector-instructor,  N.  G.  of  -  — ,  June  25,  1916. ) 

Another  question  has  arisen  as  to  what  oath  they  shall  take  when  sworn 
into  the  service.  Men  of  many  organizations,  in  conformity  with  instructions 
from  your  office,  took  the  oath  prescribed  in  section  70  of  the  new  law  before 
leaving  their  home  stations;  an  oath  has  been  furnished  me  by  the  chief  mus- 
tering officer  which  I  have  been  directed  to  use,  and  a  third  oath  is  printed 
upon  the  muster  rolls  which  the  men  sign.  The  question  which  oath  is  proper 
has  been  referred  to  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  by  the  chief  mustering 
officer,  but  no  instructions  have  been  received  as  yet  by  me.  It  hardly  seems 
probable  that  these  men  are  to  be  sworn  in  under  all  three  oaths. —  (Extract 
from  report  of  Capt.  Sloan,  inspector-instructor  in  N.  G.  of  -  — ,  July  1.) 

The  California  troops  were  presented  as  Organized  Militia  and  mustered  in 
as  such.  They  were  not  translated  into  National  Guard  troops  under  the 
defense  act. —  (Report  of  Capt.  H.  A.  Hanigan,  Inf.,  U.  S.  A.,  inspector-in- 
structor. ) 

To  the  best  of  my  knowledge  this  regiment  has  been  accepted  without  being 
recognized  as  a  part  of  the  National  Guard.  The  State  is  organizing  two  troops 
of  Cavalry,  which  will  have  an  opportunity  to  come  into  the  Federal  service  in 
the  same  way,  i.  e.,  by  taking  the  new  oath  and  appearing  at  a  mobilization 
camp,  unless  existing  orders  are  revoked. —  (Extract  from  report  Lieut.  Ever- 
ington,  inspector-instructor  in  N.  G.  of  —  — ,  Aug.  2.) 

The  new  oath  of  enlistment  has  been  taken  by  about  85  per  cent  of  the  com- 
mand, and  it  is  believed  that  others  will  be  coerced  or  shamed  into  signing  up 
to-day. —  (Extract  from  report  Lieut.  Everington,  inspector-instructor  in  N.  G. 
of  -  — ,  July  1.) 

The  muster-in  oath  was  administered  only  to  those  members  of  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  who  did  not  desire  to  take  the  new  dual  oath  and  thereby  become 
members  of  the  National  Guard.  In  a  few  instances  enlisted  men  refused  to 
take  the  muster-in  oath — Organized  Militia.  In  these  cases  the  company  com- 
mander was  advised  to  place  the  men  in  arrest  and  to  prefer  charges  against 
them,  it  not  having  been  considered  by  me  that  the  mere  presenting  themselves 
at  the  mobilization  camp  was  a  complete  compliance  with  the  Organized  Militia 
law.— (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  V.  La  S.  Rockwell,  Cav.,  inspector-instruc- 
tor, N.  G.,  of  —  — ,  Sept.  7,  1916.) 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  33 

EFFECT    OF    MOBILIZATION    ON    INSPECTORS    OF    SMALL-ARMS 
PRACTICE,  ORGANIZED  MILITIA. 

The  act  of  January  21,  1903  (Dick  bill),  provided  in  section  3,  that 
in  peace  and  war  in  the  Organized  Militia  there  should  be  an  in- 
spector of  small-arms  practice,  for  a  division  with  the  rank  of  lieu- 
tenant colonel,  for  a  brigade  one  with  the  rank  of  major,  for  a  regi- 
ment of  Cavalry  or  Infantry  one  assistant  inspector  of  small-arms 
practice  with  the  rank  of  captain,  and  for  each  separate  or  un- 
assigned  battalion  of  Infantry  or  engineers,  or  squadron  of  Cavalry, 
one  assistant  inspector  of  small-arms  practice  with  the  rank  of  first 
lieutenant. 

When  the  Organized  Militia  was  called  out,  these  officers  very 
properly  responded  to  the  call.  So  long  as  the  officers  and  men  of 
their  organizations  had  not  taken  the  Federal  oath  they  had  a  legal 
status.  In  the  hurry  and  confusion  of  mustering  troops  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States,  however,  and  due  to  the  fact  the  pro- 
visions of  the  new  law  were  not  generally  understood  at  the  time  of  the 
recent  call  into  Federal  service  of  the  National  Guard,  a  number  of 
inspectors  of  small-arms  practice  w^ere  erroneously  mustered  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States  as  the  fact  appears  to  have  been  over- 
looked that  while  the  Dick  bill  provided  for  inspectors  and  assistant 
inspectors  of  small-arms  practice,  the  national-defense  act  did  not. 

So  long  as  entire  organizations  were  mustered  in  as  Organized 
Militia,  i.  e..  without  taking  the  Federal  oath  of  section  73,  national- 
defense  act,  these  officers  were  properly  a  part  of  the  troops  called 
into  service,  but  when  all  or  any  portion  of  these  organizations  took 
the  Federal  oath,  thus  becoming  National  Guard,  these  officers  had 
in  fact  no  legal  status. 

The  action  of  the  War  Department  in  these  cases  was  that  indicated 
in  the  following  telegram  sent  to  all  department  commanders : 

JULY  27,  1916. 

It  has  been  held  by  the  War  Department  that  inspector  of  small-arms  prac- 
tice is  no  part  of  the  organization  of  the  National  Guard  as  authorized  by 
national-defense  act,  and  that  the  effect  of  the  qualification  of  the  organizations 
under  the  act  was  to  eliminate  such  an  officer  from  the  organization— the  office 
being  abolished.  It  is  also  held  that  an  inspector  of  smell-arms  practice  who. 
without  authority  of  law,  has  been  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United. 
States  as  such  with  an  organization  which  has  been  converted  into  an 
organization  of  the  National  Guard  can  not  be  regarded  even  for  the  pur- 
pose of  appointment,  as  a  member  of  the  National  Guard,  and  that  he  can 
not  be  appointed  an  officer  of  the  National  Guard  unless  he  is  within  one 
or  the  other  of  the  classes  specified  by  section  74,  national-defense  act,  or 
unless  he  enlists  in  the  National  Guard  and  so  by  becoming  a  member  thereof, 
becomes  eligible  for  appointment.  Secretary  of  War  therefore  directs  that  in 
justice  to  the  officers  concerned  all  inspectors  of  small -arms  practice  who 
without  legal  authority  have  already  been  mustered  into  the  Federal  service  be 
honorably  discharged  therefrom  on  or  before  July  31st  instant. 

MCCAIN. 

It  might  be  added,  as  stated  in  a  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  of 
August  11,  that — - 

The  War  Department  does  not  look  with  favor  toward  the  restoration  of  the 
office  of  inspector  of  small-arms  practice.  The  office  of  inspector  of  small-arms 
practice  has  no  tactical  function  when  the  National  Guard  is  called  into  Federal 

72031—16 3 


34  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

service,  and  at  other  times  the  duties  which  have  been  performed  by  the  in- 
cumbents of  the  office  properly  pertain  to  regimental  officers.  The  observation 
of  the  War  Department  indicates  that  generally  the  existence  of  the  office  has 
in  the.  past  relieved  regimental  officers  from  a  sense  of  responsibility  for  the 
instruction  of  their  organizations  in  this  most  important  work,  and  sometimes 
lias  resulted  in  conflict  and  interference.  With  the  pay  allowance  provided  by 
the  national  defense  act  company  and  regimental  officers  .should  be  required  to 
devote  the  necessary  time  and  attention  to  the  instruction  of  their  organizations. 
If  a  special  supervisor  of  target  practice  is  desired  in  particular  cases,  there 
seems  to  be  no  reason  why  the  duty  can  not  be  performed  by  staff  and  other 
officers  of  the  regiments. 

The  War  Department  appreciates  the  unfortunate  position  of  those  inspectors 
of  small-arms  practice  who  were  mustered  into  the  Federal  service  before  the 
provisions  of  the  national  defense  act  on  this  subject  were  generally  understood. 

It  is  believed,  however,  that  the  proper  remedy  to  be  applied  to  these  cases  is 
to  provide  for  their  appointment  to  other  offices  in  which  vacancies  may  exist. 
Such  appointments  are,  of  course,  in  the  hands  of  the  governors  of  the  States. 
It  is  believed  that  as  officers  of  the  former  Organized  Militia  inspectors  of  small- 
arms  practice  were,  under  the  provisions  of  section  73  of  the  national  defense 
act,  eligible  to  be  placed  on  the  reserve  or  unassigned  list  of  the  National  Guard, 
and  that  they  should  now  be  held  to  be  in  that  status,  from  which,  under  the 
provisions  of  section  74,  they  may  be  appointed  to  any  vacancy  now  existent  in 
the  active  National  Guard.  The  view  of  the  War  Department  is  that,  while  the 
office  of  inspector  of  small-arms  practice  was  in  effect  abolished  by  the  national 
defense  act,  it  was  not  the  intention  of  the  act  to  legislate  the  incumbents  out 
of  office  in  the  National  Guard,  nor  to  limit  the  period  of  adjustment  as  a  mo- 
ment of  time. 

It  is  thought,  moreover,  that  line  officers  in  general  should  qualify 
as  instructors  in  rifle  practice  rather  than  to  have  instructors  limited 
to  the  small  number  heretofore  available  as  inspectors  of  small-arms 
practice.  In  several  cases  officers  had  been  mustered  into  United 
States  service  as  brigade  ordnance  officers.  There  being  no  authority 
of  law  for  this,  the  same  action  was  taken  as  observed  in  the  cases 
of  inspectors  of  small-arms  practice. 

DISCHARGES  FROM  SERVICE  AFTER  MOBILIZATION  BY  GOV- 
ERNORS OR  STATE  OFFICIALS  AND  FAILURES  TO  RESPOND  TO 
CALL. 

During  the  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  in  Nebraska  the 
senior  assistant  mustering  officer  reported  that  it  had  come  to  his 
attention  that  many  discharges  of  National  Guardsmen  had  been 
made  in  some  organizations  subsequent  to  the  call  of  the  President 
and  prior  to  the  preparation  of  rolls  for  muster  in.  These  discharges 
had  been  of  two  general  characters.  First,  "  By  order  of  the  gov- 
ernor," the  most  of  which  being  against  the  wishes  and  recommenda- 
tions of  the  commanders  of  the  organizations,  and  upon  personal  ap- 
peals made  to  the  governor  by  relatives  and  friends  of  the  discharged. 
The  governor  ceased  ordering  such  discharges  following  a  letter  on 
this  subject  from  the  senior  assistant  mustering  officer  to  the  adjutant 
general  of  the  State.  Second,  summary  and  more  or  less  informal 
discharges  at  home  stations  had  been  made  by  company  and  other 
commanders  of  men  who  were  considered  undesirable  and  worthless. 
In  Omaha  the  company  commanders  also  eliminated  all  men  whom 
they  were  satisfied  were  physically  disqualified  for  service,  with  the 
result  that  in  the  four  Omaha  companies  there  were  only  21  men  re- 
jected upon  physical  examination.  This  matter  was  referred  to  the 
Judge  Advocate  General  of  the  Army  for  his  opinion,  the  action  in 


ETC.  35 

the  case  being  as  indicated  in  the  following  letter  to  the  Commanding 
General,  Central  Department : 

JULY  28,  1916. 

From :  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 

To:  The  Commanding  General,  Central  Department,  Chicago,  111. 
Subject :  Discharge  of  certain  members  of  Nebraska  National  Guard  subsequent 
to  June  18,  1916. 

1.  With  reference  to  the  question  raised  by  the  mustering  officer  at  Lincoln, 
Nebr.,  with  regard  to  the  authority  of  the  governor  of  Nebraska  to  order  the  dis- 
charge of  men  of  the  Organized  Militia  of  that  State  subsequent  to  the  receipt 
of  the  call  of  the  President,  June  18,  1916,  and  also  with  respect  to  the  authority 
for  certain  discharges  issued  by  certain  militia  commanders,  the  following  opin- 
ion and  recommendation  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General  of  the  Army,  approved 
by  the.  Secretary  of  War,  is  quoted  for  your  information : 

2.  "  It  is  stated  that  these  discharges  were  issued  prior  to  the  preparation  of 
the  rolls  for  muster  in.  and  it  is  understood  that  when  the  discharges  wer^ 
issued  the  men  had  not  qualified  as  members  of  the  National  Guard.     But 
whether  they  had  so  qualified  or  not,  I  think  it  is  clear  that  subsequent  to  the 
receipt  by  the  governor  of  the  call  of  June  18,  1916,  the  discharges  were  unau- 
thorized.    Upon  the  issue  of  the  call  into  the  Federal  service,  if  they  had  not  so 
qualified,  they  became  bound  to  appear  for  muster  in,  and  the  Federal  authority 
alone  could  relieve  them  from  this  obligation.     However,  as  the  discharges  by 
order  of  the  governor  were  issued  under   a  misapprehension  by  him  of  his 
powers,  I  concur  in  the  recommendation  of  the  commanding  general,  Central 
Department,  that  the  discharges  be  approved  and  no  further  action  respecting 
them  taken. 

"  With  respect  to  the  discharges  issued  by  company  and  other  commanders,  it 
appears  that  these  were  of  men  who  were  considered  undesirable,  worthless,  or 
physically  disqualified  for  service,  and  in  my  opinion  these  discharges  should 
also  be  approved  and  no  further  action  be  taken  respecting  them. 

G.  W.  READ,  'Adjutant  General. 

A  somewhat  similar  case  arose  in ,  where  24  men  took  the 

national-defense  oath,  but  before  they  were  mustered  into  the  United 
States  service  they  were  discharged  by  the  State  authorities. 

The  discharges  were  allowed  to  stand  as  being  for  the  convenience 
of  the  Government  under  circumstances  as  stated,  but  the  State 
authorities  were  informed  that  the  action  which  had  been  taken  by 
them  was  without  the  authority  of  law. 

In  one  of  the  States  a  comparison  of  the  muster-in  rolls  with  lists 
of  membership  of  organizations,  as  they  existed  on  June  18,  dis- 
closed the  fact  that  1,375  names  which  appear  on  these  lists  do  not 
appear  on  muster-in  rolls.  In  other  words,  1,375  members  of  the 
National  Guard  or  Organized  Militia  of  this  State  failed  to  answer 
the  call  of  the  President.  The  Federal  Government  did  not  then 
release,  nor  has  it  since  released,  these  men  from  their  obligation  to 
serve  when  called  by  the  President.  Two  thousand  one  hundred  and 
forty-two  new  men  were  enlisted  by  the  State  authorities  of  this 
State  between  the  time  of  the  call  and  the  muster  in.  Considerable 
difficulty  was  experienced  by  some  organizations  to  obtain  the  re- 
quired minimum  number  of  enlisted  men.  One  company,  which  had 
been  organized,  inspected  for  recognition,  and  accepted  by  the  Militia 
Bureau  less  than  a  month  prior  to  the  call  of  the  President  brought 
only  about  15  men  to  the  mobilization  camp.  To  rehabilitate  this 
company  the  officers  and  the  enlisted  men  of  a  prospective  machine- 
gun  company  then  being  in  process  of  organization  were  taken  over 
by  the  first-mentioned  company.  This  prospective  machine-gun  com- 
pany had,  however,  not  been  inspected  for  recognition  or  accepted  by 
the  Militia  Bureau.  It  is  not  known  how  the  officers  of  the  first- 


36  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,    ETC. 

mentioned  company,  whose  date  of  commission  was  May  16.  were 
disposed  of. 

The  State  and  National  Guard  authorities  of  this  State,  desiring 
to  make  a  good  record  for  promptness  in  the  transition  from  the 
status  of  Organized  Militia  to  that  of  National  Guard,  had  taken 
steps  to  have  the  members  of  its  Organized  Militia  take  the  new  oath 
prescribed  in  the  new  national-defense  act  as  soon  as  possible  after 
the  approval  of  this  act. 

The  men  who  were  on  the  rolls  of  organizations  June  18  and  who 
did  not  report  for  muster  in  either  had  or  had  not  taken  the  new 
oath.  All  had  taken  the  old  oath  and  were  in  service  on  June  3, 
1916,  under  that  oath.  That  they  all,  whether  bound  by  the  new  oath 
or  the  old,  were  included  in  the  call  of  the  President  of  June  18  is 
admitted. 

It  was  found  that  all  of  the  enlisted  men,  members  of  organiza- 
tions on  June  18,  who  reported  at  the  mobilization  camp  with  their 
companies  had  not  taken  the  new  oath,  and  some  difficulty  was  en- 
countered by  some  organization  commanders  to  persuade  some  of 
these  men  to  take  the  new  oath.  Some  others  who  came  to  the  mo- 
bilization camp  as  members  of  organizations  refused  to  take  and  did 
not  take  the  new  oath,  and  some  refused  to  sign  the  muster-in  rolls. 
When  such  cases  of  refusal  presented  themselves  organization  com- 
manders applied  to  the  adjutant  general  of  the  State,  who  was  in 
camp  at  the  time,  or  to  the  commanding  general  of  the  guard  for 
advice.  But  it  appeared  that  no  definite  line  of  action  in  such  cases 
had  been  decided  upon,  and  organization  commanders  were  finally 
instructed  to  let  the  men  go.  The  State  has  not,  as  far  as  known, 
taken  any  action  in  these  cases  nor  in  those  of  the  1,375  men  who 
failed  to  answer  the  call  of  the  President  and  who  never  appeared 
at  the  mobilization  camp. 

When  the  mustering  officer  became  urgent  in  his  request  that  the 
State  authorities  take  action  in  these  cases  and  hold  these  men  to 
service  either  under  the  provisions  of  the  new  national  defense  act 
or  under  those  of  the  Dick  bill,  a  copy  of  <"  '*  Executive  order  was,  on 
July  19.  furnished  him,  which  order  w^s  dated  June  10,  and  which 
directed,  first,  that  all  enlisted  men  refusing  to  take  the  oath  pre- 
scribed in  the  new  national-defense  act  will  be  immediately  dis- 
charged, and,  second,  that  all  enlisted  men  who  had  not  taken  the 
new  oath  on  or  before  June  15  will  be  discharged  and  their  names 
dropped  from  the  rolls  on  such  date. 

That  this  order  was  not  in  existence  in  any  visible  form  and  not 
known  to  the  organization  commanders  prior  to  the  departure  of  the 
last  organizations  from  the  mobilization  camp  for  the  border  can 
admit  of  no  doubt,  for  men  who  had  not  taken  the  oath  by  June  15 
had  not  been  discharged,  as  required  by  the  terms  of  the  order,  but 
had  been  brought  to  the  mobilization  camp,  where  some  did  and 
others  did  not  take  the  oath.  Also  organization  commanders,  in  the 
cases  of  the  men  who  refused  to  take  the  new  oath,  did  not  know 
just  w7hat  to  do,  and  the  adjutant  general  seemed  to  be  unable  to 
advise  them  what  steps  to  take. 

Based  on  this  order,  which  made  its  appearance  after  the  middle 
of  July,  but  which  is  dated  June  10,  the  National  Guard  authorities 
of  this  State  claim  that  there  was  no  Organized  Militia  in  the  State 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  37 

on  date  of  call  of  the  President  of  June  18,  and  that  all  the  men 
were  either  in  the  National  Guard  under  the  new  law  or  out  of 
service.  And  this  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  organizations 
of  this  State  were  inspected  at  the  mobilization  camp  by  the  muster- 
ing officer  for  recognition  by  the  Militia  Bureau  as  "  National 
Guard  "  and  were  so  recognized  by  that  bureau  upon  receipt  of  re- 
port of  such  inspection  and  were  subsequently  mustered  in  the  Fed- 
eral service. 

It  is  held  that  the  action  of  the  State  and  National  Guard  authori- 
iks  in  thus  releasing  from  service  men  who  had  failed  to  take  the 
new  oath  was  illegal,  and  that  the  State  failed  in  its  duty  when  it 
did  not  adopt  efficient  measures  to  bring  every  absent  member  of 
the  organizations  included  in  the  call  of  the  President  to  the  mobiliza- 
tion camp  or  to  proceed  otherwise  against  them. 

The  following  is  a  report  of  an  officer  on  duty  in  the  same  State : 

1.  In  compliance  with  your  letter  this  date  the  following  is  submitted: 

•2.  A  personal  check  made  by  me  of  muster-in  rolls,  physical  examination 
forms,  and  list  of  members  of  —  -  National  Guard  furnished  by  the  adjutant 
general  of  the  State  from  files  of  enlistment  contracts  at  —  — ,  disclosed  the 

following  number  of  officers  and  men  in  the  National  Guard  of on  June 

19,  1916,  who  failed  to  report  at  the  call  of  the  President,  1,375,  or  about  30 
per  cent.  This  does  not  include  an  entire  organization  from  —  — ,  mention 
of  which  will  be  made  later.  Number  of  men  enlisted  after  the  call  and  before 
muster  in,  2,142,  or  about  39  per  cent.  Discharged  for  physical  disability  prior 
to  departure  for  the  border  702,  or  about  13  per  cent. 

;>.  I  mustered  in  only  two  regiments,  the  -  -  and  -  -  Infantry.  In 
the  first  there  were  three  instances  of  men  refusing  to  take  the  Federal  oath 
after  arrival  in  camp.  In  the  fourth  only  15  men  of  the  -  -  company 
reported  at  camp  for  muster  in.  *  *  *  They  were  assigned  to  another 
organization  of  the  same  regiment  *  *  *  and  a  new  organization  from 
-  formed  to  take  their  place.  In  at  least  twro  instances,  Companies  - 
and  — ,  muster  in  was  delayed  24  hours  until  the  captains  could  get  the 
minimum  necessary  to  sign  the  muster  rolls.  What  methods  the  company 
officers  used  to  obtain  the  requisite  number  of  men  (65)  I  am  unable  to  state, 
but  a  letter  from  the  captain  of  Company  —  to  a  National  Guard  recruiting 
officer  advises  that  it  would  be  useless  to  attempt  to  obtain  recruits  at  - 
(home  station  of  Company  — )  until  the  present  feeling  against  the  captain 
and  his  organization  dies  down.  Affidavits  have  been  submitted  through  this 
office  that  officers  of  Company  — ,  -  -  Infantry,  resorted  to  threats 

and  the  use  of  liquor  in  order  to  obtain  the  required  number  of  enlisted  men. 

4.  The  order  issued  by  the  State  authorities  dated  June  10  was  not  in  ex- 
istence at  time  of  muster  in  of  these  organizations  or  these  men  who  were 
presumably  discharged  would  never  have  been  brought  to  camp.  No  one  in 
<-amp  knew  of  its  existence —not  even  the  adjutant  general  whose  signature 
authenticates  it — as  evidenced  by  his  asking  as  to  what  to  do  with  these  men 
who  refused  to  take  the  oath. 

EXECUTIVE    ORDER. 

1.  Under  the  provisions  of  the  act  approved  June  3,  1916.  officers  and  enlisted 
men  failing  to  immediately  take  the  oath  therein  prescribed  are  not  recognized 
as  members  of  the  National  Guard.     Enlisted  men  refusing  to  take  such  oath 
will  be  immediately  discharged. 

2.  All  enlisted  men  who  do  not  take  their  required  oath  on  or  before  June 
15,  1916.  will  be  discharged  and  their  names  dropped  from  the  roll  on  such 
date. 


Governor. 
By  the  governor: 


Tlie  Adjutant  General. 


38  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

FAILURE  OF  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD  IN  TO  RESPOND  TO 

THE  CALL  OF  THE  PRESIDENT. 

The  Militia  of  -  -  responded  to  the  call,  not  in  its  entirety, 
as  there  were  numerous  cases  where  sickness,  absence  from  the 
State,  important  other  obligations  prevented  the  appearance  of  indi- 
viduals— just  how  many  can  never  be  accurately  determined,  but  the 
great  majority  responded. 

The  chief  trouble  in  -  -  arose  from  the  fact  that  the  State 
authorities  and  a  large  majority  of  the  officers  of  the  organiza- 
tions desired  to  present  themselves  in  the  new  status  of  National 
Guards  at  a  time  when  the  provisions  of  the  national  defense  act 
were  but  little  known  to  the  enlisted  men,  being  chiefly  understood 
as  a  six-year  enlistment,  Avhich  was  to  take  the  place  of  the  periods 
of  one,  two,  or  three  years  provided  by  the  State  law  up  to  that 
time.  This  new  requirement — an  obligation  to  serve  six  years — was 
not  received  with  any  degree  of  enthusiasm  by  the  enlisted  personnel 
of  the  Organized  Militia.  Many  stated  they  were  ready  to  carry 
out  their  existing  contracts,  but  were  not  willing  to  extend  their 
obligations  to  a  period  of  six  years  less  the  time  served  in  current 
enlistment.  This  state  of  affairs  threatened  a  deadlock  in  some 
organizations  between  the  officers,  who  desired  to  enter  the  United 
States  service  as  National  Guards,  and  the  men  when  the  troops 
reached  the  mobilization  camp.  All  kinds  of  runners  were  afloat 
as  to  the  requirements  of  the  new  law.  A  very  few  officers  of  the 
National  Guard  had  authoritative  copies  of  the  law.  Abbreviated 
reports  of  the  law  as  printed  in  the  daily  papers  had  to  be  relied 
upon  largely.  These  were  varied  and  uncertain.  Discussions  were 
numerous  in  the  camp.  It  was  reported  to  the  senior  mustering 
officer  several  times  that  the  men  of  certain  organizations  were 
positively  not  going  to  take  the  new  oath.  But  finally  a  majority 
of  all  organizations  subscribed  to  the  new  oath.  It  became  certain 
that  the  Organized  Militia  of  -  -  would  be  transformed  into 

National  Guards  as  defined  in  the  new  law.  There  were,  how- 
ever, several  hundreds  of  enlisted  men  who  steadily  declined  to  take 
the  new  oath.  At  this  time  peremptory  orders  to  send  organizations 
to  the  border  at  minimum  strength  if  necessary  were  received.  The 
organized  militiamen  who  refused  to  take  the  new  oath  were  vari- 
ously told  by  their  company  and  regimental  officers  to  go  to  their 
homes  and  there  await  orders  or  to  return  to  their  armories,  deposit 
their  uniforms  there,  and  do  as  they  liked  about  it ;  that  they  were 
no  longer  members  of  the  organization  which  was  now  transformed 
into  National  Guard,  or  that  as  they  refused  to  take  the  new  oath 
they  were  automatically  released  from  further  obligation  in  the 
matter,  or  to  go  to  their  homes  and  their  discharges  would  be  sent 
to  them.  Officers  had  been  informed  by  the  senior  assistant  muster- 
ing officer  that  he  hacl  nothing  to  do  with  the  choice  made  by  or- 
ganizations or  individual  members  in  the  matter  of  taking  the  new 
oath ;  that  if  they  took  the  oath  and  were  transformed  into  National 
Guards  they  would  be  mustered  in  as  such,  otherwise  they  would 
be  mustered  in  as  Organized  Militia. 

At  this  time  it  had  not  developed,  so  far  as  the  senior  assistant 
mustering  officer  was  concerned,  that  an  organization  which  had  been 
transformed  as  National  Guard  and  so  mustered  in,  could  also  have 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC.  39 

as  members  those  individuals  who  had  refused  to  take  the  new  oath. 
This  fact  developed  and  the  principle  was  announced  in  telegram, 
headquarters,  Eastern  Department,  July  19,  1916,  relating  to  the 
muster  in  of  a  noncommissioned  officer  of  the  Organized  Militia,  be- 
longing to  -  — .  This  instituted  in  -  -  the  situation  of  organi- 
zations being  composed  of  members  of  the  National  Guard  and  of 
the  Organized  Militia  also. 

After  the  muster  in  of  'the  organizations  of  the  State  as  National 
Guards,  it  was  then  seriously  questioned  by  legal  authorities  in  the 
State  that  any  obligation  to  serve  the  United  States  in  any  military 
capacity  rested  on  members  of  the  Organized  Militia  who  had  failed 
or  declined  to  take  the  new  Federal  oath,  it  being  held  by  many  that 
the  national  defense  act  operated  to  abrogate  the  Dick  bill.  So  cer- 
tain about  this  were  the  State  military  authorities  that  they  began 
preparations  to  discharge  all  such  remaining  members.  About  60 
such  discharges  were  prepared  at  the  statehouse,  but  were  not  deliv- 
ered because  a  letter  dated  headquarters,  Eastern  Department,  July 
11.  1916,  quoting  telegram  from  the  War  Department,  dated  July  7, 
was  received  by  the  adjutant  general  of  -  — .  in  which  he  was 
informed,  "  Members  of  the  Organized  Militia  of  -  -  called  for 
by  the  President  on  June  18,  1916,  who  refuse  to  qualify  as  mem- 
bers of  the  National  Guard  under  the  provisions  of  the  national 
defense  act  should  be  mustered  for  service  under  section  7  of  the 
Dick  bill."  When  this  letter  was  received  at  the  statehouse  the  dis- 
charges were  destroyed  or  withheld  and  a  general  order  was  issued 
by  the  State  incorporating  for  information  of  the  members  of  the 
Organized  Militia  the  department  commander's  letter.  This  affected 
about  1.000  organized  militiamen.  In  response  to  this  order  278 
members  of  the  Organized  Militia  presented  themselves  for  muster  in 
under  their  existing  contracts  of  enlistment  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  the  Dick  bill.  About  100  of  these,  upon  muster  in,  im- 
mediately applied  for  their  discharge  on  account  of  dependent  rela- 
tives, a  majority  of  the  applicants  receiving  their  discharge. 

It  was  at  this  time,  August  4,  that  an  application,  through  a  writ  of 
habeas  corpus,  was  made  by  -  — ,  Squadron  Cavalry,  - 
Organized  Militia,  for  his  discharge  from  the  military  custody  of 
the  United  States.  The  case  was  heard  before  -  — ,  resulting  in 
the  issuance  of  the  writ  and  the  order  of  the  court  for  the  release  of 
Private  -  — .  The  case  was  appealed  to  the  United  States  Circuit 
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  First  Circuit.  The  case  was  heard  in  the 
October  term.  1916,  and  the  order  of  the  district  court  was  vacated, 
with  directions  "  that  the  petitioner  be  returned  to  the  military  cus- 
tody from  which  he  was  taken."  The  issue  raised  in  the  petition  for 
writ  of  habeas  corpus  was  as  to  the  authority  of  the  President  over 
— ,  as  the  latter  had  never  taken  the  Federal  oath.  It  was  claimed 
by  petitioner  that  the  Organized  Militia  ceased  to  exist  on  June  3, 
when  the  national  defense  act  was  approved,  and  that  the  President, 
therefore,  had  no  authority  to  call  petitioner  into  the  Federal  service. 
There  were  four 'other  writs  issued  in  four  other  cases  identical  with 
that  of  -  — ,  which,  by  agreement,  were  to  be  disposed  of  in 
accordance  with  the  decision  in  the  -  -  case.  At  the  present  date 
it  has  not  developed  whether  petitioner  will  appeal  the  case,  30  days 
being  allowed  for  such  action. 


40 

DISCHARGE  FROM  SERVICE  AFTER  MOBILIZATION  ON  ACCOUNT 
OF  DEPENDENT  RELATIVES. 

Immediately  following  both  the  first  and  second  calls  a  great  num- 
ber of  applications  for  the  discharge  of  men  on  account  of  dependent 
relatives  were  received.  This  gave  the  War  Department  no  little 
embarrassment  at  the  very  time  that  it  was  making  every  effort  to 
get  men  mustered  in  and  forAvarded  to  the  border. 

It  was  known  when  these  men  enlisted  in  the  Organized  Militia 
that  they  Avere  subject  to  just  such  calls  as  Avere  made  on  May  9  and 
June  18,  and  manifestly  they  never  should  haA'e  been  allowed  to  enter 
the  service.  Their  being  on  the  rolls  at  that  time  proved  a  serious 
embarrassment  both  to  the  State  and  National  Governments,  which 
should  have  been  foreseen  by  those  who  originally  enlisted  them. 

The  question  whether  General  Order  No.  31,  War  Department, 
1914,  relating  to  the  discharge  of  enlisted  men  in  the  Regular  Army 
on  account  of  dependent  relates  was  applicable  to  militia  after 
muster  into  the  Federal  service  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
War  Department  through  inquiry  made  by  the  commanding  general, 
Southern  Department,  May  20  on  behalf  of  14  enlisted  men  of  Com- 
pany I,  Fourth  Texas  Infantry. 

The  view  taken  at  this  time,  and  so  announced,  was  that  the  order 
in  question  was  applicable  only  to  the  Regular  Army,  and  was  not 
applicable  to  the  National  Guard  owing  to  its  temporary  character. 

Section  29  of  the  act  of  June  3,  1916,  contains  a  provision  "that 
when  by  reason  of  death  or  disability  of  a  member  of  the  family  of 
an  enlisted  man,  occurring  after  his  enlistment,  members  of  his  family 
become  dependent  upon  him  for  support,  he  may,  in  the  discretion 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  be  discharged  from  the  service  of  the  United 
States  or  be  furloughed  to  the  Regular  Army  Reserve,  upon  due  proof 
being  made  of  such  condition/'  This,  hoAvever,  applies  only  to  the 
Regular  Army. 

To  meet  a  similar  need  in  the  National  Guard  the  following  orders 
were  published,  the  provisions  of  which  are  even  more  liberal  than 
those  in  section  29  above  quoted : 

BULLETIN  \  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

No.  20.     /  Washington,  July  IS,  1916. 

The  following  rules  are  prescribed  for  observance  in  the  cases  of  enlisted 
men  of  the  National  Guard  or  the  Organized  Militia  who  are  called  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States  and  who  have  dependent  relatives  : 

(a)  Department  commanders  may  issue  discharges  to  enlisted  men.  except 
noncommissioned  officers,  of  the  National  Guard  or  Organized  Militia  called  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States  who  are  serving  within  their  respective  de- 
partments, provided  applications  for  discharge  are  made  to  them  in  due  form, 
through  military  channels,  setting  forth  that  the  applicant  has  one  or  more 
relatives  who  are  dependent  upon  him  for  support,  each  application  to  be  accom- 
panied by  adequate  written  evidence  of  real  dependency.  Applications  from 
noncommissioned  officers  for  discharge  under  the  conditions  referred  to  herein 
will  be  forwarded  to  the  War  Department  for  action. 

(I))  When  it  comes  to  the  knowledge  of  a  commanding  officer,  through  au- 
thentic sources,  that  a  soldier  of  his  command  has  one  or  more  dependent  rela- 
tives, the  soldier  concerned  will  be  informed  of  his  right  to  make  application 
for  discharge  on  that  account,  and  the  discharge  will  be  issued  upon  application 
if  warranted  by  the  circumstances.  Should  the  soldier  express  a  desire  to 
remain  in  the  service  and  at  the  same  time  decline  to  allot  any  portion  of  his 
pay  to  his  family  or  dependents,  the  case  will  be  reported  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment for  final  action. 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  41 

(c)  When  an  application  for  discharge  has  been  finally  approved,  the  proper 
recruiting  agencies  will  be  at  once  informed,  so  that  the  vacancy  caused  may  be 
filled  as  promptly  as  possible.  Recruiting  and  mustering  officers  will  be  enjoined 
to  avoid  the  acceptance  of  recruits  having  relatives  dependent  upon  them  for 
support.  Department  commanders  will  report  to  the  War  Department  at  the 
close  of  each  month  the  number  of  soldiers  discharged  by  them  under  these 
instructions  during  the  month  for  which  the  report  is  made. 
[2426477,  A.  G.  O.] 

BY  ORDER  OF  THE   SECRETARY  OF  WAR  I 

H.  L.  SCOTT, 
Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 

OFFICIAL  : 

H.  P.  McGAix, 

The  Adjutant  General. 

These  instructions  were  in  force  only  until  September  25,  when 
rescinded  by  Bulletin  No.  36,  War  Department,  the  occasion  of  this 
being  that  Congress  had  made  other  provisions  for  the  dependent 
relatives  of  national  guardsmen,  as  indicated  in  General  Orders, 
No.  42,  as  follows : 

GENERAL  ORDERS,!  WAE  DEPARTMENT, 

No.  42.  /  Washington,  September  1,  1916. 

The  following  extract  from  an  act  of  Congress  approved  August  29,  1916, 
and  instructions  relative  thereto  are  published  for  the  information  and  guid- 
ance of  all  concerned : 

1.  "An  act  making  appropriations  for  the  support  of  the  Army  for  the  fiscal 
year  ending  June  30,  1917,  and  for  other  purposes." 

******* 

"  That  the  sum  of  $2,000,000  is  hereby  appropriated  out  of  any  money  in 
the  Treasury  not  otherwise  appropriated,  to  be  expended  under  the  direction 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  under  such  rules  and  regulations  as  he  may  pre- 
scribe, for  the  support  of,  at  a  cost  of  not  more  than  $50  per  month,  or  so 
much  of  said  amount  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  deem  necessary,  and  not 
more  than  such  enlisted  man  has  been  contributing  monthly  to  the  support 
of  his  family  at  the  time  of  his  being  called  or  drafted  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  or  during  his  enlistment  period  in  the  Regular  Army  at  the  time 
of  such  call  or  draft  of  the  Organized  Militia  or  National  Guard,  the  family 
of  each  enlisted  man  of  the  Organized  Militia  or  National  Guard  called  or 
drafted  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  until  his  discharge  from  such 
service,  and  the  family  of  each  enlisted  man  of  the  Regular  Army  until  his 
discharge  from  active  service  therein  or  until  the  discharge  of  the  Organized 
Militia  or  National  Guard  from  such  service  if  such  enlisted  man  is  at  that 
time  in  active  service  in  the  Regular  Army,  which  family  during  the  term  of 
service  of  such  enlisted  man  has  no  other  income,  except  the  pay  of  such 
enlisted  man,  adequate  for  the  support  of  said  family :  Provided,  That  the 
action  of  the  Secretary  of  War  in  all  cases  provided  for  in  this  paragraph  shall 
be  final,  and  no  right  to  prosecute  a  suit  in  the  Court  of  Claims  or  in  any 
other  court  of  the  United  States  against  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
shall  accrue  to  such  enlisted  man,  or  to  any  member  of  the  family  of  any  such 
enlisted  man,  by  virtue  of  the  passage  of  this  act :  And  provided  further,  That 
this  paragraph  shall  not  apply  to  any  such  enlisted  man  who  shall  marry  after 
the  fifteenth  day  of  July,  nineteen  hundred  and  sixteen ;  and  the  word  '  family ' 
shall  include  only  wife,  children,  and  dependent  mothers." 

2.  Construing  this  provision,  the  Comptroller  of  the  Treasury,  on  August  30, 
1916,  held  that: 

(a)  Only  the  families  of  those  men  of  the  Militia  or  National  Guard  who 
were  brought  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  under  the  call  of  the  Presi- 
dent are  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  the  act.  The  family  of  a  man  enlisting  in 
the  Militia  or  National  Guard  of  Texas,  New  Mexico,  or  Arizona  after  May  9, 
and  that  of  a  man  enlisting  in  the  Militia  or  National  Guard  of  the  other  States 
after  June  18,  1916,  are  not  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  the  act.  The  amount 
paid  to  the  family  of  an  enlisted  man  of  the  Militia  or  National  Guard  may 
be  paid  to  the  family  of  such  soldier  until  his  discharge  from  the  service. 


42  MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   OEGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC. 

(&)  The  amount  which  may  be  paid  to  the  family  of  an  enlisted  man  in  the 
Regular  Army  is  the  amount  the  soldier  was  contributing  to  the  support  of 
his  family  on  June  18,  1916,  the  time  of  the  President's  general  call.  The 
family  of  a  man  enlisting  or  reenlisting  in  the  Regular  Army  after  June  18, 
1916,  is  not  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  the  act. 

(c)  The  benefits  of  the  act  do  not  extend  to  the  families  of  enlisted  men  of 
the  Porto  Rico  Regiment  of  Infantry  or  the  Philippine  Scouts. 

(d)  Since  members  of  the  Regular  Army  Reserve  had  not  been  called  to  the 
colors  and  were  not  in  active  service  at  the  time  of  the  call  of  the  President 
of  June  18,  1916,  which  brought  the  Militia  or  National  Guard  as  a  body  into 
the  actual  service  of  the  United  States,  the  families  of  members  of  the  Regular 
Army  Reserve  are  not  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  the  act. 

(e)  The  law  is  not  retroactive,  and  its  benefits,  therefore,  do  not  begin  until 
the  date  of  its  approval,  August  29,  1916. 

3.  Immediately  upon  receipt  of  this  order  the  provisions  thereof  will  be  read 
by  company  and  other  commanding  officers  to  all  enlisted  men  of  their  com- 
mands and  the  men  advised  that  they  are  privileged  to  make  application  for 
the  support  of  their  families.     Men  who  claim  to  have  dependent  families  in 
contemplation  of  the  law  will  thereupon  be  furnished  by  their  commanding  offi- 
cers with  the  form  prescribed  for  making  application  for  support  of  families. 
These  forms  will  be  furnished  to  all  department  commanders  for  distribution  to 
all  posts  and  stations  within  the  territorial  limits  of  their  commands,  whether 
under  their  administrative  control  or  not. 

Distribution  should  not  be  made  to  organzations  of  the  Porto  Rico  Regiment 
of  Infantry  or  the  Philippine  Scouts. 

4.  The  application  form,  when  executed  by  the  man  and  certified  to  by  his 
organization  commander,  will  be  forwarded  directly  to  the  Depot  Quartermaster, 
Washington,  D.  C.     To  avoid  delays  incident  to  the  return  of  these  forms  for 
correction,  the  organization  commanders  will  see  that  the  forms  are  properly 
prepared  by  the  men. 

5.  The  attention  of  all  concerned  is  called  to  the  fact  that  the  word  "  family  " 
as  used  in  the  law  includes  only  wife,  children,  and  dependent  mothers. 

6.  When  the  application  is  forwarded  to  the  Depot  Quartermaster,  entry  to 
that  effect  will  be  made  on  the  soldier's  descriptive  list,  and,  in  the  event  of 
the  soldier's  death,  discharge,  muster-out,  furlough  to  the  reserve,  or  desertion, 
such  fact  will  be  immediately  reported  by  the  soldier's  immediate  commanding 
officer  to  the  Depot  Quartermaster,  Washington,  D.  C.,  or  in  the  Philippine  and 
Hawaiian  Department  to  the  adjutants  of  those  departments.     In  the  Philip- 
pine and  Hawaiian  Departments,  except  in  case  of  deaths  which  are  otherwise 
reported,  the  department  commanders  will  send  by  cable  notification  to  The 
Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  who  will  at  once  notify  the  Quartermaster 
General. 

[2455574  A.  G.  O.] 
BY  ORDER  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  : 

H.  L.   SCOTT, 

Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 
OFFICIAL  : 

H.  P.  MCCAIN, 

The  Adjutant  General. 

Up  to  November  30  there  had  been  $983,108.11  disbursed  of  the 
$2,000,000  appropriated  by  this  act,  of  which  $923,495.15  was  on 
account  of  the  National  Guard  and  $59,612.96  on  account  of  the 
Regular  Army. 

The  status  of  enlisted  men  discharged  from  the  Federal  service  on 
account  of  dependent  relatives  may  at  present  be  regarded  as  being 
held  in  abeyance  per  decision  of  September  6,  1916,  on  such  cases  by 
the  Secretary  of  War,  as  follows: 

Discharge  as  discussed  in  the  foregoing  papers  should  be  held  to  release  a 
man  from  service  to  the  United  States  under  the  present  call  of  the  President, 
but  should  return  him  to  the  National  Guard  until  such  time  as,  under  general 
regulations,  the  National  Guard  is  reorganized  and  undesirable  classes  of  en- 
listed men  excluded  therefrom. 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  43 

RELEASE   FROM    SERVICE   OF    STUDENTS    OF    EDUCATIONAL 

INSTITUTIONS. 

When  the  State  troops  were  called  out  on  June  18  there  were  a 
number  of  National  Guard  organizations  wholly  composed  of  under- 
graduates of  colleges,  and  in  other  cases  there  were  organizations 
composed  in  part  of  such  students. 

Naturally,  these  men  sought  relief  from  military  service,  and  to 
meet  this  demand  the  Chief  of  the  Militia  Bureau  on  August  2  ad- 
dressed the  following  letter  to  the  adjutants  general  of  all  States 
having  field  artillery  and  to  all  inspectors  of  field  artillery : 

I  am  directed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  inform  you  that  the  following  policy 
is  adopted  with  reference  to  the  National  Guard  organizations  composed  of 
undergraduates  of  colleges,  and  the  same  policy  will  be  applied  to  all  individuals 
who  are  members  of  other  organizations  of  the  National  Guard  and  who  can 
show  bona  fide  intention  of  entering  or  returning  to  colleges  or  schools  at  the 
commencement  of  the  fall  term  in  1916 : 

1.  The  organizations  which  are  composed  of  students  of  colleges  or  schools 
and  which  have  been  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  will  remain 
in  that  service  for  the  time  being.     Those  organizations  which  have  not  been 
sent  to  the  Mexican  border  prior  to  August  1,  1916,  will  not  be  sent  there  unless 
some  unforeseen  need  arises  for  their  services. 

2.  Should  the  National  Guard  be  retained  in  the  service  of  the  United  States 
until  September  1.  1916.  all  organizations  composed  of  students  of  colleges  or 
schools  will  be  returned  to  their  home  stations  on  September  1,  1916,  and  will 
be  mustered  out  of  the  service  of  the  United  States  as  soon  thereafter  as  prac- 
ticable, unless  the  military  situation  at  that  time  shall  be  such  as  to  render 
their  retention  in  the  service  necessary.     All  individuals  of  other  organizations 
of  the  National  Guard  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  who  can 
show  a  bona  fide  intention  of  entering  or  returning  to  colleges  or  schools  at  the 
beginning  of  the  fall  term  in  1916  will  be  discharged  as  soon  as  practicable  after 
September  1,  1916.  unless  the  military  situation  at  that  time  shall  be  such  as  to 
render  their  retention  in  the  service  necessary. 

3.  Immediately  after  mustering  out  the  organizations  composed  of  students 
of  colleges  or  schools,  Federal  recognition  will  be  withdrawn  from  such  organi- 
zations as  a  part  of  the  National  Guard. 

4.  Should  any  college  or  school  whose  students  composed  the  membership  of 
an  organization  from  which  Federal  recognition  is  withdrawn  under  the  pro- 
visions of  paragraph  3  desire  to  maintain  a  division  of  the  Reserve  Officers' 
Training  Corps,  the  authorities  thereof  will  make  application  as  soon  as  prac- 
ticable for  such  division  to  be  authorized  under  the  regulations  to  be  prescribed 
under  the  provisions  of  the  national-defense  act. 

Subsequently,  it  was  found  impracticable  to  completely  carry  out 
this  policy,  for  reasons  set  forth  in  the  following  letter  from  the 
Secretary  of  War  of  September  9 : 

When  the  militia  were  first  called  out  the  call  reached  several  purely  student 
organizations  which  had  been  formed  in  various  colleges  in  the  country  and 
associated  with  the  State  militia  merely  because  there  was  no  legislative  pro- 
vision for  officers'  reserve  corps,  and  no  other  easier  way  for  providing  arms 
and  training  for  college  students  who  would  thus  be  made  available  for  mem- 
bership in  an  officers'  reserve.  I  therefore  directed  that  on  the  1st  of  Septem- 
ber these  student  groups — who  could  not  properly  be  regarded  as  State  militia 
in  a  narrow  sense,  because  for  the  most  part  their  members  were  not  residents 
of  the  State  in  which  they  were  attending  college — be  released  from  the  service, 
and  at  the  same  time  directed  that,  if  practicable,  individual  students  in  other 
militia  organizations  should  be  so  released.  A  canvass  of  the  situation  devel- 
oped a  good  many  thousand  such  students  in  the  regiments  on  the  border,  and  I 
became  satisfied  that  any  general  release  of  high-school  and  college  students 
would  produce  profound  disorganization  in  the  regiments  which  are  doing  bor- 
der service.  I  was  therefore  obliged  to  suspend  the  original  order  applying  to 
individual  members,  and  so  far  have  not  seen  my  way  clear  to  afford  them 
relief.  I  earnestly  hope  this  border  service  will  not  have  to  be  indefinitely 


44 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 


extended,  and  that  the  interference  with  the  work  of  the  high-school  and  college 
boys,  as  well  as  the  interference  with  the  professional  and  business  activities 
of  the  other  militia  soldiers,  can  be  minimized  as  far  as  possible. 

Student  organizations  mustered  out  of  tlie  service  of  the  United  States. 


Designation. 

Strength. 

Designation. 

Strength. 

Colorado: 

70 

Indiana—  Continued. 
Company  I,  First  Infantry  

57 

69 

Band  Second  Infantry 

26 

Troop  D  Cavalry                 

70 

Minnesota: 

Battery  A  Field  Artillery 

145 

Battery  F,  First  Field  Artillery  

177 

Connecticut: 
Headquarters  and  Batteries,  A,  B, 
C  D  Tenth  Field  Artillery      

513 

Vermont: 
Headquarters    Company,    Supply 
Company,  Machine-gun  Company, 

Illinois: 

and  Company  C,  First  Infantry.  .  . 

1124 

Total                                  .     ... 

1  1,  523 

Battery  B  ,  Field  Artillery  

148 

'  i  Not  including  Company  C,  for  which  no  report  has  been  received. 

DISCHARGE  FROM  SERVICE  OF  GOVERNMENT  EMPLOYEES  AND 
EMPLOYEES  OF  FIRMS  ENGAGED  IN  FABRICATION  OR  SUPPLY 
OF  MUNITIONS. 

The  question  indicated  in  the  heading  above  arose  immediately 
after  the  second  call  through  inquiry  made  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  requesting  the  release  from  military  service  of  certain  em- 
ployees of  the  Washington  Navy  Yard  who  had  associated  them- 
selves with  the  Organized  Militia.  It  was  represented  that  the 
absence  of  these  men  from  the  guard  would  seriously  cripple  the 
Navy. 

The  Chief  of  Ordnance  also  on  behalf  of  a  firm  engaged  in  the 
manufacture  of  munitions  of  war,  suggested  the  relief  from  military 
service  of  persons  occupying  positions  of  importance  to  the  success- 
ful operation  of  private  establishments  which  might  be  needed  to 
serve  the  Government  in  the  execution  of  the  same  purposes  for 
which  the  troops  were  called,  and  whose  withdrawal  from  their  posi- 
tions might  interfere  with  such  execution  to  a  greater  extent  than 
their  services  with  troops  would  forward  it. 

These  matters  having  been  duly  considered,  the  following  general 
order  (G.  O.  No.  33,  War  DepC  July  29,  1916)  was  published  to 
cover  all  such  cases : 

II.  Members  of  organizations  of  the  National  Guard  that  have  been  mustered 
into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  who  are  officers  or  employees  of  Govern- 
ment departments,  the  loss  of  whose  services  would  seriously  hamper  any  of 
the  bureaus  of  those  departments ;  members  who  are  Government  contractors ; 
and  members  who  are  employed  by  such  contractors  in  the  capacities  of  super- 
intendents, foremen,  inspectors,  or  in  any  other  special  skilled  capacity,  the 
loss  of  whose  services  would  seriously  hamper  the  contractors  in  the  fulfillment 
of  contracts  with  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  for  characteristically  or  dis- 
tinctively war  material,  may  be  discharged  from  the  service  in  the  manner  here- 
inafter indicated.  Such  discharges  will  be  ordered  by  department  commanders 
upon  receipt  by  them  of  proper  certification  by  the  proper  heads  of  departments 
or  of  independent  bureaus,  and  in  the  case  of  Government  contractors  or  em- 
ployees thereof,  upon  receipt  of  a  proper  certificate  of  an  officer  of  the  contract- 
ing firm  whose  responsibility  has  been  certified  to  by  the  chief  of  the  supply 
bureau  of  the  War  or  Navy  Departments  under  whom  contracts  are  being 
filled.  Action  toward  the  obtaining  of  any  discharge  under  the  conditions  above 
stated  should  be  initiated  by  the  heads  of  the  Government  departments  or  incle- 


MOBILIZATI6X    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  45 

pendent  bureaus  concerned  or  by  the  heads  of  contracting  firms  supplying  war 
material,  but  no  member  of  the  National  Guard  will  be  discharged  from  the 
service  under  the  provisions  of  this  order  without  his  consent. 

The  substance  of  the  foregoing  has  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
proper  officers  of  the  various  Government  departments  and  independent  bureaus 
located  in  Washington,  D.  C. 
[2416320,  A.  G.  O.] 

BY  ORDER  OF  THE   SECRETARY   OF  WAR  : 

H.  L.  SCOTT, 
Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 

Although,  as  will  be  seen,  the  War  Department  made  prompt  pro- 
vision for  the  discharge  of  such  men  of  the  National  Guard  as  might, 
from  the  nature  of  their  usual  occupations,  better  (so  far  as  Gov- 
ernment interests  are  concerned)  be  so  employed  than  performing 
military  dut}^  the  actual  number  of  such  discharges  of  all  classes  of 
Government  employees  was  less  than  150.  There  were  about  115 
employees  of  the  Navy  discharged  under  this  order. 

The  Chief  of  Ordnance,  United  States  Army,  reported  September 
12  that  inquiry  had  been  made  of  the  various  arsenals  and  inspection 
forces  and  that  no  contractors  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  char- 
acteristic and  distinctive  war  material  are  hampered  in  the  delivery 
of  material  to  the  Ordnance  Department  by  the  calling  out  of  the 
National  Guard. 

DISCHARGE  FROM  FEDERAL  SERVICE  EFFECTS  A  COMPLETE 
SEPARATION  FROM  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD,  STATE  AS  WELL 
AS  FEDERAL  SERVICE. 

Question  having  arisen  as  to  the  nature  of  discharges  to  be  given 
those  members  of  the  National  Guard  who  responded  to  the  call  of 
the  President  but  who  on  the  subsequent  physical  examination  re- 
quired by  section  115,  national  defense  act,  were  rejected  for  ac- 
ceptance into  Federal  service  owing  to  physical  defects,  the  matter 
was  referred  for  opinion  to  the  Judge  Advocate  General,  who  gave 
opinion  as  follows : 

1.  The  views  of  this  office  are  desired  on  the  request  of  the  adjutant  general 
of  the  State  of  Georgia  for  information  with  respect  to  the  discharge  of  mem- 
bers of  the  National  Guard  of  that  State  who  have  been  called  into  the  Federal 
service  and  who  have  been  rejected  owing  to  physical  defects.     He  says  that 
he  is  informed  that  "all  members  of  the  National  Guard  of  this  State  who 
responded  to  the  call  of  the  Secretary  of  War  who  have  been  rejected  for 
acceptance  in  the  Federal  service  owing  to  physical  defect  will  be  discharged 
from  the  service  by  the  War  Department,"  and  requests  that  he  be  advised 
"  if  the  discharge  referred  to  is  a  complete  release  from  the  National  Guard, 
or  only  so  far  as  the  Federal  Government  is  concerned." 

2.  The  statutes  of  the  United  States  define  the  composition  of  the  militia 
to  consist  "  of  all  able-bodied  male  citizens,"  etc.,  and  of  the  National  Guard, 
the   only    authorized   organization    of   militia,    as   consisting   of   the   regularly 
enlisted  militia  and  the  commissioned  officers  between   the  ages  specified  for 
each,   respectively.     The  statute  further  prescribes  the  qualifications  for  en- 
listment and  appointment  therein,  and  provides  that  the  National  Guard  "  when 
called  as  such  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  shall     *     *     *     be  subject 
to  the  laws  and  regulations  governing  the  Regular  Army,  so  far  as  such  laws 
and  regulations  are  applicable  to  officers  and  enlisted  men  whose  permanent 
retention  in  the  military  service,  either  on  the  active  or  retired  list,  is  not  con- 
templated by  existing  law."     (Sec.  101,  national  defense  act,  June  3,  1916.) 

The  national  defense  act  (sec.  72),  respecting  the  discharge  of  enlisted  men 
from  the  National  Guard,  provides: 

"An  enlisted  man  discharged  from  service  in  the  National  Guard  shall  re- 
ceive a  discharge  in  writing  in  such  form  and  with  such  classification  as  is  or 


46 

shall  be  prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army,  and  in  time  of  pence  discharges  may 
be  given  prior  to  the  expiration  of  terms  of  enlistment  under  such  regulations 
as  the  President  m/ny  prescribe" 

It  is  further  provided  in  section  115  of  the  same  act  that  "  every  officer  and 
enlisted  man  of  the  National  Guard  who  shall  be  called  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  as  such  shall  be  examined  as  to  his  physical  fitness  under  such 
regulations  as  the  President  may  prescribe  without  further  commission  or 
enlistment." 

I  understand  that  the  Organized  Militia  of  the  State  of  Georgia  have  qualified 
by  taking  the  oath  prescribed  in  the  national  defense  act,  so  that  their  status 
can  be  properly  regarded  as  members  of  the  National  Guard  provided  for  in 
said  act  called  as  such  into  the  service  of  the  United  States.  I  think  it  is  clear 
from  the  national  defense  act  that  the  National  Guard  occupies  a  dual  status — 
that  is,  as  a  National  force  and  also  as  State  force — and  further  that  no  officer 
or  enlisted  man  can  remain  a  member  of  the  National  Guard  unless  he  is  physi- 
cally qualified  for  Federal  service.  It  is  clear  that  Congress  has  undertaken 
in  the  national  defense  act  to  prescribe  the  qualifications  for  enlistment  or  com- 
mission in  the  National  Guard  and  has  asserted  on  behalf  of  the  United  States 
the  authority  to  prescribe  the  conditions  under  which  enlistments  and  dis- 
charges in  and  from  the  National  Guard  shall  be  made.  Section  72  of  that  act 
restricts  the  discharges  in  time  of  peace  so  that  no  discharges  may  be  given  in 
time  of  peace  "  prior  to  the  expiration  of  terms  of  enlistment "  except  "  under 
such  regulations  as  the  President  may  prescribe.'"  Section  115  of  the  same  act 
provides  for  a  medical  examination  to  determine  the  physical  condition  of  the 
officers  or  enlisted  men  when  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  and 
I  think  it  is  clear  that  an  officer  or  enlisted  man,  upon  being  examined  as  re- 
quired by  that  section  and  found  physically  defective,  must  be  discharged  not 
only  from  the  operation  of  the  call  into  the  Federal  service,  but  also  from  the 
National  Guard.  In  the  case  of  an  enlisted  man  the  discharge,  when  ordered, 
should  be  effected  by  a  discharge  in  writing,  signed  by  the  proper  National 
Guard  commander  under  the  provisions  of  section  72  of  the  national  defense  act, 
and  should  be  so  worded  as  to  show  that  it  is  a  discharge  not  only  from  the 
operation  of  the  Federal  call  but  also  from  the  National  Guard.  With  respect 
to  a  commissioned  officer,  I  think  the  discharge  should  be  ordered  by  the  Presi- 
dent and  should  purport  to  be  a  discharge  from  the  National  Guard. 

The  above  opinion  was  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 
RESIGNATIONS  OF  OFFICERS. 

During  the  latter  part  of  August  a  large  number  of  resignations  on 
the  part  of  National  Guard  officers  were  received  at  the  War  Depart- 
ment, the  policy  of  which  was  announced  in  the  following  telegram  to 
the  commanding  general.  Southern  Department,  September  4,  1916: 

Secretary  War  is  returning  several  tenders  of  resignations  last  received  from 
your  headquarters  with  his  action  thereon.  This  action  will  indicate  to  you  the 
general  policy  be  intends  to  follow.  Tenders  of  resignations  for  ordinary  busi- 
ness or  family  reasons  will  be  disapproved.  This  will  be  especially  true  of 
medical  officers  who  can  not  be  permitted  to  leave  their  commands,  which  are 
in  an  unusual  degree  dependent  upon  sufficient  medical  attention  for  their  effi- 
ciency. Discharges  of  enlisted  men  are  no  longer  permitted  for  business  or 
family  reasons  because  of  provisions  Congress  has  made  for  support  of  relatives. 
It  is  not  proper  to  permit  officers  to  leave  their  commands  for  reasons  which  are 
not  accepted  in  case  of  enlisted  men.  Some  cases  of  resignation  are  noted  where 
it  is  evident  that  disciplinary  action  and  not  resignation  is  proper.  In  numerous 
cases  it  is  noted  officers  tender  resignations  because  they  are  not  sufficiently 
instructed  to  perform  their  duties.  Such  cases  should  be  met  by  special  instruc- 
tion and  not  by  resignation. 

MCCAIN. 

In    the    case    of    First    Lieut.    -         — ,    -  Infantry,    - 

National  Guard,  whose  discharge  had  been  recommended  by  an  effi- 
ciency board  convened  under  the  provisions  of  section  77.  act  ap- 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  47 

proved  June  3, 1916,  and  in  whom  was  "  found  a  lack  of  general  fitness 
and  capacity,"  the  Secretary  of  War  decided  as  follows: 

In  this  case  of  resignation  of  First  Lieut.  —  — ,  tendered  be- 
cause he  does  not  consider  himself  adapted  to  perform  the  duties  of  his  posi- 
tion in  a  manner  creditable  to  himself  or  the  service,  his  colonel  states  that 
"  there  is  nothing  against  his  character,"  and  that  the  resignation  was  tendered 
as  the  result  of  a  suggestion  from  him.  There  are  great  numbers  of  National 
Guard  officers  (of  good  habits  and  character  as  this  officer  appears  to  be)  who 
can  not  thoroughly  well  perform  the  duties  of  their  position.  The  Federal  Gov- 
ernment is  giving  them  an  opportunity  at  very  great  expense  to  itself  to  qualify 
themselves  in  this  respect.  The  department  commander  will  instruct  his  com- 
manding officers  to  see  that  he -is  trained  to  the  highest  degree  possible  and  that 
when  relieved  from  duty  on  the  border  a  special  report  is  made  in  his  case 
for  future  guidance  of  the  proper  authorities. 

The  tender  of  resignation  is  disapproved. 

The  Adjutant  General  reports  that  up  to  and  including  November 
28,  1916,  the  resignation  of  482  National  Guard  officers  had  been 
accepted. 

STATUS   AND    DISPOSITION    OF   NATIONAL   GUARD    RESERVISTS 
CREATED   BY  THE  NATIONAL-DEFENSE  ACT. 

At  the  date  of  mobilization,  following  as  it  did  close  upon  the  date 
of  the  passage  of  the  act  of  June  3.  1916,  sections  69,  70,  and  78  of 
said  act  had  not  begun  to  operate  to  create  a  National  Guard  Reserve. 
At  least  there  was  no  record  in  the  War  Department  to  show  that 
any  individuals  had  become  reservists  as  contemplated  by  the  law. 
Soon  after  the  mobilization  instances  were  reported  of  members  of 
the  National  Guard  whose  active  service  of  three  years  had  been 
completed,  and  who,  under  the  terms  of  the  law,  would  pass  to  the 
National  Guard  Reserve.  The  question  having  been  presented  as  to 
the  liability  to  service  under  the  President's  call  of  members  of  the 
National  Guard  who  would  pass  to  the  reserve  while  in  the  Federal 
service  the  Chief  of  the  Militia  Bureau  took  the  ground  that  such 
individuals  might  be  held  and  continued  in  active  service  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  President,  since  as  individuals  they  had  already  been 
included  in  the  call.  The  matter  having  been  referred  to  the  Judge 
Advocate  General  of  the  Army  for  an  opinion  a  contrary  view  was 
taken,  and  such  contrary  view  having  been  approved  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  instructions  in  accordance  therewith  were  communi- 
cated to  the  commanding  general,  Southern  Department,  in  a  tele- 
gram from  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  dated  August  14, 
1916,  as  follows : 

According  to  opinion  rendered  by  Judge  Advocate  General,  dated  July  '2(3, 
1916,  approved  by  Secretary  of  War,  National  Guardsmen  who  have  completed 
their  three  years'  term  active  service  can  not  under  call  June  18,  1916,  be  held 
for  active  service  beyond  active-enlistment  period  unless  they  so  elect.  Con- 
tinuation in  active  service  into  period  of  reserve  service  should  be  as  provided 
for  in  section  69,  national-defense  act.  Reenlistment  can  take  place  only  after 
completion  full-term  enlistment,  including  reserve  period.  National  Guards- 
men who  have  completed  their  terms  active  service  and  who  do  not  desire  ro 
remain  in.  active  service  should  be  transferred  to  National  Guard  reserve  of 
State  to  which  they  belong  and  sent  to  their  homes  under  proper  orders,  accord- 
ing to  practice  followed  with  reservists  of  Regular  Army.  Men  who  are  in 
service  without  having  taken  oath  are  not  National  Guardsmen  but  Organized 
Militia.  Such  men  should  be  given  final  discharge  upon  completion  of  enlist- 
ment term,  there  being  no  provision  for  reserve  period  of  service  under  Dick- 
law.  Such  may  be  reenlisted  for  a  six-year  torni  as  National  Guardsmen  if 
they  so  desire.  MCCAIN-. 


48  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

It  was  also  decided  that  there  is  no  provision  in  the  national-de- 
fense act  by  which  members  of  the  National  Guard  reserve  could  be 
required  by  the  President  or  by  the  governor  of  a  State  to  engage  in 
field  or  coast-defense  training  with  the  active  National  Guard. 

ADVANTAGES   OF   DIVISIONAL   ORGANIZATION. 

The  first  step  since  the  enactment  of  the  militia  law  of  1903,  look- 
ing to  the  organization  of  the  militia  into  higher  tactical  units,  was 
taken  in  1910  in  the  organization  of  the  so-called  "  First  Field  Army." 
set  forth  in  General  Orders,  No.  35,  War  Department,  series  1910. 
The  field  army  contemplated  by  this  order  embraced  the  militia 
organizations  of  New  York  and  the  NewT  England  States  and  the 
Regular  Army  regiments  stationed  in  those  States.  It  was  to  com- 
prise three  divisions  of  three  brigades  each.  The  units  of  the  Regu- 
lar Army  were  to  be  distributed  among  the  divisions  and  brigades. 

It  became  apparent,  however,  that  this  organization  did  not  have 
the  necessary  qualities  of  permanency,  as  it  comprised  elements  of 
different  degrees  of  training  and  readiness  for  service.  An  organiza- 
tion of  this  character  was  sure  to  be  disrupted  upon  the  occurrence 
of  the  first  emergency  requiring  the  immediate  services  of  the  regular 
troops,  and  it  was  probable  that  a  considerable  time  must  elapse  be- 
fore the  less  thorough^  trained  elements  would  be  capable  of  en- 
gaging in  the  same  character  of  operations  as  the  better  trained. 
For  this  reason,  the  project  of  combining  militia  organizations  with 
regular  troops  for  the  formation  of  higher  tactical  units,  was  aban- 
doned, and  the  plan  to  develop  the  Organized  Militia  into  a  complete 
and  independently  organized  force,  was  adopted.  This  plan  was 
formulated  in  1912  as  a  result  of  detailed  study  of  the  question  by  the 
General  Staff  and  the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  and  after  consulta- 
tion with  the  State  authorities.  The  plan  contemplated  the  formation 
of  12  tactical  divisions  corresponding  to  12  groups  of  contiguous 
States.  These  divisions  and  groups  as  subsequently  amended  were  as 
follows : 

Fifth  Division,  the  New  England  States. 

Sixth  Division,  New  York. 

Seventh  Division,  Pennsylvania. 

Eighth  Division,  Delaware,  New  Jersey,  Maryland,  District  of 
Columbia,  Virginia,  West  Virginia. 

Ninth  Division,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Florida,  Georgia. 

Tenth  Division,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Tennessee,  Kentucky. 

Eleventh  Division,  Michigan,  Ohio. 

Twelfth  Division,  Illinois,  Indiana. 

Thirteenth  Division,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  North  Dakota,  South 
Dakota,  Iowa. 

Fourteenth  Division,  Missouri,  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Colorado, 
Wyoming. 

Fifteenth  Division,  Arkansas,  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  Texas,  Okla- 
homa, Louisiana. 

Sixteenth  Division,  California,  Oregon,  Washington,  Montana, 
Utah,  Idaho,  Nevada. 

At  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  plan  the  Organized  Militia  in 
the  United  States,  comprised  the  following  units:  1,584  companies  of 
infantry,  64  batteries  of  field  artillery,  80  troops  of  cavalry,  22  com- 


MOBILIZATION   OF    THE   ORGANIZED    MILITIA,   ETC. 


49 


panies  of  engineers,  22  companies  of  signal  troops,  15  ambulance 
companies,  23  field  hospitals. 

For  the  12  tactical  divisions  there  were  required:  1,296  companies 
of  infantry,  144  batteries  of  field  artillery,  144  troops  of  cavalry,  36 
companies  of  engineers,  24  companies  of  signal  troops,  48  field  hos- 
pitals, 48  ambulance  companies. 

There  was  thus  a  shortage  of  the  following  units:  64  troops  of 
cavalry,  80  batteries  of  field  artillery,  14  companies  of  engineers,  2 
companies  of  signal  troops,  25  field  hospitals,  33  ambulance  com- 
panies, and  an  excess  of  288  companies  of  infantry. 

The  divisional  .plan  was  further  developed  by  the  publication  of 
Circular  No.  19,  D.  M.  A.,  1914,  in  which  the  quotas  of  auxiliary 
troops  required  to  complete  the  tactical  divisions  were  assigned  to 
the  several  States  in  accordance  with  their  population. 

During  the  period  from  May  9  to  October  31,  1916,  there  were  in 
the  Federal  service  the  following  units  of  the  several  arms  and 
branches  (exclusive  of  headquarters,  supply,  and  machine-gun  com- 
panies of  infantry,  and  cavalry  regiments)  :  1,324  companies  of  in- 
fantry, 107  batteries  of  field  artillery,  123  troops  of  cavalry,  26  com- 
panies of  engineers,  24  companies  of  signal  troops,  26  ambulance 
companies,  and  39  field  hospitals,  leaving  a  shortage  of  37  batteries 
of  field  artillery,  21  troops  of  cavalry,  10  companies  of  engineers,  22 
ambulance  companies,  and  9  field  hospitals. 

There  has  thus  been  a  gain  of  the  following  units  since  the  adoption 
of  the  divisional  plan  of  1912  :  43  batteries  of  field  artillery,  43  troops 
of  cavalry,  4  companies  of  engineers,  2  companies  of  signal  troops, 
11  ambulance  companies,  and  16  field  hospitals. 

The  above  statements  are  based  on  the  Tables  of  Organization, 
1914,  in  force  on  the  date  of  the  call  (June  18,  1916).  It  is  under- 
stood that  these  tables  are  now- under  revision  and  that  the  result 
will  be  to  considerably  increase  the  shortage  in  respect  to  field  ar- 
tillery and  engineers. 

The  above  statement  sets  forth  the  shortages  in  respect  to  tactical 
units  of  the  several  arms  and  branches  of  service.  In  respect  to  com- 
position of  the  National  Guard  in  Federal  service,  i.  e.,  the  propor- 
tion existing  between  the  numerical  strength  of  the  several  arms  and 
branches,  the  results  differ  considerably  from  a  comparison  of  the 
number  of  tactical  units.  According  to  Table  2,  Tables  of  Organiza- 
tion, 1914,  the  proportion  at  which  the  several  elements  enter  the 
composition  of  a  tactical  division  is  as  follows : 


Numerical 
strength. 

Percent, 

Infantry  .   .                .         .         

17  244 

77  43 

Cavalry 

l'  308 

5  87 

Field  Artillery  

2  391 

10  74 

Engineers                                            

514 

2  31 

Signal  Troops 

176 

79 

Sanitary  Troops  

638 

i  2  86 

22,271 

100.00 

i  Exclusive  of  regimental  detachments. 


The  strength  of  all  units  of  the  various  arms  and  branches  of  the 
National  Guard  in  service  of  the  United  States  to  September  30, 


72031— 


50  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,    ETC. 

1916,  and  the  percentage  of  each  arm  and  branch  of  the  total  strength 
were  as  follows: 


Strength. 

Per  cent. 

Infantry  

119  134 

77  24 

Cavalry  

10  522 

6  82 

Field  Artillery  - 

16  210 

10  52 

Engineers  

2  299 

1  48 

Signal  Corps  

1  894 

1  22 

Sanitary  Troops  

4  191 

2  72 

154,  230 

100.00 

From  the  last  two  tables,  it  will  be  seen  that  while  there  exists  a 
considerable  shortage  in  the  number  of  units  of  auxiliary  arms  re- 
quired to  complete  the  divisional  organization,  the  proportions  in 
point  of  actual  strength  are  practically  complete.  This  apparent 
discrepancy  is  due  to  the  relative  low  strength  at  which  Infantry 
units  have  been  maintained. 

It  would,  therefore,  appear  that  in  the  future  development  of  the 
divisional  plan,  an  increase  in  the  strength  of  Infantry  units  should 
go  hand  in  hand  with  the  raising  of  the  new  units  of  auxiliary  arms 
required  to  complete  the  divisional  organization. 

The  above  statements  refer  only  to  the  extent  to  which  the  di- 
visional plan  evolved  in  1912  has  approached  realization  and  do  not 
consider  Infantry  units  in  excess  of  divisional  requirements  and  not 
called  into  Federal  service  nor  the  field-army  troops  which  are  totally 
unorganized.  The  following  Infantry  units  were  not  called  into  Fed- 
eral service:  Thirteen  regiments,  3  separate  battalions,  10  separate 
companies,  or  nearly  the  equivalent  of ^15  regiments. 

These  regiments  were  considered  surplus  under  the  divisional  plan 
and  were  therefore  not  called  into  service.    By  their  conversion  into 
units  of  the  proper  arm,  the  greater  part  of  the  existing  deficiencies 
in  field-army  troops  would  be  made  up. 
• 

ACTUAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  FEDERAL  SERVICE. 

While  at  the  date  of  the  call  of  the  President  the  divisional  plan 
was  still  incomplete,  enough  progress  had  been  made  to  admit  of 
expressing  the  quotas  of  troops  required  from  the  several  States  in 
terms  of  organized  units  instead  of  in  bare  terms  of  numerical 
strength. 

Due  to  the  immediate  necessity  for  the  presence  of  troops  on  the 
Mexican  border,  regiments  were  at  first  ordered  to  border  stations 
as  rapidly  as  they  could  be  prepared  for  service.  As  troops  were 
ordered  to  stations  where  their  presence  was  most  required  in  the 
order  of  their  arrival  in  the  Southern  Department,  regiments  from 
the  same  division  were  often  located  at  widely  separated  points. 
Many  regiments  were,  moreover,  held  at  their  mobilization  sites  until 
other  regiments  were  returned  from  the  border  for  muster  out.  The 
result  was  that  the  divisional  plan  never  materialized,  and  it  was 
necessary  to  regroup  the  units  serving  on  the  border  into  provisional 
divisions  and  brigades  which  did  not  in  any  way  correspond  to  the 
original  scheme.  Under  instructions  from  the  War  Department, 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED    MILITIA,   ETC.  51 

dated  August  4,  1916,  the  commanding  general,  Southern  Depart- 
ment, provided  for  an  organization  of  the  National  Guard  in  Federal 
service  into  10  provisional  divisions  and  6  separate  brigades.  At 
this  time  many  of  the  units  included  in  the  provisional  organization 
were  located  at  the  mobilization  centers  of  the  several  States,  and 
when  they  were  ordered  to  the  border,  others  were  returned  to  the 
place  of  muster  in,  so  that  even  the  provisional  organization  never 
became  a  concrete  fact. 

VALUE  OF  THE  DIVISIONAL  PLAN. 

As  very  few  of  the  regiments  in  Federal  service  have,  as  judged 
by  reports  received  to  date,  attained  a  sufficient  degree  of  proficiency 
to  enable  them  to  participate  with  profit  in  the  training  of  the  higher 
units,  the  failure  of  the  divisional  plan  to  materialize  can  not  be  con- 
sidered to  have  resulted  in  any  great  actual  loss.  Efficient  partici- 
pation in  maneuvers  and  operations  of  the  higher  units  implies  that 
the  lower  units  have  been  brought  to  a  state  of  proficiency  by  the 
thorough  and  progressive  training  of  each  of  the  component  organ- 
izations. It  can  not  be  expected  with  the  short  periods  of  training 
required  of  the  National  Guard  that  company,  battalion,  and  regi- 
mental units  will  ever  attain  this  degree  of  proficiency  in  time  of 
peace  or  for  some  months  after  their  mobilization  for  service.  The 
divisional  plan,  even  if  fully  carried  into  effect  in  time  of  peace,  can- 
not therefore  be  expected  to  result  in  the  constitution  of  divisions 
available  for  immediate  service. 

The  plan  has,  however,  certain  distinct  advantages  that  should  not 
be  lost  from  view.  It  establishes  a  standard  toward  the  realization 
of  which  all  efforts  can  be  concentrated  and  without  which  such 
development  of  the  National  Guard  as  may  take  place  would  be 
entirely  haphazard  and  unregulated.  The  result  of  such  a  develop- 
ment would  be  a  product  which  would  be  unsuited  for  field  opera- 
tions and  which  would  have  to  be  entirely  remodeled  upon  the  occur- 
rence of  an  emergency  calling  for  the  mobilization  of  the  National 
Guard.  The  countless  details  which  are  represented  or  implied  in 
the  plan  would  have  to  be  worked  out  under  very  difficult  circum- 
stances. It  may  indeed  be  doubted  whether  any  well-digested  plan 
for  higher  organization  could  be  devised  if  the  drafting  of  the  or- 
ganizational scheme  were  deferred  until  the  occurrence  of  the  emer- 
gency. If  the  plan  is  completely  realized  it  will  enable  future  calls 
to  be  framed  in  terms  of  the  higher  units,  and  the  process  of  mobiliza- 
tion can  be  decentralized  by  charging  commanders  or  chiefs  of  staff 
of  the  divisions  with  the  supervision  of  the  details  of  the  mobilization 
of  each  division.  In  this  connection  it  is  believed  that  had  the 
recent  call  included  all  the  units  required  for  the  12  divisions,  as 
would  doubtless  have  been  done  had  the  emergency  been  more  serious, 
the  result  would  have  been  the  organization  of  the  greater  part  of 
the  units  required  to  complete  the  divisional  organization.  On  such 
occasions  the  local  pride  of  the  States  acts  as  a  stimulus  toward  rais- 
ing the  assigned  quotas. 

Not  the  least  of  the  advantages  of  the  divisional  plan  lies  in  the 
power  which  it  gives  to  limit  the  appointments  of  the  numerous  can- 
didates for  the  positions  of  general  officers  which  are  always  urged 
on  occasion  of  the  formation  of  our  war  armies.  With  exact  knowl- 


52  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

edge  as  to  the  higher  units  to  be  formed,  general  officers  can  be 
selected  to  command  definite  tactical  units  instead  of  the  units  being 
raised  to  create  positions  for  particular  persons.  The  divisional  plan 
is  the  concrete  expression  of  the  spirit  of  teamwork.  As  such  it  rep- 
resents the  general  interest  as  opposed  to  the  interest  of  individuals 
and  should  receive  the  active  support  of  all  who  are  interested  in 
the  general  welfare.  Its  value  as  the  expression  of  a  definite  policy 
became  apparent  during  the  recent  mobilization,  for  it  made  possible 
continuous  and  progressive  action,  while  without  it  there  could  have 
been  only  halting,  vacillation,  and  conflict.  . 

TRANSPORTATION  OF  NATIONAL  GUARD  TROOPS  TO  THE  MEXI- 
CAN BORDER  AND  REPLY  TO  COMPLAINTS. 

During  the  transfer  of  troops  from  their  mobilization  camps  to 
concentration  camps  on  the  border  articles  appeared  in  the  public 
press  in  which  it  was  alleged  that  troops  were  "  being  transported  in 
cars  lacking  sufficient  sleeping  space  " ;  that  the  cars  used  have  been 
or  are  being  used  to  transport  troops  without  light;  that  they  had 
"  been  sidetracked  and  delayed  en  route  to  accommodate  private  busi- 
ness " ;  that  troops  en  route  had  been  obliged  to  seek  food  of  citizens, 
and  that  the  supply  of  drinking  water  had  been  insufficient.  It  was 
intimated  that  the  cars  used  for  transportation  of  National  Guard 
troops  had  not  been  inspected  so  as  to  protect  the  safety  and  health 
of  troops  assigned  to  them,  and  that  furthermore  these  troops  had 
not  been  equipped  with  arms  and  accouterments  required  by  Army 
regulations  for  actual  service  in  time  of  war. 

These  reports  coming  to  the  notice  of  Congress  resulted  in  House 
Resolution  No.  292  of  July  5,  1916 : 

RESOLUTION. 

Resolved,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  directed  to  trans- 
mit to  the  House  of  Representatives  full  information  as  to  the  following  mat- 
ters: 

First.  Whether  the  troops  of  the  National  Guard  mustered  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States  and  on  their  way  to  Mexico  have  been,  or  are  being,  trans- 
ported in  cars  lacking  sufficient  sleeping  space. 

Second.  Whether  such  cars  have  been,  or  are  being,  used  to  transport  said 
troops  without  light. 

Third.  Whether  said  cars  have  been  sidetracked  and  delayed  en  route  to 
accommodate  private  business. 

Fourth.  Whether  the  troops  en  route  have  been  subsisted  by  the  Government 
in  accordance  with  the  United  States  Army  Regulations  or  have  been  obliged 
to  seek  food  of  citizens,  and  whether  the  supply  of  drinking  water  in  the  cars 
has  been  sufficient. 

Fifth.  Whether  cars  used  for  the  transportation  of  National  Guard  troops 
mustered  into  the  United  States  service  were  inspected  to  protect  the  health 
and  safety  of  the  troops  assigned  to  them,  and  by  whom. 

Sixth.  Whether,  being  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  the 
troops  of  the  National  Guard  are  equipped  with  arms  and  accouterments  re- 
quired by  Army  Regulations  for  actual  service  in  time  of  war. 

These  matters  were  immediately  made  the  subject  of  investigation 
by  the  War  Department.  The  reply  of  the  Secretary  of  War  of 
July  21, 1916,  published  as  Document  1311,  House  of  Representatives, 
together  with  the  reports  called  for,  cover  the  ground  completely. 

The  reply  of  the  Secretary  of  War  is  as  follows: 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED    MILITIA,    ETC.  53 

WAR  DEPARTMENT. 
Wasliinpton,  July  21,  1916. 
The  SPEAKER  OF  THE  HOUSE  or  REPRESENTATIVES. 

SIR:  In  reply  to  House  resolution  292.  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  you 
the  following  information : 

First  Troops  of  the  National  Guard  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States  and  on  their  way  to  the  Mexican  border  have  been,  in  some  instances, 
transported  in  day  coaches.  This  was  done  only  in  cases  where,  due  to  the 
urgency  of  the  situation  on  the  border  and  the  large  number  of  troops  being 
moved* at  one  time,  it  was  not  practicable  to  delay.  When  day  coaches  were 
used  three  men  were  assigned  to  each  four  sittings,  in  accordance  with  the  rule 
invoked  in  like  cases  in  transporting  organizations  of  the  Regular  Army.  In 
some  cases  the  railroad  company,  without  extra  charge,  allowed  each  two  men 
to  occupy  four  sittings.  Wherever  it  could  be  done,  arrangements  were  made  to 
transfer' troops  from  day  coaches  to  tourist  sleepers  while  en  route. 

Second.  No  cars  without  lights  were  used  to  transport  troops. 

Third.  Trains  were  not  sidetracked  or  delayed  beyond  what  should  be 
reasonably  expected,  due  to  the  great-  number  of  special  trains  employed,  most 
of  them  manned,  no  doubt,  by  extra  train  crews. 

Fourth.  Regular  Army  rations  more  than  sufficient  for  the  journey  were  fur- 
nished to  all  troops  either  upon  leaving  their  mobilization  camps  or,  in  accord- 
ance with  a  prearranged  plan,  while  en  route.  Where  the  necessary  ranges 
and  boilers  were  not  placed  on  trains,  the  troops  were  furnished  in  advance 
of  the  movement  with  money  for  the  purchase  of  hot  coffee  at  the  same  rate  as 
troops  of  the  Regular  Army  are  allowed  under  similar  conditions.  No  reason 
existed  for  troops  seeking  food  from  civilians.  Drinking  water  arrangements 
were  ample. 

Fifth.  All  cars  used  were  inspected  with  a  view  to  remedying  any  defects  or 
deficiencies  which  would  imperil  the  health  or  safety  of  the  troops  assigned  to 
them.  The  inspections  were  made,  as  a  rule,  by  the  quartermaster,  accom- 
panied in  some  cases  by  the  train  commander,  the  train  quartermaster,  the 
mustering  officer,  or  the  surgeon. 

Sixth.  As  rapidly  as  possible,  all  National  Guard  troops  mustered  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States  are  being  equipped  with  arms  and  accouterments 
identical  with  those  furnished  the  Regular  Army.  The  delays  have  been  due 
to  lack  of  reserve  supplies  kept  on  hand  for  the  purpose. 

The  telegraphic  reports  rendered  by  the  commanding  generals  of  the  Eastern, 
Western,  and  Central  Departments  in  reply  to  the  inquiries  above  referred  to, 
are  herewith. 

Respectfully, 

NEWTON  D.  BAKER, 

Secretary  of  War. 

The  gist  of  the  reports  concerning  the  supply  of  tourist  sleepers 
is  found  in  the  fact  that  to  accommodate  all  the  troops  moved  with 
Pullman  tourist  sleepers  would  have  required  approximately  3,000 
such  cars.  The  Pullman  Co.  owns  only  about  750  tourist  sleepers 
and  supplied  623  of  these  for  the  movement.  The  only  reason  that 
more  were  not  supplied  was  that  to  have  done  so  they  would  have  had 
to  be  taken  from  the  regular  passenger  service.  Conditions  were 
such  as  admitted  of  no  delay,  and,  as  the  bulk  of  the  entire  National 
Guard  had  to  be  moved  at  once,  a  great  proportion  of  them  had  to 
be  transported  in  day  coaches. 

PHYSICAL  EXAMINATIONS. 

Section  7  of  the  Dick  bill  provided:  "That  every  officer  and  en- 
listed man  of  the  Militia  who  shall  be  called  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  mustered  for  service  without  further  enlist- 
ment, and  without  further  medical  examination  previous  to  such 
muster,  except  for  those  States  which  have  not  adopted  the  standard 


54  MOBILIZATION    OP   THE   OKGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

of  medical  examination  prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army "  (see 
par.  19,  Mustering  Regulations).  This  not  being  inconsistent  with 
the  act  of  June  3,  1916,  is  still  in  force,  but  is  subject  to  the  modifica- 
tion of  section  115  of  the  act  of  June  3,  1916,  which  provides  that 
every  officer  and  enlisted  man  of  the  National  Guard  who  shall  be 
called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  as  such  shall  be  examined 
as  to  his  physical  fitness  under  such  regulations  as  the  President  may 
prescribe  without  further  commission  or  enlistment  (see  also  par. 
19,  Mustering  Regulations). 

At  the  time  of  the  call  of  May  9,  Texas  and  Arizona  had,  and  New 
Mexico  had  not  adopted  the  standard  of  examination  for  the  Regular 
Army,  while  on  June  18,  the  Regular  Army  physical  standard  had 
been  adopted  by  all  the  States  whose  troops  were  called  out,  except 
Delaware,  Kansas,  and  North  Carolina.  The  normal  procedure 
therefore  was  to  accept  into  the  United  States  service  all  National 
(guardsmen  from  States  which  had  adopted  the  Regular  Army 
standard  and  subsequently  to  make  the  required  physical  examina- 
tion, discharging  men  disqualified  by  the  usual  means  of  surgeon's 
certificate  of  disability.  In  those  few  States  where  the  Regular 
Army  standard  had  not  been  adopted,  the  physical  examination 
necessarily  had  to  precede  any  muster  into  the  United  States  service, 
and  only  the  names  of  those  found  physically  qualified  appeared  on 
the  muster-in  roll. 

Previous  experience  demonstrated  the  advisability,  and  muster- 
ing regulations  contemplated  having  an  adequate  number  of  regular 
medical  officers  at  mobilization  camps  for  the  purpose  of  exercising 
the  functions  of  the  Medical  Department.  At  the  time  of  the  call  of 
June  18,  the  majority  of  the  medical  officers  of  the  regular  service  were 
in  Mexico  or  on  the  border,  so  that  only  one  medical  officer  was  avail- 
able for  duty  at  each  of  the  several  mobilization  camps.  Even  this 
number  was  secured  after  considerable  delay  and  strain  on  the  regu- 
lar service.  The  inadequacy  of  but  one  experienced  medical  officer 
at  a  mobilization  camp  having  from  4,000  to  18,000  troops,  is  ob- 
vious, when  the  responsible  duties  devolving  upon  them  are  taken 
into  consideration.  It  is  reasonable  and  safe  to  assume  that  the  in- 
terests of  the  Government  were  not  properly  safeguarded  where 
State  troops  were  sent  to  the  border  within  10  days  after  mobiliza- 
tion. It  is  true  that  one  or  more  reserve  medical  officers  were  sent 
to  several  of  the  mobilization  camps  to  assist  the  regular  medical 
officers;  but  the  majority  of  them  were  without  experience  and 
training. 

Sufficient  copies  of  circular  No.  8,  W.  D.,  D.  M.  A.,  dated  May 
10,  1916,  were  sent  to  the  adjutant  general  of  each  State  one  month 
prior  to  the  call,  with  instructions  that  each  medical  officer  be  fur- 
nished with  a  copy.  This  circular  defined  the  duties  of  medical 
officers,  called  attention  to  the  necessity  of  careful  physical  examina- 
tion, prevention  of  camp  diseases,  importance  of  and  instructions 
for  the  administration  of  typhoid  and  smallpox  prophylaxis.  At- 
tention was  called  to  organization  and  equipment.  It  contained 
also  extracts  from  mustering  regulations  and  much  other  valuable 
information  for  the  guidance  of  medical  and  other  officers  in  case 
the  Organized  Militia  was  called  into  the  Federal  service.  This  cir- 
cular appears  to  have  accomplished  the  purpose  intended,  since  re- 


Defective  dentition 249 

Defective  hearing 96 

Overweight  and  obesity _  65 

Nervous  diseases 19 

Hemorrhoids 43 

Heart  and  lungs 724 

Illiteracy 49 

Skin  diseases 26 

Alcoholism  and  drug  habits 12 

Unclassified..  189 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  55 

ports  show  that,  with  few  exceptions,  the  medical  officers  carefully 
followed  the  instructions  contained  therein. 

Complete  data  is  not  as  yet  available  showing  the  number  of  re- 
jections on  account  of  physical  disqualifications  by  States.  From 
the  data  available  there  were  23,721  rejections  out  of  a  total  of  128,- 
517  examined,  making  an  average  of  18.45  per  cent  rejected  on  ac- 
count of  physical  defects.  This  did  not  include  those  who  were, 
eliminated  by  the  State  authorities  prior  to  muster  in.  the  number  of 
whom  is  not  known. 

CAUSES   FOR   REJECTION. 

Causes  for  rejection  on  account  of  physical  disqualification  can  not 
be  given  for  each  State,  as  the  data  is  not  as  yet  available.  Incom- 
plete data  from  five  States  in  different  sections  of  the  country  repre- 
senting 35,824  persons  examined,  shows  5,526  rejections  on  account  of 
physical  disqualification  and  for  the  following  causes : 

Venereal  diseases : 287 

Poor  physique,  under  height  and 

weight 1,  731 

Defective  vision  and  disease  of 

eyes 741 

Deformity  of  feet  and  flat  feet  __  414 

Amputations  and  deformities 195 

Goiter 57 

Defective  mentality 40 

Diseases  of  nose  and  throat 24 

Veins,  arteries,  and  varicosities_  80 

Hydrocele  and  varicocele 89 

Hernia 396 

It  is  evident  that  a  large  number  of  the  defects  noted  above  should 
have  been  detected  even  by  a  layman.  The  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
are  that  a  large  number  of  these  cases  were  not  examined  physically 
or  that  inexcusable  laxity  was  shown  on  the  part  of  the  medical  ex- 
aminers. The  States  from  which  this  data  was  compiled  claim  to 
have  adopted  the  standard  of  physical  examinations  prescribed  for 
the  regular  service.  It  would  seem  then  that  the  medical  depart- 
ments of  the  Organized  Militia  in  these  States  were  responsible. 
They  are  no  doubt  partly  to  blame;  however,  the  extent  of  their 
culpability  pertains  only  to  those  .actually  examined  by  them.  They 
can  not  justly  be  held  responsible  for  those  defectives  who  were  en- 
listed without  a  physical  examination,  those  who  were  examined  by 
civilian  physicians,  nor  those  who  were  enlisted  against  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  medical  officers.  It  is  believed  that  inexperienced 
and  untrained  medical  officers  of  the  National  Guard,  at  the  time 
of  the  call,  did  not  have  a  clear  conception  of  the  physical  require- 
ments for  military  service,  which  is  also  believed  to  be  an  important 
factor  in  accounting  for  the  large  number  of  the  personnel  of  the 
Organized  Militia  being  found  physically  disqualified  upon  muster 
into  the  Federal  Service. 

The  matter  of  physical  examinations  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  of 
all  the  problems  connected  with  the  muster  in  of  the  National  Guard 
and  the  records  of  the  Pension  Office  have  furnished  ample  evidence 
of  the  absolute  necessity  of  rigid  examinations  in  this  connection. 
This  will  be  at  once  apparent  when  it  is  realized  that  in  1898,  out  of 


Total _  5,526 


56  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

an  enrollment  of  211,161  men,  no  less  than  108,258  subsequently  ap- 
plied for  pensions. 

Only  30,000  of  these  were  granted,  from  which  it  is  fair  to  assume 
that  over  78,000  had,  to  say  the  least,  exaggerated  ideas  of  their 
claims  on  the  Government  on  account  of  physical  disabilities  in- 
curred while  in  active  service. 

It  is  reported  that  the  30,000  applicants  whose  claims  were  found 
to  be  valid  have  already  cost  the  Government  some  $42.000,000. 

The  procedure  to  prevent  fraud,  therefore,  is  to  make  a  careful 
physical  examination  of  every  officer  and  man  stripped,  upon  his  en- 
try into  the  Federal  service,  making  note  of  every  physical  defect 
which,  though  not  disqualifying  for  military  service,  might  in  after 
years  be  presented  to  support  a  claim  for  a  pension. 

A  similar  examination  is  made  upon  muster  out  of  Federal  service, 
particular  attention  being  paid  to  any  physical  defect  which  the  per- 
son examined  claims  was  incurred  wrhile  in  the  military  servce. 

If  these  examinations  are  carefully  made  and  full  notes  made  of 
the  result,  they  afford  an  almost  certain  check  against  subsequent 
fraudulent  claims  for  pensions. 

The  excessive  amount  of  work  imposed  upon  those  connected  wyith 
the  physical  examinations  upon  mobilization  is  graphically  told  by 
Maj.  Wadhams,  Medical  Corps,  in  his  report  on  the  "physical  inspec- 
tions of  the  New  York  troops,  from  which  report  the  following 
extract  is  made : 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  rejection  rate  is  very  low.  This  is  due  to  several 
causes,  but  the  three  most  important  will  be  mentioned : 

(a)  The  adoption  by  the  State  some  time  ago  of  the  War  Department  stand- 
ard and  a  fairly  rigid  adherence  thereto,  which  resulted  in  excluding  from  the 
National  Guard  many  who  formerly  would  have  been  accepted. 

( b )  The  great  haste  in  which  examinations  were  made  rendered  it  impossible 
to  detect  all  disqualifying  defects. 

(c)  Immediately  upon  the  publication  of  the  President's  call  for  the  National 
Guard  practically  every  organization  in  the  State  began  to  eliminate  either  by 
discharge  or  by  transfer  to  the  depot  battalion  those  men  known  to  be  unlit. 

There  are  many  lessons  for  the  medical  officer  to  be  drawn  from  this  ex- 
perience. Some  of  them  are  too  obvious  to  need  mention  here,  while  a  few 
are  noted,  as  follows : 

(a)  The  need  of  a  sufficient  number  of  trained  officers  and  enlisted  men  of 
the  medical  department  of  the  Army  available  as  soon  as  the  National  Guard 
is  called  into  the  Federal  service  is  perhaps  the  most  important.  Experience 
in  the  past  has  shown  that  within  a  few  years  after  such  a  muster  in,  about  50 
per  cent  of  the  men  so  mustered  will  apply  for  pension.  The  great  majority 
of  such  claims  will  be  fraudulent.  The  only  protection  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment lies  in  having  a  complete  and  accurate  record  of  the  physical  condition  of 
every  man  accepted.  Civilian  physicians  and  inexperienced  National  Guard 
officers,  if  depended  upon  to  do  this  work,  will,  without  doubt,  become  proficient 
in  time  but  at  a  tremendous  ultimate  cost  to  the  Government. 

(&)  In  view  of  the  experience  outlined  above,  it  seems  imperative  that  the 
place  designated  in  each  State  as  a  mobilization  camp  should  be  prepared  in 
advance  for  the  mobilization  of  the  State  troops.  The  muster  in  can  be  con- 
ducted in  armories,  in  this  State  at  least,  and  probably  would  be  in  wintertime. 
It  is  necessary  therefore  to  prepare  in  advance  for  both  contingencies.  The 
physical  examination  is  a  War  Department  requirement  and  it  would  seem  that 
the  details  for  making  this  examination  and  the  materials  and  equipment  re- 
quired should  be  provided  for  by  the  War  Department.  In  the  recent  muster  in 
in  this  State  the  physical  examinations  were  going  on  in  many  widely  sepa- 
rated places  at  the  same  time.  To  do  the  work  under  such  conditions  a  much 
larger  number  of  medical  officers  is  necessary  and  should  be  provided.  Even 
in  Greater  New  York  the  time  spent  in  getting  from  one  armory  to  another  was 
a  serious  handicap. 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   OEGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  57 

(c)  The  plan  followed  provided  for  the  muster  in  of  organizations  without 
physical  examination.    The  additional  work  this  procedure  entails  is  very  great. 
As  each  man  mustered  in,  subsequent  to  that  time,  in  the  Federal  service,  it 
becomes  necessary  to  discharge  those  men  rejected  physically  in  the  manner 
required  by  the  War  Department.     This  necessitates  the  preparation  of  certifi- 
cates of  disability,  final  statements,  and  a  discharge  certificate — all  papers  wtih 
which  the  National  Guard  officer  is  entirely  unfamiliar.     In  some  organizations 
in  this  State  the  muster  in,  the  physical  examination,  and  the  departure  all 
took  place  on  the  same  date.     It  was  therefore  obviously  impossible  to  comply 
with  War  Department  orders.     It  seems  to  me  inevitable  that  there  will  be  a 
great  deal  of  trouble  in  the  future  in  clearing  up  the  status  of  many  of  these 
men  whose  service  to  the  United  States  was  of  a  few  hours'  duration.     Of  all 
the  organizations  mustered  in  in  this  State,  it  was  possible  to  follow  the  pre- 
scribed procedure   in   but   one.     The   exception   occurred   in   the   Third   Field 
Artillery,  which  was  not  mustered  in  until  August  4,  and  had  not  yet  gone  to 
tlu-  border.     In  fin-  casi>  of  this  regiment  there  was .  sufficient  time,  blank  cer- 
tificates of  disability  had  been  received,  and  the  regimental  commander  being 
an  officer  of  the  Army,  was  familiar  with  the  preparation  of  the  required  papers. 

(d)  In  my  opinion  it  would  make  far  better  results  if,  an  officer  of  the  Army 
of  suitable  rank  were  detailed  to  command  the  mobilization  camp.     At  Camp 
Whitman  there  was  a  brigadier  general,  National  Guard  of  New  York,  in  com- 
mand of  the  State  troops,  who  was  not  mustered  into  the  United  States  service. 
The  senior  assistant  mustering  officer  was  a  captain  of  the  Army.     As  each 
regiment  of  the  National  Guard  was  mustered  in  the  senior  colonel,  being  the 
senior  officer  in  the  Federal  service,  was,  presumably,  in  command  of  all  troops 
in  the  Federal  service.     As  each  regiment  left  camp  as  soon  as  possible  after 
muster  in,  the  commanding  officer  changed  almost  from  day  to  day.    As  surgeon 
of  the  camp  there  were  frequent  questions  regarding  sanitary  measures  to  be 
enforced  which  arose,  and  it  was  at  times  a  difficult  matter  to  find  who  was  in 
command.     Camp  administration  became  a  difficult  matter  and  the  putting  into 
effect  sanitary  measures  was  often  very  much  delayed. 

.  (e)  One  medical  officer  of  the  Army  acting  as  medical  examiner,  camp  sur- 
geon, and  in  charge  of  the  camp  hospital  was  hopelessly  overburdened.  As 
medical  examiner  I  worked  during  the  hours  of  daylight  to  the  point  of  com- 
plete physical  exhaustion,  and  in  that  condition  had  to  take  up  at  night  the 
many  problems  connected  with  sanitating  a  large  camp  and  the  administration 
of  a  camp  hospital.  There  should  have  been  an  officer  for  each  position,  and 
the  examiner  should  have  had  a  permanent  organization  for  his  part  of  the 
work.  A  working  force  detailed  from  the  organizations  in  camp  would  no 
sooner  become  partially  familiar  with  its  duties  than  the  departure  of  a  regi- 
ment would  require  a  new  detail  of  inexperienced  men.  This  has  been  re- 
ferred to  in  paragraph  10  above. 

New  York  is  one  of  the  two  States  having  a  complete  divisional 
organization,  and  it  is  well  known  that  its  troops  are  among  the  fore- 
most in  preparedness;  yet  our  system  seems  to  have  been  so  faulty 
that  in  order  to  get  these  troops  started  for  the  border  on  June  27 
on  a  call  issued  June  18,  that  the  work  of  the  medical  examiners  was 
kept  up  for  two  nights  and  a  day  without  intermission. 

It  may  pertinently  be  asked,  why  these  strenuous  efforts,  and  why 
such  rigid  physical  examinations,  but  Maj.  Wadhams  points  out  that 
u  experience  in  the  past  has  shown  that  within  a  few  years  after  such 
muster  in  about  50  per  cent  of  the  men  so  mustered  will  apply  for 
a  pension.  The  great  majority  of  such  claims  will  be  fraudulent." 
These  statements  are  startling  ones,  but  they  are  borne  out  by  the 
records. 

We  note  that  he  comments  on  these  extreme  efforts  to  safeguard 
the  interests  of  the  Government  by  referring  to  the  exhausting  char- 
acter of  the  work,  and  "  during  the  long  hours  of  duty  it  was  observed 
that  officers,  as  time  passed,  lost  the  power  or  ability  to  observe 
closely,  and  physical  defects  which  should  have  been  detected  were 
overlooked."  Certainly  any  system  which  with  the  extreme  efforts 


58  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

put  forth  still  gives  faulty  and  unsatisfactory  results  should  be  dis- 
carded for  more  rational  methods. 

To  make  a  careful  physical  examination  of  every  man  of  the 
National  Guard  called  into  the  Federal  service  requires  considerable 
time  and  a  large  number  of  experienced  medical  officers.  It  is  be- 
lieved that  in  future  if  every  officer  of  the  National  Guard  was  ex- 
amined physically  each  year  and  every  enlisted  man  carefully  exam- 
ined physically  as  soon  as  practicable  after  enlistment  or  reenlistment 
in  the  National  Guard  by  a  qualified  medical  officer  of  the  Regular 
Army,  not  more  than  1  per  cent  (barring  venereal  diseases  and  acute 
maladies)  would  be  found  physically  disqualified  when  called  into 
the  Federal  service,  and  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  so  thorough  a 
physical  examination  on  muster  into  Federal  service,  and  the  work 
would  be  greatly  expedited. 

APPOINTMENT  OF  OFFICERS  AND  NONCOMMISSIONED  OFFICERS 
OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  TO  COMMISSIONS  IN  THE  NATIONAL 
GUARD. 

OFFICERS. 

The  general  policy  adopted  by  the  War  Department  as  to  appoint- 
ment of  officers  to  commissions  in  the  National  Guard  is  as  follows : 

1.  That  Regular  Army  officers  may  be  selected  for  detail  as  com- 
manders of  divisions  or  brigades. 

2.  That  only  one  Regular  Army  officer  -,vill  be  detailed  with  each 
regiment  of  the  National  Guard,  and  this  detail  must  be  in  the  grade 
of  colonel  or  lieutenant-colonel. 

3.  That  Regular  Army  officers  to  be  detailed  as  chiefs  of  staff  of 
divisions  will  be  taken  only  from  the  grade  of  colonel  or  lieutenant 
colonel. 

Assistant  chiefs  of  staff  may  be  detailed  from  the  grades  of  major 
and  captain. 

Individual  applications  under  this  policy  will  be  submitted  to  the 
Chief  of  Staff  for  decision  as  to  the  individual  before  the  detail  is 
made.  (Decision,  Secretary  of  War,  June  30,  1916  (2426227).) 

Pursuant  to  the  above  policy,  there  had  been  up  to  September  14, 
43  officers  (1  lieutenant  colonel,  2  majors,  25  captains,  and  15  lieu- 
tenants) of  the  Regular  Army  authorized  to  accept  commissions  in 
the  National  Guard  under  section  100  of  the  national-defense  act. 
These  were  appointed  as  follows:  3  in  the  grade  of  brigadier  general, 
11  in  the  grade  of  colonel,  24  in  the  grade  of  lieutenant  colonel,  and 
5  in  the  grade  of  major. 

NONCOMMISSIONED   OFFICERS. 

The  legality  of  commissioning  retired  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular 
Army  in  active  service  in  the  National  Guard  has  been  referred  to 
the  Judge  Advocate  General  of  the  Army,  who  on  June  8,  1916, 
rendered  opinion  as  follows: 

I  am  of  opinion  that  a  retired  enlisted  man  may  not  legally  be  accepted  for 
active  service,  except  as  provided  in  section  11  of  the  act  of  April  25,  1914,1  so 
long  as  he  retains  the  status  of  a  retired  enlisted  man. 

1  Voluntary  Army  Act. 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE  ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC.  59 

As  to  enlisted  men  of  the  National  Guard,  the  several  department 
commanders  were  telegraphed  by  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army 
on  August  3,  granting  them  authority  to  discharge  enlisted  men  of 
the  National  Guard  to  enable  them  to  accept  commissions  in  the 
National  Guard  when  they  are  eligible  for  such  commissions. 

A  considerable  number  of  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army,  both 
sergeant-instructors  and  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  line,  were 
discharged  to  accept  commissions  in  the  National  Guard.  The  pro- 
vision of  the  national-defense  act  which  permits  such  appointments 
is  the  last  clause  of  section  74,  which  reads:  "such  other  civilians  as 
may  be  especially  qualified  for  duty  therein." 

There  is  no  provision  for  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  Regular 
Army  being  furloughed  to  enable  them  to  accept  National  Guard 
commissions. 

This  is  an  unfortunate  oversight  in  the  law,  for  when  the  National 
Guard  is  mobilized  it  would  not  only  be  of  great  assistance  to  the 
State  troops  to  have,  while  in  active  service,  the  temporary  services 
of  old  and  experienced  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  Regular 
Army.  Such  service  is  broadening  to  the  noncommissioned  officers; 
the  advantages  of  such  service  are  therefore  reciprocal.  Under  pres- 
ent laws,  however,  a  noncommissioned  officer  of  the  Regular  Army 
to  accept  service  as  an  officer  of  the  National  Guard  must  be  dis- 
charged, and  if  he  is  in  service  with  the  National  Guard  longer  than 
three  months  he  forfeits  the  advantages  incident  to  long  service  in 
the  Regular  Establishment. 

REPORT  OF  INSPECTION  BY  ASSISTANT  CHIEF  OF  STAFF. 

Maj.  Gen.  Tasker  H.  Bliss,  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  was  sent  by 
the  Secretary  of  War  to  ascertain  the  conditions  existing  in  the 
National  Guard  who  are  now  camped  on  the  border.  His  instruc- 
tions were  as  follows: 

Subject:  Inspection  trip  of  commands  along  the  Mexican  border. 

1.  The  Secretary  of  War  directs  that  you  proceed  from  this  city  to  Fort  Sam 
Houston,  Tex.,  and  from  that  place  begin  and  complete  a  thorough  inspection  of 
all  stations  and  commands  of  the  Regular  Army  and  of  the  National  Guard 
and  Organized  Militia  along  the  Mexican  border. 

2.  In  making  this  inspection  you  will  be  guided  by  the  verbal  instructions  of 
the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Chief  of  Staff.     You  will  make  as  frequent  re- 
ports as  possible,  by  wire  when  necessary,  with  recommendation  of  action  which 
in  your  judgment  should  be  taken  by  the  War  Department.     You  will  confer 
with  the  commanding  general  of  the  Southern  Department,  keep  him  informed 
of  the  results  of  your  observations,  and  transmit  to  him  whatever  views  and 
instructions  as  to  the  general  situation  are  communicated  to  you  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  for  that  purpose. 

3.  The  commanding  general,   Southern  Department,  has  been  instructed  ta 
furnish  you  whatever  assistance  is  necessary  to  enable  you  to  carry  out  the 
foregoing  order. 

H.  L.  SCOTT, 

Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 
Approved. 
BAKER. 

The  inspections  were  made  between  July  14  and  August  15.  He 
inspected  the  troops  in  the  Brownsville  district,  as  follows: 

Brownsville :  First  Illinois  Cavalry  and  First  and  Second  Virginia 
Infantry. 


60  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

Mission :  Second,  Fourteenth,  and  Sixty-ninth  New  York  Infantry 
and  one  ambulance  company  (New  York)  ;  Seventh,  Twelfth,  and 
Seventy -first  New  York  Infantry ;  four  squadrons  of  Cavalry. 

McAllen:  First  and  Second  Regiments  Field  Artillery,  First  Bat- 
talion Signal  Corps,  First  Field  Hospital,  Third  Ambulance  Com- 
pany, First  Battalion  of  Engineers,  all  from  New  York. 

Pharr :  Twenty- third  and  Seventy- fourth  New  York  Infantry  and 
one  ambulance  company. 

Llano  Grande:  First,  Second,  and  Third  Indiana  Infantry;  one- 
Virginia  field  artillery;  one  signal  company;  two  ambulance  com- 
panies; and  one  field  hospital;  the  Minnesota  Brigade,  consisting  of 
the  First,  Second,  and  Third  Infantry;  the  First  and  Second  Ne- 
braska Infantry;  and  one  field  hospital  (Nebraska). 

Mercedes :  Six  companies  Third  Texas  Infantry. 

Donna :  Four  companies  Second  Texas  Infantry. 

Harlingen :  Five  companies  Second  Texas  Infantry. 

Troops  at  other  points  were  inspected,  as  follows : 

Laredo:  The  First,  Second,  Third,  and  Fourth  Missouri  Infantry 
and  auxiliary  troops  from  Missouri. 

Eagle  Pass:  Maryland  troops:  First,  Fourth,  and  Fifth  Infantry, 
one  troop  of  Cavalry,  one  ambulance  company,  and  one  field  hospital. 
Kansas  troops :  First  and  "Second  Infantry,  one  battery  Field  Artil- 
lery; First  Regiment  Vermont  Infantry. 

San  Antonio:  Illinois  troops:  First,  Second,  Third,  Fourth,  Sev- 
enth, and  Eighth  Infantry;  First  and  Second  Field  Hospital  Com- 
panies ;  First  Field  Artillery ;  Company  A,  Signal  Corps ;  Company 
A,  Engineers.  Wisconsin  National  Guard :  First,  Second,  and  Third 
Infantry ;  Battery  A,  Field  Artillery ;  Troop  A,  Cavalry ;  First  and 
Second  Field  Hospitals. 

El  Paso  district :  Pennsylvania  Division.  Michigan  troops :  Thirty- 
first  and  Thirty-second  Infantry.  Massachusetts  troops:  Fifth, 
Eighth,  and  Ninth  Infantry,  First  Field  Artillery. 

Columbus :  First  New  Mexico  and  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry. 

Douglas :  First,  Fourth,  and  Fifth  New  Jersey  and  auxiliary  troops 
from  that  State,  and  Second  Montana  Infantry. 

Warren :  Company  A,  Signal  Corps,  and  First  Field  Hospital  from 
the  District  of  Columbia. 

Naco:  Headquarters  and  one  battalion  First  Arizona  and  First 
Separate  Battalion  District  of  Columbia  (colored)  Infantry. 

Nogales:  California  troops:  Second,  Fifth,  and  Seventh  Infantry 
and  auxiliary  troops.  Connecticut  troops:  First  and  Second  Infan- 
try and  auxiliary  troops.  Idaho  troops:  First  Infantry.  Utah 
troops:  Two  squadrons  Cavalry,  one  battery  Field  Artillery,  one 
field  hospital. 

Gen.  Bliss's  reports,  in  a  condensed  form,  of  inspections  of  troops 
from  Brownsville  to  Nogales,  inclusive,  is  as  follows : 

Tentage. — Sufficient  and  excellent,  with  minor  exceptions,  as  where  one  of 
the  Indiana  regiments  was  still  in  shelter  tents,  but  large  tentage  had  been 
shipped  by  express  and  was  daily  expected. 

Cloth-inft  and  shoes. — All  troops  were  found  suitably  equipped  with  O.  D. 
cotton  uniforms  except  three  Missouri  regiments  at  Laredo  and  a  few  indi- 
viduals elsewhere  who  were  still  wearing  woolen  clothing,  but  with  prospects 
of  an  early  supply  of  the  cotton  uniforms. 

Generally  men  were  found  to  be  well  equipped  with  shoes,  the  most  notable 
exception  being  in  the  Third  Missouri  and  Fourteenth  New  York  Infantry,  where 
about  100  or  more  men  were  reported  as  being  without  serviceable  shoes 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  61 

There  was  a  shortage  of  hats  in  the  First,  Second,  and  Third  Indiana  Regi- 
ments. 

Condition  of  camp  site.-*— In  Brownsville  district  camp  sites  are  suitable  as 
a  rule,  but  on  account  of  the  flat  nature  of  the  country  not  easily  drained. 
This  was  notably  the  case  in  the  camp  of  the  First  Illinois  Cavalry  at  Browns- 
ville, and  the  Third  Texas  Infantry  at  Harlingen.  The  soil  here  is  gumbo.  At 
Laredo  and  Eagle  Pass  the  camp  sites  are  excellent,  well  drained,  and  in  good 
sanitary  condition.  At  San  Antonio  they  are  excellent,  except  as  to  character 
of  soil,  which  is  gumbo  and  does  not  absorb  water.  At  El  Paso  troops  are 
encamped  in  three  localities,  the  Pennsylvania  division  being  in  one  body  and 
near  their  drill  grounds  and  target  range.  The  Massachusetts  brigade  and 
two  Michigan  regiments  are  encamped  in  the  southeastern  section  of  El  Paso 
to  prevent  illegal  use  of  the  international  boundary.  The  auxiliary  troops  from 
Massachusetts  and  Rhode  Island  are  camped  on  high  and  somewhat  rocky  ground 
in  the  northeastern  section  of  El  Paso.  At  Columbus  and  Douglas  the  sites 
are  on  flat  plains  drained  with  deep  ditches;  those  at  Warren  and  Naco  are 
hilly  and  satisfactory.  At  Nogales  the  site  of  camps  of  the  California  Infantry 
is  on  low  ground  and  liable  to  overflow  in  heavy  rains,  in  consequence  of  which 
a  change  to  a  more  suitable  site  farther  from  town  is  under  consideration.  The 
location  of  camp  sites  at  Nogales  and  elsewhere  was  governed  in  a  measure  by 
facilities  for  piping  water  to  the  camps. 

Condition  of  sinks  and  bathhouses. — Sinks,  with  few  exceptions,  were  re- 
ported to  be  in  excellent  condition,  being  vaults  with  covered  seats  and  disin- 
fected by  being  burned  out  daily  with  straw  and  oil.  In  the  excepted  cases 
the  troops  had  shown  neither  the  ingenuity  nor  carefulness  in  making  most  of 
the  facilities  available  as  had  been  done  in  other  commands.  Steps  were  taken 
to  remedy  this  defect.  Twenty-four  seats  per  battalion  is  reported  as  the 
number  provided,  though  as  low  as  12  seats  per  battalion  was  found  and  no- 
complaint  of  overcrowding.  At  Llano  Grande  straddle  trenches  \vere  in  gen- 
eral use,  but  well  cared  for  and  sanitary. 

The  number  of  shower  baths  found  varied  from  12  to  30  per  regiment ;  even 
with  the  smaller  number  there  was  no  complaint  of  overcrowding.  There  were 
no  shower  baths  at  McAllen  or  Llano  Grande,  the  water  system  at  these  places 
at  time  of  inspection  just  being  installed. 

Cleanliness  of  men  and  camp. — The  hard  work  in  the  hot  sun  makes  clothing 
wet,  and  the  dust  and  lack  of  washing  facilities  makes  it  difficult  to  keep  cloth- 
ing clean.  Prospects  for  a  remedy  in  the  future  in  this  respect  are,  however, 
good. 

Cooks. — In  nearly  all  companies  and  other  units  it  was  reported  that  they 
had  at  least  1  cook  of  from  2  to  16  years'  experience  in  cooking,  either  in  res- 
taurants, construction  camps,  hotels,  or  elsewhere.  On  the  whole  there  was 
very  general  satisfaction  with  the  cooking. 

Occasionally  cooks  were  found  who  had  had  no  previous  experience,  a  defect 
which  effort  was  made  to  remedy  at  Eagle  Pass  and  other  camps  by  the  detail 
of  cooks  from  regular  organizations  to  give  instruction,  and  at  San  Antonio 
by  detailing  four  men  from  each  regiment  under  instruction  as  bakers  in  the 
School  of  Bakers  and  Cooks  at  Fort  Sam  Houston. 

In  some  of  the  camps  there  had  been  complaint  for  a  short  time  after  troops 
arrived  of  lack  of  variety  of  food.  This  defect  was  of  short  duration  and  soon 
remedied. 

Kitchens. — These  are  the  weak  points  in  most  camps,  and  their  condition  was 
found  to  vary  all  the  way  from  excellent  in  the  First  Kansas  to  poor  in  the 
-  and  -  -  and  -  -  Squadron  -  -  Cavalry.  As  a 

rule  the  Pennsylvania  division  brought  mess  tents  with  them,  which  proved  a 
great  help.  The  poor  average  condition  found  is  natural,  owing  to  troops 
having  arrived  only  a  short  time  before  the  inspection  and  the  change  of  con- 
ditions under  which  the  personnel  were  obliged  to  work.  At  the  time  of  the 
inspection  of  most  camps  authority  had  just  been  received  to  provide  screened 
kitchens  and  mess  shelters,  making  a  great  step  forward  in  the  fly  problem. 
The  importance  of  proper  kitchen  sanitation  was  strongly  impressed  upon  all 
organization  commanders. 

Picket  lines. — These  were  reported  as  not  well  drained  and  no  cover  for 
animals  anywhere,  except  for  the  animals  of  one  ambulance  company  of  New 
York  and  a  battalion  of  Field  Artillery  of  Indiana,  wrhich  had  provided  shelter 
at  their  own  expense.  The  loss  of  a  few  animals  dying  from  heat  would  involve 
more  expense  than  a  simple  shelter  for  the  picket  line. 

An  estimate  for  shelters  was  approved  by  the  Department  Commander,  and 
its  approval  by  the  War  Department  is  strongly  urged  by  the  Assistant  Chief 
o.*  Staff. 


62  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

Cots. — In  the  Brownsville  district  men  were  without  cots,  except  in  two 
Virginia  regiments  and  in  the  cases  of  individual  men  who  had  purchased  cots 
at  their  own  expense.  At  other  points  most  of  the  troops  inspected  were  sup- 
plied with  cots.  Practically  all  of  the  remainder  were  sleeping  on  bed  sacks 
stuffed  with  hay  or  straw. 

Conduct  and  appearance  of  men. — All  camps  were  orderly  and  men  seemed 
contented  and  cheerful,  except  among  some  of  the  New  Jersey  troops  at  Douglas, 
thought  to  be  due  to  diarrhea  and  consequent  depression  and  discomfort. 

The  physique  of  the  officers  was  reported  to  be  generally  better  than  that 
of  the  men.  The  poor  physical  development  of  the  men  was  particularly  notice- 
able in  regiments  from  large  cities. 

Considerable  training  will  be  necessary  before  these  men  will  be  physically 
fit  for  hard  field  service. 

Preparedness  for  field  service. — All  organizations  were  reported  as  equipped 
for  field  service,  except  as  to  horses  and  mules ;  but  in  no  other  way  than  in 
material  is  this  the  case.  The  men,  many  of  whom  were  only  recruits,  appeared 
almost  entirely  ignorant  of  the  duties  of  a  soldier,  and  were  poor  even  in  the 
simple  evolutions  of  company  drill.  Their  equipment  can  be  completed  long 
before  their  instruction  can  be.  Practically  all  organizations  except  the  Wis- 
consin troops  are  supplied  with  the  old-model  personal  equipment,  and  recom- 
mendation has  been  made  that  all  be  supplied  as  soon  as  possible  with  the 
model  1910  equipment  to  increase  the  comfort  of  men  on  the  march. 

Instruction. — Instruction  has  been  going  on  continually  since  arrival  in 
camp,  but  owing  to  the  necessity  for  obtaining  equipment  the  instruction  has 
been  interfered  with.  Practice  marches  of  short  length  are  given  practically 
each  day.  The  total  amount  of  instruction  varies  from  1£  to  6  hours  per  day. 

Officers'  schools  have  been  started  in  a  large  proportion  of  the  regiments,  and 
occasionally  an  officer  or  enlisted  man  is  found  who  can  speak  Spanish. 

Guard  duty  and  instruction  is  confined  to  regimental  guards  about  camps, 
the  duty  being  generally  performed  by  company  with  tours  varying  in  intervals 
from  15  to  40  days. 

Owing  to  the  great  proportion  of  recruits  much  of  the  instruction  at  the 
time  of  the  inspection  was  confined  to  the  School  of  the  Soldier  and  School 
of  the  Squad. 

Transportation. — The  Indiana  brigade  had  only  nine  wagons  to  each  regiment, 
but  practically  all  other  organizations  had  received  their  full  allowance  of 
wagons  and  harness,  and  some  of  the  organizations  had  received  animals.  Some 
also  are  reported  as  having  automobiles  and  a  few  have  motor  trucks.  Animals 
are  being  purchased,  and  the  deficiency  in  this  respect  is  being  removed  as  fast 
as  possible. 

Roads. — The  roads  to  all  camps  are  passable,  at  Laredo  and  San  Antonio 
excellent ;  to  other  camps  they  are  good.  This  remark  applies  to  dry  weather. 
Where  necessary  to  construct  roads  within  the  camps,  the  work  was  going  on  at 
a  fair  rate.  A  new  road  to  the  camp  of  the  Pennsylvania  Division  at  El  Paso 
will  soon  be  absolutely  necessary. 

Water. — In  the  Brownsville  district  camps  are  supplied  from  the  local  water 
supply  of  the  towns  near  which  they  are  located,  all  of  which  in  turn  receive 
their  supply  from  the  Rio  Grande  River,  the  water  being  excellent. 

The  water  supply  is  reported  as  ample  in  quantity,  except  at  Llano  Grande, 
where  the  water  system  was  just  being  installed,  and  at  Columbus  and  the 
camps  of  the  California  regiments  at  Nogales. 

As  to  purity,  it  is  satisfactory  at  Eagle  Pass,  San  Antonio,  El  Paso,  Douglas, 
Warren,  Naco,  and,  with  slight  exceptions,  at  Nogales. 

At  Laredo  it  is  reported  "  at  present  unsatisfactory,"  but  a  sanitary  in- 
spector (Lieut.  Col.  Munson,  M.  C.)  has  pointed  out  how  it  could  be  made 
satisfactory. 

Diseases. — The  number  of  contagious  and  infectious  diseases  have  been 
almost  negligible.  A  few  cases  of  lice  and  some  venereal  cases — the  latter 
being  generally  brought  from  mobilization  camps  or  home  stations — are 
reported. 

Practically  all  the  men  have  been  inoculated  for  typhoid  and,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  one  New  York  regiment,  vaccinated  for  smallpox. 

The  percentage  of  sick  in  the  -  -  and  -  -  Infantry  and 

-  Squadron  -  -  Cavalry  ranged  at  time  of  inspection  from"  5  per 

cent  to  10  per  cent,  the  majority  of  cases  being  diarrhea.  Immediate  remedial 
action  was  taken  up  with  district  and  department  commanders  and  attention 
called  to  the  conjunction  of  insanitary  camp  conditions,  poorly  constructed 
sinks,  and  a  high  sick  rate. 


MOBILIZATION    OF   THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  63 

Diseases  among  animals. — No  diseases  have  appeared  among  the  animals  in 
the  camps,  except  in  a  few  cases  due  to  lack  of  shelter.  These  animals  pur- 
chased have  been  quarantined  for  about  three  weeks  before  being  issued. 

Sanitary  condition  of  the  camp. — This  is  reported  as  excellent  in  the  Browns- 
ville district  at  Laredo,  Eagle  Pass,  San  Antonio,  and  El  Paso,  except  that  it  is 
feared  that  the  camp  of  the  Pennsylvania  Division  may  be  flooded  in  the  rainy 
season.  At  Nogales  it  is  reported  as  very  good,  but  that  some  of  the  incinera- 
tors were  faultily  constructed. 

Health  of  the  men. — Generally  the  health  of  the  men  since  their  arrival  in 
camp  has  been  excellent.  The  few  cases  of  sickness  have  been  from  heat,  slight 
intestinal  derangements,  due  doubtless  to  change  of  diet  and  water,  and  lack  of 
experience  on  the  part  of  the  men  in  judicious  eating  and  drinking. 

The  sick,  where  not  cared  for  in  regimental  infirmaries  and  field  hospitals, 
are  sent  to  the  nearest  hospital — usually  one  at  a  military  post.  A  new  base 
hospital  has  just  been  established  at  Brownsville  and  one  is  under  construction 
at  Nogales. 

Ration. — The  food,  with  the  exception  hereinafter  noted,  was  invariably  re- 
ported as  excellent  in  quality  and  abundant  in  quantity.  The  facilities  for 
caring  for  the  food  in  camp  are  not  very  good,  and  in  some  organizations  but 
little  ingenuity  was  shown  in  making  the  most  of  the  facilities  available. 

At  McAllen  and  Mission  there  was  for  a  couple  of  days  a  shortage  of  bread 
and.  due  to  lack  of  transportation,  a  shortage  of  ice. 

Complaints  and  suggestions. — The  officers  of  each  regiment  were  asked  for  sug- 
gestions, and  these  were  generally  limited  to  requests  that  screening  for 
kitchens  and  lumber  for  mess  tables  be  furnished,  while  a  few  desired  canvas 
shelter  for  mess  tables.  At  El  Paso  troops  were  almost  totally  without  blank 
forms  for  their  everyday  administration.  In  the  Brownsville  district  there 
were  some  requests  for  improving  the  ration  and  a  general  desire  for  more 
clothing  and  underwear.  Early  compliance  with  these  requests  will  be  made. 

Machine-gun  companies. — The  machine-gun  companies  were  found  to  be  only 
in  part  organized  and  equipped,  the  progress  made  being  substantially  as  indi- 
cated below: 

Brownsville  district :  Only  5  of  the  22  organizations  inspected  had  guns. 

Eagle  Pass :  Two  Maryland  and  one  Kansas  regiment  supplied  with  neither 
guns  nor  equipment :  the  other  three  regiments  had  guns  and  equipment  but  no 
animals.  All  were  being  instructed  by  the  personnel  from  the  Regular  organiza- 
tions. 

Laredo :  All  regiments  except  Third  Missouri  equipped  with  guns,  some  com- 
panies just  being  organized ;  very  little  instruction  as  yet  has  been  given. 

San  Antonio :  The  two  Illinois  brigades  are  reported  backward  in  this  respect, 
being  entirely  without  animals,  and  some  lack  even  the  guns.  Some  companies 
just  being  organized,  and  instruction  not  yet  begun.  In  the  Wisconsin  brigade 
all  companies  are  organized  and  have  their  guns  but  no  animals. 

El  Paso :  All  the  Massachusetts  regiments  except  one  and  the  Michigan  regi- 
ment equipped  with  Benet-Mercier  guns;  one  Massachusetts  regiment  has  the 
Colt  gun. 

The  Pennsylvania  Division  has  neither  guns  nor  equipment,  and.  generally 
speaking,  companies  not  yet  organized. 

Columbus,  Douglas,  Warren,  and  Naco :  No  organizations  except  Second  Mas- 
sachusetts supplied  with  guns.  This  regiment  has  20  side-carriage  motorcycles, 
on  which  are  to  be  carried  men.  guns,  and  supplies. 

Nogales :  All  the  infantry  regiments  here,  except  the  Idaho  and  Second  Cali- 
fornia Regiments,  have  guns  and  are  being  assisted  in  the  instruction  of  their 
personnel  by  the  machine  gun  company  of  the  Twelfth  United  States  In- 
fantry. 

Naturally,  until  the  arrival  of  guns  and  equipment  no  progress  can  be  made 
in  training  these  units. 

General  conditions. — A  general  good  spirit  prevailing  among  the  officers  and 
men  of  various  commands  is  noticeable. 

At  Laredo  there  is  a  congestion  of  troops  at  the  present  camp  site,  and 
steps  are  being  taken  to  remedy  this.  The  telegram  sent  to  Washington  by 
citizens  of  Laredo  complaining  about  insanitary  conditions  in  camp  related 
chiefly  to  matters  of  indecency  rather  than  insanitation,  due  to  latrines  and 
shower  baths  not  being  properly  screened.  This  matter  has  been  remedied. 

A  few  cases  of  dissatisfaction  that  existed  arose  from  the  .military  con- 
siderations which  required  organizations  to  be  hurried  to  the  border  from  their 
mobilization  camps  without  supplying  them  there  according  to  the  original 


64  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

plans  of  the  War  Department.  These  deficiencies  are  being  made  good  with 
all  possible  dispatch. 

At  El  Paso  a  sulxlonot  is  to  ho  established  for  the  Pennsylvania  division  at 
their  camp,  supplies  for  this  depot  being  shipped  to  it  by  rail,  thus  lessening 
the  work  of  motor  and  wagon  transportation. 

As  additional  troops  arrive  at  this  point  their  organization  into  divisions, 
each  with  its  own  supply  depot,  is  recommended. 

Some  disappointment  has  been  observed  at  failure  of  troops  to  be  used  in 
active  operations  immediately  on  their  arrival  at  the  border. 

Local  commanders  have  been  handicapped  in  a  number  of  instances  by  the 
lack  of  a  suitable  staff,  and  have  been  obliged  to  pick  up  such  officers  for  this 
duty  as  happened  to  be  available  within  their  commands.  These  improvised 
staffs  have  done  well,  but  the  necessity  for  tactical  organization  and  accom- 
panying staffs  has  been  strongly  emphasized  by  this  concentration. 

At  Nogales  the  physical  examination  of  regiments  not  so  examined  previous 
to  departure  from  mobilization  camps  had  at  the  time  of  inspection  just  been 
completed,  resulting  in  the  rejection  of  about  1,000  men.  or  approximately 
10  per  cent  of  the  personnel  at  that  point. 

On  the  whole  the  general  conditions,  except  as  already  mentioned,  are  satis- 
factory. 

The  sick  rates  are  generally  very  low,  men  well  fed  and  cared  for,  and 
serving  and  being  trained  under  the  very  best  conditions  as  to  health  and 
comfort  that  are  consistent  with  the  requirements  of  soldier  life.  The  in- 
evitable discomforts  arid  inconveniences  of  camp  life  are  accepted  by  the  men 
in  a  true  soldierly  spirit.  They  are  contented  with  these  conditions,  and 
will  doubtless  remain  so  unless  some  misguided  and  misinformed  people  in- 
terfere and,  basing  their  opinions  on  the  comforts  and  arrangements  of  civil 
life,  lead  soldiers  to  feel  that  their  lot  is  unnecessarily  hard  and  should  be 
ameliorated. 

ANIMALS  AND  MEANS  OF  TRANSPORTATION  FOR  THE  NATIONAL 

GUARD. 

At  the  time  of  the  call  the  only  animals  in  the  hands  of  the  State 
troops  that  had  been  purchased  from  Federal  funds  were  558  horses 
issued  to  the  Field  Artillery.  Congress  had  made  appropriations 
for  the  pay  of  mechanics  and  helpers  to  care  for  horses,  and  for 
forage  and  other  supplies  for  32  horses  for  each  battery,  and  for 
4  horses  for  each  regimental  and  battalion  headquarters  of  the  Feld 
Artillery,  and  the  allotments  to  the  States  under  the  act  of  Congress 
approved  May  27,  1908,  and  under  section  1661,  Revised  Statutes, 
were  made  available  for  the  purchase  of  these  horses.  Many  of  the 
States  were  unable  or  unwilling  to  avail  themselves  of  the  oppor- 
tunity to  obtain  horses  in  this  way,  and  in  consequence  only  399 
horses  had  been  purchased  from  Federal  funds  and  159  condemned 
Regular  Army  horses  had  been  issued. 

States  had  been  required  to  expend  a  part  of  their  Federal  allot- 
ments for  the  purchase  of  field  wagons,  and  where  the  allotments 
were  not  sufficient  for  this  purpose  wagons  were  supplied  from 
unallotted  funds.  As  a  result  of  these  efforts  3.882  of  the  3,969  field 
wagons  required  were  available  at  the  time  of  the  mobilization. 

When  the  militia  organizations  of  the  various  States  were  called 
into  the  Federal  Service  on  June  18,  1916,  the  War  Department  took 
immediate  steps  to  secure  the  number  of  animals  needed  to  equip 
the  troops  by  directing  all  remount  stations  and  the  purchasing 
officers  throughout  the  country  to  advertise  for  them  as  extensively 
as  possible. 

Meanwhile  such  animals  as  were  on  hand  at  the  auxiliary  remount 
depots,  and  also  those  that  were  being  delivered  under  contracts  for 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 


65 


reserve  purposes  of  the  Regular  Army,  were  utilized  in  equipping  the 
National  Guard  and  were  afterwards  replaced  from  animals  con- 
tracted for  on  June  27.  Bids  were  opened  on  June  26  and  wired  to 
the  War  Department,  and  contracts  were  awarded  on  June  27  to 
26  of  the  lowest  bidders  for  42,408  horses  and  18,440  mules.  The 
necessary  number  of  inspection  boards  were  sent  to  the  points  of 
delivery  to  inspect  and  ship  the  animals  to  the  auxiliary  remount 
depots  established  at  El  Paso  and  Fort  Sam  Houston,  Tex.,  where 
they  were  held  until  entirely  free  from  shipping  fever,  which  is 
prevalent  among  animals  required  to  undergo  a  railway  journey. 
This  quarantine"interval  covered  a  period  of  at  least  two  weeks.  If 
animals  were  issued  to  troops  before  they  fully  recovered  from  this 
ailment,  they  would  infect  the  well  animals  with  the  organization. 
From  the  date  that  contracts  were  awarded  for  animals  (June  27) 
to  October  28,  1916,  the  following  horses  and  mules  were  on  hand,, 
received  at,  and  issued  from  the  auxiliary  remount  depots  and  other 
points  on  the  Mexican  border: 


Period. 

Received. 

Issued. 

Horses. 

Mules. 

Horses. 

Mules. 

Auxiliary  Remoimt  Depot,  El  Paso,  Tex.: 
On  hand  Tul  v  1  ,  1916     

769 
351 
1.092 
2'.  703 
2,822 
2.239 
1,712 
1,399 
1,  408 
1,212 
613 
238 
617 
402. 
59 
20 
120 
38 

583 
23 
235 
702 
1,853 
1,037 
1,809 
448 
535 
504 
222 
341 
68 
160 
8 
400 

46 

Week  ending  Julv  8  1916 

68 
365 
429 
1,160 
2,857 
792 
1,986 
1,291 
1,226 
572 
1,167 
1,131 
96 
137 
85 
630 
464 

Week  ending  Julv  15  1916 

151 
331 
829 
1,240 
702 
857 
850 
559 
130 
689 
1,043 
255 
55 
123 
29 
222 

Week  endin^  Julv  22,  1916      

Week  ending  July  29  1916 

Week  ending  Vug  5  1916 

Week  ending  \ng  12  1916        .... 

Week  ending  Vug  19  1916 

Week  ending  Vug.  26,  1916  

Week  ending  Sept  2  1916  . 

Week  ending  Sept  9  1916 

Week  ending  Sept.  16,  1916    

Week  ending  Sept  23  1916 

Week  ending  Sept  30  1916 

Week  ending  Oct  7,  1916    . 

Week  ending  Oct  14  1916 

Week  ending  Oct.  21,  1916  .   .   . 

Week  ending  Oct  28  1916 

Total                 

17,814 

,  459 
,652 
,161 
,093 
,831 
,588 
1,814 
563 
1,  568 
1,764 
486 
648 
578 
532 
869 
503 
290 
10 

8,981 

290 
1,620 
2,055 
2,137 
1,415 
1,421 
1,191 
620 
59 
4 
302 
565 
40 
96 
261 
309 
321 
126 

14,  456 

8,065 

Auxi'iarv  Remount  Depot,  Fort  Sam  Houston,  Tex.: 
On  hand  July  1,  1916    

•\Veek  endin^  July  8  1916 

878 
479 
1,997 
1,069 
1,693 
766 
969 
665 
2,441 
459 
291 
30 
234 
426 
611 
160 
326 

235 

176 
1,036 
1,831 
1,433 
910 
895 
1,100 
280 
248 
246 
134 
24 
605 
326 
151 
950 

Week  ending  Inly  15  1916 

Week  ending  Julv  22,  1916      

Week  ending  July  29  1916 

Week  ending  A  ug.  5,  1916  

Weekending  Vug.  12,  1916   .   .          ... 

Week  ending  Vug  19  1916 

Week  ending  -Vug  26  1916 

Week  ending  Sept.  2,  1916  

"NYepk  ending  Sept  9  1916 

Week  endin<*  Sept  16  1916 

Week  ending  Sept.  23,  1916  

V,'eek  ending  Sent  30  1916 

Week  ending  Oct.  7,  1916  

Week  ending  Oct.  14,  1916      

Week  ending  Oct  21  1916 

Week  ending  Oct.  28,  1916  

Total 

19,  409 

12,  832 

13,  494 

10,  580 

Shipped  to  various  posts  on  the  border  (  Brownsville,  Harlingen, 
Eagle  Pass,  Laredo,  McAllen,  Calexico)  and  issued  to  troops 
when  re'  eased  from  quarantine 

2,787 

633 

2,787 

633 

Grand  total      

40,010 

22,  446 

30,  737 

19,278 

72031—16 5 


66  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

Of  the  animals  received  at  the  auxiliary  remount  depots  1,964 
horses  and  2,711  mules  were  turned  in  by  National  Guard  organiza- 
tions that  have  been  mustered  out  of  the  Federal  service. 

Of  the  animals  issued  from  the  auxiliary  remount  depots  8,449 
horses  and  2,160  mules  were  supplied  to  organizations  of  the  Regu- 
lar Army. 

Were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  foreign  buyers  had  purchased  and 
exported  thousands  of  animals  from  the  United  States  during  the 
past  two  years  double  the  number  of  horses  and  mules  shown  above 
would  have  been  delivered  during  the  same  period. 

In  distributing  animals  to  troops  each  organization  was  given  a 
partial  supply  before  attempting  to  issue  the  complete  allowance  to 
any  one  organization.  This  enabled  each  unit  to  get  along  until  ad- 
ditional animals  become  available  for  issue.  The  prudence  of  this 
method  of  distributing  animals  is  apparent. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  data  that  the  War  Department 
lost  no  time  in  obtaining  the  animals  required  to  equip  the  militia 
troops,  and  after  taking  into  consideration  all  the  conditions  that 
enter  into  the  task  of  equipping  a  large  body  of  troops  with  their 
quota  of  animals,  the  matter  was  handled  as  expeditiously  as  pos- 
sible. 

The  department  commander  of  the  Eastern  Department  was  au- 
thorized to  purchase  the  following  animals  for  the  National  Guard 
in  his  department :  1,861  cavalry  horses,  2,685  artillery  horses,  1,308 
draft  mules,  and  268  pack  mules. 

Such  animals  as  were  purchased  in  the  Eastern  Department  neces- 
sarily had  to  be  purchased  hurriedly.  The  haste  in  which  this  was 
done  and  the  resulting  consequences  are  clearly  shown  in  the  fol- 
lowing letter: 

HEADQUARTERS  EASTERN   DEPARTMENT, 
Governors  Island,  Nrir  York  City,  August  9,  1916. 
From  :  Department  ( "oinmaiuler. 
To:  The  Adjutnnt  General  of  the  Army. 

Subject:  Branding,  hoof  marking,  etc.,  of  animals  furnished  National  Guard, 
New  Jersey. 

1.  When  the  troops  of  the  National  Guard  of  the  State  of  New  Jersey  left 
for  duty  on  the  Mexican  border  some  of  the  animals  taken  with  them  were  not 
branded,  some  were  not  hoof  marked,  descriptive  cards  had  not  been  made  for 
some,  and  no  receipts  and  invoices  were  made  out  covering  the  animals  assigned 
to  each  organization,  though  it  is  understood  that  memorandum  receipts  were 
obtained  to  cover  all  animals. 

2.  In  order  that  the  contractors  from  whom  these  animals  were  purchased 
may  be  paid,  and  in  order  that  the  property  officer  of  the  State  of  New  Jersey 
who  received  these  animals  from  the  board  which  inspected  them  for  purchase 
may   prepare  "his  property   returns,    it    is   recommended   that   the   commanding 
Officer  at  Douglas.  Ariz.,  where  it  is  understood  that  all  of  the  troops  of  the 
.National  Guard  of  the  State  of  New  Jersey  are  stationed,  be  directed  to  detail 
one  or  more  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  to  inspect  all  of  the  animals  brought 
with  these  troops  and. see  that  the  following  action  is  taken  in  regard  to  them, 
to  wit: 

(a)  That  all  are  branded  "  U.   S." 

(b)  That  all  are  hoof  marked. 

(r)   That  descriptive  cards  are  made  for  all  of  them. 

(d)  That  invoices  and  receipts  are  made  by  each  respective  officer  for  the 
animals  turned  over  to  him  at  the  mobilization  camp  at  Sea  Girt,  N.  J. 

(c)  That  the  invoices  are  signed  by  this  officer  for  Lieut.  Col.  David  S.  Hill, 
National   Guard.   New  Jersey. 

(/)  That  the  receipts  made  out  in  favor  of  Lieut.  Col.  Hill  are  signed  by 
the  officer  who  had  the  animals  turned  over  to  him  at  the  mobilization  camp. 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED    MIL1TJA,    ETC. 


67 


((/)  That  these  receipts  are  all  forwarded  to  the  department  quartermaster, 
Eastern  Department,  who  will  see  that  they  are  turned  over  to  Lieut.  Col.  Hill 
and  that  any  memorandum  receipts  which  he  holds  are  canceled  and  returned 
to  the  persons  who  signed  them. 

(70  That  boards  of  survey  are  made  to  cover  the  loss  of  any  animals  be- 
tween the  time  that  they  left  the  mobilization  camp  at  Sea  Girt.  N.  J.,  and 
the  time  of  this  inspection,  which  boards  of  survey  should  be  utilized  by  the 
officers  signing  these  receipts  to  cover  their  losses  since  receiving  the  animals. 

(/)  A  certified  list  be  furnished  by  these  officers  showing  the  number  of 
privately  owned  animals  which  were  inspected  and  taken  over,  giving  a  value 
for  each  of  the  same. 

(j)  A  certified  list  be  furnished  by  these  officers  showing  the  number  of 
State  owned  animals  which  weire  inspected  and  taken  over,  giving  a  value  for 
each  of  ihe  same. 

(/»•)  A  certified  list  be  furnished  by  these  officers  showing  the  number  of 
organization  owned  animals  which  were  inspected  and  taken  over,  giving  a 
value  for  each  of  the  same. 

(0  Wherever  it  is  practicable  to  do  so  the  name  of  the  contractor  and  the 
number  of  animals  furnished  by  him  should  be  furnished. 

3.  It  is  requested  that  action  be  taken  in  this  matter  as  soon  as  possible 
and  the  papers  forwarded  to  the  department  quartermaster,  Eastern  Depart- 
ment, in  order  that  .the  matter  may  be  cleared  up. 

4.  In  this  connection  you  are  informed  that  Capt   S.  H.  Barlow,  National 
Guard  of  New  Jersey,  has  been  sent  to  Douglas,  Ariz.,  by  the  State  of  New 
Jersey,   to  represent   it  and   its  disbursing  and  property   officer   in   adjusting 
this  matter. 

LEONARD  WOOD. 

The  following  is  a  statement  showing  by  months  the  number  of 
animals  issued  to  the  National  Guard  from  the  auxiliary  remount 
depots  at  El  Paso  and  Fort  Sam  Houston,  Tex.,  and  the  number  re- 
maining on  hand  at  those  depots: 


Month. 

Issued  to  National  Guard  from  re- 
mount depots. 

On   hand   at   remount   depots  —  El 
Paso  and  Fort  Sam  Houston,  last 
day  of  month. 

Horses.                    Mules. 

Horses. 

Mules. 

Cavalry. 

Artillery.   Draft. 

I 

Pack. 

Cavalry. 

Artillery. 

Draft. 

Pack. 

June  18  to  June  30    

181 
3,367 
6,159 
2.943 
791 

100              6 
1,803       3,9SO 
4,038       6,065 
860  .    2,313 
2,046       2,046 

7 
781 
1,227 
327 
366 

1,266 
6,120 
7,137 
6,416 
6,241 

960 
3,527 
•       3,  179 
3.693 
2,666 

578 
5,3.53 
4,233 
3,130 
2,217 

295 

489 
535 
644 
464 

July  1  to  31 

August  1  to  31  

September  1  to  30  
October  1  to  28 

On  July  11,  1916,  the  commanding  general  of  the  Eastern  Depart- 
ment reported  that  the  Second  Maine  Infantry  had  left  for  the  border 
practically  without  animals  and  stated  that  unless  the  Government  is 
prepared  to  promptly  furnish  animals  to  organizations  arriving  on 
the  border  it  is  recommended  that  the  War  Department  fix  a  mini- 
mum number  of  animals  for  organizations  to  take  with  them  in  order 
that  they  may  have  some  degree  of  mobility  on  arrival  on  the  border, 
and  not  be  entirely  helpless. 

The  Quartermaster  General  reported  in  this  connection  on  July  28 
that  a  sufficient  number  of  horses  and  mules  were  being  shipped  to 
El  Paso  and  Fort  Sam  Houston,  auxiliary  remount  depots,  to 
promptly  equip  organizations  arriving  on  the  border  with  the  neces- 
sary animals  to  enable  them  to  get  along  until  they  can  be  equipped 
with  the  full  field  allowance  of  animals,  and  therefore  he  considered 


68  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

it  not  necessary  to  purchase  animals  for  troops  at  mobilization  camps 
in  addition  to  those  which  the  department  authorities,  Eastern  De- 
partment, were  authorized  to  buy  under  War  Department  instruc- 
tions. He  states  that  the  full  allowance  of  horses  and  mules  has 
already  been  contracted  for  to  equip  all  militia  organizations  called 
into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  and  that  animals  are  being 
shipped  at  the  rate  of  6,000  per  week  to  remount  depots  mentioned 
above,  and  that  there  were  at  El  Paso  on  July  19,  2,635  Cavalry 
horses,  1,144  Artillery  horses,  586  draft  mules,  219  pack  mules,  and 
at  Fort  Sam  Houston  July  22,  1,417  Cavalry  horses,  860  Artillery 
horses,  4,115  draft  mules,  and  292  pack  mules. 

The  commanding  general,  Southern  Department,  indorsed  this 
paper  August  12,  stating  that  the  supply  of  animals  for  all  organi- 
zations is  being  rapidly  furnished.  To  indicate  the  amount  and 
character  of  the  work  being  done,  the  example  is  cited  of  issues  from 
Fort  Sam  Houston  July  22  of  859  animals.  Endeavor  is  being  made 
to  give  a  partial  supply  to  all  organizations  before  attempting  to 
issue  completely  to  any  one.  The  wisdom  of  issuing  green  animals  to 
organizations  to  bring  to  the  border  with  them  immediately  is  seri- 
ously doubted.  About  150  deaths  have  been  reported  in  the  New 
York  division,  and  a  board  of  mounted  officers  has  reported  as 
follows : 

The  board  on  mortality  among  public  animals  at  McAllen  considers  that  mor- 
tality is  not  abnormal  in  view  of  conditions  of  mobilization.  Losses  mostly 
occurred  amongst  horses  purchased  for  the  emergency  of  which  nearly  all  were 
sick  when  received  by  organizations,  and  many  sick  when  entrained. 

This  matter  having  again  been  referred  to  the  commanding  gen- 
eral, Eastern  Department,  he  states  that  comments  of  the  McAllen 
board  on  the  action  taken  at  his  headquarters  in  the  matter  of  pur- 
chase of  horses  for  the  New  York  troops  are  unwarranted,  as  a  board 
of  thoroughly  competent  Eegular  officers,  assisted  by  veterinarians, 
inspected  and  purchased  these  horses,  and  that  similar  boards  pur- 
chased for  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  Rhode  Island,  and  New  Jer- 
sey. No  horses  were  sick  when  they  embarked.  He  states : 

I  deemed  it  highly  inadvisable  to  send  mounted  organizations  to  the  border 
without  horses.  It  was  assumed  that  under  conditions  which  necessitated  the 
mobilization,  mounted  troops  would  be  required  to  act  as  such  on  arrival  at  the 
scene  of  probable  military  activity,  and  therefore  all  mounted  organizations 
should  have  gone  fully  equipped  with  animals.  The  animals  purchased  were  as 
a  rule  seasoned  animals.  A  large  portion  of  those  for  the  New  York  troops 
were  those  which  had  been  hired  for  their  summer  training  period.  The 
mounted  troops  from  New  York,  Massachusetts,  New  Jersey,  Connecticut,  and 
Rhode  Island  were  given  horses  enough  to  mount  a  portion  of  the  Cavalry 
organizations,  and  the  Artillery  was  supplied  with  horses  enough  to  at  least  pull 
the  guns  into  position.  These  were  the  only  horses  they  had  on  arrival  at  the 
border  and  in  most  instances  the  only  horses  they  had  for  a  long  time  after- 
wards. 

He  states  that  a  policy  which  results  in  men  75  per  cent  of  whom 
are  untrained  being  supplied  at  the  theater  of  operations  with  green 
horses,  untrained  and  untried,  is  in  his  opinion  an  unsound  and  dan- 
gerous one.  If  we  had  had  to  meet  conditions  of  actual  military 
operations  on  arrival  the  results  would  have  been  disastrous.  In 
case  it  is  ever  necessary  to  send  the  militia  to  the  border  again,  or  to 
call  it  into  the  service  under  conditions  which  render  active  operations 
probable,  as  was  the  case  in  this  instance,  every  organization  should 
leave  with  its  full  complement  of  seasoned  animals. 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   OKGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  69 

On  October  2,  1916,  the  Secretary  of  War,  upon  recommendation 
of  the  Chief  of  the  Militia  Bureau,  authorized  the  issue  by  the  Quar- 
termaster Corps  of  such  of  the  surplus  horses  as  the  law  allowed 
and  were  needed  for  training  purposes  by  organizations  of  National 
Guard  upon  being  mustered  out  of  the  service  of  the  United  States. 
Immediately  upon  receipt  of  this  authority  by  the  Chief  of  the 
Militia  Bureau  telegrams  were  directed  to  the  adjutants  general  of 
all  States  that  had  organizations  of  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  and 
signal  troops,  informing  them  of  the  action  of  the  War  Department 
and  requesting  that  they  report  by  wire  if  horses  were  desired  issued 
to  such  organizations  of  the  National  Guard  of  the  State,  and  re- 
questing the  designation  of  the  troop,  battery  or  company  for  which 
it  was  desired  horses  be  issued,  and  requesting  information  as  to  the 
number  of  horses,  not  exceeding  32  per  troop,  battery,  or  company, 
and  4  for  regimental,  battalion,  or  squadron  headquarters,  that  could 
be  cared  for  and  provided  proper  stabling  facilities  by  the  State. 

Upon  receipt  of  this  information  at  the  Militia  Bureau  it  was  at 
once  tabulated  and  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  furnished 
lists  thereof,  with  request  that  the  commanding  general,  Southern 
Department,  be  furnished  with  the  information  contained  in  the  lists 
and  that  he  be  directed  that  when  the  organizations  referred  to  were 
returned  from  the  border  for  muster  out  of  the  service  of  the  United 
States  the  number  of  horses  desired  by  the  State  for  each  organiza- 
tion be  returned  with  those  organizations,  and  further,  that  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  several  organizations  of  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery, 
and  Signal  Corps  had  already  been  returned  from  the  border  for 
muster  out,  that  the  horses  desired  for  such  organizations  be  shipped 
to  the  State  concerned  with  the  first  mounted  troops  of  the  National 
Guard  of  that  particular  State  that  should  be  next  returned  from  the 
border  for  muster  out. 

The  action  of  the  Secretary  of  War  contained  in  the  above-men- 
tioned instructions,  dated  October  2,  1916,  provided  means  whereby 
a  large  number  of  the  animals  left  surplus  in  the  hands  of  the 
Quartermaster  Corps  on  the  muster  out  of  mounted  troops  could  be 
disposed  of  to  advantage  and  further  enabled  these  National  Guard 
organizations  to  be  furnished  with  animals  essential  for  their  proper 
training  at  their  home  stations  and  without  charge  against  National 
Guard  appropriations.  The  number  of  animals  authorized  issued 
under  the  authority  referred  to  have  been  3,409  for  Cavalry,  2,345 
for  Field  Artillery,  and  619  for  Signal  Corps. 

The  number  of  horses  authorized  issued  to  mounted  organizations 
of  the  National  Guard  by  the  act  of  August  29,  1916,  which  amended 
section  90,  act  of  June  3,  1916,  is  not  exceeding  32  to  any  one  battery, 
troop,  or  company,  or  4  to  a  battalion  or  regimental  headquarters 
of  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  Signal  Corps,  Engineer  company,  Ambu- 
lance company,  and  other  mounted  units  of  the  National  Guard. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  original  estimates  of  the  Militia  Bureau 
for  funds  for  the  purpose  of  purchasing  horses  for  the  National 
Guard,  issue  of  forage,  and  payment  of  competent  help  for  the  care 
of  these  animals,  authorized  by  sections  89  and  90  of  the  act  of  June 
3,  1916,  were  so  materially  reduced  by  Congress  as  the  result  of  the 
call  of  the  National  Guard  into  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
the  Militia  Bureau  found  it  necessary  to  recommend  the  issue  of 
horses  only  to  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  and  Signal  Corps  units  of 


70  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

the  National  Guard,  deeming  it  more  advisable  to  make  the  first 
issue  of  animals  to  those  organizations  wholly  mounted  and  to  which 
the  issue  of  animals  was  more  essential  for  training  purposes  than 
to  any  other  partly  mounted  organizations.  It  is  the  expectation, 
however,  of  the  Militia  Bureau  to  authorize  the  issue  of  horses  to 
sanitary  and  engineer  organizations  in  a  limited  number  for  train- 
ing purposes  as  soon  as  Congress  makes  further  appropriations  for 
this  purpose.  Deficiency  estimates  have  been  submitted  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  asking  for  funds  to  provide  for  the  National  Guard  for 
the  last  six  months  of  the  fiscal  year  1917. 

SMALLPOX  AND   TYPHOID   PROPHYLAXIS. 

Circular  No.  8,  War  Department,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  dated 
May  10,  1916,  issued  to  all  States  for  distribution  to  all  medical 
officers  of  the  Organized  Militia,  appears  to  have  been  very  bene- 
ficial in  securing  the  desired  results  in  the  matter  of  prompt  pro- 
tection of  the  personnel  of  the  Organized  Militia  against  smallpox 
and  typhoid  fever.  Paragraph  7  of  this  circular  called  attention 
to  the  importance  of  these  preventive  measures  and  the  method  of 
supplying  the  necessary  apparatus  and  vaccine  for  mobilization 
camps. 

The  Medical  Department  of  the  United  States  Army  deserves 
great  credit  for  the  prompt  delivery  of  the  vaccine,  and  the  necessary 
apparatus  for  administering  it,  to  the  mobilization  camps.  All  the 
antityphoid  serum  was  prepared  in  the  laboratory  of  the  Army 
Medical  School  and  represented  an  immense  amount  of  labor.  Cir- 
cular No.  8  also  contains  full  instructions  pretaining  to  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  antityphoid  serum. 

As  a  result  of  this  timely  circular  of  instructions  to  the  medical 
officers  of  the  Organized  Militia  and  the  prompt  and  adequate  sup- 
ply of  the  vaccine  by  the  medical  department,  practically  all  the 
personnel  of  the  Organized  Militia  were  vaccinated  against  smallpox 
and  received  their  first  dose  of  antityphoid  prophylaxis  within  from 
one  to  three  days  after  their  arrival  at  the  mobilization  camp,  and 
with  few  exceptions  all  had  their  second  dose  of  antityphoid  before 
their  departure  for  the  border,  while  those  who  were  permitted  to 
remain  in  mobilization  camp  20  days  received  their  last  dose  within 
the  time  limit  prescribed  in  the  instructions  issued.  Those  organiza- 
tions which  were  ordered  to  the  border  before  June  28  were  given 
their  remaining  two  doses  after  their  arrival  on  the  border,  as  were 
all  other  organizations  whose  antityphoid  prophylaxis  was  not  com- 
pleted at  the  mobilization  camps. 

The  administration  of  these  preventive  measures  against  smallpox 
and  typhoid  fever  was  done  by  the  medical  officers  of  the  Organized 
Militia,  as  there  were,  not  sufficient  medical  officers  of  the  Regular 
Army  available  for  this  purpose.  As  proof  that  these  valuable  pro- 
tective measures  were  properly  administered  there  have  been  no  cases 
of  smallpox  on  the  border  and  only  few  cases  of  typhoid  fever. 
While  in  mobilization  camps  two  or  three  cases  of  smallpox  were 
reported,  which  occurred  before  vaccination.  Only  a  few  cases  of 
typhoid  fever  were  reported,  the  origin  of  which  is  reputed  to  have 
been  due  to  infection  before  coming  to  camp.  As  compared  with 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC.  71 

conditions  in  the  mobilization  camps  of  1898,  this  is  a  remarkable 
showing  of  the  triumph  of  science  over  disease. 

INSPECTIONS  OF  NATIONAL  GUARD. 

In  the  inquiry  as  to  the  condition  of  the  National  Guard,  its  effi- 
ciency and  readiness  to  take  its  place  in  the  first  line  of  defense,  there 
were  really  three  inspections  made. 

First.  When  the  National  Guard  was  mustered  in,  at  which  time 
it  was  reported  on  by  about  40  inspector  instructors  and  mustering 
officers,  7  medical  officers, .as  well  as  several  special  inspectors. 

Second.  Shortly  after  the  arrival  of  the  bulk  of  the  National  Guard 
on  the  border  a  general  inspection  was  made  (July  14  to  August  15) 
by  Maj.  Gen.  T.  H.  Bliss,  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  an  abstract  of 
whose  series  of  reports  appears  elsewhere  in  this  publication. 

Third.  Subsequently  thorough  and  detailed  inspections  were  made 
by  officers  of  the  Inspector  General's  Department,  with  the  assistance 
of  a  few  special  inspectors.  It  was  the  intention  to  inspect  every 
organization,  but  some  few  were  mustered  out  before  this  could  be 
done.  These  inspections  originated  in  the  following  manner : 

On  July  12  the  Chief  of  the  Militia  Bureau  prepared  a  memo- 
randum for  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army  on  the  subject  of 
the  inspection  of  the  Organized  Militia  and  National  Guard  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States,  suggesting  in  considerable  detail  the 
character  of  the  proposed  inspection,  covering  such  subjects  as  the 
present  degree  of  readiness  and  fitness  for  field  service,  and  to  deter- 
mine the  length  of  time  considered  necessary  to  make  the  organiza- 
tions efficient  units  at  war  strength  in  campaign,  etc.  This  memo- 
randum was  submitted  to  the  Inspector  General  of  the  Army,  who 
stated  that  there  seemed  to  be  some  prospect  also  of  tactical  divisions 
being  organized,  and  such  inspections  could  be  made  by  division 
inspectors  with  probably  some  assistance.  He  stated,  moreover,  that 
he  thought  it  a  very  wise  plan  to  begin  the  inspections  at  once,  with- 
out further  delay,  and  considered  "  the  objects  of  these  inspections," 
as  outlined  by  the  Chief  of  the  Militia  Bureau,  as  appropriate. 

Acting  on  the  above,  a  regular  form  of  report  of  special  field  in- 
spection (Form  20,  I.  G.  D.)  was  prepared  and  the  Special  Field 
Inspections  were  commenced  about  July  27.  The  L°st  report  re- 
ceived was  dated  October  19. 

These  inspections  were  made  by  22  officers — mostly  of  field  rank — 
all  of  extended  experience  and  nearly  all  from  the  regular  personnel 
of  the  Inspector  General's  Department.  Nine  of  these  officers  had 
served  mainly  in  the  Infantry,  seven  mainly  in  the  Cavalry,  and  six 
mainly  in  the  Artillery. 

They  were  made  by  the  following  named  officers : 

Infantry.— Li.  Col.  Charles  E.  Tayman;  Lt.  Col.  Eli  A.  Helmick, 
I.  G.;  Lt.  Col.  Paul  A.  Wolf;  Maj.  Hamilton  A.  Smith,  I.  G.;  Maj. 
William  P.  Jackson,  I.  G. ;  Maj.  Douglas  Settle;  Maj.  William  H. 
Simons,  I.  G. ;  Capt.  Cromwell  Stacey ;  Capt.  Robert  H.  Wescott. 

Cavalry. — Col.  George  K.  Hunter,  I.  G. ;  Col.  George  H.  Morgan ; 
Col.  John  B.  McDonald,  I.  G.;  Col.  Thomas  Q.  Donaldson,  I.  G.; 
Col.  Jesse  Mel.  Carter;  Lt.  Col.  John  S.  Winn,  I.  G.;  Lt.  Col.  Frank 
M.  Cald.well,  I.  G. 

Coast  Artillery. — Maj.  James  F.  Brady;  Maj.  Jacob  C.  Johnson, 
I.  G. 


72  MOBILIZATION    OF   THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

Field  Artillery. — Col.  John  L.  Chamberlain,  I.  G. ;  Maj.  John  E. 
Stephens,  I.  G. ;  Maj.  Fox  Conner,  I.  G. ;  Capt.  William  Bryden. 

No  arrangement  could  easily  be  made  which  was  better  calculated 
than  this  to  eliminate  bias  and  prejudice. 

Most  of  the  inspections  were  made  at  border  camps,  others  at  the 
State  mobilization  camps. 

The  statistical  data  collected  by  these  inspectors  have  been  of  great 
value  to  the  Militia  Bureau  and  this  subject  is  treated  in  a  subsequent 
chapter. 

To  determine  the  military  value  of  these  troops,  inspectors  were 
called  on  for  c;  General  remarks  which  may  serve  in  appraising  the 
real  value  of  the  citizen  soldier  on  a  hasty  call  into  the  Federal 
service  and  the  amount  of  time  necessary  for  his  after  development." 
Especial  attention  is  invited  to  these  general  remarks,  which  are 
abstracted  here. 

The  replies  to  the  questions:  No.  1,  present  degree  of  readiness 
and  fitness  for  service  of  the  organization  and,  No.  5,  length  of  time 
considered  necessary  to  make  the  organization  efficient  at  war 
strength  in  campaign,  counting  from  date  of  the  President's  call,  are 
also  especially  pertinent  to  our  inquiry.  The  reports  under  these 
headings  have  been  much  condensed,  so  as  to  present  to  the  reader, 
within  the  scope  of  a  few  pages,  a  fairly  accurate  picture  of  the 
efficiency  of  these  troops  from  two  to  four  months  after  the  call  of 
June  18. 

GENERAL  REMARKS  MADE  BY  INSPECTORS  WHICH  MAY  SERVE  IN  APPRAISING 
THE  REAL  VALUE  OF  THE  CITIZEN  SOLDIER  ON  A  HASTY  CALL  INTO  THE 
FEDERAL  SERVICE,  AND  THE  AMOUNT  OF  TIME  NECESSARY  FOR  HIS  FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENT. 

The  essence  of  the  general  remarks  of  Lieut.  Cols.  Helmick  and 
P.  A.  Wolf,  under  this  head  in  reports  of  about  31  different  inspec- 
tions— 25  of  Infantry  and  6  of  Cavalry — is,  in  effect,  as  follows : 

The  real  value  of  the  citizen  soldier  is  directly  dependent  upon  the  degree  of 
training  he  has  had  and  upon  the  completeness  of  his  equipment.  From  a  con- 
sideration of  the  data  collected  as  to  the  amount  of  previous  instruction  given 
the  National  Guardsmen,  the  state  of  their  equipment,  and  the  amount  of  target 
practice  which  they  have  had,  the  prospects  do  not  seem  promising.  *  *  * 
The  quality  of  instruction  received  since  being  mustered  into  Federal  service  is 
defective  and  satisfactory  results  in  training  have  not  been  reached. 

It  seems  that  governors  of  States  have  not  kept  their  organizations  fully 
equipped.  Then,  too,  the  fact  that  the  organization  is  under  State  control  in 
time  of  peace,  with  a  system  of  administration  and  records  different  from  that 
of  the  Federal  Government,  adds  to  the  difficulty  and  length  of  time  necessary 
to  attain  efficiency  when  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States.  While 
the  provisions  of  the  act  approved  June  3,  1916,  call  for  higher  requirements  for 
the  National  Guard  than  formerly,  it  seems  hopeless  to  expect  that  any  satis- 
factory degree  of  efficiency  can  be  reached  by  National  Guard  troops  in  a  rea- 
sonable length  of  time  unless  the  commissioned  personnel  contains  a  sufficient 
number  of  trained  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  to  act  as  instructors  for  the 
mass  of  untrained  men  comprising  the  regiment. 

GENERAL  REMARKS. 
INFANTRY. 

Maj.  H.  A.  Smith,  in  his  inspection  of  the  -        -  Infantry,  says: 

History  shows  an  absence  of  economy  and  efficiency  following  a  hasty  raising 
of  soldiers.  These  men  are  not  trained  soldiers  and  would  encounter  in  a  hasty 
campaign  all  the  difficulties  to  be  encountered  by  any  body  of  men  undertaking 


MOBILIZATION   OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  73 

an  intricate  business  based  on  constantly  changing  conditions,  and  would  show 
the  same  absence  of  results ;  and  in  the  case  of  soldiers  the  stake  is  human  lives, 
property,  national  ideals,  and  honor. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  -        -  Infantry,  he  says : 

It  is  thought  this  organization  would  soon  find  itself  short  teamsters,  cooks, 
mechanics,  horseshoers,  and  other  men  of  useful  soldier's  trades.  Some  men 
holding  such  offices  are  paid  extra  from  other  than  Government  sources. 

Maj.  Smith  reports  in  another  regimental  inspection : 

The  regiment  seems  loosely  held  together.    Effective  leadership  is  lacking. 

In  another  he  says : 

The  officers  are  trained  only  in  a  small  degree.  Their  ideas  of  discipline  are 
crude  and  unformed.  The  equipment  was  very  incomplete  on  muster  in,  and  is 
still  not  complete.  The  militia  has  no  dependable  method  of  recruiting. 

Maj.  H.  A.  Smith,  I.  G.,  in  his  inspection  of  the  -  -  Infantry, 
says : 

The  strength  of  the  command  was  increased  by  37.3  per  cent  of  green  men,  and 
20  per  cent  of  the  increased  strength  have  been  discharged  on  account  of  physical 
disability.  Almost  50  per  cent  of  present  strength  were  without  previous  field 
or  camp  experience,  and  the  regiment  is  still  short  nearly  500  men.  New  men 
had  to  be  vaccinated  and  to  receive  typhoid  prophylaxis.  The  officers  had  had 
no  experience  with  Federal  records,  reports,  returns,  or  methods  of  supply,  and 
no  serious  military  training  of  any  kind.  The  existence  of  the  organization  de- 
pended on  the  popularity  of  officers  and  will  shortly  revert  to  the  same  basis. 
The  degree  of  control  of  officers  and  their  efficiency  as  leaders  and  instructors' 
can  under  such  circumstances  but  be  most  limited. 

Of  the  -      —  Infantry  he  says: 

This  regiment  was  called  out  in  May,  1916,  but  shows  a  less  degree  of  readi- 
ness than  others  with  less  service.  The  colonel,  on  being  directed  to  prepare 
his  regiment  for  inspection,  directed  the  lieutenant  colonel  to  do  it,. and  on  being 
informed  that  a  regimental  drill  was  desired  remained  in  his  tent  and  directed 
the  lieutenant  colonel  to  take  the  drill.  It  is  thought  that  all  National  Guard 
troops  have  military  spirit,  else  they  would  not  be  in  the  service.  Their  lack 
of  efficiency  is  due  to  want  of  training.  Thirty  days'  intensive  training  under 
competent  officers  with  the  least  efficient  regiment  that  the  undersigned  has 
inspected  would  make  it  equal  in  readiness  to  tha  most  efficient. 

Of  the  -     —  Infantry  he  says : 

Forty-two  per  cent  in  green  men  were  added  to  the  number  in  service  on  call. 
Forty-nine  and  three-tenths  per  cent  had  had  no  previous  field  or  camp  training, 
and  the  regiment  is  now  below  strength  about  440  men.  The  opinion  exists 
in  the  National  Guard  that  it  is  not  more  incumbent  upon  them  than  upon  all 
others  to  defend  the  country.  They  are  in  for  a  limited  time  only,  and  having 
no  serious  military  training,  the  limit  of  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  in 
disciplinary  control,  leadership,  and  as  instructors  must  soon  be  reached. 

Maj.  Smith,  in  inspecting  the  -         -  Infantry,  says: 

It  is  thought  that  all  National  Guard  troops  have  military  spirit,  else  they 
would  not  be  in  the  service.  Their  lack  of  efficiency  is  due  to  want  of  training. 
Thirty  days'  intensive  training  under  competent  officers  with  the  least  efficient 
regiment  would  make  it  equal  in  readiness  to  the  most  efficient  the  undersigned 
has  inspected. 

Maj.  Simons,  in  his  inspection  of  the  -  -  Infantry,  October  4, 
says: 

Nearly  all  of  the  regiment  seem  to  have  joined  after  the  call.  This  is  prob- 
ably due  to  the  fact  that  Federal  recognition  had  been  withdrawn  from  about 
half  of  this  regiment  prior  to  the  call,  and  that  after  the  call  the  organizations 
were  inspected  and  recognition  restored.  Sixty-four  per  cent  of  the  men  have 
not  attended  a  previous  encampment,  the  regiment  is  short  of  men,  and  not  now 
fit  for  active  field  service. 


74  MOBILIZATION   OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  -        -  Infantry,  October  3,  he  says : 

Over  77  per  cent  of  the  men  joined  after  the  call,  and  about  62  per  cent  of  these 
had  no  prior  service.  Both  officers  and  men  apparently  have  little  conception 
of  what  real  discipline  is,  and  are  slow  and  inattentive  to  their  duties.  The 
regiment  is  not  now  fit  for  active  service. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  -  -  Infantry  (less  Companies  A,  B,  and 
C) .  October  6  and  7,  Maj.  Simons  says : 

Over  88  per  cent  of  the  men  joined  after  the  call  and  over  37  per  cent  of  these 
had  no  former  service.  Sixty-five  per  cent  had  not  attended  a  previous  encamp- 
mont.  The  regiment  is  not  now  fit  for  active  service  in  campaign. 

Maj.  Simons,  in  reporting  on  an  inspection  of  the  mobilization 

camp  of  the  -         -  National  Guard  at  Fort ,  June  30  to  July 

3,  said: 

As  the  command  reported  at  camp  they  were,  in  my  opinion,  in  no  way  pre- 
pared for  active  service.  There  is  a  very  large  percentage  of  entirely  new  men, 
and  the  older  men,  as  judged  by  the  manner  in  which  they  acted  at' inspection, 
do  not  appear  to  have  had  much  training.  The  spirit  of  *  the  officers  and  men 
is  particularly  good,  and  they  all  seemed  very  anxious  to  learn.  Any  sugges- 
tions as  to  camp  sanitation,  instructions,  or  paper  work  is  eagerly  sought  and, 
as  far  as  possible,  is  taken  advantage  of.  The  troops  are  now,  I  believe,  very 
well  equipped,  but  have  had  very  little  proper  training. 

RECOMMENDATIONS  :  That  in  any  mobilization  camp  a  regular  officer  of  high 
rank  be  assigned  as  camp  commander,  with  authority  to  enforce  proper  camp 
sanitation  and  regulate  the  system  of  supply,  and  that  as  many  detached  officers 
of  the  regular  service  as  can  be  spared  be  detailed  as  instructors,  with  authority 
to  supervise  and  direct  the  instruction  in  administration  and  training  of  the 
National  Guard. 

Maj.  Simons,  in  his  inspection  of  the  -  -  Infantry,  reports  as 
foil  OATS  : 

The  general  spirit  of  the  men  is  very  good,  and  the1  officers  inform  me  that 
most  of  the  men  desire  to  remain  in  service  and  are  not  clamoring  to  go  home. 
The  material  of  the  regiment  is  very  good,  and  with  proper  training  they  would 
make  very  good  troops.  Regiment  lacking  in  training  and  proper  discipline 
and  not  now  fit  to  take  the  field  in  active  operations. 

Again,  in  two  other  regimental  inspections,  he  says: 

The  instruction  of  the  older  men  has  not  been  thorough.  It  is  nol  now  fit  to 
take  the  field  in  active  operations. 

In  another  inspection,  he  says: 

The  regiment  has  been  commanded  for  about  two  weeks  by  an  officer  of  tho 
Regular  Army  and  shows  it,  but  this  officer's  time  has  been  so  much  taken  up  by 
routine  papers,  getting  the  regiment  equipped,  etc.,  that  he  has  not  had  the  time 
to  devote  to  instruction  that  he  should  have. 

In  two  other  inspections,  he  says : 

The  time  of  the  officers  since  arrival  in  this  camp  has  been  largely  taken  ur> 
with  muster-in  rolls  and  preparation  of  requisitions  to  complete  equipment. 
The  regiment  is  not  now  fit  to  take  the  field  in  active  operations. 

At  another  inspection,  he  says: 

Since  the  other  two  regiments  of  Infantry  from  this  State  have  been  ordered 
home  the  spirit  of  this  regiment  seems  broken,  and  they  take  very  little  interest 
in  their  work.  They  seem  always  thinking  of  going  home. 

Again  he  says: 

This  is  a  colored  battalion,  and  the  officers  and  men  seem  very  anxious  to 
learn.  The  major  seems  to  have  good  control  of  his  officers  and  men.  The 
battalion  needs  training  and  proper  discipline  and  instruction  to  make  it  effi- 
cient. A  good  deal  of  time  is  wasted  in  learning  Army  papers  and  methods, 
which  might  be  taught  with  good  results  at  the  home  station. 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED    MILITIA,   ETC.  75 

Again : 

The  spirit  of  the  regiment  appears  to  bo  very  good,  but  it  needs  a  considerable 
amount  of  training;  it  is  not  now  fit  for  active  service. 

In  another  inspection,  he  says : 

The  men  are  of  exceptionally  good  material  for  soldiers,  and  with  training 
will  make  a  very  good  regiment.  The  spirit  of  the  regiment  is  very  good  and 
they  seem  to  take  an  interest  in  their  work.  The  regiment  is  not  now  fit  for 
active  service  in  campaign. 

Lieut.  Col.  Winn,  I.  G.,  in  his  inspection  of  the  -  -  Infantry, 
states : 

For  more  than  50  per  cent  of  the  men  this  is  a  first  experience  in  camp. 
They  have  had  practically  no  field  training — further  than  living  in  a  permanent 
camp.  It  seems  hopeless  to  expect  that  National  Guard  regiments  can  be 
depended  upon  for  immediate  readiness  under  a  hasty  call,  and  there  are  so 
many  unknown  quantities  in  the  equation — whether  clothing,  arms,  and  equip- 
ments were  immediately  available,  the  time  required  for  necessary  recruiting, 
the  ability  of  the  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  as  instructors,  the  number 
of  trained  officers  available  to  supervise  training — that  it  is  impossible  to  more 
than  guess  at  the  time  required  to  make  them  ready. 

In  inspecting  the  -        -  Infantry,  he  says : 

It  seems  to  me  unreasonable  to  expect  the  National  Guard  to  be  made  ready  for 
active  field  service  under  a  hasty  call,  either  in  training  or  equipment. 

Lieut.  Col.  Winn,  in  his  report  of  inspection,  September  21,  of  the 
-  Infantry,  says : 

At  date  of  inspection  this  regiment  had  a  total  enlisted  strength  of  928,  of 
which  888  were  present  in  camp ;  of  these,  443  enlisted  under  the  call  without 
prior  service  and  217  others  had  less  than  3  months'  service ;  so  that  660 — more 
than  74  per  cent — were  wholly  without  training  or  had  only  a  few  hours  of 
drill,  less  than  they  would  get  in  two  days  under  an  intensive  system  with 
competent  instructors.  Of  those  armed  with  the  rifle,  382  had  not  fired  before 
the  call.  All  of  this  regiment  have  had  some  rifle  practice  since  muster  in.  The 
regiment  has  had  no  real  field  experience,  and  the  training  has  been  almost 
entirely  elementary,  and  that  is  far  from  complete.  Even  in  close-order  drill 
the  companies  do  not  average  fair. 

Under  the  head  of  drill  and  instruction  in  close-order  drill  of  this 
regiment  he  reports  5  companies  fair,  7  poor.  In  extended  order, 
he  reports  1  company  good,  6  fair,  3  poor,  and  2  bad.  In  bayonet 
exercise,  he  reports  1  company  good,  2  fair,  9  poor.  In  marching 
ability  and  march  discipline,  bad.  Of  an  enlisted  strength  present 
of  841  on  a  10-mile  march  there  were  101  stragglers. 

Lieut.  Col.  Winn,  in  the  inspection  of  the  -        -  Infantry,  says : 

Physical  inspection  prior  to  muster  in  seems  to  have  been  very  lax,  as  236 
were  found  disqualified  upon  muster  in.  Pour  hundred  and  ninety-four  men  had 
not  fired  prior  to  the  call,  and  these  men  have  fired  only  10  rounds  each  since  the 
call.  Four  hundred  and  ninety  of  the  men  are  in  camp  for  the  first  time.  The 
time  since  muster  in  has  been  necessarily  devoted  to  getting  equipped,  getting 
settled  in  camp,  and  to  preliminary  instruction.  Men  and  officers  are  earnest 
and  energetic,  and  the  regiment  has  made  commendable  progress  along  these 
lines,  but  has  had  practically  no  real  field  training,  and  its  preliminary  training 
is  far  from  complete. 

Lieut.  Col.  Winn,  in  his  inspection  of  the  —  -  Infantry,  Septem- 
ber 23, says : 

This  regiment  is  stronger  than  the  average,  having  1,243  enlisted  men  present 
in  camp ;  609  are  without  prior  service,  203  had  less  than  three  months'  service, 
therefore  about  65  per  cent  had  received  before  enlistment  less  instruction  than 
they  would  get  in  two  days'  intensive  training  under  competent  instructors. 


76  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

Of  those  armed  with  the  rifle,  428  had  not  fired  at  date  of  call  and  661  were  with- 
out previous  field  service.  One  battalion  has  had  a  little  border  guard  duty  in 
the  Big  Bend  district.  The  training  of  the  regiment  has  been  almost  elementary 
and  is  not  by  any  means  complete.  Commendable  progress  has  been  made,  and 
the  regiment  is  above  the  average  in  training. 

In  the  inspection  of  the he  says : 

This  regiment  is  more  nearly  equipped  and  at  its  present  strength  more 
nearly  ready  than  any  yet  inspected  by  me.  Its  training  has  been  almost 
entirely  elementary,  and,  aside  from  living  in  tents,  it  has  had  little  field  train- 
ing. The  regiment  was  not  ready  for  field  service  at  the  call,  and  is  not  ready 
now,  but  it  has  made  good  progress  in  training  arid  is  getting  itself  equipped. 
I  believe  within  six  months  of  date  of  call  it  would  be  in  condition  to  render 
fairly  efficient  service. 


11  iy  emcieni  service. 

In  the  inspection  of  another  regiment  he  states : 

TTnvMlCkT*      i~"h  n  n      li^^innr     n-nrlrkr*      /^OI-»TTOC<        i  r-k      n       T^/\T»I-V-*  *-»  vi/\i-»4-      s»n  •» 


Further  than  living  under  canvas,  in  a  permanent  camp,  the  regiment  has 
had  little  or  no  training  in  field  service.  There  are  so  many  unknown  quan- 
tities that  it  is  impossible  to  more  than  guess  at  the  time  required  to  make  the 
regiment  efficient  in  campaign  at  war  strength. 

In  the  inspection  of  another  regiment  he  states : 

The  training  has  necessarily  been  almost  entirely  elementary.  The  field 
experience  of  the  regiment  has  consisted  almost  entirely  in  living  in  tents  in  a 
permanent  camp.  Considering  the  extremely  large  percentage  of  wholly  un- 
trained men,  the  regiment  has  made  commendable  progress,  but  its  training  is 
far  from  complete,  and  it  is  not  ready  for  field  service. 

In  the  inspection  of  another  regiment  he  says : 

Aside  from  being  under  canvas  in  a  permanent  camp  it  has  had  little  or  no 
field  training.  The  regiment  was  not  ready  for  field  service  at  the  call ;  it  is 
not  ready  now,  and  the  question  as  to  when  it  would  be  ready  at  war  strength 
is  one  that  involves  so  many  uncertainties  that  no  one  could  pretend  to  more 
than  guess  at  the  minimum  time  required — assuming  the  most  favorable 
conditions. 

Lieut.  Col.  Winn,  in  the  inspection  of  the  —      —  Infantry,  says : 

This  regiment  has  had  a  little  experience  in  border  patrol,  but  its  field  ex- 
perience has  consisted  largely  in  living  under  canvas  in  a  permanent  camp. 
In  numbers,  training,  and  equipment  it  is  considerably  above  the  average  of 
regiments  so  far  inspected  by  me.  Its  training,  however,  has  been  largely  ele- 
mentary, and  it  still  has  much  to  learn  to  make  it  really  effective  in  campaign. 
The  officers  are  earnest  and  have  apparently  taken  advantage  of  their  oppor- 
tunities for  professional  study,  but  through  lack  of  experience  they  are  deficient 
in  knowledge  of  practical  tactics  and  of  the  care  of  their  command  in  actual 
field  service. 

In  the  inspection  of  the  —        -  Infantry  he  says : 

The  training  has  been  almost  entirely  elementary  and  is  incomplete.  The 
regiment  is  larger  than  the  average,  and  the  enlisted  personnel  is  above  the 
average  physically.  Officers  and  men  deficient  in  training  and  experience 
necessary  for  proper  care  of  themselves,  men,  and  animals  in  actual  field 
service. 

In  the  inspection  of  the  —      -  Infantry  he  says : 

*  *  *  its  field  training  has  consisted  largely  in  living  under  canvas  in  a 
permanent  camp  in  El  Paso.  This  regiment  is  the  largest  yet  inspected,  and  its 
per  cent  of  recruits  is  below  the  average.  Its  training,  however,  has  been 
almost  elementary,  and  it  has  much  to  learn  before  it  could  be  considered 
really  effective  in  campaign. 

Maj.  Douglas  Settle,  in  his  inspections  of  the  -          -  Infantry, 
—  Infantry,  and  -         -  Infantry,  says,  in  effect,  as  follows: 

The  value  of  a  soldier  depends  upon  his  physical  condition,  the  completeness 
of  his  equipment,  and  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  training  he  has  received 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  77 

to  fit  him  for  the  duties  of  war.  When  a  nation  depends  principally  upon  its 
citizens  for  soldiers,  compulsory  service  is  most  desirable,  if  not  necessary, 
and  should  be  accompanied  by  universal  military  training.  Even  without 
compulsory  service,  it  is  not  thought  there  will  be,  in  the  beginning  at  least, 
serious  difficulty  experienced  in  case  of  war  in  securing  the  requisite  numbers 
of  men  physically  fit,  or  in  properly  equipping  them,  but  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  only  a  very  small  per  cent  of  them  will  have  had  any  military  train- 
ing or  experience.  In  the Regiment,  whose  physical,  mental,  and  moral 

state  is  excellent,  44  per  cent  (58  per  cent  in  the  -  -  Regiment)  are  men 
who  were  enlisted  under  the  call  without  prior  service,  while  the  instruction 
received  by  the  remainder  was  so  limited  as  hardly  to  qualify  a  nucleus  of 
competent  instructors,  especially  in  the  important  grade  of  noncommissioned 
officer.  It  is  manifest  that  no  military  organization  can  absorb  at  one  time 
such  a  large  per  cent  of  untrained  men  and  be  in  a  state  of  readiness  for  imme- 
diate service.  Besides  the  mistake  of  not  maintaining  organizations  at  war 
strength  in  time  of  peace  there  are  two  other  defects  in  the  National  Guard 
system  for  which  a  remedy  should  be  sought,  viz,  the  dual  allegiance  to  State 
and  Nation  and  the  election  of  officers  by  the  men  they  command.  A  system 
of  thorough  instruction  of  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  should  be 
advised  in  such  way  -the  time  required  after  the  call  for  the  development  of 
National  Guard  organizations  into  effective  military  units  can  be  materially  de- 
creased. In  its  present  state  of  instruction  and  incomplete  personnel,  it  is 
my  opinion  that  National  Guard  organizations  after  being  called  into  the  Fed- 
eral service  will  require  from  six  to  nine  months  to  prepare  them  for  offensive 
action  against  a  first-class  foe,  and  that  purely  volunteer  organizations  will 
similarly  need  one  year.  Against  an  inferior  enemy  the  requisite  development 
could  probably  be  had  in  one-half  the  time  stated  above. 

Col.  Morgan,  in  his  report  of  inspection  of  the  -  -  Infantry, 
says: 

With  one  Regular  officer  to  the  battalion  it  would  take  three  months  to  make 
these  men  into  good  soldiers. 

Col.  Morgan  reports: 

The  -  Infantry  could  be  made  efficient  in  six  months  if  an  efficient 

Regular  officer  were  attached  to  each  company. 

On  another  regiment,  Col.  Morgan  says: 

The  organization  shows  the  effect  of  its  camp  work  and  life.  The  men  look 
hardy  and  healthy  and  are  beginning  to  march  and  look  like  soldiers.  *  *  * 
Some  of  the  officers  have  not  made  good,  and  should  the  regiment  remain  at  the 
border  for  a  determined  time,  they  should  be  replaced. 

Col.  Morgan,  in  his  inspection  of  the  -         -  Infantry,  says: 

It  is  the  best  National  Guard  regiment  at  Eagle  Pass  in  equipment  and 
general  efficiency.  The  colonel  is  a  Regular,  a  good  executive,  and  the  regi- 
ment shows  it.  Regiment  will  be  fit  for  the  field  in  about  two  months. 

Of  another  regiment,  he  says: 

Three  months  would  make  them  very  good  troops. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  -         -  Infantry,  he  says : 

Probably  50  per  cent  were  new  men  at  muster  in,  and  it  will  take  probably 
six  months  to  make  the  regiment  a  reliable  military  force  with  the  assistance 
of  proper  instructors. 

Col.  Morgan,  in  reporting  on  the  inspection  of  two  regiments 
of  -  -  Infantry,  says : 

With  the  large  number  of  new  men  the  result  of  instruction  and  training 
after  two  months  has  been  good.  Six  months  more  similar  training  will  make 
the  regiment  a  reliable  force  in  war. 

Col.  McDonald,  in  inspecting  the  -         -  Infantry,  says : 

There  is  no  basis  on  which  to  rest  an  estimate  of  the  time  necessary  to  de- 
velop the  citizen  soldier  or  National  Guardsman  as  exemplified  by  these  organi- 


78  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

Zfltions  into  nn  efficient  soldier  of  the  first  line.  With  an  average  of  over  50 
per  cent  of  the  enlisted  men  utterly  untrained  at  the  time  of  muster  in  and  the 
remainder,  together  with  their  officers,  men  of  little  experience  in  field  work,  I 
should  estimate  the  time  at  three  months  from  date  of  inspection,  August  15,  to 
convert  them  into  a  fairly  good  border  patrol.  To  fit  them  for  the  duties  of 
well-trained,  modern  soldiers  would  take  longer. 

Col.  Hunter,  I.  G.,  in  his  reports  of  inspections  of  First  and  Second 
Battalions,  -  -  Infantry,  says  it  will  require  a  year's  training  to 
make  them  efficient. 

Lieut.  Col.  Caldwell,  in  inspecting  the  -         -  Infantry,  says: 

It  has  been  commanded  by  Col.  McLaughlin,  a  Regular  captain,  United 
States  Infantry,  for  about  two  years.  This  advantage  in  training  is  apparent. 
The  training  and  instruction  of  the  regiment  was  carried  on  under  adverse 
conditions,  as  it  was  hurriedly  mustered  in  and  shipped  to  the  border.  Officers 
and  men  intelligent,  zealous,  and  anxious  to  learn.  Results  under  these  condi- 
tions very  creditable. 


Maj.  Jackson  reports  at  one  of  his  inspections: 


The  commanding  officer  impresses  me  as  being  efficient.  Administration  very 
satisfactory.  Discipline  enforced.  Course  of  training  very  satisfactory.  In 
six  months  intensive  training  along  present  lines  will  make  the  organization 
efficient.  What  it  needs  is  the  services  of  well-trained  Army  officers  as  in- 
structors. The  real  value  of  this  organization  as  a  fighting  unit  on  first  entry 
into  the  service  would  have  been  small,  though  field  and  staff  and  many  of  the 
company  officers  appear  to  have  devoted  considerable  time  to  the  study  of  their 
duties.  Practical  work  will  bring  good  results  in  six  months.  Better  results 
would  be  obtained  if  the  regiment  was  sent  away  from  its  home  station,  so  as 
to  get  rid  of  the  distraction  of  families. 

Col.  Donaldson,  in  inspecting  the  -        -  Infantry,  says : 

This  is  the  best-prepared  regiment  for  field  service  in  the  brigade,  but  all 
officers  and  enlisted  men  will  require  much  more  field  training  before  pre- 
pared to  enter  active  field  service.  The  commanding  officer  is  a  very  capable 
officer,  and  will  likely  bring  the  regiment  up  to  an  efficient  state  within  a  very 
few  mouths. 

In  inspecting  the  -        -  Infantry,  he  says  : 

This  regiment  was  by  no  means  prepared  when  the  call  for  troops  was  sent 
out,  and  is  not  much  better  now.  Officers  are  evidently  appointed  from  personal 
and  not  professional  qualifications.  *  *  *  The  men  have  improved  greatly 
in  the  past  two  months  and  have  gained  from  5  to  15  pounds  in  weight. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  —         -  Infantry,  Col.  Donaldson  says : 

Many  men  were  rejected  on  the  nmster  in  of  this  regiment  for  physical  de- 
fects. A  large  percentage  of  them  were  underweight.  Practically  every  enlisted 
man  has  gained  from  5  to  15  pounds  during  the  tour  of  duty  here.  The  officers 
generally  are  not  familiar  with  the  necessary  duties  pertaining  to  active  service. 
Apparently  all  the  officers  were  selected  for  the  positions  they  hold  for  personal 
and  not  professional  qualifications.  Had  this  regiment  been  called  upon  for 
immediate  active  field  service,  the  majority  of  the  organizations  would  not  have 
been  prepared. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  -        -  Infantry,  he  says : 

Officers  and  men  still  lack  the  hard  physical  condition  necessary  for  profi- 
cient field  service,  but  they  are  gradually  acq\iiring  it.  The  most  urgent  need 
is  trained  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers. 

Of  the  —         -  Infantry  he  says : 

The  appearance  of  officers  and  men,  their  physical  condition,  and  the  observ- 
ance of  military  duties  have  greatly  improved.  There  has  also  been  an  im- 
provement in  training,  but  the  great  need  is  trained  officers  and  noncommis- 
sioned officers.  About  0-7  per  cent  of  the  men  of  this  regiment  had  no  military 
service  prior  to  the  call. 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  79 

He  says  the  same  in  his  inspection  of  the  -        -  Infantry. 
Maj.  Johnson,  in  inspecting  the  -        -  Infantry,  September  1  to  6, 
says: 

Under  the  present  system  of  physical  examinations  the  physique  of  the 
members  of  the  organizations,  as  a  whole,  is  not  what  is  to  be  desired.  Twenty- 
eight  per  cent  of  the  enlisted  personnel  of  this  regiment  was  found  physically 
disqualified  on  muster-in.  These  were  replaced  in  general  by  untrained  men. 

Under  the  previous  system  of  instruction  of  enlisted  men,  30  to  40  per  cent 
of  the  enlisted  men  have  had  not  more  than  96  hours  instruction.  The  re- 
mainder have  had  none  or  practically  none.  Instruction  given  in  this  camp  is 
not  included  in  these  figures.  -The  officers  are  often  poor  instructors.  This  is 
the  cause  for  one  of  the  greatest  delays  in  getting  the  men  up  to  an  efficient  de- 
gree of  training.  Fortunately  in  this  regiment  quite  a  number  of  the  officers  saw 
service  in  1898,  and  some  have  been  to  Plattsburg  and  to  the  southern  training 
camp,  and  I  agree  with  the  regimental  commander  that  after  two  months'  train- 
ing in  this  camp,  this  regiment  is  in  better  condition  for  field  service  to-day 
than  most  of  the  organizations  were  in  1898  after  a  summer's  training. 

Maj.  Johnson,  in  inspecting  the  -         -  Infantry,  says: 

For  efficiency  in  campaign  under  the  present  system,  where  a  large  percentage 
of  the  personnel  are  troops  without  any  training,  from  four  to  six  months'  in- 
struction should  be  given  in  camp  in  the  fundamentals  of  military  work, 
followed  by  a  similar  period  in  target  practice,  field-firing  problems,  and 
maneuvers. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  -  — ,  -  — ,  and  -  -  Regiments  of 
-  Infantry,  at  Fort  -  — ,  -  — ,  August  24  to  29,  the  in- 
spector, Maj.  J.  C.  Johnson,  I.  G.,  remarked  that  under  the  present 
system  of  making  physical  examinations  of  applicants  for  enlist- 
ment in  the  Organized  Militia  the  citizen  soldier  will  be  of  little 
value  on  a  hasty  call  in  the  Federal  service.  He  gives  as  a  reason  for 
this  the  very  large  number  of  officers  and  men  found  physically 
disqualified  on  muster-in,  the  loss  reaching  as  high  as  77  per  cent  in 
one  company,  and  as  a  result,  in  the  first  and  second  regiments,  all 
but  one  company  was  reduced  below  peace  strength,  and  these  losses 
had  to  be  replaced  almost  entirely  by  untrained  men.  He  criticizes 
the  system  which  permits  this  as  being  faulty. 

Another  criticism  made  is  the  totally  inadequate  number  of  instruc- 
tors, which  in  general  is  limited  to  one  instructor  for  each  branch  of 
the  service  in  one  or  more  States,  which  is  entirely  inadequate  for 
efficiency.  At  this  call  the  instructors  were  in  general  taken  off  in- 
struction work  and  made  assistant  mustering  officers,  at  a  time  when 
instruction  could  best  be  given,  viz,  when  troops  were  mobilized  and 
could  give  their  whole  time  to  instruction  and  training.  Proper  in- 
struction of  even  one  regiment  is  not  a  one-man  job  if  these  troops 
are  to  be  trained  and  ready  for  service  at  any  time  for  a  hasty  call. 

Maj.  Johnson,  in  inspecting  the  -  -  Infantry,  September  1  to  6, 
says: 

This  regiment  lost  about  one-fourth  of  its  members  (24*  per  cent)  upon  physi- 
cal examination,  and  about  three-fourths  of  the  regiment  has  not  attended  a 
previous  encampment  and  have  not  fired.  In  two  of  the  lettered  companies 
none  of  the  enlisted  men  have  fired.  These  figures  show  that  this  is  practically 
a  "  recruit "  regiment.  This  is  offset  to  a  certain  extent  by  having  about  a  hun- 
dred ni'Mi  in  it  who  have  served  in  the  Regular  Army,  and  nearly  all  of  these 
men  have  been  made  noncommissioned  officers.  The  State  authorities  have 
made  no  provision  for  the  payment  of  fees  to  examining  surgeons,  and  as 
civilian  surgeons  were  not  willing  to  make  the  necessary  examinations  free  of 
charge,  many  of  the  applicants  were  enlisted  after  being  examined  physically, 
as  far  as  possible,  by  the  company  officers.  This  was  done  in  some  cases  after 
the  call  was  made. 


80  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

The  regimental  commander  reports  that  most  of  the  officers  took  the  course 
at  the  officers'  school  under  the  direction  of  Gapt.  W.  N.  Hughes,  instructor. 
After  two  months  of  work  in  this  camp  the  command  has  acquired  a  good 
knowledge  of  camp  sanitation  and  of  close-order  drill.  The  enlisted  personnel 
is  of  excellent  quality,  with  an  average  age  of  probably  between  20  and  21  years. 
Possibly  20  per  cent  are  19  or  under,  and  are  not  yet  to  their  full  physical 
capacity.  The  regimental  commander  is  of  the  opinion  that  there  is  ample  mate- 
rial in  the  enlisted  personnel  who,  with  a  few  months'  training,  would  be  able 
to  replace  the  entire  commissioned  personnel.  In  my  opinion  there  are  enlisted 
men  in  this  organization  who  would  make  better  commissioned  officers  than 
gome  of  those  who  at  present  hold  commissions.  I  concur  in  the  opinion  of  the 
regimental  commander  as  to  the  value  of  the  citizen  soldier — that,  in  general, 
he  is  a  man  of  keen  intelligence,  of  good  spirit,  who  has  not  yet  attained  his 
maximum  physical  development,  but  who,  with  six  months'  intensive  training, 
would  give  a  good  account  of  himself. 

Maj.  Brady,  C.  A.  C.,  A.  I.  G.,  in  reporting  on  the  inspection  of  the 

three  regiments  of Infantry  at  — ,  August  18  to  29,  states 

that  he  is  unable  to  arrive  at  any  valuable  conclusions  which 
may  -serve  in  appraising  the  real  value  of  the  citizen  soldiery 
on  a  hasty  call  into  Federal  service  and  the  time  necessary  for  his 
after  development,  as  these  factors  depend  so  largely  upon  the 
efficiency  and  general  coordination  of  the  various  staff  and  supply 
departments,  but  states  that  he  believes  it  would  require  a  minimum 
of  from  four  to  six  months  of  intensive  training. 

Maj.  Brady,  in  his  inspection  of  the  -  -  Infantry,  makes  the 
same  general  remarks  as  above,  adding  that  the  colonel  is  efficiently 
commanding  and  instructing  his  regiment,  which,  however,  has  had 
very  little  training  in  marching  and  field  exercises. 

Maj.  Brady,  in  reporting  on  the  -  —  Infantry,  is  favorably  im- 
pressed with  both  the  colonel  and  lieutenant  colonel  in  matters  of  dis- 
cipline and  instruction,  and  states  that  the  regiment  is  making  satis- 
factory progress.  It  lacks  considerable  equipment,  and  it  is  esti- 
mated that  it  will  require  at  least  six  months  from  date  of  call  to 
make  the  regiment  a  satisfactory  field  unit. 

The  six  -  -  Infantry  Regiments  were  inspected  by  Capt.  Crom- 
well Stacey  between  August  6  and  13  at  —  — ,  —  — . 

In  his  general  remarks  he  says  of  the  -  - — and -  that  they 

have  been  in  camp  over  a  month  and  the  majority  of  the  men  do  not 
know  the  School  of  the  Soldier.  They  have  no  progressive  system  of 
instruction.  A  large  proportion  of  the  officers  of  these  regiments 
turned  out  for  drill  before  the  inspector  without  belts  or  side  arms. 

Companies  in  both  regiments  were  unnecessarily  slow  in  forming 
for  drill.  Performance  of  guard  duty  poor. 

Enlisted  men  pay  very  little  attention  to  officers  of  their  own  regi- 
ment and  none  to  officers  of  other  regiments. 

In  the  -  -  the  inspector  says :  Many  officers  do  not  know  where 
they  belong  at  drill  or  what  their  duties  are.  In  attacks  no  range 
given,  no  target  indicated.  Officers  attempting  to  control  their  or- 
ganizations in  extended  order  by  shouting  out  orders,  and  in  close 
order  they  use  signals.  It  is  pitiful  to  watch  their  incompetency. 
The  regiment  would  be  of  no  value  on  the  border.  To  be  made  effi- 
cient in  any  reasonable  time  it  must  be  placed  under  a  regular  officer. 
The  colonel  stated  that  he  did  not  think  it  possible  to  have  good  disci- 
pline in  his  regiment,  as  there  were  so  many  men  in  it  who  were  his 
equals  socially. 


81 

In  the  —  -  Infantry  the  inspector  observed  men  in  ranks  at  drill 
smoking  cigarettes  without  protest  from  their  officers.  The  officers 
and  sergeants  seem  to  have  no  control  over  their  men  and  appear  to  be 
afraid  of  hurting  their  feelings.  The  regiment  has  apparently  gone  as 
far  as  it  can  under  its  own  officers.  Everywhere  there  is  lack  of  coordi- 
nation, system,  and  control.  At  drill  officers  sit  in  the  shade  ;ind  talk 
while  the  men  are  being  drilled  by  sergeants  who  do  not  know  the 
drill  themselves.  Apparently  there  is  no  supervision  on  the  part  of 
the  brigade  commander,  the  colonel,  or  even  the  majors.  The  excused 
list  from  drill  is  excessive,,  both  officers  and  men. 

It  is  a  relief  to  turn  from  this  unpromising  picture  to  the  report  on 
the  other  four  Infantry  regiments  from  the  same  State.  These  four 
regiments  are  well  commanded.  The  inspector  reports  the  - 
and  —  -  ready  for  border  duty.  The  -  -  and  -  -  could  be 
made  ready  for  border  duty  in  a  few  months,  and  that  time  even 
could  be  considerably  shortened  if  they  had  a  Regular  Army  officer 
for  instructor  and  with  intensive  training.  They  have  evidently 
much  still  to  learn,  but  the  progress  being  made  is  satisfactory. 

Capt.  Wescott,  in  inspecting  the  —        -  Infantry,  says : 

It  is  not  working  on  any  systematic  schedule  of  instruction.  It  has  several 
officers  that  have  soldierly  qualities  and  who  are  men  of  more  than  ordinary 
intelligence,  but  the  military  knowledge  of  most  of  the  officers  is  too  limited 
to  permit  the  carrying  out  of  a  varied  and  progressive  schedule  of  instruction. 

Again,  Capt.  Wescott  says  of  a  National  Guard  brigade  com- 
mander, his  adjutant,  and  aid-de-camp: 

They  are  intelligent  men  who  have  been  successful  in  civil  life  and  their 
actual  military  experience  limited  to  the  National  Guard.  *  *  *  Their 
value  in  the  Federal  service  is  problematical. 

Lieut.  Col.  Tayman,  in  inspecting  the  -     —  Infantry,  says : 

This  regiment  was  mustered  into  the  service  in  May,  and  since  June  has  been 
constantly  in  the  field,  with  small  detachments,  patrolling  the  river,  guarding 
outlying  ranches,  acting  as  escort  to  trains,  and  the  like.  It  has  had  the  ad- 
vantage in  most  cases  of  being  under  an  officer  of  the  Regular  Army,  as  district, 
subdistrict,  or  camp  commander.  Is  fairly  efficient  in  the  field,  though  lacking 
the  refinements  of  close-order  drill  and  the  supervision  of  the  field  officers. 
The  regiment  is  in  19  different  stations,  15  of  which  were  visited.  The  spirit 
displayed  is  excellent  throughout.  The  field  officers  of  the  regiment  are  em- 
ployed by  the  district  commander  in  making  frequent  inspections  of  companies 
and  detachments. 

Col.  Carter,  in  his  inspection  of  the Infantry,  says: 

This  regiment  has  recently  returned  from  field  service  at  small  stations  on 
the  boundary.  Two  companies,  which  returned  late  the  night  before,  were 
not  present  at  field  inspection ;  one  company  is  detailed  and  is  doing  duty  as 
a  motor-truck  company  (No.  67). 

The  officers  are  well  instructed  in  the  mechanism  of  drill  and  the  theory  of 
combat,  but,  apparently  owing  to  lack  of  practical  training,  make  poor  appli- 
cation of  their  knowledge  in  combat  exercises. 

More  than  50  per  cent  of  the  enlisted  personnel  mustered  in  had  had  no 
prior  service  and  are  lacking  in  elementary  training. 

The  average  intelligence  of  the  enlisted  men  is  high  and  they  learn  rapidly. 
The  care  of  public  property,  especially  of  animals  and  transportation,  is  unusually 
good  in  this  regiment. 

CAVALRY. 

Col.  Morgan,  in  reporting  on  inspection  of  the  -  -  Cavalry, 
September  16,  says : 

This  regiment  has  been  handicapped  with  all  the  drawbacks  incident  to  the 
organization  of  a  Cavalry  regiment  in  this  country. 

72031—16 6 


82  MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

The  horses  when  received  were  more  or  less  suffering  from  the  usual  car 
fever,  and  some  are  just  beginning  instruction.  But  one  regular  officer  is 
detailed  with  the  regiment,  and  its  camp  is  so  isolated  that  the  men  have  little 
opportunity  of  learning  from  observation  the  small  items  of  their  new  business 
from  other  mustered  organizations. 

A  regular  schedule  of  drill  has  been  adhered  to  with  good  results.  But  one 
horse  has  been  lost  from  disease.  The  animals  look  very  well  kept,  but  many 
are  still  weak  and  unable  to  be  properly  drilled. 

During  preliminary  training  I  consider  it  a  mistake  to  isolate  this  regiment 
from  the  good  Regular  Cavalry  regiments  in  the  vicinity. 

Col.  Morgan,  in  inspecting  Troop  — ,  -  -  Cavalry,  September  7, 
states : 

The  troop  has  no  sanitary  personnel  and  lacks  attention  from  that  direction. 
Its  horses  have  but  lately  recovered  generally  from  the  shipping  or  other  fever, 
and  the  men  and  horses  need  drill  by  an  expert. 

Its  camp  is  isolated  and  not  in  a  very  good  location ;  its  sanitary  condition  is 
not  as  it  should  be.  The  men  are  not  furnished  with  cots  and  the  tents  are 
not  neat. 

The  horses  are  small  and  now  in  poor  condition  in  most  cases. 

The  troop  should  be  camped  near  another  cavalry  organization  for  instruc- 
tion. This  I  understand  will  be  done  at  once. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  First  Squadron,  -  —  Cavalry,  Septem- 
ber 15,  he  says : 

This  squadron  is  a  part  of  a  provisional  regiment  composed  of  units  from 
three  States,  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  and  South  Carolina.  It  is  com- 
manded by  a  regular  officer,  Lieut.  Col.  James  J.  Hornbrook,  Seventeenth 
Cavalry. 

They  were  supplied  with  horses  upon  organization  and  later,  about  six  weeks, 
and  have  been  nursing  the  horses  and  drilling  them  when  able.  Lost  25  from 
sickness. 

The  drills  have  evidently  been  conducted  in  a  conservative  manner  and  with 
system.  It  will  take  probably  six  months  to  make  an  efficient  regiment  of  the 
command. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  First  Squadron  of  -  -  Cavalry  at  Fort 
— ,  Tex.,  September  15,  Col.  Morgan  remarked  that  this  organ- 
ization had  had  their  horses  only  a  short  time,  and  when  received 
they  were  sick  with  car  fever — 25  died.  An  immense  amount  of 
work  had  been  done  but  as  much  more  would  be  necessary  to  make 
that  command  a  military  asset.  The  principal  cause  of  delay  was 
the  poor  condition  of  horses,  and  he  reported  that  it  would  require 
six  months  to  fit  the  squadron  for  the  field.  Remarks  of  the  same 
tenor  were  made  by  this  inspector  upon  the  inspection  of  Troop  A, 
—  Cavalry,  at  the  same  place  and  date. 

Maj.  Conner,  in  his  inspection  of  Troop  — , Cavalry,  July 

28  and  29,  says: 

This  troop  has  an  experienced  and  capable  ex-regular  for  its  captain.  The 
troop  personnel  is  exceptional  in  intelligence  and  other  qualities.  It  has  a  high 
esprit  and  is  in  earnest.  Yet  the  troop  is  not  ready  for  service.  This  unreadi- 
ness is  due  to  lack  of  horses  and  equipment  of  all  kinds  and  to  lack  of  adequate 
training. 

As  indicated  above  the  troop  is  making  satisfactory  progress  in  its  training, 
but  its  real  value  "  on  a  hasty  call  into  the  Federal  service  "  is  nil  in  so  far  as 
immediate  service  in  the  field  is  concerned. 

The  amount  of  time  required  for  after  development  of  the  citizen  soldier  is 
dependent  upon  the  time  needed  to  secure  equipment,  etc.,  and  largely  on  the 
'experience  and  ability  of  his  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers.  For  this 
organization  it  is  believed  that  four  months  would  suffice,  provided  horses  and 
all  equipment  could  be  provided  within  10  days  of  its  muster  into  the  Federal 
service. 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED    MILITIA,    ETC.  83 

Col.  Hunter,  I.  G.,  in  his  inspection  of  the  First  Squadron,  - 
Cavalry,  says  that  it  will  require  probably  about  a  year  of  intensive 
training  to  make  this  organization  efficient. 

Lieut.  Col.  Winn,  in  his  inspection  of  Troop  — ,  -  -  Cavalry, 
August  21  and  22,  says : 

The  value  and  efficiency  of  any  soldiery  depend  upon  the  amount  and  charac- 
ter of  its  training  and  the  condition  and  completeness  of  its  equipment.  In  all 
National  Guard  organizations  military  training  is,  and  necessarily  must  be, 
subordinated  to  the  professions  and  trades  upon  which  the  personnel  depends 
for  livelihood  and,  except  for  a  'few  days  in  camp  during  the  summer,  the  train- 
ing consists  generally  of  an  hour  or  so  of  instruction,  not  oftener  than  once  a 
week,  after  a  full  day  devoted  to  other  pursuits.  As  the  profession  of  arms 
is  only  a  side  issue,  the  extent  and  thoroughness  of  the  instruction  is  necessarily 
not  of  a  high  order.  From  the  latest  data  available  (1914)  it  appears  that  during 
the  year  this  organization  had  45  drills,  mounted,  and  20  drills,  dismounted, 
with  average  attendance  of  52  and  51,  respectively.  From  the  data  furnished, 
it  appears  that  only  49  enlisted  men  had  as  much  as  a  year  of  such  training 
as  they  receive,  and  that  26  were  enlisted  after  the  call  without  any  previous 
training.  Of  the  94  enlisted  men  present  at  inspection,  57  had  not  fired  the 
rifle  prior  to  the  call  and  45  had  not  attended  a  previous  encampment  or  period 
of  field  service.  The  organization  prior  to  the  call  had  56  horses  and  all  the 
men  on  the  rolls  at  that  time  had  some  instructions  in  riding  and  in  the  care 
of  animals.  Only  six  of  these  horses — mounts  for  the  troop  officers — were 
brought  into  the  Federal  service.  All  the  mounts  for  the  enlisted  personnel 
were  furnished  after  the  arrival  at  Fort  Sam  Houston.  The  horses  were  all 
green,  generally  not  of  high  class ;  many  of  them  have  been  sick  and  some  are 
still  sick  with  shipping  fever  or  influenza ;  none  have  been  in  service  more  than 
six  weeks ;  none  have  been  shod  behind  and  the  organization  has  only  one  horse- 
shoer.  The  organization  since  the  call  had  had  no  assistance  in  the  way  of  in- 
;>truction  by  a  Regular  officer  or  noncommissioned  officer.  The  time  of  the 
organization  has  necessarily  been  largely  devoted  to  the  training  of  the  horses 
and  very  creditable  progress  has  been  made.  The  organization  will  require  a 
considerable  period  of  training  before  it  is  ready  for  any  real  service,  and  should' 
have  the  assistance  of  a  Regular  officer  or  experienced  noncommissioned  officer. 
In  my  opinion  no  National  Guard  organization  can  be  depended  upon  for 
immediate  service  upon  a  hasty  call  into  the  Federal  service,  and  this  is  par- 
ticularly true  of  mounted  organizations. 

Lieut.  Col.  Caldwell,  in  inspecting  Troop  — ,  -  -  Cavalry, 
August  15  to  17,  inclusive,  states: 

This  troop  has  been  in  existence  a  little  more  than  two  years.  At  date  of 
call  it  wTas  composed  of  2  officers  and  50  men.  It  possessed  no  mounts.  Since 
that  date  it  has  been  filled  up  with  a  captain,  47  men,  and  105  horses.  The 
officers  are  men  of  superior  intelligence,  are  enthusiastic,  and  willing  to  work, 
but  are  inexperienced. 

Enlisted  men  are  intelligent,  adaptable,  and  eager  to  learn — in  fact  high- 
grade  material  for  soldiers.  About  50  per  cent  knew  some  of  the  rudiments 
of  a  cavalryman's  duties ;  the  balance  were  absolutely  ignorant  of  them. 

By  August  6,  105  horses,  none  more  than  partially  broken  to  the  saddle, 
were  furnished.  They  were,  of  course,  unshod  and  all  had  to  be  shod  by  con- 
tract, the  troop  horseshoer  being  sick.  These  horses  will  not  average  better 
than  "  fair."  They  have  been  under  training  less  than  two  weeks.  Eight  un- 
broken mules  were  also  received. 

Arms  and  equipment  were  on  hand  for  only  65  men  and  had  to  be  taken  in 
and  issued  out  daily  for  drills  and  guard  duty.  Yet,  due  to  the  intelligence, 
adaptability,  and  enthusiasm  of  the  men,  the  horses,  with  few  exceptions,  are 
gentle  and  can  be  ridden  in  ranks. 

I  first  saw  the  troop  on  the  road  making  a  practice  march  to  Imperial  Beach, 
about  15  miles  from  the  camp.  No  one  knew  I  was  in  the  vicinity.  The  troop 
was  marching  in  column  of  twos,  each  platoon  well  closed  up,  and  it  presented 
a  very  creditable  appearance. 

It  is  very  evident  that  the  training  the  officers,  noncommissioned  officers,  and 
some  of  the  men  have  received  before  the  call  is  a  great  asset  toward  making 
an  efficient  organization  for  war  service.  This  is  especially  true  as  regards 


84  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

sanitation,  care  of  arms  and  equipments,  care  of  animals,  and  discipline  in 
camp  and  on  the  march. 

Taking  into  account  the  conditions  which  have  existed  and  do  at  present 
exist  in  this  organization,  it  is  practically  impossible  to  make  an  estimate 
which  will  be  of  any  value  in  determining  the  length  of  time  necessary  for  the 
after  development  of  the  citizen  soldier.  With  instruction  and  training  under 
experienced  officers,  this  troop  could  be  made  an  efficient  organization  in  three 
months  from  date  of  inspection. 

Col.    Donaldson    says    of    the    First    Squadron  Cavalry, 

August  22,  that  it  was  originally  an  infantry  battalion  and  as  such 
would  in  two  or  three  months  render  fair  service  in  the  field,  but  as 
a  cavalry  organization  its  value  now  is  nil,  no  officer  or  man  having 
had  any  cavalry  experience.  No  horses  on  hand  and  no  instructor 
from  the  Regular  Army.  Men  and  officers  generally  are  above  the 
average  in  intelligence  and  will  learn  their  duties  quickly  when 
properly  instructed,  but  are  making  no  progress  now  as  far  as  cavalry 
work  is  concerned. 

He  says  of  the  Second  Squadron  and  one  attached  troop  - 
Cavalry : 

They  have  had  little  mounted  instruction,  as  there  are  no  animals  on  hand 
except  a  few  private  mounts. 

Capt.  Donaldson  says  of  Troops  —  and — ,  National  Guard  of 
— ,  that  they  have  had  very  little  mounted  instruction,  due  to 
lack  of  horses,  they  having  had  only  16  horses  every  alternate  day. 
The  men  appear  to  be  above  average  intelligence  and  in  excellent 
physical  condition.  With  proper  instruction  they  would  develop 
into  efficient  cavalrymen. 

Maj.  Johnson,  on  September  6,  reports  that  Troop  — ,  -  -  Cav- 
alry, has  no  mounts,  which  disposes  of  the  question  of  its  efficiency  as 
a  Cavalry  organization. 

Col.  Chamberlain  makes  the  same  report  September  7.  regarding 
Troop  — ,  -  -  Cavalry. 

Maj.    Simons,  in  his  inspection  of  the   First   Squadron,  - 
Cavalry,  says : 

About  83  per  cent  of  the  men  have  no  prior  service.  About  50  per  cent  have 
not  attended  a  previous  encampment  or  period  of  field  service.  Since  the  two 
Infantry  regiments  from  -  -  have  been  ordered  home,  the  main  idea  of 
this  squadron  seems  to  be  to  get  home  also.  There  is  very  little  interest  in 
the  work,  and  the  squadron  is  not  fit  for  active  field  service. 

Maj.  Simons,  in  inspecting  the  First  Squadron,  -  -  Cavalry, 
August  25  says : 

The  squadron  is  not  supplied  with  horses,  so  that  it  is  not  possible  to  have 
any  mounted  exercises  or  to  test  the  troops  in  marching.  The  squadron  is  not 
now  fit  to  take  the  field  in  active  operations. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  First  and  Second  Squadrons,  -  -  Cav- 
alry, August  21,  he  says: 

Two  troops  are  still  without  horses ;  none  of  the  horses  are  trained,  and  few 
of  them  are  shod ;  so  that  it  was  not  possible  to  have  any  mounted  exercises 
or  to  test  the  troops  in  marching.  Six  of  the  troops  were  originally  in  the 
Infantry,  and  two  were  recruited  on  the  call.  These  two  troops  are  equal  to 
or  better  than  the  others.  Due  to  recruiting  above  the  minimum  strength  on 
the  call,  the  organizations  were  not  supplied  with  sufficient  arms,  equipment 
and  clothing  to  equip  the  increased  strength.  One  of  the  squadrons  is  com- 
manded by  an  officer  of  the  Regular  Army  (captain,  Twentieth  Infantry),  and 
the  organizations  show  the  effect  of  his  experience  and  knowledge.  This  is 
the  second  organization  wrhich  I  have  inspected  which  had  a  Regular  officer  in 
a  position  of  authority,  and  the  value  of  Regular  officers  in  such  positions  is 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   OKGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  85 

very  marked.    These  squadrons  are  not  now  fit  to  take  the  field  in  active 
operations. 

In  inspecting  Troop  — ,  -        -  Cavalry  August  25  he  says: 

Over  63  per  cent  of  the  men  have  net  attended  a  previous  encampment  or 
period  of  field  service.  The  troop  needs  disciplinary  drills  to  steady  it  down. 
The  troop  is  now  performing  patrol  guard  duty  and  orderly  service,  so  that 
the  men  do  not  get  the  instruction  they  require.  The  troop  is  not  fit  for  field 
service. 

He  states  in  his  inspection  of  Troop  — , Cavalry,  August  26 : 

The  troop  needs  disciplinary  drills  to  steady  it  down.  It  is  not  now  fit  for 
field  service. 

Maj.  Simons,  in  his  general  remarks  on  the  inspection  of  Troop  — , 
-  Cavalry,  says : 

This  troop  was  organized  after  the  call,  and  72  per  cent  of  the  men  had  no 
prior  service.  Most  of  the  men  are  cattlemen,  and  understand  horses  and  can 
ride.  The  troop  has  only  had  its  horses  a  short  time,  but  they  seem  to  be  mak- 
ing good  progress  with  them.  Both  men  and  horses  require  a  great  amount  of 
training  to  put  them  in  condition  for  field  service.  The  men  are  willing  and 
the  spirit  of  the  troop  seems  to  be  good. 

Maj.  Settle,  in  his  inspection  of  Troop  — ,  -         -  Cavalry,  says: 

The  value  of  a  soldier  depends  primarily  upon  his  physical  condition,  the 
completeness  of  his  equipment,  and  the  character  and  extent  of  his  training. 

The  average  amount  of  drill  and  instruction  imparted  to  this  troop  prior  to 
the  Federal  call  consisted  of  two  drills  of  one  and  one-half  hours'  duration  a 
week.  The  troop  prior  to  the  call  had  16  horses,  and  the  instruction  not  only 
covered  the  prescribed  mounted  and  dismounted  drill  but  also  the  care  and 
training  of  animals.  Upon  muster-in  to  the  Federal  service  it  was  called  upon 
to  absorb  38  per  cent  of  men  without  prior  service  or  training  and  60  per  cent 
who  had  not  participated  in  target  firing.  To  reduce  the  time  required  for 
after  development  it  is  manifest  that  these  organizations  should  be  maintained 
at  war  strength  in  time  of  peace. 

Cavalry  can  not  be  mobilized  and  developed  into  a  state  of  readiness  for  field 
service  in  as  short  a  period  as  Infantry  because  of  the  time  required  to  train 
its  mounts.  The  animals  when  received  were  below  the  prescribed  standard  for 
Cavalry  mounts  and  were  green  and  unbroken.  At  the  date  of  this  inspection 
the  horses,  considering  the  short  while  they  had  been  on  hand  and  their  inferior 
quality,  were  remarkably  well  trained  and  conditioned. 

The  time  required  for  the  development  of  any  units  into  an  effective  fighting 
machine  is  largely  dependent  upon  the  personnel,  especially  that  of  the  officers 
and  noncommissioned  officers,  and  its  prior  training.  In  these  respects  this 
organization  has  been  more  fortunate  than  the  average  National  Guard  organi- 
zation, and,  coming  from  a  horse  country,  is  in  a  fair  state  of  readiness  for  field 
service  against  inferior  troops.  For  its  thorough  development,  however,  it 
should  have  at  least  two  mouths  more  training  and  instruction  to  make  it  an 
effective  troop  in  the  field. 

In  his  inspection  of  Troop  — ,  -  -  Cavalry,  at  -  — ,  Tex., 
September  22,  Maj.  Settle  says: 

Cavalry  can  not  be  mobilized  and  developed  into  a  state  of  readiness  for  field 
service  in  as  short  a  period  as  Infantry  because  of  the  time  required  to  train 
its  mounts.  The  animals  for  that  troop  had  been  received  about  seven  weeks 
previously,  were  below  the  prescribed  standard,  and  were  green  and  unbroken. 
He  estimated  that  at  least  two  months'  more  training  would  be  necessary  to 
make  the  troop  effective  for  field  service. 

In  his  inspection  of  the  -  — ,  -         -  Cavalry,  at  Camp 

— ,  -       — ,  -       — ,  August  8  to  14,  the  inspector,  Capt.  Stacey, 
remarked  as  follows : 

The  officers  of  this  squadron  are  generally  capable,  as  far  as  education  and 
intelligence  is  concerned,  but  professionally  they  are  below  the  average  of  Hegu- 


86  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

lar  Cavalry  sergeants.  They  don't  kiiow  anything  about  handling  the  saber,  are 
ignorant  of  combat  principles,  are  careless  in  camp  sanitation,  and  I  believe 
that  the  squadron  has  gone  just  as  far  as  it  can  without  outside  help  from  a 
Regular  officer.  I  do  not  believe  that  simply  attaching  a  Regular  officer  to  the 
squadron  would  accomplish  much,  as  they  do  not  realize  how  little  they  know. 
They  don't  appear  to  be  willing  to  learn  from  the  Regular  service.  They  drill 
close  order  dismounted  very  well,  and  seem  to  have  devoted  their  entire  atten- 
tion to  this,  the  least  important  duty  of  a  cavalryman.  They  do  not  seem  to 
have  a  correct  appreciation  of  what  Cavalry  is  for.  They  have  wasted  valuable 
time  on  close  order  that  might  have  been  devoted  to  sketching,  patrolling,  recon- 
noissance,  signaling,  and  extended-order  exercises,  all  of  which  could  have  been 
learned  without  horses.  If  they  are  ever  to  become  efficient,  they  will  have  to 
be  attached  to  a  Regular  regiment  or  placed  under  the  command  of  a  Regular 
officer.  If  given  horses  and  left  to  themselves,  they  will  not  be  reasonably  effi- 
cient in  a  year. 

Capt.  Wescott,  in  his  inspection  of  Troop  — ,  -  -  Cavalry, 
August  11  to  15,  says : 

The  organization  has  no  horses  excepting  one  private  mount.  When  the 
horses  are  assigned  it  will  be  safe  to  say  that  both  horses  and  men  will  be 
green  and  untrained.  In  my  opinion,  the  organization  could  have  little  or  no 
value  as  cavalry  in  less  than  a  year. 

In  inspecting  Troop  — ,  —      -  Cavalry.  August  11  to  15,  he  says: 

The  organization  has  only  eight  horses.  Most  of  the  men  of  the  troop  are 
green  and  untrained  in  horsemanship.  The  horses  to  be  assigned  will  probably 
be  green  also.  In  my  opinion  they  would  have  little  value  as  cavalry  in  any 
kind  of  service  in  less  than  a  year. 

Col.  McDonald,  inspecting  Troop  — ,  -  -  Cavalry,  August  18, 
states : 

This  organization  furnishes  no  basis  on  which  to  rest  such  an  estimate.  It 
was  mustered  in  on  June  28,  1916,  and  not  furnished  with  horses  that  could 
be  used  until  August  21,  and  then  only  for  slow  work  at  a  walk  on  account  of 
recent  shipping  fever. 

It  had  added  to  it  35  recruits.  The  men.  though  generally  able  to  ride,  are 
not  horse  trainers  nor  skilled  horsemen. 

It  is  a  mere  guess  as  to  how  long  it  will  take  to  train  these  men  and  horses 
at  the  same  time ;  much  depends  on  the  quality  of  both,  which  can  not  be 
judged  at  a  glance.  The  citizen  soldier  is  not  given  a  fair  chance  to  show  his 
ability  to  round  out  as  a  trained  soldier  under  such  circumstances,  when  he  is 
handicapped  by  every  drawback  abhorred  by  regular  officers  in  their  training 
of  regular  commands.  The  law  should  require  National  Guard  organizations  to 
be  always  kept  at  the  minimum  number  required  for  war  service,  so  that  on 
the  call  they  could  be  shipped  at  once  to  the  point  required  even  before  muster 
in,  if  needed  for  immediate  use,  and  mustered  in  afterwards. 

Lieut.  Col.  Tayman,  in  his  report  of  inspection  of  the  First  Squad- 
ron, -  —  Cavalry,  says : 

The  adaptability  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  after  a  few  months'  service  under 
an  officer  of  experience,  they  have  become  fair  soldiers.  The  spirit  displayed 
in  the  performance  of  the  duty  now  engaged  upon  is  excellent. 

ARTILLERY. 

Maj.  Stephens,  in  inspecting  the  First  Battalion,  -  -  Field 
Artillery,  says : 

They  have  been  under  the  instruction  of  the  officers  of  the  —  -  Battalion, 
-  Field  Artillery,  and  have  progressed  rapidly.  If  they  continue  to  be 
instructed  by  these  regular  officers,  I  believe  they  would  be  ready  to  take  the 
field  in  about  three  months.  The  time  necessary  for  the  future  development  of 
the  citizen  soldier  is  dependent  on  so  many  variables  that  each  case  is  likely 
to  be  different.  If  left  to  their  own  devices.  I  think  it  would  take  very  much 
longer  to  develop  them  than  when  they  arc  associated  with  and  looked  after. 
by  Regular  Field  Artillery  officers, 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,    ETC.  87 

in  inspecting  the  First  Battalion,  -        -  Artillery,  he  says: 

Practically  all  men  are  absolutely  unfamiliar  with  animals.  Green  horses 
furnished.  Will  require  six  months  to  make  them  efficient.  Battalion  com- 
mander knows  less  about  field  artillery  than  some  of  the  other  officers  and 
hence  is  absolutely  useless  as  an  instructor  of  others.  Unless  this  batt.-.lion  has 
the  assistance  of  a  Regular  Field  Artillery  officer  as  instructor,  it  is  doubtful 
if  it  will  become  efficient  in  a  year's  time.  The  estimate  of  time  necessary  to- 
make  them  efficient  is  made  on  the  supposition  that  a  Regular  officer  would  be 
with  them. 

Of  the  -         -  and  -          -  Regiments,  -        —Field  Artillery,  he 

says : 

This  is  one  of  the  brigade  commanded  by  Gen.  McNair  (Regular),  who  treats 
his  brigade  as  a  big  regiment,  and  they  are  indeed  fortunate  to  have  a  Field 
Artillery  officer  of  ability  and  experience  to  command  them.  With  his  instruc- 
tion, assisted  by  Capt.  Booker,  they  are  making  very  good  progress,  and  at 
least  twice  as  much  progress  as  \yould  be  possible  without  their  supervision. 

He  speaks  of  six  months  as  the  least  amount  of  time  required  to 
make  them  efficient. 

Maj.  Stephens,  in  his  report  of  inspection  of  Battery  — ,  -  — , 
Field  Artillery,  says: 

This  battery  is  commanded  by  probably  the  best  battery  commander  in  the 
militia  field  artillery.  He  served  in  the  Philippines  in  1898  as  a  second  lieu- 
tenant in  one  of  the  Utah  batteries  and  has  been  continuously  in  the  militia 
since,  most  of  the  time  as  battery  commander.  He  has  been  able  to  hold  his 
organization  together  well  and  keep  a  large  number  of  trained  men  in  it,  con- 
sequently when  his  battery  was  called  out  it  was  in  much  better  condition  than 
the  average  organization.  A  battery  such  as  this  one  could  be  put  in  good 
shape  for  field  service  in  about  four  .months  provided  it  was  mobilized  in  a 
suitable  locality  for  instruction  and  target  practice,  and  had  its  aniamls  and 
equipment  furnished  promptly,  and  could  be  supervised  by  a  regular  Field 
Artillery  officer  of  experience  and  judgment. 

Maj.  Stephens,  in  inspecting  Battery  — ,  -  — ,  Field  Artillery, 
says: 

This  battery  is  further  along  in  its  development  than  any  that  I  have  yet 
seen,  but  it  has  had  about  two  months'  longer  service  than  the  others.  It  is 
ready  for  target  practice  now,  and  in  about  one  month's  time  ought  to  be  ready 
for  field  service  in  campaign.  It  has  had  the  advantage  of  having  two  officers 
who  served  enlistments  in  regular  Field  Artillery  and  has  also  had  the  assist- 
ance of  Regular  officers  as  instructors;  also  its  horses  were  received  more 
promptly  than  in  the  case  of  the  other  batteries  that  I  have  seen.  Results  of 
the  four  months'  work  of  this  battery  since  being  called  into  service  lead  to  the 
belief  that  about  six  months  is  the  time  necessary  for  the  after  development  of 
the  citizen  soldier  on  a  hasty  call  into  the  Federal  service,  provided  he  has  the 
assistance  of  experienced  officers  from  the  Regular  service. 

Maj.  Stephens,  I.  G.,  in  inspecting  the  First  Battalion,  Field  Ar- 
tillery of  -  — ,  September  5,  says : 

Practically  all  men  are  absolutely  unfamiliar  with  all  phases  of  the  mounted 
work,  and  consequently  there  are  no  instructors  within  the  organization  for 
that  part  of  the  work.  Without  assistance  from  the  Regular  Artillery  they 
would  be  a  long  time  getting  on  to  the  details  of  this  very  important  part  of 
the  Field  Artillery  soldier's  duties.  If  the  horses  had  been  furnished  this  or- 
ganization promptly  and  they  had  a  competent  Regular  Field  Artillery  officer 
placed  in  charge  of  the  instruction  with  about  four  noncommissioned  officers 
from  Regular  Artillery  as  assistants,  it  is  believed  this  organization  would  be 
ready  for  service  in  about  six  months.  This  assumes  that  the  mobilization 
camp  is  suitable  ground  for  Field  Artillery  to  work  over. 

In  inspecting  the  -        -  Field  Artillery  August  30  and  31,  he  says : 

In  my  opinion  the  citizen  soldier,  while' of  excellent  material,  is  in  nowise 
fitted  for  field  service,  for  his  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  have  n  >t 
the  training  or  knowledge  necessary  to  enable  them  to  instruct  their  men. 


88  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

Six  months  under  competent  instructors  would  be  needed  for  an  organization's 
after  development,  and  this  only  provided  field-maneuver  ground  is  furnished 
the  organization. 

This  regiment  has  an  advantage  over  many  in  having  a  colonel  retired  Field 
Artillery  officer ;  lieutenant  colonel,  a  Regular  Field  Artillery  officer ;  adjutant, 
an  ex-Field  Artillery  officer ;  'and  one  battery  is  commanded  by  an  ex-Cavalry 
officer.  No  Regular  officer  has  been  assigned  to  them  as  instructor.  They  have 
progressed  very  well  and  are  now  having  target  practice,  which  Maj.  H.  L. 
Newbold  has  been  detailed  to  supervise. 

In  inspecting  Battery  — ,  -  — ,  Field  Artillery,  September  27, 
he  says: 

On  account  of  having  a  great  many  men  with  considerable  service  in  this 
battery  and  the  opportunities  afforded  them  at  home  to  work  at  the  mounted 
part  of  the  work,  this  battery  will  probably  need  a  shorter  time  for  its  after- 
development  than  most  others.  This  battery  is  ready  to  go  into  the  field  now 
and  have  its  target  practice,  to  which  should  be  devoted  about  one  month  for 
best  results.  At  the  end  of  that  time  it  should  be  ready  for  service  in  campaign. 

Maj.  Stephens  reports  in  his  inspection  of  the  First  Battalion, 
Field  Artillery : 

The  task  of  training  green  men  and  green  horses  on  a  hasty  call  into  the  Fed- 
eral service  is  110  doubt  a  big  one,  and  it  is  not  believed  that  such  a  task  can  be 
done  in  any  reasonably  short  time  unless  competent  instructors  from  the  regular 
artillery  service  can  be  furnished.  There  is  no  doubt  that  a  battalion  such  as 
this  has  a  nucleus  of  officers  and  men  partially  trained  on  a  hasty  call  into  the 
Federal  service,  which  makes  the  task  of  development  into  an  efficient  organiza- 
tion much  simpler  and  easier  than  taking  the  entire  force  from  untrained  men. 
The  amount  of  time  necessary  for  the  after-development  is  dependent  on  the 
amount  of  instruction  that  can  be  given  by  regular  officers  detailed  as  in- 
structors with  the  organization.  With  ene  competent  regular  Field  Artillery 
officer,  as  instructor  for  this  battalion,  it  is  believed  that  it  could  be  made  fairly 
efficient  for  field  service  in  about  six  months  after  the  call.  The  commanding 
officer  of  this  battalion.  Maj.  Tyndall,  is  a  very  able  and  energetic  officer  of  the 
National  Guard,  and  has  taken  every  advantage  of  his  opportunities  to  become 
proficient  in  Field  Artillery. 

The  same  remarks  apply  to  Maj.  Stephens's  inspection  of  the 

Field  Artillery  of  -          -  (less  one  battalion) ,  and  in  his  report  of 
that  inspection,  he  adds : 

The  regimental  commander,  Col.  George  E.  Leach,  is  one  of  the  most  enthusi- 
astic artillery  officers  in  the  National  Guard,  and  is  as  well  qualified  to  command 
a  Field  Artillery  regiment  as  any  officer  not  a  regular  officer  that  I  know  of. 

Maj.  Stephens,  in  his  inspection  of  Battery  -  -  Field  Artillery, 
September  25,  says : 

I  consider  this  the  best  National  Guard  battery  I  have  inspected.  The  cap- 
tain is  a  real  soldier  and  he  has  fine  control  over  his  men.  He  has  been  in  the 
service  now  since  about  May  9,  and  has  probably  had  most  of  his  horses  since 
the  latter  part  of  June,  or  about  three  months.  They  have  all  had  to  pass 
through  the  epidemic  of  influenza  and  are  now  generally  in  very  good  shape, 
both  as  to  condition  and  training,  and  ready  for  almost  any  kind  of  service,  but 
this  organization  contained  more  men  used  to  riding  and  the  handling  of  ani- 
mals than  are  usually  found  in  a  militia  battery,  consequently  they  are  probably 
further  along  in  their  mounted  work  than  the  average  battery  would  be.  In 
about  two  more  months,  provided  an  opportunity  was  given  this  battery  to  work 
over  a  suitable  terrain  and  have  target  practice,  I  should  consider  this  battery 
ready  for  any  kind  of  service. 

In  inspecting  the  -        -  Field  Artillery,  September  26,  he  says : 

The  fact  that  this  organization  was  only  supplied  with  a  few  condemned 
horses  for  each  battery  before  muster  in  necessitated  their  being  supplied  with 
remounts  after  arrival  in  Camp  Stewart.  The  horses  supplied  in  many  cases 
were  sick,  and  it  was  necessary  to  put  them  in  quarantine  for  10  days  before 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  89 

training  could  be  started.  Gentling  the  horses  and  breaking  them  to  harness 
and  draft  requires  time.  I  should  estimate  three  months  requirement  after 
horses  received  before  organization  could  be  made  mobile.  And  then  there 
would  be  required  considerable  time  to  familiarize  officers  and  men  with  the 
real  work  of  reconnoissance  and  occupation  of  position  so  as  to  thoroughly 
train  each  battery  to  work  as  a  machine  throughout.  Then  more  drill  instruc- 
tion to  train  them  to  perform  their  proper  function  in  battalions  and  in  the 
regiment.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  complete  development  of  the  regiment 
could  be  accomplished  under  six  months  even  under  most  favorable  conditions 
as  to  prompt  supply  of  all  equipment,  suitable  terrain  to  work  over,  and  the 
assistance  of  competent  regular  officers  as  instructors,  and  then  it  is  thought 
many  of  the  higher  officers  would  be  in  need  of  further  training  in  actual 
campaign. 

He  reports,  in  his  inspection,  September  28,  of  the  -  -  Field 
Artillery : 

A  great  many  of  the  men  and  officers  have  had  considerable  prior  service. 
They  haye  also  had  some  horses  on  hand  in  the  batteries,  so  the  men  have  had 
some  opportunity  to  be  trained  for  the  mounted  part  of  the  work.  This  makes 
the  time  necessary  for  their  after-development  much  shorter.  I  should  judge 
that  this  regiment  ought  to  be  ready  for  service  in  about  five  months  after  call, 
provided  horses  are  supplied  promptly  and  suitable  terrain  for  training  and 
target  practice  is  furnished. 

Capt.  Bryden,  in  his  inspection  of  Battery  -  — ,  Field  Artillery, 
reports : 

This  organization  is  an  average  National  Guard  battery ;  the  enlisted  men 
are  of  average  intelligence  and  appear  ready  and  willing  to  obey  instructions  and 
to  learn.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  officers.  Both  officers  and  noncom- 
missioned officers  lack  force  and  that  confidence  in  themselves  which  comes  from 
a  thorough  knowledge  of  their  duties. 

There  is  an  easy-going  unpunctu.il  atmosphere  about  the  battery ;  formations 
are  not  on  time ;  the  service  of  the  guns  is  slow ;  and  "  stables  "  is  a  period 
devoted  as  much  to  conversation  as  to  grooming. 

The  battery  has  just  completed  three  and  a  half  months'  duty  in  the  Federal 
service  and  is  now  about  to  be  mustered  out.  The  battery  commander  states 
that  at  no  time  during  this  tour  of  Federal  service,  not  even  at  service  practice 
at  which  135  rounds  of  shell  and  shrapnel  were  expended,  had  an  officer  of 
the  Regular  Army  been  assigned  to  the  battery  as  instructor,  and  the  work  of 
the  organization  at  this  inspection  showed  plainly  the  need  of  such  instruction. 
In  its  present  state  of  training  the  value  of  this  battery  as  a  tactical  unit  is 
small. 

The  personnel,  including  both  officers  and  men,  is  good,  and  it  is  bejieved 
that  with  a  live,  energetic  Field  Artillery  officer  of  the  Regular  Army  as  in 
structor,  with  a  full  complement  of  animals,  a  reasonable  allowance  of  service 
ammunition  for  practice,  and  opportunity  for  at  least  10  hours  of  instruction 
per  day,  this  organization  could  be  made  into  an  efficient  light  battery  in  eight 
months  time. 

Col.  Hunter,  I.  G.,  in  his  report  of  inspection  of  Batteries  - 
and  -       — ,  -         -  Field  Artillery,  says  that  they  have  profited  by 
having  a  regular  officer  to  direct  their  work  and  that  they  ought  to 
be  in  first-class  shape  in  six  months  more  work. 

Capt.  "Westcott,  in  his  inspection  of  Batteries  -         -  and , 

—  Field  Artillery,  says: 

These  batteries  have  only  five  horses  each.  Very  few  of  the  men  have  had 
any  training  in  horsemanship.  When  horses  are  assigned,  they  will  un- 
doubtedly be  untrained.  Although  the  commanders  of  these  batteries  are  intel- 
ligent men,  their  batteries  could  not  be  of  any  real  value  to  the  Government 
against  a  modern  enemy  in  less  than  a  year  from  date  of  call.  The  best 
artillery  officer  in  the  United  States  Army  or  in  any  other  army  could  not 
properly  train  these  batteries  in  less  than  one  year. 


90  MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

Maj.   Fox   Conner,   in   inspecting   Batteries  -  -   and 

-  Field  Artillery,  says: 


These  batteries  have  not  made  the  progress  which  they  should  have  made. 
This  is  due  to  great  change  in  personnel,  to  lack  of  serviceable  horses,  and 
proximity  of  -  — ,  the  place  of  inspection,  to  the  homes  of  the  men.  They 
have  no  well-considered  program  of  intensive  training  and  its  enforcement. 
Only  from  three  to  five  privates,  now  in  gnn  squads,  have  participated  in 
artillery  target  practice.  The  real  value  of  these  organizations  on  a  hasty 
call  into  the  Federal  service  is  nil.  The  amount  of  time  for  the  development 
of  these  organizations  is  not  less  than  six  months,  and  then  only  in  case  they 
are  supplied  with  an  adequate  number  of  competent  instructors. 

Maj.  Johnson,  in  inspecting  the  —       -  Field  Artillery,  says: 

The  personnel  of  this  regiment  is  very  intelligent,  and  they  take  a  great 
interest  in  their  work.  The  present  organization  would  probably  not  be  self- 
supporting  in  the  field,  due  to  the  lack  of  men  having  varied  occupations,  such  as 
cooks,  horseshoers,  saddlers,  and  mechanics.  Other  organizations  require  more 
training  than  this  one,  but,  once  trained,  they  come  nearer  having  trained  men 
for  all  positions. 

In  my  opinion,  which  is  based  upon  my  observations  in  camps  of  seven  dif- 
ferent State  troops,  the  citizen  soldier  at  the  present  state  of  training  will  be 
of  little  real  value  on  a  hasty  call  into  the  Federal  service,  unless  there  i.> 
a  sufficient  number  of  instructors  from  the  Regular  Army  on  duty  with  these 
troops,  not  only  in  times  of  'peace  at  their  armories  but  also  in  their  camps  of 
mobilization.  In  most  camps  I  have  found  that  the  Regular  Army  instructors 
had  been  taken  off  their  regular  duty  and  had  been  made  mustering  officers. 
The  instruction  and  training  of  the  troops  in  such  camps  were  practically  at 
a  standstill.  The  officers  were  attempting  drills  to  some  extent,  but  they  were 
groping  in  the  dark.  Here  it  is  different.  The  colonel,  lieutenant  colonel, 
majors,  regimental  and  battalion  staff  officers,  and  one  battery  commander  are 
officers  or  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  Regular  Army,  and  the  work  accom- 
plished here  is  in  marked  contrast  to  that  accomplished  in  other  camps. 
Instruction  is  progressive  and  methodical  and,  above  all,  thorough.  The 
accuracy  of  aiming  and  laying  the  pieces  at  artillery  drill  and  the  snappiness 
of  the  drills  rival  the  work  accomplished  by  Regular  Army  organizations.  The 
days  are  so  full,  from  early  morning  until  late  at  night,  for  both  officers  and 
enlisted  men  that  it  seems  as  though  they  could  not  possibly  accomplish  more 
with  increased  effort,  if  such  increase  were  possible.  They  are  worked  to  the 
limit,  but,  I  think,  for  a  limited  time  at  least,  not  to  excess.  After  the  day's 
work  is  over  a  final  assembly  of  all  commissioned  officers  is  held  and  all  mis- 
takes, defects,  and  irregularities  are  taken  up  and  discussed,  with  a  view  of 
their  prevention  in  the  future.  Some  of  these  remarks  do  not  appear  at  first 
thought  to  come  under  the  caption  "  Remarks  which  may  serve  in  appraising 
the  real  value  of  the  citizen  soldier,"  etc.,  but  I  have  made  them  here  to  show 
that  the  citizen  soldier  is  of  little  value  on  a  hasty  call  unless  they  are  provided 
with  competent  instructors,  and  I  am  becoming  more  and  more  convinced  that 
the  number  of  instructors  which  we  must  use  from  the  Regular  Army  must 
be  far  greater  than  that  which  we  have  used  in  the  past.  The  instruction  of 
a  regiment  is  not  a  one-man  job ;  it  is  too  great  a  task  for  efficiency.  And  if 
we  expect  efficiency  from  the  National  Guard  organizations,  I  believe  that  one 
Regular  Army  officer  detailed  as  instructor  with  each  company  or  battery  is 
not  an  extravagance.  In  the  regular  service  we  do  not  think  of  bringing  and 
keeping  a  company  up  to  the  proper  standard  of  efficiency  with  one  officer, 
even  when  he  has  the  advantage  of  trained  noncommissioned  officers  as  assist- 
ants. Much  less  can  we  expect  to  take  untrained  troops  and  bring  them  up  to 
and  keep  them  at  a  proper  state  of  efficiency,  so  that  they  will  be  ready  for 
service  on  a  hasty  call,  with  less  than  one  commissioned  officer  and  possibly 
one  sergeant  instructor  to  a  company  or  battery. 

Maj.  Johnson,  in  inspecting  Battery  -         -  Field  Artillery,  says: 

The  value  of  the  course  of  instruction  received  at  Plattsimrg  by  about  one- 
third  of  the  men  of  this  company  is  very  noticeable.  They  have  had  good 
groundwork,  they  have  an  idea  of  discipline,  dismounted  drill,  small-arms  prac- 
tice, sanitation,  courtesy,  guard  duty,  and  care  of  equipment,  which  are  im- 
portant assets  in  this  camp. 


ETC.  91 

The  personnel  of  this  battery  is  very  intelligent,  and  they  take  a  great 
interest  in  their  work ;  but  the  present  organization  would  probably  not  be  self- 
supporting,  due  to  the  lack  of  interest  by  this  class  of  men  in  cooking,  horse- 
shoeing, repairing  harness,  camp  sanitation,  and  work  of  similar  nature.  Other 
organizations  require  more  training  than  this  one,  but  when  once  trained  they 
come  nearer  having  trained  men  for  all  positions. 

The  instruction  of  this  organization  is  under  the  general  direction  of  Col. 
R.  M.  Danford,  Tenth  Field  Artillery,  National  Guard  of  Connecticut  (first  lieu- 
tenant, Fifth  Field  Artillery,  United  States. Army),  and  under  the  immediate 
supervision  of  Second  Lieut.  C.  A.  Selleck,  First  Field  Artillery,  United  States 
Army.  All  instruction  has  been  progressive.  The  instruction  of  the  drivers  and 
cannoneers  in  camp  has  been  very  thorough,  which  is  shown  by  snappy  drills  and 
the  accuracy  with  which  the  pieces  are  aimed  and  laid  and  other  desired  results 
accomplished.  The  company  is  now  just  taking  up  road  work  and  field  exer- 
cises. Reveille  is  at  5.15  a.  m. ;  the  last  school  of  instruction  for  the  officers 
ends  about  10.15  p.  m.  The  days  are  so  full,  from  early  morning  until  late  at 
night,  for  both  officers  and  enlisted  men  that  it  seems  as  though  they  could  not 
possibly  accomplish  more  with  increased  effort  if  such  increase  were  possible. 
They  are  worked  to  the  limit,  but,  I  think,  not  to  excess. 

The  work  accomplished  by  this  organization  and  by  other  organizations  in 
this  camp  stands  out  in-  marked  contrast  to  that  accomplished  by  troops  in 
other  camps  which  I  have  inspected,  where  they  received  no  instruction  from 
Regular  Army  officers,  their  inspector  instructors  having  been  taken  off  of 
instruction  work  and  detailed  as  mustering  officers. 

Maj.  Johnson,  in  his  report  of  inspection  of  Battery  -  — ,  Field 
Artillery,  says : 

This  organization  appears  to  be  interested  in  its  work  and  anxious  to  learn.. 
The  battery  was  organized  about  three  months  ago,  and  will  require  much  in- 
struction and  training  before  it  will  be  of  use  for  field  service.  Two  of  the  officers 
have  had  prior  service  and  have  participated  in  firing.  Most  of  the  noncommis- 
sioned officers  are  new  at  this  work  and  lack  experience. 

The  instruction  of  this  organization  is  progressing  satisfactorily.  The  results 
accomplished  stand  out  in  marked  contrast  with  those  accomplished  in  other 
mobilization  camps  which  I  have  inspected  where  the  inspector-instructor  had 
been  taken  off  of  instruction  work  and  required  to  devote  his  entire  time  and 
attention  to  the  duties  of  muster  and  supply.  In  my  opinion,  which  is  based 
upon  my  observations  in  camps  of  seven  different  State  troops,  the  citizen  sol- 
dier will  be  of  little  real  value  on  a  hasty  call  into  the  Federal  service  unless 
there  is  a  sufficient  number  of  instructors  from  the  Regular  Army  on  duty  with 
these  troops,  not  only  in  time  of  peace  at  their  armories  but  also  in  their  camps 
of  mobilization. 

The  instruction  of  this  organization  has  been  under  the  general  direction 
of  Col.  R.  M.  Danford,  Tenth  Field  Artillery,  National  Guard  of  Connecticut 
(first  lieutenant,  Fifth  Field  Artillery,  U.  S.  Army),  and  under  the  immediate 
supervision  of  Second  Lieut.  C.  A.  Selleck,  First  Field  Artillery,  United  States 
Army.  All  instruction  has  been  progressive  and  they  are  now  just  taking  up 
road  work  and  field  exercises.  I  consider  that  the  results  accomplished  are  very 
satisfactory  and  show  that  the  instructors  have  put  in  long  hours  and  have 
spared  no  pains  in  the  thoroughness  of  their  work. 

Col.  McDonald,  in  inspecting  Battery  -       — ,  Field  Artillery,  says : 

There  is  no  basis  on  which  to  rest  an  estimate  in  the  case  of  this  battery.  The- 
same  difficulties  that  beset  the  Cavalry  and  Infantry  are  present  here.  Inflation 
by  100  per  cent  of  recruits,  no  horses,  no  chance  for  target  practice  or  combined 
maneuvers. 

One  man's  guess  is  as  good  as  another's  a.s  to  the  rate  of  development  under 
these  conditions. 

The  officers  are  capable  men  and  they  have  excellent  raw  material  on  which 
to  work  for  enlisted  personnel.  With  proper  assistance  from  an  experienced 
instructor  good  results  should  be  obtained  at  field  firing  and  marching  maneuvers, 
in  four  months  from  date  of  receipt  of  horses,  August  10,  1916. 

Capt.  Stacey,  in  inspecting  the  First  Battalion,  —  -  Field  Artil- 
lery. August  4;  to  14  at  -  — ,  —  — ,  says: 

The  battalion  commander,  Maj.  H.  M.  Bush,  is,  in  my  opinion,  a  very  efficient 
officer  and  is  entirely  capable  of  developing  this  organization  into  a  very  efficient 


92  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

unit  if  given  time.    The  officers  of  this  battalion  are  generally  good,  with  the 

exception  of  Capt. ,  whom  I  do  not  consider  competent.    His  battery  does 

not  measure  up  to  the  standard  of  the  other  two  batteries  in  anything.  His  bat- 
tery kitchen  was  positively  filthy;  I  scraped  filth  from  the  kitchen  table  with  my 
knife.  His  battery  drill,  mounted  and  dismounted,  was  poor.  This  battalion  has 
92  horses  that  are  owned  by  the  State.  Twenty-three  were  inspected  and  passed 
by  First  Lieut.  Hunsaker,  United  States  Cavalry,  for  peace  training  under  the 
law  of  June  3,  1916,  but  have  not  yet  been  officially  taken  over  by  the  Federal 
Government.  The  remainder  of  the  horses  are  totally  unfit  for  Cavalry  or  Artil- 
lery work.  The  battery  drill  mounted  of  this  battalion  at  a  walk  and'  slow  trot 
is  fair.  They  can  not  drill  at  a  gallop.  It  was  not  attempted.  It  will  take  this 
battalion  four  months  to  become  proficient  in  battery  and  battalion  drill 
mounted  after  they  receive  their  horses.  This  time  might  be  reduced  some  by 
intensive  training  under  the  direction  of  a  Regular  officer,  not  necessarily  in  com- 
mand. This  organization  has  had  a  progressive  system  of  training  since  their 
arrival  in  this  camp  and  the  results  show  it.  It  is  capable  of  being  developed 
into  a  very  efficient  organization.  It  is  not  fit  for  any  service  yet. 

Maj.  Brady,  in  inspecting  Battery  -        — ,  Field  Artillery,  says: 

Officers  are  educated  and  willing,  but  inexperienced.  Great  need  of  Regular 
officers  for  outline  work.  Due  to  lack  of  experienced  officers,  those  in  the  bat- 
tery are  unable  to  outline  a  progressive  system  of  instruction. 

Maj.  Brady,  in  his  inspection  August  27  of  Battery  -  — ,  Field 
Artillery,  of ,  reports  that  this  battery  has  no  horses. 

Col.  Donaldson,  in  inspecting  the  First  Battalion,  Field 

Artillery,  says: 

Men  are  fairly  proficient  in  standing  gun  drill  and  officers  generally  can  give 
proper  commands  for  firing.  On  account  of  small  number  of  horses  available, 
mounted  drill  has  not  progressed  as  fast  as  it  should.  The  personnel  appears 
to  be  excellent. 

In  inspecting  the  First  Battalion,  -  -  Field  Artillery,  Col. 
Donaldson  says: 

Horses  are  necessary.  Officers  are  anxious  to  progress,  but  organizations 
suffer  from  fact  that  there  is  no  Regular  officer  to  outline  work  arid  to  offer 
criticisms. 

Col.  Chamberlain  reports  September  8  of  Battery  -  -  Field 
Artillery,  of  —  — ,  that  it  has  no  draft  animals  and  only  30  mounts, 
these  latter  being  well  cared  for. 

INFANTRY. 

In  reply  to  the  question  "  Present  degree  of  readiness  and  fitness 
for  field  service  of  the  organization,"  the  answer  in  89  per  cent  of 
the  reports  was  either  "fair,"  "poor,"  "unfitted,"  "not  ready," 
"  wholly  unprepared,"  or  some  reply  the  equivalent  of  this. 

There  were  102  reports  of  inspections  in  the  Infantry,  and  in  46 
of  these  inspections  the  report  of  the  inspector  was  generally  as  fol- 
lows, or  the  opinion  expressed  was  so  near  this  that  it  may  be  so  taken 
without  material  error: 

Under  most  favorable  conditions,  assuming  that  recruits  niul  equipment  for 
war  strength  were  made  available  on  call,  the  regiment  might  be  made  efficient 
for  field  service  against  an  inferior  enemy  in  six  months ;  against  trained  troops, 
it  will  require  two  years. 

In  some  cases  this  was  coupled  with  the  condition  that  this  progress 
could  only  be  made  by  having  a  Regular  Army  officer  on  duty  with 
the  regiment. 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  9& 

In  14  of  the  earlier  reports  submitted,  in  which  the  inspector  had 
made  the  above  remarks,  the  department  commander  (Gen.  Fimston) 
expressed  the  opinion  that  such  was  far  from  a  correct  estimate  of 
the  present  wrorth. 

He  considered  that  with  two  months'  additional  training  it  could 
be  pitted  against  an  inferior  enemy,  and  with  six  months'  additional 
training  it  wou-ld  have  become  as  efficient  as  was  possible  without 
being  in  contact  with  an  armed  enemy.  Later  he  reconsidered  this 
action  and  wrote  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  as  follows: 

1.  In  forwarding  reports  of -department  inspectors  on  the  following  organiza- 
tions  I  have  disagreed  with  the  renun'ks  of  the  inspector  as  to  length  of  time 
which  would  be  required  for  those  organizations  to  prepare  themselves  for  active 
field  service.     My  remark  was  based  largely  on  the  belief  that  after  a  period 
of  approximately   six   months'   additional   training   those  organizations   would 
begin  to  grow  stale  and  would  no  longer  improve  and  nothing  but  actual  field 
service  against  an  enemy  would  improve  them  from  that  time  on. 

2.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  no  militia  organization  can  become  better  than 
its  officers,  and  the  further  fact  that  the  officers  have  no  facilities  for  improving 
themselves  beyond  a  limited  stage,  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  the  time  set 
by  the  department  inspectors  for  these  organizations  to  become  proficient   is 
not  far  from  correct. 

3.  I  therefore  request  that  the  Inspector  General's  Office  attach  a  copy  of  this 
letter  to  the  inspection  reports  of  the  following  organizations : 

*  *  *  *  *  *  * 

4.  In  the  reports  of  remaining  organizations  that  go  forward  I  shall  concur 
\frith  the  department  inspector  in  this  matter,  and  do  not  want  to  do  any  injus- 
tice to  those  organizations  as  compared  with  those  mentioned  above  on  which 
I  have  made  a  different  report. 

In  37  other  reports  the  opinion  expressed  was  essentially  as 
follows : 

If  the  organization  was  at  war  strength  at  the  time  of  the  call  and  was  fully 
equipped  so  that  they  could  devote  their  -entire  time  to  instruction,  and  had  at 
least  one  experienced  officer  of  the  Regular  Army  to  each  battalion,  it  is  be- 
lieved that  the  regiment  could  be  made  efficient  for  campaign  in  about  six 
months. 

This  covers  this  point  in  about  83  per  cent  of  the  Infantry  inspec- 
tions (mostly  regimental)  ;  the  others  vary  considerably.  In  about 
six  reports  the  opinion  was  expressed  that  the  troops  could  be  made 
ready  in  about  three  months. 

These  were  the  most  favorable — in  the  remaining  11  per  cent  the 
reports  indicated  that  a  longer  period  would  be  required. 

In  10  reports  the  inspector  says : 

Under  their  present  officers  it  is  doubtful  if  it  will  ever  become  efficient. 

This  seems  to  coincide  with  Gen.  Funston's  idea,  expressed  above, 
that  "  no  militia  organization  can  become  better  than  its  officers,  and 
the  further  fact  that  the  officers  have  no  facilities  for  improving 
themselves  beyond  a  limited  stage." 

CAVALRY. 

• 

There  w-ere  in  the  Cavalry  33  inspections — 3  of  regiments,  11  of 
squadrons,  and  19  of  separate  troops. 

In  two  of  the  troops  the  inspector  stated  that  two  or  three  months 
would  be  required  to  make  them  fit  for  field  service,  while  one 
squadron  (Texas)  was  reported  as  being  already  in  the  field.  All 
the  remaining  Cavalry  was  reported  as  being  either  "  unfitted,"  "  not 
ready,"  or  "  not  fit  for  field  service,"  etc. 


"94  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

In  the  inspection  of  the  following  organizations  it  was  reported 
that  there  were  either  no  animals  or  only  a  few  on  hand  at  time  of 
inspection:  Second  Squadron,  Georgia,  inspected  September  1-8; 
Troops  A  and  B,  North  Carolina,  inspected  August  24-29;  Troop  B, 
Tennessee,  inspected  September  1-6;  Troop  A,  New  Hampshire,  in- 
spected September  7;  First  Squadron,  Virginia  Cavalry,  inspected 
August  16-22;  First  Squadron,  Ohio  Cavalry,  inspected  August 
8-14;  Troops  A  and  B,  Michigan,  inspected  August  11-15.  These 
troops  and  squadrons  of  Cavalry  were  called  out  June  18. 

Horses  are  to.  Cavalry  what  ships  are  to  the  Navy — without  ani- 
mals such  troops  are  helpless,  or  at  best  are  very  poor  Infantry. 

(Due  to  extra  expense  of  transportation  and  risk  of  loss  of  animals 
from  shipping  fever,  the  Secretary  of  War  under  date*  of  June  29, 
1916,  had  ordered  that,  with  but  few  exceptions,  militia  troops 
should  receive  their  animals  on  arrival  at  the  border.) 

One-third  of  the  reports  indicated  that  it  would  require  from  six 
to  nine  months  to  make  the  organizations  fit  for  service  against  an 
inferior  enemy,  and  approximately  from  two  to  three  years  against 
trained  troops.  In  six  other  reports  four  to  six  months  was  consid- 
ered the  time  needed  to  make  them  ready  for  active  service. 

The  Texas  squadron  was  reported  as  already  doing  effective  work 
at  time  of  inspection  in  patrolling  the  border,  but  the  inspector 
thought  that  it  would  require  six  months  to  make  the  squadron  effi- 
cient for  campaign  service. 

In  no  report  did  it  appear  that  the  organization  inspected  could 
be  made  ready  in  less  than  about  four  months. 

FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

In  the  Field  Artillery  there  were  30  inspections — 6  of  regiments, 
8  of  battalions,  and  16  of  separate  batteries. 

In  17  the  organizations  were  reported  as  unfit  for  field  service. 

Six  organizations,  it  was  reported,  would  require  only  from  one  to 
three  months  to  be  ready ;  the  remainder  would  require  a  longer  time. 

The  following  at  time  of  inspection,  between  August  24  and  Sep- 
tember 8,  were  without  horses  or  practically  so:  First  Battalion. 
Georgia  Field  Artillery;  Batteries  A  and  B,  Alabama  Field  Artil- 
lery ;  and  Battery  A,  New  Hampshire  Field  Artillery. 

In  reply  to  the  question  "Length  of  time  considered  necessary  to 
make  the  organization  efficient  at  war  strength  in  campaign,  count- 
ing from  date  of  the  President's  call,"  the  inspectors  reported  usually 
six  months,  but  the  time  varied  generally  from  two  to  three  months 
to  one  year. 

DEDUCTIONS  FROM  STATISTICAL  DATA  SECURED  BY  INSPECTOR  GENERAL. 

The  statistical  data  collected  by  inspectors  general  at  the  inspec- 
tions referred  to  in  the  previous  chapter  include  organizations  hav- 
ing an  aggregate  enlisted  strength  of  128,517,  these  being  contained 
in  98  regiments  and  5  battalions  of  Infantry ;  3  regiments,  13  squad- 
rons, and  20  troops  of  Cavalry ;  6  regiments,  9  battalions,  and  15 
batteries  of  Field  Artillery;  3  battalions  and  10  companies  of  Engi- 
neers ;  4  battalions  and  16  companies  of  Signal  Corps ;  24  ambulance 
companies:  and  36  field  hospitals. 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED    MILITIA,    ETC.  95 

STATISTICAL   DATA. 

Effective  strength  present 1 •__  119,  874 

Noneffective  strength  present 3,  219 

Number  carried  on  rolls  not  present 5,  424 

Number  present  who  have  a  marksmanship  rating  of  first  class  or 

better,  secured  before  the  call 19,  202 

Number  present  who  have  fired  and  secured  a  rating  of  less  than  first 

class  before  the  call 14,  802 

Number  present  who  have  not  fired  before  the  call 56,  813 

Number  with  less  than  3  months'  service 20,  964 

Number  with  3  or  more  months'  and  less  than  1  year's  service 21,  610 

Number  with  1  or  more  years'  and  less  than  3  years'  service 34,  976 

Number  with  3  or  more  years'  service 19,  601 

Number  of  men  on  rolls  at  call  who  did  not  respond 7,  258 

Number  of  men  enlisted  under  the  call  with  prior  service 13,  440 

Number  of  men  enlisted  under  the  call  without  prior  service 60,  299 

Number  serving  as  Organized  Militia  who  have  not  taken  the  oath  re- 
quired by  the  act  of  June  3,  1916 21,  884 

Number  that  have  subscribed  to  oath  under  the  act  of  June  3,  1916 107,  706 

Enlisted  men  transferred  to  organizations  from  other  organizations 

after  receipt  of  call 7,  435 

Number  found  physically  disqualified  on  muster  in 23,721 

Number  of  enlisted  men  apparently  under  18  years  of  age 678 

Number  who  have  not  attended  a  previous  encampment  or  period  of 

field  service 71,  505 

Number  at  date  of  inspection  who  were  present  in  arrest  or  confine- 
ment    1,533 

Number  at  date  of  inspection  who  were  present  sick  in  hospital 1,  816 

Number  at  date  of  inspection  who  were  present  sick  in  quarters 1,  887 

Number  of  married  men 16,  009 

Number  of  arrests 7,  984 

Number   of  confinements 6,  687 

Number  of  enlisted  men  so  arrested  or  confined 7,  849 

Number  of  trials  by  general  court-martial 48 

Number  of  convictions  by  general  court-martial 28 

Number  of  trials  by  special  court-martial 122 

Number  of  convictions  by  special  court-martial 99 

Number  of  summary  court  trials 6,  503 

Number  of  convictions  by  summary  court-martial 6,  084 

Number  of  deserters : 1, 116 

From  a  careful  study  and  analysis  of  the  above  figures  the  fol- 
lowing deductions  are  made: 

1.  The  extent  to  which  the  National  Guard  and  the  Organized 
Militia  responded  to  the  call  and  passed  into  the  Federal  service 
may  be  arrived  at  in  an  indirect  way  through  a  consideration  of  the 
number  of  men  on  the  rolls  of  the  organizations  at  the  date  of  call 
in  connection  with  the  number  of  men  reported  as  having  been 
transferred  to  or  enlisted  in  the  organizations  included  in  the  call 
after  the  call  was  issued. 

Seven  thousand  four  hundred  and  thirty-five  men  were  thus  trans- 
ferred from  other  organizations,  60,299  men  without  former  service, 
and  13,440  men  with  former  service  were  enlisted  after  the  call. 

The  aggregate  of  these  three  classes  is  81,174  enlisted  men,  or  63 
per  cent  of  the  total  number  reported  upon — 128,517,  the  remaining 
47,343,  or  37  per  cent  representing  the  National  Guard  or  Organized 
Militia  element  on  the  rolls  of  the  organizations  in  question  at  the 
date  of  call. 

2.  The  records  of  the  Militia  Bureau  show  that  at  the  date  of  the 
call  approximately  95,000  enlisted  men  were  on  the  rolls  of  the  organ- 
izations now  under  consideration.     Fortv-seven  thousand  six  him- 


96  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

dred  and  fifty-seven  therefore  represents  the  number  of  members  of 
the  Organized  Militia  whose  names  disappeared  from  the  rolls  dur- 
ing the  transition  from  State  service  to  the  Federal  service.  This 
disappearance  is  explained  in  part  as  follows:  23,721  enlisted  men 
were  found  physically  disqualified  and  discharged,  and  7,258  en- 
listed men  failed  to  respond  to  the  call.  These  two  classes  combined 
account  for  30,979  enlisted  men.  Deducting  this  number  from  the 
number  stated  as  having  disappeared  from  the  rolls  during  the 
transition  period  there  still  remain  16,678  enlisted  men  to  be  ac- 
counted for — a  number  nearly  equal  to  the  strength  of  an  Infantry 
division.  The  absence  of  these  men  may  be  accounted  for  in  several 
ways.  The  numbers  reported  as  having  failed  to  respond  to  the  call 
or  as  having  been  discharged  for  physical  disability  on  muster  in 
may  have  been  understated.  It  is  known  that  many  discharges  from 
the  National  Guard  were  issued  by  governors  of  States  or  State  offi- 
cials in  the  interval  between  the  date  of  the  call  and  the  actual  date 
of  muster  in,  but  the  number  so  discharged  can  not  now  be  ascer- 
tained with  any  certainty.  Undoubtedly  some  members  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard  or  Organized  Militia  on  the  rolls  at  the  date  of  call 
were  discharged  by  the  Federal  authorities  after  muster  in  and 
before  the  date  of  inspection  on  account  of  dependency  or  for  some 
other  reason.  The  reasons  for  such  separations  from  service,  and 
whether  the  discharges  issued  by  State  officials  were  valid  or  not. 
need  not  be  dwelt  upon,  as  these  matters  are  of  little  concern  now 
compared  to  the  importance  of  the  evidence  which  the  figures  afford 
as  to  the  dependability  of  the  National  Guard  in  a  national  emer- 
gency requiring  its  employment  as  a  Federal  force. 

3.  The  number  of  men  enlisted  under  the  call  without  prior  service 
gives  an  idea  of  the  state  of  training  of  the  commands  inspected ;  but 
a  more  correct  conception  will  be  gained  if  to  this  number  there  be 
added  the  number  of  men  with  less  than  three  months  Organized 
Militia  service  at  the  date  of  call.    The  sum  of  these  two  is  81,263 
enlisted  men,  which  is  63  per  cent  of  the  total  number,  the  other  37 

Eer  cent  representing  a  partially  trained  Organized  Militia  element, 
ome  value  must  attach  to  the  partial  training  obtained  in  the  Na- 
tional Guard,  but  the  disposition  is  to  overrate  its  value. 

4.  The  state  of  training  in  marksmanship  for  troops  armed  with 
the  rifle  is  shown  by  the  numbers  giving  classifications  above  or  below 
a  rating  of  first  class,  and  the  number  which  are  reported  as  never 
having  fired.     Of  a  total  of  90,817  included  in  the  report  only  21 
per  cent  are  rated  as  first  class  or  better,  first  class  being  a  standard 
which  is  barely  tolerable.    Sixteen   per  cent  can  be  rated  as  indiffer- 
ent shots  and  63  per  cent  are  stated  as  being  entirely  untrained. 
Combining  the  two  latter  classes,  the  untrained  and  partially  trained 
element  will  be  represented  by  79  per  cent  and  the  trained  element  by 
21  per  cent.     It  is  thus  seen  that  as  far  as  the  inspection  has  pro- 
ceeded, including  as  it  does  organizations  having  a  total  strength  of 
128,517  enlisted  men,  63  per  cent  of  this  strength  is  a  raw  untrained 
element  and  37  per  cent  represents  the  partially  trained  Organized 
Militia  or  National  Guard  element,  the  untrained  element  predomi- 
nating in  the  ratio  indicated  by  the  two  percentages  stated.    Prob- 
ably these  percentages  may  be  taken  as  establishing  rules  which 
might  be  safely  applied  to  the  entire  National  Guard  in   Federal 
service,  about  150,000  men. 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  97 

5.  The  sick  record  of  the  National  Guard  in  Federal  service,  2.8 
per  cent  as  shown  by  the  inspection  reports,  is  the  most  favorable 
showing  made  by  these  troops. 

6.  The  great  loss  in  effective  strength  at  a  critical  time  amounting 
to  about  50  per  cent  of  the  original  strength,  although  compensated 
for  in  part  by  the  transfer  and  enlistment  of  men  credited  with 
militia  service,  seems  enough  to  condemn  the  system  created  by  the 
old   militia   lawT   as   an  effective  means  of  making  the   Organized 
Militia  into  an  effective  force. 

7.  The  operation  of  the  law  of  June  3,  1916,  with  the  far  more 
rigid  exactions  and  requirements,  which,  under  its  terms  the  Federal 
Government  may  now  impose,  might  be  expected  in  time  to  produce 
a  great  improvement.     But  the  very  exactions   and  requirements 
which  are  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  efficiency  will  undoubtedly 
tend  to  produce  a  distaste  for  service  in  the  National  Guard  among 
the  classes  of  young  men  who  have  hitherto  joined  it  for  social  rea- 
sons, or  for  the  sake  of  the  recreation  which  the  service  afforded 
them.     Already  evidence  of  pronounced  reluctance  to  serve  is  seen 
in  the  report  that  21,884  members  of  the  Organized  Militia  now  in 
Federal  service  have  failed  to  take  the  oath  called  for  under  the  new 
defense  act,  these  men  being  held  to  service  under  the  Dick  law. 

8.  Many  complaints  have  been  made  that  members  of  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  have  been  induced  to  take  the  new  oath  through  decep- 
tion or  coercion.    Further  evidence  of  reluctance  to  serve  in  the  Na- 
tional Guard  is  afforded  by  the  large  number  of  applications  for  dis- 
charge from  the  Federal  service,  the  considerable  number  of  resig- 
nations of  officers,  about  480,  and  the  great  difficulty  in  obtaining 
recruits  for  the  National  Guard  in  the  Federal  service.    An  active  re- 
cruiting campaign  carried  on  all  over  the  United  States  during  a 
period  of  four  months  from  July  1,  to  October  31  produced  about 
15,000  recruits — a  number  insufficient  to  fill  vacancies  caused  by  dis- 
charge and  causualties  occurring  during  the  same  period. 

9.  It  is-  reported  from  various  sources  that  those  men  who  have 
served  on  the  border  have  not  given  any  the  more  cheerful  service 
from  the  belief  that  the  National  Guard  system  with  voluntary  serv- 
ice operates  unequally  and  unfairly,  a  few  bearing  the  burdens  and 
the  many,  with  obligations  just  as  great,  being  exempt.    It  can  not 
be  expected  that  such  men  upon  their  return  to  civil  life  wall  become 
earnest  advocates  of  such  a  system. 

ENGINEERS. 

The  call  of  the  President  of  June  18,  1916,  included  the  following 
engineer  troops,  viz :  Two  battalions  of  4  companies  each  from  New 
York,  2  companies  from  Pennsylvania,  1  battalion  of  4  companies 
(mustered  in  as  a  battalion  of  3  companies  and  1  separate  company) 
from  Ohio,  1  company  each  from  Michigan,  Illinois,  Iowa,  and  Okla- 
homa, and  2  companies  from  Colorado — a  total  of  20  companies. 
Company  A,  Engineers  of  Hawaii,  was  not  included  in  the  call. 

Company  C,  Engineers  of  Pennsylvania,  was  formed  by  the  trans- 
fer of  Company  F,  Fourth  Pennsylvania  Infantry,  after  the  call. 
Subsequent  to  the  call  there  were  organized  and  called  into  the  serv- 
ice of  the  United  States  one  company  each  from  Virginia,.  South 
72031—16 7 


98 

Carolina,  and  California,  and  two  companies  each  from  North  Caro- 
lina and  Texas.  This  makes  a  total  of  eight  companies  organized 
after  the  call  but  subsequently  included  in  it. 

Reports  of  special  field  inspections  are  not  at  hand  for  Companies 
A,  D,  and  F,  New  York  Engineers;  Companies  A  and  B,  North 
Carolina  Engineers;  Company  B,  Texas  Engineers;  and  Company 
A,  California  Engineers.  Company  A,  Hawaii  Engineers,  was  not 
called  into  Federal  service.  Companies  A  and  B,  Colorado  Engi- 
neers, were  mobilized  at  the  State  camps  but  were  mustered  out 
without  border  service.  Company  A,  Colorado  Engineers,  had  great 
difficulty  in  recruiting  to  minimum  strength,  not  being  mustered  in 
until  August  5,  1916;  it  should  be  noted  that  this  was  a  student  or- 
ganization. The  average  strength  per  engineer  company  at  muster 
into  the  United  States  service  was  about  100.  Of  this  strength,  with 
the  exception  of  Companies  B  and  E,  New  York;  Company  B,  Penn- 
sylvania; and  Company  A,  Iowa,  the  number  mustered  in  without 
prior  service  was  from  50  to  80  per  cent;  the  companies  organized 
after  the  call  were  of  necessity  composed  almost  exclusively  of  men 
without  prior  service. 

The  deficiencies  in  equipment  were  mostly  in  the  mobilization 
stores,  i.  e.,  the  difference  between  that  required  for  the  peace 
strength  and  that  for  the  strength  to  which  the  organizations  were 
recruited  for  the  emergency.  In  some  instances  the  deficiencies  were 
in  articles  which  were  habitually  kept  in  State  arsenals  for  issue  at 
mobilization,  such  as  identification  tags,  first-aid  packets,  socks, 
shoes,  underclothing,  cooking  utensils,  housewives.  The  inadvisabil- 
ity  of  awaiting  for  the  time  of  stress  to  distribute  equipment  for  or- 
ganizations was  made  manifest.  Not  only  should  all  equipment  for 
the  organizations  at  peace  strength  be  on  hand  at  the  home  armories, 
but  for  the  full  strength  to  which  the  organizations  will  be  recruited. 

As  to  personnel,  the  opinion  of  almost  every  inspector  was  that  the 
greatest  handicap  was  a  lack  of  trained  officers  and  especially  the 
lack  of  officers  with  engineering  training.  This  defect  is  one  which 
was  not  possible  of  remedy  until  the  passage  of  the  act  of  June  3, 
1916,  whereby  engineering  qualifications  can  be  insisted  upon  for 
officers  appointed  or  promoted  after  date  of  the  act.  For  some  time 
yet  this  disadvantage  will  exist.  There  is  another  phase  to  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  qualifications  of  the  commissioned  personnel  of  en- 
gineer organizations :  To  be  a  success  a  National  Guard  organization 
must  have  the  support  of  the  home  community,  and  in  branches  of 
the  service  which  are  technical,  such  as  engineer,  medical,  and  signal 
troops,  the  support  of  the  local  profession  must  be  secured  to  demand 
respect.  Engineering  societies  exist  in  almost  every  community — 
cities  principally — in  which  engineer  troops  can  be  maintained.  It 
is  essential  that  the  officers  be  men  of  standing  in  the  engineering  pro- 
fession. New  York  has  insisted,  in  its  reorganization  of  the  engineer 
troops,  that  only  men  of  engineering  experience  be  commissioned; 
results  justify  the  wisdom  of  the  policy. 

It  is  believed,  therefore,  that  the  greatest  step  toward  securing  a 
reliable  engineering  National  Guard  force  is  to  require  as  early  as 
is  practicable  a  conformance  to  this  principle;  in  other  words,  get  the 
engineering  profession  in  each  large  city  behind  its  local  organization. 
The  satisfactory  showing  made  by  Company  B,  Pennsylvania  En- 


99 

gineers,  at  this  mobilization  demonstrates  the  value  of  such  support 
for  it  was  organized  from  members  of  the  Engineer's  Club  of  Phila- 
delphia and  has  had  the  recognition  and  support  of  that  society. 

None  of  the  organizations  was  reported  as  fit  for  field  service. 
One  of  the  greatest  defects  noticed  was  the  lack  of  training  in 
mounted  work ;  this  is  accounted  for  by  lack  of  funds  for  supplying 
the  necessary  facilities  for  training  in  peace  time.  Generally  speak- 
ing, the  enlisted  personnel  was  good  material  for  engineering  re- 
quirements. 

On  the  question  as  to  length  of  time  necessary  for  training  in  order 
to  be  prepared  for  service  against  a  trained  enemy,  opinions  of  in- 
spectors vary,  but,  generally  speaking,  it  was  supposed  that  from 
three  months  to  one  year  under  a  Regular  Army  officer  of  experience 
would  be  required. 

SIGNAL    TROOPS. 

1.  An  examination  of  the  field-inspection  reports  of  24  field  com- 
panies of  the  National  Guard,  which  were  inspected  two  months  or 
more  after  they  were  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
discloses  the  fact  that  not  one  of  these  organizations  was  considered 
ready  and  fit  for  field  service  at  the  dates  of  inspection.    The  average 
length  of  time  considered  necessary  to  make  the  companies  efficient 
at  war  strength  in  campaign  was  five  additional  months  of  training 
under  Regular  Army  officers  as  instructors. 

2.  Some  of  the  weak  points  in  judging  the  efficiency  of  these  com- 
panies were  common  to  nearly  all  companies  and  were,  briefly : 

(a)  As  mounted  organizations  their  training  was  defective  in  har- 
nessing, saddling,  bridling,  bitting,  the  care  and  use  of  animals. 

(b)  As  technical  organizations  created  only  for  rapid  and  certain 
communication  within  a  division,  coordination  in  training  was  over- 
looked which  involves  primarily  almost  perfect  interior  economy, 
administration,  and  management  of  wagons  and  animals,  in  order 
that  every  effort  may  be  concentrated  on  the  technique  of  communi- 
cation by  all  the  methods  provided  by  wire,  radio,  flag,  helio,  etc. 
Failure  in  the  initial  steps  of  training  means  certain  failure  in  the 
final  test  of  efficiency. 

(c)  As  an  organization  requiring  almost  perfect  teamwork,  dis- 
cipline was  lacking  which  insures  even  fair  teamwork. 

3.  The  best  feature  shown  was  a  personnel  composed  of  a  large 
number  of  men  trained  in  civilian  occupations  as  telegraph  and  radio 
operators  and  as  linemen  and  electricians,  and,  with  a  few  exceptions, 
a  commendable  zeal  on  the  part  of  the  organization  to  learn  all  that 
could  be  taught  them. 

SANITARY    TROOPS. 

1.  STRENGTH. — At  the  time  of  the  call,  June  18,  1916,  the  Medical 
Department  consisted  of  174  detachments,  31  field  hospitals,  and  22 
ambulance  companies.  Since  the  call  8  field  hospitals  and  4  ambu- 
lance companies  have  been  organized,  recognized  by  the  War  De- 
partment, and  mustered  into  the  Federal  service.  In  addition,  the 
sanitary  troops  required  for  those  line  organizations  having  none  on 
date  of  call  have  been  organized.  All  detachments  and  units  were 
increased  in  strength,  the  majority  being  brought  up  to  war  strength, 
so  that  there  were  approximately  850  officers  and  7,500  enlisted  men 


100 

mustered  into  the  Federal  service.  In  addition  to  the  above,  80  dental 
surgeons  and  25  veterinarians  were  authorized  mustered  into  the 
Federal  service. 

2.  SPECIAL  FIELD  INSPECTION  REPORT. — The  folloAving  data  were  ob- 
tained from  the  reports  of  a  special  field  inspection  made  by  the 
inspector  general's  department  on  60  of  the  65  field  hospitals  and 
ambulance  companies  of  the  National  Guard  from  six  weeks  to  three 
months  after  their  muster  into  the  Federal  service : 

(a)  Personnel. — 


Officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

Effective  strength  present  

281 

3.556 

Noneffectives  present 

3 

52 

Number  carried  on  rolls  not  present  

24 

144 

(b)  March  ability  and  march  discipline. — Two  organizations  were 
reported  as  "  very  good,"  13  as  "  good,"  21  as  "  fair,"  5  as  "  poor," 
and  9  organizations  were  not  reported  upon  under  this  head. 

(c)  Transportation  and  care  of  animals. — Twenty-four  organiza- 
tions were  reported  as  having  the  required  number  of  animals,  31 
were  reported  as  having  no  animals,  and  in  5  organizations  no  re- 
marks were  made  under  this  head.    The  horses  of  22  organizations 
were  reported  as  being  well  cared  for,  of  6  the  care  of  horses  was 
expressed  as  being  "  fair  "  to  "  poor,"  and  of  the  remainder  no  re- 
port was  made  under  this  head.     The  horses  were  reported  as  not 
being  shod  in  3  organizations. 

(d)  Proficiency  of  officers  as  to  discipline  and  as  instructors. — 
Under  this  head  the  officers  of  7  organizations  were  reported  as  "  very 
good,"  of  20  as  "  good,"  of  27  as  "  fair,"  of  2  as  "  poor,"  of  1  as 
"  bad,"  of  2  as  "  inefficient,"  and  of  1  no  report  was  made  under  this 
head. 

(e)  Proficiency  of  noncommissioned  officers  as  to  discipline  and  as 
instructors. — Under  this  head  the  noncommissioned  officers  of  1  or- 
ganization were  reported  as  "  very  good,"  of  14  as  "  good,"  of  25  as 
"  fair,"  of  11  as  "  poor,"  of  1  as  "  bad,"  and  as  "  not  efficient "  in  1, 
organization.     Seven  organizations  were  not  reported  upon  under 
this  head. 

(/)  Instruction. — The  instruction  of  1  organization  was  reported 
as  "  excellent,"  1  as  "  very  good,"  8  as  "  good,"  19  as  "  fair,"  and 
11  as  "  poor."  Twenty  organizations  were  not  reported  upon  under 
this  head. 

(g)  Equipment. — Forty-seven  organizations  were  reported  as  com- 
pletely equipped  except  for  some  minor  articles.  Some  of  these  had 
not  received  the  required  animals.  Two  were  reported  as  having 
personal  equipment  only,  and  11  were  reported  as  lacking  essential  ar- 
ticles of  the  Quartermaster  Department.  Much  of  the  equipment  was 
of  the  old  model.  Some  was  obsolete  and  some  was  unserviceable. 

(h)  Care  of  the  sick. — The  sick  of  all  organizations  were  reported 
as  being  properly  cared  for. 

(i)  Records. — The  records  of  9  organizations  were  reported  as 
being  "  very  good  "  and  "  good,"  of  19  as  being  "  fair,"  of  26  as  being 


MOBILIZATION   OF    THE   OKGANIZED    MILITIA,   ETC>  101 

"poor,"  and  of  1  as  being  "bad."  Five  organizations  were  not 
reported  upon  under  this  head. 

(j)  Present  degree  of  fitness  of  organizations  for  field  service. — 
All  organizations  were  reported  as  being  unfit  for  immediate  active 
field  service. 

(k)  Length  of  time  needed  to  make  organizations  fit  for  active 
field  service. — This  varied  for  the  several  organizations  from  one 
month  to  nine  months.  Two  organizations  were  reported  as  requir- 
ing only  one  month's  training  to  make  them  proficient  for  active 
field  service.  The  records  of  this  bureau  show  that  both  of  these 
organizations  were  new  ones,  organized  after  the  call.  Neither  had 
had  any  field  service,  nor  had  they  been  issued  horses.  It  is  safe  and 
reasonable,  under  these  circumstances,  to  assume  that  neither  of 
these  organizations  would  be  found  efficient  for  active  field  service 
in  the  time  stated  by  the  inspector.  The  average  length  of  time 
needed  to  train  and  instruct  51  of  these  organizations  to  assure  pro- 
ficiency in  the  field  in  active  campaign  w^as  reported  as  six  months. 
On  5  organizations  no  statement  was  made  under  this  head. 

3.  Prior  to  mobilization  all  armory  and  field  inspection  reports 
show  that  the  greatest  weakness  of  the  sanitary  troops,  especially 
the  units,  were  the  inefficiency  of  the  noncommissioned  officers,  inex- 
perience and  lack  of  knowledge  in  handling  transportation,  and  little 
or  no  knowledge  of  rendering  returns  and  preparing  the  records 
required  by  the  Medical  Department. 

The  mobilization,  as  indicated  by  the  above  special  inspection,  has 
demonstrated  the  accuracy  of  these  reports,  and  the  results  are  as  it 
was  anticipated  they  would  be.  It  is  believed  that  if  adequate  medi- 
cal officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  had 
been  assigned  to  the  Organized  Militia  as  inspectors  and  sergeant- 
instructors,  and  more  opportunities  had  been  given  sanitary  units 
for  field  training,  much  of  the  inefficiency  as  shown  by  the  mobiliza- 
tion would  have  been  obviated.  Unless  adequate  officers  and  ser- 
geants of  the  Medical  Department,  United  States  Army,  are  detailed 
Jor  duty  with  the  National  Guard,  and  more  facilities  given  the 
sanitary  units  in  handling  their  transportation,  no  improvement  can 
be  expected  in  the  efficiency  of  the  sanitary  troops  of  the  National 
Guard. 

4.  The  value  of  any  soldier,  as  such,  depends  upon  his  physical 
condition,  the  completeness  of  his  equipment,  and  the  nature  and 
extent  of  the  training  he  has  received,  to  fit  him  for  the  duties  of 
war.     There  should  be  no  difficulty  experienced  in  case  of  war  in 
securing  the  requisite  number  of  men  who  are  physically  fit,  or  in 
completely  arming  and  equipping  them,  but  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  only  a  very  small  per  cent  of  those  secured  will  have  had  any 
prior  military  service.     This  is  well  shown  in  the  personnel  of  the 
sanitary  units  reported  upon  above.    The  reports  show  that,  includ- 
ing those  with  less  than  three  months'  service,  more  than  33  per  cent 
of  the  personnel  of  the  sanitary  units  mustered  into  the  Federal 
service  had  had  no  previous  military  training  or  experience,  and 
the  instruction  and  training  received  by  the  remainder  was  very 
limited  and  insufficient  to  properly  qualify  them  as  competent  in- 
structors.    These  reports  also  show  that  over  63  per  cent  of  the 
personnel  of  the  sanitary  units  called  into  the  Federal  service  had 


102  N MOBILISATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

never  attended  a  previous  encampment  or  period  of  field  service. 
Auxiliary  organizations,  such  as  field  hospital  and  ambulance  com- 
panies, have  a  large  field  from  which  to  draw  men  whose  civil  pur- 
suits have  more  or  less  fitted  them  for  the  duties  required  of  them  in 
war,  and  the  time  requisite  for  development  of  such  organizations  is 
shorter  than  is  the  case  with  combatant  units.  It  is  believed  that 
with  competent  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers,  completely 
equipped  sanitary  units  can  be  made  proficient  with  from  four  to 
six  months  of  intensive  training  and  instruction. 

CAMP  SANITATION  AND  HEALTH  OF  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD 

TROOPS  IN  CAMP. 

1.  The  majority  of  the  medical  officers  of  the  National  Guard  are 
proficient  in  the  subject  of  theoretical  hygiene  and  camp  sanitation, 
and  a  large  number  of  the  older  officers  have  had  practical  experience 
along  this  line,  so  that  they  could  be  depended  upon  for  making 
proper  recommendation  for  the  maintenance  of  efficient  sanitation. 
While  numerous  sanitary  defects  were  reported  as  existing  in  all 
organizations  in  all  the  reports  of  the  general  sanitary  inspections 
of  the  Regular  Medical  Corps,  it  was  noted  that  in  the  majority  ol 
cases  it  was  the  fault  of  the  organization  commander  in  failing  to 
carry  out  the  recommendations  of  the  sanitary  officer.     The  rigid 
system  of  sanitary  inspection  adopted  by  the  Medical  Department  for 
all  troops  on  the  border  has  produced  excellent  results. 

2.  The  sick  report  of  an  organization  or  a  body- of  troops  in  camp 
is  a  good  criterion  by  which  to  judge  camp  sanitation.    The  sick  re- 
port for  the  National  Guard  troops  on  the  border,  obtained  from  the 
Surgeon  General's  Office,  shows  that  between  July  22  and  November 
4,  1916,  the  average  strength  was  104,334;  average  sick  rate  per  1,000, 
21.5,  making  an  average  per  cent  of  2.15,  a  remarkably  IOAV  sick  rate, 
much  lower  than  it  is  for  the  same  number  of  persons  in  civil  life. 
During  this  period  there  have  been  72  deaths,  no  cases  of  smallpox, 
26  cases  of  typhoid  fever,  and  326  reported  cases  of  paratyphoid. 
No  deaths  from  typhoid  fever.    This  is  a  record,  it  is  believed,  without 
precedent  under  similar  conditions.    Compare  the  above  sick  record 
with  that  of  the  second  division  of  the  Seventh  Army  Corps  camped 
at  Jacksonville,  Fla.,  between  June  and  October,  1898,  consisting 
for  the  most  part  of  volunteer  troops,  and  it  will  show  a  remarkable 
achievement  in  the  prevention  of  typhoid  fever.     There  were  en- 
camped there  from  June  to  October  10,759  volunteer  troops.    During 
this  period  there  were  4,422  cases  of  certain  and  probable  cases  of 
typhoid  fever,  with  281  deaths,  248  of  which  were  from  typhoid 
fever.    Other  comparisons  equally  remarkable  could  be  shown,  but  it 
is  believed  that  the  above  is  sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  progress  of 
the  Medical  Department  in  the  matter  of  application  of  the  science 
of  medicine  to  sanitation  and  prevention  of  disease. 

3.  The  remarkable  contrast  in  the  sick  rate  and  mortality  rates 
exhibited  by  the  Spanish  War  camps  of  1898  and  those  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard  mobilization  camps  of  the  border  in  1916  is  directly 
attributable  to  the  following  factors : 

(a)  Great  advances  made  in  the  knowledge  of  the  cause  and  methods 
of  transmission  of  infectious  diseases  and  in  the  knowledge  of  pre- 
ventive medicine,  personal  hygiene,  and  camp  sanitation. 


ETC.  103 

(6)  The  development  and  practical  application  by  Army  Medical 
Corps  of  vaccination  against  typhoid  fever,  a  measure  which  has 
practically  abolished  the  most  destructive  of  all  camp  diseases  from 
the  armies  of  the  United  States. 

(c)  Improved  methods  and  greater  care  in  the  handling  of  camp 
sites,  and  in  the  protection  of  food  and  water  supplies,  and  in  the, 
disposal  of  wastes. 

(d)  Higher  standard  of  physical  requirements  for  volunteer  and 
National  Guard,  approximating  those  for  the  Regular  service. 

4.  The  relatively  large  number  of  reported  cases  of  paratyphoid 
occurred  in  the  troops  camped  at  Me  Allen,  Tex.,  and  among  troops 
whose  home  stations  were  in  New  York  City,  and  will  in  all  proba- 
bility be  found  due  to  paratyphoid  carriers  existing  in  one  or  more 
of  these  regiments.  The  laboratory  finding,  no  doubt,  in  these  cases 
will  show  that  a  large  number  of  them  were  not  paratypoid  fever. 
This  is  a  disease  that  can  be  prevented  in  the  same  manner  as  typhoid 
fever,  and  no  doubt  the  paratyphoid  prophylaxis  now  being  adminis- 
tered to  the  troops  on  the  border  will  soon  stamp  it  out.  The  fact 
that  this  comparatively  rare  disease  was  not  prevalent  among  the 
Regular  troops  on  the  border  prior  to  the  arrival  of  the  State  troops 
made  it  appear  unnecessary  to  administer  prophylactic  serum  for 
paratyphoid  to  the  National  Guard  at  mobilization  camp. 

NOTES   OF   INSPECTOR-INSTRUCTORS    ON   WORK    OF   NATIONAL 
GUARD   OFFICERS   DURING   MOBILIZATION. 

So  large  a  proportion  of  inspector-instructors,  inspector  generals, 
special  inspectors,  sanitary  inspectors,  and  mustering  officers,  and 
others  who  have  in  one  way  or  another  been  connected  with  this 
mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  and  have  criticized  the  military 
efficiency  of  organizations  with  which  they  have  been  associated,  that 
it  is  but  just  to  say  that  this  report  would  not  be  complete  without 
some  reference  to  these  defects,  which  perhaps  can  best  be  done  by 
quoting  extracts  from  the  reports  received. 

It  may  be  asked,  Why  refer  to  these  disagreeable  features?  The 
National  Guard  was  duly  turned  out  and  sent  to  the  Mexican  border 
and  criticisms  as  to  how  it  was  done  are  now  past  history. 

All  this  is  true,  but  in  general  terms  it  may  be  stated,  without  fear 
of  contradiction,  that  the  chief  reason  why  this  country  is  not  fur- 
ther-advanced in  "  preparedness  "  is  that  it  has  failed  to  profit  by  past 
errors,  blunders,  and  general  deficiencies. 

To  publish  a  report  on  the  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  and 
devote  no  space  to  this  would  be  accepted  as  a  tacit  admission  that 
there  was  nothing  on  this  subject  to  report. 

The  publication  of  the  criticisms  in  the  last  mobilization  will  serve, 
therefore,  as  a  warning  what  to  avoid  in  the  next  one. 

Unless  we  profit  by  the  lessons  of  the  past  we  make  no  progress. 
It  must  not  be  inferred  that  there  were  no  words  of  commendation  in 
the  mass  of  reports  received ;  on  the  contrary,  there  were  many  such, 
and  these  are  referred  to  elsewhere  in  this  report.  A  chain  is  as  strong 
as  its  weakest  link,  and  it  would  seem  that  we  might  profitably  note 
where  the  weak  links  were  in  our  recent  mobilization  that  they  may 
be  made  stronger  in  our  preparation  for  the  next  one. 


104  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

EVIDENCES  OF  INEFFICIENCY. 

Every  day  I  have  seen  the  most  pitiful  exhibitions  of  helplessness  at  the  camp 
headquarters.  Only  two  days  ago  the  quartermaster  discovered  5,513  new 
Army  wool  blankets  which  he  did  not  know  he  had ;  the  regiments  have  been 
clamoring  for  them  and  the  quartermaster  depots  have  been  sending  civilian 
blankets  of  various  types  here  after  purchasing  in  open  markets. —  (Extract 
from  the  report  of  First  Lieut.  James  G.  Mcllroy,  inspector-instructor,  National 
Guard  of  -  — ,  Aug.  17,  1916. ) 

It  took  the  regiment  15  hours  to  entrain  on  the  31st  after  much  of  its  heavy 
impedimenta  had  been  loaded  on  the  29th  and  30th ;  as  an  exhibition  of  incom- 
petency  it  was  entirely  successful.  The  spectacle  of  field  and  other  officers 
and  all  grades  of  enlisted  men  sweating  in  one  chaotic,  headless  attempt  to  load 
everything  at  once  was  edifying.  It  compared  favorably  with  the  way  in 
which  everything  had  been  done  since  the  regiment  mobilized.— (Extract  from 

report  of  Lieut.   Everington,   inspector-instructor,   National   Guard  of  

Aug.  2.) 

To  a  Regular  officer  interested  in  seeing  an  efficient  national  force,  the  situ- 
ation here  has  ceased  to  be  amusing — to  think  that  the  Federal  Government 
must  pay  such  enormous  sums  of  money  for  so  much  inefficiency !  There  is  a 
provisional  division  in  this  camp,  but  not  one  trained  officer  in  its  personnel. 
What  can  any  one  expect  in  results?  It  is  my  honest  opinion  that  a  volunteer 
regiment  composed  of  field  officers  from  the  Regular  Army  and  all  other  officers 
and  men  absolute  recruits  would  be  worth  much  more  to  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment after  one  month  of  training  than  any  regiment  here  will  be  if  kept  in  this 
camp  under  present  conditions  for  one  year. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut. 
Mcllroy,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  —  — ,  Aug.  8.) 

An  examination  of  the  last  efficiency  report  cards  submitted  will  confirm  my 
opinion  that  it  will  be  nothing  short  of  murder  to  send  these  troops  into  any 
sort  of  active  service  under  some  of  the  officers  now  on  its  roster.  Many  of 
the  officers,  including  three  field  officers,  have  only  the  remotest  ideas  of  their 
duties,  and  have  absolutely  no  conception  of  even  the  elements  of  military 
tactics. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Everington,  inspector-instructor,  Na- 
tional Guard  of  -  — ,  June  24.) 

I  was  detailed  to  muster  the  —  -  Infantry.  They  arrived  in  camp  during 
the  day  of  the  24tbr;  most  of  the  regiment  was  in  by  noon.  The  last  battalion 
in  procured  their  tents  and  pitched  them ;  the  other  battalions  waited  for  some 
one  to  bring  their  tents  to  them.  Most  of  the  companies  had  their  canvas  up 
for  that  night.  The  majority  of  the  officers  spent  their  time  renewing  old 
acquaintances  and  let  the  men  shift  for  themselves.  The  State  did  not  have 
sufficient  canvas  for  their  troops  and  tentage  had  to  be  procured  from  the 

quartermaster,   Fort  .     No   effort  was  made  to  dig  rears  before  dark 

on  the  first  day  of  arrival,  and  then  straddle  trenches  were  constructed  for 
the  night.  No  lanterns  were  used  to  mark  the  location  of  the  trenches  so  the 
men  defecated  at  will  and  where  they  liked.  The  next  day  the  commanding 
officer's  attention  was  again  called  to  this  condition  and  along  toward  evening 
several  of  the  companies  had  dug  rears.  Friends  and  relative  from  all  over 
the  State  were  in  camp  and  officers  and  men  were  busy  entertaining  them  and 
it  was  very  difficult  to  get  any  military  work  done. —  (Extract  from  report  of 
First  Lieut.  Philip  Remington,  Infantry  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard 
of ,  July  14,  1916.) 

I  have  had  an  opportunity  to  observe  property  throughout  camp.  In  gen- 
eral, rifles  and  bayonets  are  in  an  awful  condition,  some  completely  covered 
with  rust  inside  and  out. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Mcllroy,  inspector- 
instructor,  National  Guard  of ,  July  7.) 

Another  point  in  which  the  officers  of  the  guard  proved  exceptionally  weak 
was  in  the  preparation  of  muster  rolls  and  other  papers.  In  some  cases  this 
was  due  to  lack  of  care  and  attention  on  their  part. —  (Extract  from  report 
Lieut.  Garber,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  July  12. ) 

Officers  and  men  ignorant  of  administration  paper  work  and  papers  will  be 
in  bad  shape. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  H.  P.  Hobbs,  Infantry,  inspector- 
instructor,  National  Guard  of ,  July  5,  1916.) 

The  weakest  point  in  this  State  seems  to  be  the  matter  of  paper  work. 
Officers  are  unfamiliar  with  the  forms  to  be  used  and  seem  unable  to  accomplish 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  105 

forms  properly  when  given  to  them.  My  duties  have  been  so  many  and  so 
varied  that  I  have  heen  unable  to  devote  the  time  that  I  should  like  to  have 
given  to  this  matter  of  paper  work.  There  seems  to  be  a  great  need  for  more 
instructor-sergeants,  who  would  be  able  to  take  this  matter  in  hand  and  thus 
render  a  valuable  service. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  L.  R.  James, 
Infantry,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  July  22,  1916.) 

Discipline  improving,  but  it  is  hard  to  make  officers  read  instructions  on 
blank  forms  and  comply  with  same.  They  have  not  yet  learned  to  obey  orders 
promptly. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  H.  P.  Hobbs,  Infantry,  inspector-in- 
structor, National  Guard  of  -  — ,  July  11,  1916.) 

Service  in  -  -  has  completely  broken  down;  the  adjutant  general  has 
done  nothing  since  mobilization  and  has  been  steadily  absent  from  this  camp 
for  some  three  weeks ;  his  retention  of  the  office  of  State  property  and  disburs- 
ing officer  has  seriously  hampered  service  in  that  he  has  not  rendered  checks 
for  services  and  property  promptly ;  it  is  most  probable  that  his  appointment 

was  illegal  as  being  over  age  limit.     When  I  first  came  to he  was  to 

have  arrived  at  64  in  March,  1915 ;  the  time  has  now  been  postponed  till  March, 
1917. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  —  — ,  jr.,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor, 
National  Guard  of  -  — ,  Aug.  3,  1916.) 

Lack  of  familiarity  with  and  a  study  of  the  regular  forms  and  of  methods  of 
procedure  immediately  became  apparent  and  there  was  much  delay  and  confu- 
sion and  needless  repetition.  Officers  and  men  worked  night  and  day  and  were 
worn  out  on  what  should  have  been  a  simple  affair. —  (Extract  from  report  of 
Capt.  Emery  T.  Smith,  Field  Artillery,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of 
,  July  6,  1916.) 

It  is  presumed  that  in  spite  of  anything  on  record  officers  who  are  known 
to  be  absolutely  incompetent  will  be  mustered  in ;  still  I  wish  to  add  the  follow- 
ing to  my  reports  now  on  file  in  your  office.  For  over  a  year  I  have  endeavored 

to   induce  the  State  authorities  to  eliminate  ,   Medical   Corps,   on  the 

grounds  of  incompetence  and  unfitness,  and  the  adjutant  general  has  admitted 

that  all  I  have  said  is  correct,  but — it  is  politically  inexpedient.     After  Capt. 

— ,  Medical  Corps,  United  States  Army,  had  inspected  the  —     —  regimental 

infirmary  last  winter  and  seen  the  inside  of  Dr. 's  office  in  his  home  town 

he  told  me  that  it  would  be  no  less  than  murder  to  send  men  into  active  service 
with  such  a  man  as  a  surgeon. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Everington, 
inspector-instructor  in  National  Guard,  July  1.) 

Of  the  papers  returned  to  me,  three  officers  have  been  found  physically  dis- 
qualified: Maj.  ,  Infantry;  Maj.  -  — ,  Infantry;  First  Lieut.  , 

Infantry.  Majs.  —  -  and  -  -  are  both  pensioners.  This  fact  was  never 
suspected  by  me.  A  few  weeks  ago  another  field  officer,  who  probably  hoped  to 
profit  by  the  removal  of  one  of  these  officers,  gave  me  the  first  hint  as  to  the 

situation.     As  soon  as  I  returned  to City  (June  19)  I  wired  to  know  if 

this  was  true,  and  soon  received  a  telegram  affirming  it.     Maj. has  taken 

his  rejection  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  is  making  no  protest.  Maj.  —  — ,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  making  a  vigorous  fight  to  have  his  physical  defects  waived.  As 
he  is  the  most  competent  field  officer  of  the  regiment  professionally,  I  asked  the 
surgeon  if  the  defects  in  his  case  were  such  as  could  be  waived  without  detri- 
ment to  the  service.  He  replied  in  the  negative.  The  surgeon  reported  him 
"  obese ;  weak  heart ;  sounds  believed  to  be  fatty."  I  have  been  urged  by  Maj. 
-  and  several  officers  of  his  battalion  to  recommend  that  defects  in  his 
case  be  waived,  but  have  refused  to  do  so. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut. 

W.  G.  Murchison,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of ,  July 

9,  1916.) 

An  incident  of  the  week  was  the  ordering  in  to  this  camp  at  State  expense 
Company  I,  of  -  — .  This  company  is  not  recognized  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment. Its  strength  was  3  officers  and  65  men,  very  few  of  whom  had  regularly 
enlisted  in  the  guard.  The  intention  of  the  adjutant  general  was  to  have  this 
company  substituted  for  one  of  the  other  short  companies,  but  on  physical 
examination  the  3  officers  and  13  enlisted  men  were  found  disqualified.  It  was 
then  desired  to  have  the  enlisted  personnel  enlist  for  the  other  companies,  but 

this  they  refused  to  do,  and  the  whole  organization  was  sent  back  to  . 

The  expense  to  the  State  for  this  was  about  $1,500. —  (Extract  from  report  of 

Capt.  W.  T    Bates,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  , 

July  15,  1916.) 


106  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

The  incompetency  of  National  Guard  officers  in  general  causes  the  greatest 
delay  in  mobilization.  Their  inability  or  neglect  to  do  their  individual  share 
of  the  work,  even  after  being  informed  or  shown,  requires  some  one  else  to  do  it 
or  see  that  it  is  done.  Consequently  a  few  competent  ones  do  all  the  work. 
For  political  reasons  incompetents  are  not  eliminated. —  (Extract  from  report 
of  Capt.  J.  Malcolm  Graham,  Infantry,  mustering  officer,  National  Guard  of 
— ,  Sept.  11,  1916.) 

The  -  -  troops,  less  Company  — .  Engineers,  left  here  the  19th  instant 
for  designated  border  stations.  They  were  very  well  clothed  and  equipped  for 
the  field,  but  their  lack  of  training  is  something  deplorable.  With  the  possible 
exception  of  the  two  officers  commissioned  from  sergeants  of  the  regular 
service,  there  is  not  one  of  them  fitted  for  the  position  he  holds.  Some  of  them 
are  capable  enough  men  and  with  proper  instruction  will  make  good  officers, 
but  it  will  be  a  long  hard  pull  for  them,  because  the  senior  officers  are  just  as 
inefficient,  or  more  so,  than  the  juniors.  My  experience  here  has  more  fully 
convinced  me  than  ever  before  that  National  Guard  organizations  should  never 
have  an  officer  above  the  grade  of  lieutenant  colonel.  He  would  fill  every  need 
during  times  of  peace,  and  then  when  the  troops  were  called  into  the  field  for 
active  service  an  officer  of  known  efficiency  should  be  selected  from  the  regular 
service  and  assigned  to  the  regiment  by  the  President  as  colonel.  There  would 
then  be  a  foundation  from  which  to  build.  This  would  probably  result  in  a 
speedy  elimination  of  the  most  incompetent  and  insure  the  reorganization  of  the 
personnel  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment.  It  would  also  make  certain  that 
the  discipline  and  instruction  of  the  regiment  would  be  conducted  along  proper 
lines  from  the  very  beginning,  and  would  not  be  a  case  of  "  the  blind  leading 
the  blind."  The  above  may  appear  a  rather  severe  arraignment  of  the  troops 
with  whom  I  have  been  on  duty  for  the  past  year,  but  I  believe  it  is  justified  by 
the  facts.  Officers  in  whom  I  had  confidence  proved  themselves  incapable  when 
put  to  the  test.  Not  that  some  of  them  lack  native  ability,  but  because  of  the 
fact  that  most  of  their  time  has  been  taken  up  with  making  a  living  in  civil  life, 
and,  as  one  officer  expressed  it,  the  military  part  of  it  has  been  a  sort  of  diver- 
sion for  many  of  them. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  W.  G.  Murchison, 
Infantry,  inspector-instructor  National  Guard  of  -  -  July  24,  1916.) 

When  the  reports  of  physical  examinations  were  submitted  by  the  surgeon 
they  were  found  to  be  incomplete  and  absolutely  wrong  in  many  cases.  For 
instance,  a  company  commander  did  not  hesitate  to  scratch  off  the  name  of  some 
man  who  had  failed  to  appear  and  substitute  that  of  some  other  man  for  whom 
he  (company  commander)  had  no  report  of  physical  examination. —  (Extract 
from  report  of  Lieut.  A.  A.  Hoffman,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor,  on  mobiliza- 
tion of Militia,  Aug.  16,  1916.) 

I  still  find  a  great  many  companies  with  their  small  arms  completely  covered 
with  rust,  inside  and  out.  They  look  as  though  they  had  just  spent  a  week  at 
the  bottom  of  a  creek.  In  some  regiments  no  attempt  is  made  to  clean  them. — 
(Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Mcllroy,  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard 
of July  23.) 

The  fault  lay  with  the  company  commanders,  who  had  no  control  over  their 
men.  This  straggling  rendered  it  extremely  difficult  to  keep  accurate  records, 
but  in  spite  of  it  I  think  we  have  succeeded  in  doing  so.  To  illustrate,  one  com- 
pany of  114  men  was  ordered  to  report  at  a  certain  hour  the  following  day  for 
physical  examination.  When  they  reported  there  were  40  men  missing.  On 
inquiring  it  was  stated  they  had  probably  jumped  on  a  freight  train  and  gone 

back  to  for  several  days,  but  that  they  would  return,   as  they  had 

done  the  same  thing  several  times  before,  always  without  permission. —  (Extract 
from  report  of  Capt.  J.  W.  Grissinger,  Medical  Corps,  United  States  Army, 
National  Guard  of July  28,  1916.) 

LAXITY  IN  PHYSICAL  EXAMINATIONS. 

The  large  number  of  rejections  for  physical  causes  have  been  freely  com- 
mented upon  by  medical  officers,  inspector-instructors,  inspectors  general,  and 
others.  They  throw  so  much  light  on  this  important  subject  that  extracts  from 
these  reports  are  here  reproduced : 

The  entire  time  for  the  last  two  weeks  has  been  given  up  to  the  physical 
examination  of  the  troops  of  the  —  -  National  Guard  at  Camp  — 

It  is  painfully  apparent  that  the  civilian  doctors  used  in  the  previous  ex- 
amination of  the  men  of  the National  Guard  are  not  familiar  with 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  10  T 

the  requirements  for  Army  standard  of  physical  fitness.  Also  that  the  men 
they  have  examined  have  not  been  seen  by  them  with  their  clothing  off.  For 
example,  men  have  been  sent  to  me  who  weigh  91  pounds,  and  are  5  feet  1 
inch  in  height.  Others  with  double  inguinal  hernia. 

Unless  some  other  rule  is  laid  down  this  method  of  examination  will  be  car- 
ried out  again  in  obtaining  recruits  for  the  organization  at  their  home  stations, 
with  the  second  rejection  of  a  large  number. 

The  medical  officers  of  the  Organized  Militia  are  not  well  drilled  in  the 
examination  of  recruits. 

It  is  thought  that  if  the  company  commander  could  be  given  a  course  in  the 
examination  of  recruits,  as  is  done  with  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  when 
detailed  for  recruiting  duty,  and  be  a  part  of  his  efficiency  record,  that  he  will 
at  least  have  the  clothing  removed,  weigh  and  take  the  height,  and  in  time 
know  the  apparent  causes  for  rejection.  If  the  senior  regimental  medical  officer 
or  the  inspector-instructor  visited  his  home  to\vn  they  could  pass  on  any  cases 
in  doubt.  Have  the  medical  officer  ordered  to  make  one  or  two  trips  a  year  to 
the  home  station  of  each  company  of  his  regiment  to  look  over  the  men  taken 
by  the  organization  commanding  officer  as  recruiting  officer. —  (Extract  from 
report  of  Maj.  E.  L.  Ruffner,  Medical  Corps,  inspector-instructor,  National 
Guard  of ,  July  16,  1916.) 

Nothing  but  praise  can  be  given  the  Ohio  National  Guard  for  the  spirit  in 
which  after  the  first  regiment  saw  so  many  men  rejected  the  rest  of  them  have 
accepted  the  inevitable  in  rejections  when  their  turn  came.  The  first  regiment 
tried  to  take  the  case  of  two  officers  rejected  over  our  heads,  but  being  sustained 
by  the  department  commander  no  further  attempt  was  made  by  anyone.  Many 
cases  of  officers  and  men  who  were  rejected  for  hernia  have  had  this  operated 
upon  and  will  be  ready  for  service  soon.  One  colonel  of  Infantry  is  now  con- 
valescing from  this  operation. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  E.  L.  Ruffner, 
Medical  Corps,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  July  23,  1916.) 

That  physical  inspection  of  National  Guard  officers  and  men  upon  entry  into 
the  service,  and  of  officers  upon  promotion,  be  no  longer  intrusted  to  National 
Guard  surgeons,  but  be  taken  over  by  the  Medical  Corps  of  the  Regular  Army 
in  the  most  direct  manner  possible.  Such  inspection  should  be  a  condition  of 
pay.  Smallpox  and  typhoid  inoculations  should  follow  each  physical  inspection 
and  ba  compulsory. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Col.  Morton,  special  inspector,  on 
National  Guard  of ,  July  5. ) 

Physical  disability. — I  consider  it  a  just  criticism  of  both  Federal  and  State 
authorities  that  avoidable  delays  occurred ;  that  men  taken  in  wholesale  were, 
by  reason  of  physical  disability  that  should  have  been  largely  predetermined, 
were  only  gotten  rid  of  by  retail  measures.  They  were  a  menace  and  a  nui- 
sance.—  (Extract  from  report  of  Col.  Delamere  Skerrett,  special  inspector,  on 
National  Guard  of ,  July  16.) 

The  physical  requirements  in  the  State  are  the  same  as  those  in  the  Federal 
service.  The  examinations  by  the  State  surgeons  do  not  appear  to  have  been  at 
all  thorough.  The  regiments  have  a  large  number  of  immature  boys.  I  asked 
a  great  many  of  them  how  old  they  were,  and  all  but  two  claimed  to  be  over  18. 
Only  one  company  had  been  examined  by  the  Federal  surgeon  when  I  left  the 
camp.  Out  of  76  men  examined,  21  were  found  disqualified,  but  authority  was 
requested  to  waive  the  defect  in  4  of  these  cases.  From  the  general  appearance 
of  the  command,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  about  this  percentage  of  the  men 
who  are  not  up  to  the  physical  requirements  will  be  found  in  the  other  organi- 
zations. 

The  surgeon  estimated  that  about  20  per  cent  of  the  men  would  be  rejected 
physically.  There  are  quite  a  number  of  Indians  in  the  Infantry  regiment,  and 
they  are  generally  very  good  physical  specimens.  (Extract  from  report  of  Maj. 
W.  H.  Simons,  I.  G.,  on  N.  G.  of  -  — ,  July  13.) 

No  organization  is  provided  with  the  march  kit  of  cooking  utensils. 

Physical  condition. — The  physical  requirements  in  the  State  are  the  same  as 
those  in  the  Federal  service.  The  examinations  by  the  State  surgeons  do  not 
appear  to  have  been  at  all  thorough.  The  regiments  have  a  large  number  of 
immature  boys.  I  asked  a  great  many  of  them  how  old  they  were,  and  all  but 
two  claimed  to  be,  over  18.  Only  one  company  had  been  examined  by  the  Fed- 
eral surgeon  when  I  left  the  camp.  Out  of  76  men  examined,  21  were  found 
disqualified,  but  authority  was  requested  to  waive  the  defect  in  four  of  these 


108  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

-cases.  From  the  general  appearance  of  the  command,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that 
about  this  percentage  of  the  men  who  are  not  up  to  the  physical  requirements 
will  be  found  in  the  other  organizations. —  (Maj.  W.  H.  Simons's  report  on 
inspection  of  National  Guard  of  -  — .) 

Pursuant  to  instructions  contained  in  letter  dated  Militia  Bureau.  Wash- 
ington, D.  C.,  June  30,  1916,  I  report  on  the  Mustering  Regulations  as  follows: 

The  regulations  for  mustering  the  Organized  Militia  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  are  clear  and  can  be  understood  by  all  concerned,  and  no  change 
is  recommended  except  in  one  particular,  namely :  The  law  prescribes  that  the 
militia  in  such  States  and  Territories  as  shall  have  adopted  for  enlistment 
and  reenlistment  the  standard  of  medical  examination  prescribed  for  the 
Regular  Army  shall  be  duly  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States 
without  prior  physical  examination.  (Par.  2,  p.  12.) 

However,  a  physical  examination  of  the  whole  organization  is  subsequently 
held  as  per  (d),  paragraph  2,  and  experience  has  shown  that  in  this  examina- 
tion from  3  to  20  per  cent  are  found  physically  deficient. 

As  it  is  desired  that  the  maximum  strength  shall  go  forward  to  the  concen- 
tration point  and  as  only  the  maximum  can  be  mustered  in,  it  is  not  possible 
to  determine  in  advance  what  the  strength  will  be  after  the  physical  examina- 
tion required  per  subhead  (d),  paragraph  2.  Much  delay  is  thus  caused  in 
discharging  the  physically  unfit  and  filling  up  the  organization  again  by  re- 
cruiting. 

It  would  facilitate  the  work  greatly  and  be  far  more  satisfactory  to  all 
concerned  if,  where  physical  examination  is  to  be  held  at  all,  it  be  held  before 
muster  in  and  not  after. 

The  law  should  be  changed  accordingly,  except  where  the  new  militia  law 
makes  the  present  method  unnecessary.  By  holding  examination  first,  the 
troop  or  company  commanders  would  know  beforehand  their  effective  strength 
and  could  fill  up  to  the  maximum  in  advance  and  not  be  left  in  doubt  till 
time  to  entrain,  and  often  with  insufficient  time  for  recruiting. —  (Report  of 
Maj.  M.  M.  McNamee,  Cavalry,  Inspector-Instructor,  —  —  National  Guard, 
July  8,  1916.) 

The  personnel  as  a  whole  is  good,  but  several  men  were  brought  by  organi- 
zation commanders  who  are  absolutely  unfit  for  military  service,  one  instance 
of  this  being  in  the  case  of  a  man  with  double  inguinal  hernia  and  another 
who  was  unable  to  count  the  fingers  of  a  hand  held  up  before  him  at  a  dis- 
tance of  2£  feet.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  although  —  —  provided  by  legis- 
lative enactment  in  1910  that  the  standard  of  physical  examination  for  enlist- 
ment and  reenlistment  in  the  Organized  Militia  should  be  the  same  as  that  for 
the  Regular  Army,  there  has  been  nonobservance  rather  than  observance  of 
this  statute  from  the  beginning.  In  order  to  be  certain  that  the  statute  has 
been  complied  with,  I  have  required  all  organizations  to  submit  to  me  physical 
examination  blanks  properly  made  out  and  signed  by  the  doctors  who  made 
the  examination  of  the  organization  before  leaving  their  home  stations  (this 
•examination  was  made  by  order  of  the  State  authorities).  When  I  discovered 
on  examination  of  the  blank  that  the  man  wras  evidently  and  unquestionably 
unfit  for  military  service,  I  recommended  to  the  organization  commander  that 
his  name  be  not  entered  on  the  muster  rolls  for  I  would  not  muster  into  the 
service  any  man  whom  I  knew  beyond  question  to  be  absolutely  unfit  for 
service.  This  because  I  believe  that  the  spirit  of  the  mustering  regulations 
means  not  only  that  a  State  should  have  adopted  such  a  standard  by  law,  but 
that  the  law  should  have  been  complied  \vith;  that  it  would  be  abetting  a 
fraud  upon  the  Government  to  muster  into  the  service  of  the  United  States 
any  man  when  I  knew  positively  he  would  be  rejected  at  the  examination  held 
after  muster  in  merely  because  a  company  commander,  for  reasons  best  known 
to  himself,  had  brought  this  man  to  camp  as  a  member  of  the  organization. 
All  company  commanders  have  acknowledged  the  justice  of  this  and  I  do  not 
believe  that  when  the  examination  is  made  after  muster  in  there  will  be  many, 
if  any,  men  found  unfit  for  service  at  the  physical  examination  to  be  held 
then. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Albert  B.  Sloan,  Infantry,  inspector- 
instructor,  —  —  National  Guard,  June  26,  1916.) 

The  second  sentence  of  paragraph  28,  Mustering  Regulations,  provides  that 
the  mustering  officer  before  accepting  organizations  presented  for  muster  will 
satisfy  himself  that  all  the  officers  and  men  thereof  are  fit  for  military  service, 
while  under  reiterated  instructions  from  .chief  mustering  officer  of  the  depart- 
ment I  must  disregard  this  requirement  and  muster  all  who  are  presented  into 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  109 

the  service  regardless  of  the  fact  that  some  of  them  are  practically  blind,  some 
almost  totally  deaf,  some  suffering  with  acute  gonorrhoea,  and  the  like.  It  is 
needless  to  say  that  this  is  rather  confusing. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt. 

Albert  B.  Sloan,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard,  July  1. 

1916.) 

It  needs  but  a  casual  glance  at  the  list  of  men  who  were  rejected  at  the 
physical  examination  following  the  muster  in  to  convince  that  while  there  was 
a  law  prescribing  the  standard  of  physical  examination  for  this  State  it  has 
never  been  observed.  Every  organization  is  losing  heavily  and  most  of  the  men 
who  are  rejected  are  rejected  for  some  grave  physical  defect. —  (Extract  from 

report  of  Capt.  Albert  B.  Sloan,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor, National 

Guard,  July  12,  1916.  ) 

Capt.  Sloan  recommends  that  all  men  brought  to  mobilization  camp  with 
serious  and  apparent  physical  defects  be  transported  and  subsisted  at  the 
expense  of  the  responsible  officer.  He  noted  many  cases  of  men  brought  to- 
and  kept  at  the  -  -  camp  for  a  considerable  period  suffering  from  such 
serious  physical  disability  that  they  could  nbt  perform  any  military  duty,  and 
these  men  cost  the  Government  thousands  of  dollars  in  pay,  transportation,  and 
subsistence. —  (Letter  'of  Capt.  A.  B.  Sloan,  Infantry,  United  States  Army, 
Fort  ,  Aug.  9,  1916.) 

The  examination  of  companies  each  day  more  and  more  fully  demonstrates 
how  farcical  the  standard  of  physical  examination  as  established  in  this 
State  must  have  been.  From  one-third  to  one-half  of  the  men  brought  here 
and  mustered  in  are  being  discharged  for  physical  disability  as  a  result'  of 
the  examination  made  by  the  Regular  Army  surgeon. —  (Extract  from  report 

of  Capt.  Albert  B.  Sloan,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor, ,  National  Guard, 

July  20,  1916.) 

If  the  character  of  the  physical  examination  required  for  enlistment  in  the 
National  Guard  of  other  States — even  though  the  law  prescribed  that  it  must 
be  the  same  as  that  required  for  enlistment  in  the  Regular  service — has  been, 
the  same  as  that  in : — ,  then  in  practice  it  has  been  farcical  and  the  Gov- 
ernment has  spent  thousands*  of  dollars  in  bringing  men  who  are  absolutely 
unfit  for  military  service  to  the  mobilization  camps  and  in  sending  them  home 
because  of  the  failure  to  pass  a  physical  examination  by  the  examining; 
surgeon  at  the  camp.  Men  were  brought  to  this  camp,  as  members  of  or- 
ganizations, who  were  suffering  from  diseases  and  who  had  physical  defects 
which  absolutely  unfitted  them  for  any  kind  of  military  service.  Among 
these  men  were  numbered  some  with  double  hernia,  some  with  trachoma, 
many  with  pterygium,  marked  mitral  insufficiency,  acute  gonorrhea,  and  an 
examination  by  the  surgeon  of  many  organizations  seemed  more  like  a  free 
clinic  than  the  testing  out  of  physical  fitness  of  men  to  do  duty  as  soldiers  in 
the  service  of  the  United  States.  The  only  remedy  for  this  is,  I  believe,  to 
have  every  man  who  is  brought  to  a  mobilization  camp  as  a  member  of  any 
organization,  examined  by  the  camp  surgeon  (who  should  be  an  officer  of 
the  Medical  Corps  of  the  Army)  as  soon  as  possible  after  his  arrival  thereat; 
and  if  he  is  found  physically  disqualified  that  he  be  refused  muster-in.  If 
this  be  done  in  the  future  and  the  officer  responsible  for  bringing  him  be 
required  to  pay  for  the  transportation  and  subsistence  of  the  man  from  the 
company  rendezvous  to  the  mobilization  camp  and  return,  this  practice  would 
be  stopped  and  the  Government  would  be  saved  many  thousands  of  dollars. — 
(Extract  from  report  Capt.  Sloan,  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of 
,  Aug.  9.) 

Approximately  700  men  out  of  the  3,000  or  more  examined  physically  were 
found  physically  unfit  for  service.  This  included  3  officers. —  (Extract  from 

report  of  Capt.  Hughes,   inspector-instructor,   on  National  Guard  of  -, 

July  16.) 

A  large  per  cent  of  the  officers  who  have  been  rejected  are  using  all  the 
political  influence  they  possess  to  have  their  disabilities  waived,  regardless 
of  what  the  disability  may  be. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Sloan,  inspector- 
instructor,  on  National  Guard  of .) 

The  national  defense  act,  which  allows  pay  for  the  company  officers,  should 
make  it  possible  for  all  recruits  to  be  examined  physically  by  a  doctor,  for 
which  he  should  receive  pay,  and  should  evolve  a  system  by  which  company 
officers  are  held  strictly  responsible  for  accepting  recruits  who  had  not  been 


110  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

examined  or  who  had  failed  to  pass  the  doctor's  examination. —  (Extract  from 

report   of  Capt.   Hughes,   inspector-instructor,   on   National   Guard  of  

July  16.) 

The  mustering  in  of  the  -  -  militia  has  progressed  very  slowly,  there 
being  constant  trouble  from  the  causes  mentioned  in  my  report  of  the  28th 
ultimo.  I  would  again  call  attention  to  these,  namely,  the  need  for  physical 
standards  for  the  militia  and  the  need  for  supervision  over  the  legality  of 
enlistments,  both  of  these  under  such  amount  of  Federal  supervision  as  "will 
accomplish  the  results. 

The  State  troops  arrived  here  on  May  12.  Physical  examinations  were  taken 
up  without  delay,  and  when  it  became  apparent  that  there  was  to  be  a  large 
percentage  of  rejections  all  efforts  of  the  State  authorities  were  directed  to 
getting  defects  waived — at  first  almost  regardless  of  nature  or  degree  of  defect. 
Paragraph  457,  Army  Regulations,  relating  to  the  "length  and  character  of 
service,"  was  invoked,  and  it  was  two  weeks  before  an  understanding  could  be 
reached  which  would  make  clear  what  was  and  what  was  not  a  sufficient  cause 
for  rejection. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  B.  F.  Ristine,  Infantry, 
inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  July  5,  1916.) 

The  undersigned  reports  and  desires  to  emphasize  strongly  the  need  for  hold- 
ing the  States  strictly  to  the  standards  of  physical  requirements ;  also  the  need 
for  Federal  supervision  of  the  legality  and  regularity  of  enlistments.  From  the 
experience  here  in  -  -  it  seems  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  importance 
of  these  points. 

Rejections  on  account  of  physical  disqualifications  have  been  about  33  per 
cent.  Roughly,  there  have  been  1,000  officers  and  men  accepted  and  500  re- 
jected. An  estimate  of  the  cost  to  the  Government  per  man  of  the  latter  (com- 
piled without  data)  may  be  made  conservatively  at  $40,  and  we  find  an  abso- 
lute waste  of  $20,000  on  one  regiment  of  Infantry  and  a  battery  of  Field 
Artillery. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  B.  F.  Ristine,  Infantry,  in- 
spector-instructor, National  Guard  of ,  June  28,  1916.) 

In  six  cases  officers  have  been  rejected  physically,  this  number  including  the 
regimental  adjutant  and  two  company  commanders.  One  of  the  latter  and  the 
adjutant  have  since  been  accepted  on  the  authority  of  the  department  com- 
mander. Rejection  of  officers  results  very  badly  both  to  the  individual  and  the 
organization.  Under  the  new  law  no  officer  should  be  carried  without  exami- 
nation by  surgeons  of  the  Regular  Army. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut. 
Ristine,  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  July  5. ) 

Fifty-six  officers  and  1,427  enlisted  men  were  mobilized.  Of  these,  5  officers 
and  405  enlisted  men  were  physically  rejected  by  the  examining  surgeon,  and 
minor  defects  were  waived  in  the  cases  of  several  officers.  The  State  had 
adopted  the  Regular  Army  standard  for  the  examination  of  recruits  in  so  far 
as  the  enlistment  blank,  orders,  and  instructions  were  concerned,  but  the  actual 
examinations  must  have  been  very  lax  in  many  cases.  It  is  recommended  that 
a  physical  examination  by  a  medical  officer  of  the  Regular  Army  of  all  recruits 
enlisted  since  the  last  examination  be  held  each  year  and  that  Federal  recogni- 
tion be  withheld  from  any  man  who  fails  to  pass  the  examination. —  (Extract 
from  report  of  Capt.  Niles,  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of  -  — , 
Sept  12.) 

Out  of  a  total  of  1,181  enlisted  men  mustered  in  in  the  Infantry  regiment, 
387  have  already  been  discharged  as  physically  disqualified.  The  physical 
defects  of  a  few  have  been  waived,  and  some  requests  to  have  defects  waived 
have  not  been  heard  from.  In  round  numbers,  over  400  men  were  found  physi- 
cally unfit  for  service.  Seven  officers  have  been  discharged  because  of  being 
physically  disqualified,  another  will  be  as  soon  as  he  returns  to  camp,  the 
physical  defects  of  two  have  been  waived,  and  I  am  waiting  to  hear  from  the 
request  for  waiver  in  case  of  another.  This  out  of  50  mustered  in.  The  two 
troops  of  Cavalry  lost  50  men,  the  field  hospital  4,  the  regimental  infirmary  5, 
and  Company  A,  Engineers,  25.  A  grand  total  of  471. —  (Extract  from  report 
of  First  Lieut.  W.  G.  Murchison,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard 
of  -  — ,  July  17,  1916.) 

It  was  inevitable  that  much  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  upon  the  medical 
officers  who  conducted  the  examination,  and  as  a  result  many  recruits  were  en- 
listed who  should  have  been  rejected  for  physical  disabilities;  every  effort 
was  made  by  organization  commanders  to  take  to  the  mobilization  camp  their 


ETC.  Ill 

companies  recruited  to  the  maximum,  and  as  a  result  the  organizations  arrived 
at  the  mobilization  camp  with  a  large  number  of  recruits  who  were  without 
training  and  in  some  cases  without  equipment.  Upon  the  departure  of  the 
organizations  from  their  home  stations,  a  recruiting  officer  and  party  was  left 
in  each  armory  to  continue  the  work  of  recruiting,  and  such  recruits  as  were 
then  enlisted  were  sent  to  the  mobilization  camp  without  equipment.  These 
recruiting  officers  were  generally  inexperienced  and  the  medical  examination 
was  conducted  by  physicians  generally  ignorant  of  the  requirements  of  the 
physical  examinations.  There  was  a  noticeable  deterioration  in  the  quality 
of  the  men  sent  forward  after  the  arrival  of  the  organizations,  in  one  marked 
case,  out  of  a  detachment  of  12  recruits  sent  forward  10  were  physically 
rejected  at  the  mobilization  camp.  In  many  other  cases  men  were  enlisted 
and  sent  forward  who  should'  have  been  rejected  by  a  line  officer  without  the 
assistance  of  a  medical  officer  or  a  physician;  these  cases  being  for  such  glar- 
ing physical  disabilities  as  hernia,  flat  feet,  loss  of  opposing  molar  teeth,  defec- 
tive eyesight,  etc. 

If  the  evil  of  a  peace  strength  organization  is  to  be  continued  a  better  method 
of  recruiting  from  peace  to  war  strength  must  be  determined.  Two  of  the 
regimental  surgeons  with  a  carefully  selected  personnel  of  from  12  to  20  men 
would  be  a  great  improvement  over  the  method  used  during  the  last  mobiliza- 
tion. 

The  hardships,  confusion,  and  expense  of  mobilization  in  the  future  will 
be  greatly  reduced  if  the  complete  equipment  for  the  National  Guard  is  stored 
within  the  State,  preferably  in  the  storehouses  at  or  near  the  mobilization 
points.  The  necessary  blank  forms  for  mustering  the  National  Guard  into 
Federal  service  should  be  with  the  organization,  and  in  large  measure  the  forms 
may  be  filled  out  ready  for  use.  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  Colonel  of  the 
regiment  or  the  senior  officer  of  units  other  than  the  regiment,  should  muster 
in  their  own  units  into  the  Federal  service;  later  when  opportunity  is  afforded 
the  organizations  should  be  thoroughly  inspected  by  officers  of  the  Inspector 
General's  Department  and  errors  found  can  then  be  corrected.  Another  essen- 
tial point  to  be  determined  upon  as  a  preparation  for  the  mobilization  of  an 
efficient  National  Guard  is  a  frequent  physical  inspection  so  that  the  examina- 
tion, if  one  is  to  be  made  at  muster-in,  will  be  of  men  all  of  whom  are  practi- 
cally physically  fit  for  the  duties  of  a  soldier.  At  least  once  each  year  the  entire 
personnel  of  the  National  Guard  should  be  inspected  by  a  medical  officer  of  the 
Army  whose  powers  should  be  such  that  any  found  physically  deficient  are  at 
once  eliminated  from  the  guard. 

On  account  of  the  small  fee  allowed  for  the  examinations,  doctors  usually 
made  the  examinations  in  a  very  perfunctory  manner.  Practically  the  entire 
command  had  been  examined  during  the  month  prior  to  this.  However,  out 
of  a  strength  of  53  officers  and  1,143  enlisted  men,  2  officers  and  216  enlisted 
men  were  rejected  (1  officer  submitted  to  an  operation  for  hernia  immedi- 
ately upon  rejection  and  was  later  accepted  without  having  been  discharged). 

Frequently  the  form  was  merely  signed.  Only  rarely  was  it  completely  filled 
out. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Edw.  A.  Shuttleworth,  Infantry,  inspector- 
instructor  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  September  19,  1916.) 

The  best  record  among  militia  medical  officers  was  made  by  Capt.  Charles 
F.  Jump,  Medical  Corps,  who  had  examined  Company  A  with  a  strength  of 
68.  Only  one  of  these  was  rejected  after  muster-in. 

The  poorest  record  was  made  by  Capt.  —  — ,  commanding  Company  -  — , 
who  is  a  practicing  physician,  and  who  examined  the  men  in  his  company. 
Out  of  a  strength  of  85,  22  were  rejected  after  muster  in — nearly  26  per  cent. 

The  poorest  record  among  the  civilian  doctors  was  made  by  a  Dr.  • 

who  was  then  on  duty  at  -  — .  Company  -  -  is  stationed  in  - 
city.  Dr.  -  -  examined  this  company  and  out  of  132  accepted  by  him, 
34  were  rejected.  Even  syphilitics  were  accepted,  so  the  Army  surgeon  in- 
formed me.  If  reported  his  case  to  the  department  commander,  as  I  had 
been  told  that  he  had  been  ordered  before  an  examining  board  to  take  an  exami- 
nation for  entry  into  the  Regular  Service. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut. 
Hoffman,  inspector-instructor,  on  -  —  National  Guard,  Aug.  16.) 

-  is  supposed  to  have  adopted  the  Regular  Army  standard  of  physical 
examination.    An  interesting  fact  in  connection  herewith  is  that  in  the  — 
Infantry  22  per  cent  of  enlisted  men  were  discharged  for  physical  disability 
when  examined   under  direction   of   Federal   medical   officer. —  (Extract   from 


112  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

report  of  First  Lieut.  James  G.  Mcllroy,  Infantry  inspector-instructor,  National 
Guard  of ,  July  7,  1916.) 

Eleven  per  cent  of  the  officers  mustered  in  were  rejected  by  medical  examin- 
ers. However,  many  were  reinstated.  As  soon  as  an  officer  was  rejected,  it 
meant  that  all  the  influence  he  could  command  would  be  brought  to  bear  to  see- 
that  he  was  reinstated.  Twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  enlisted  men  were  rejected 
by  the  medical  examiners. —  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  James  G. 
Mcllroy,  Infantry  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  July  23,  1916. ) 

While  this  State  has  adopted  the  Regular  Army  form  for  physical  exami- 
nations, 50  per  cent  of  the  enlisted  force  had  not  been  examined  on  June  19, 
1916;  this  made  it  necessary  to  have  the  examinations  made  prior  to  organiza- 
tions leaving  home  stations  and  the  surgeons  were  not  available  for  proper 
duty. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  W.  B.  Wallace,  Infantry  inspector-in 
structor,  National  Guard  of  —  — ,  June  25,  1916.) 

About  May  20,  1916,  a  rigid  system  of  physical  examination,  corresponding 
to  that  for  the  Regular  Army,  was  instituted  and  all  members  of  the  guard 
were  required  to  take  it.  This  resulted  in  the  elimination  of  at  least  15  per 
cent  of  the  men  examined.  The  guard  was  being  practically  reorganized  to 
comply  with  the  provisions  of  the  Army  reorganization  bill  signed  by  the  Presi- 
dent on  June  3,  1916,  and  the  order  for  mobilization  came  before  this  was  com- 
pleted.—  (Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  Max.  B.  Garber,  Infantry  inspec- 
tor-instructor, National  Guard  of ,  July  12,  1916. ) 

Maj.  Hunt  reports  *  *  *  did  not  have  the  physical  standard  of  the  Reg- 
ular Army  and  that  at  least  30  per  cent  were  rejected  physically. —  (Letter  of 
Maj.  H.  J.  Hunt,  Infantry  inspector-instructor,  —  — ,  July  9,  1916.) 

Letter  of  H.  G.  Disbrow  to  Adjutant  General,  United  States  Army,  — 
suggests  saving  in  time  and  money  to  examine  men  at  armories  for  physical 
defects  before  sending  them  to  mobilization  camps. 

On  Saturday,  June  24,  1916,  I  called  a  conference  of  several  of  the  leading 
medical  officers  of  the  National  Guard  of  —  —  with  the  medical  examiner 
and  myself.  We  all  knew  of  our  own  knowledge  that  while  this  State  had 
officially  adopted  on  paper  the  medical  standard  of  the  United  States  Army, 
that  the  detail  and  requirements  of  that  standard  had  not  been  carried  out. 
To  protect  the  interests  of  the  Government,  I  thereupon  decided,  and  so  ordered, 
that  the  muster-in  of  this  division  would  proceed  along  the  lines  of  the  regula- 
tions for  States  which  had  not  adopted  the  medical  standard. —  (Extract  from 
report  of  Capt.  J.  B.  Kemper,  Infantry  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of 
,  July  11,  1916.) 

It  was  inevitable  that  much  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  upon  the  medical 
officers  who  conducted  the  examination,  and  as  a  result  many  recruits  were  en- 
listed who  should  have  been  rejected  for  physical  disabilities;  every  effort  was 
made  by  organization  commanders  to  take  to  the  mobilization  camp  their  com- 
panies recruited  to  the  maximum,  and  as  a  result  the  organizations  arrived  at 
the  mobilization  camp  with  a  large  number  of  recruits  who  were  without  train- 
ing and  in  some  cases  without  equipment.  Upon  the  departure  of  the  organiza- 
tions from  their  home  stations,  a  recruiting  officer  and  party  was.  left  in  each 
armory  to  continue  the  work  of  recruiting,  and  such  recruits  as  were  then 
enlisted  were  sent  to  the  mobilization  camp  without  equipment.  These  re- 
cruiting officers  were  generally  inexperienced,  and  the  medical  examination  was 
conducted  by  physicians  generally  ignorant  of  the  requirements  of  the  physical 
examinations.  There  was  a  noticeable  deterioration  in  the  quality  of  the  men 
sent  forward  after  the  arrival  of  the  organizations ;  in  one  marked  case,  out  of 
a  detachment  of  12  recruits  sent  forward  10  were  physically  rejected  at  the 
mobilization  camp.  In  many  other  cases  men  were  enlisted  and  sent  forward 
who  should  have  been  rejected  by  a  line  officer  without  the  Assistance  of  a 
medical  officer  or  a  physician,  these  cases  being  for  such  glaring  physical  dis- 
abilities as  hernia,  flat  feet,  loss  of  opposing  molar  teeth,  defective  eyesight,  etc. 

If  the  evil  of  a  peace-strength  organization  is  to  be  continued  a  better  method 
of  recruiting  from  peace  to  war  strength  must  be  determined.  Two  of  the  regi- 
mental surgeons  with  a  carefully  selected  personnel  of  from  12  to  20  men  would 
be  a  great  improvement  over  the  method  used  during  the  last  mobilization. — 
(Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Shuttleworth,  inspector-instructor  on  National 
Guard  of .) 


MOBILIZATION   OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  .  113 

The  most  marked  defect  disclosed  to  date  is  the  fact  that  although  this  State 
has  adopted  the  standard  for  physical  examination  required  for  the  Regular 
Army,  this  standard  has  by  no  means  been  rigidly  adhered  to.  In  the  Eighth 
Regiment  alone,  of  the  seven  companies  so  far  reported,  an  average  of  41  officers 
and  men  have  been  rejected  for  physical  disability  in  each  company.  It  is 
thought  that  this  average  is  somewhat  high  and  will  be  reduced  in  other  regi- 
ments.—  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  H.  H.  Tebbetts,  inspector-instructor,  on 
National  Guard  of  —  — ,  July  7.) 

The  medical  examinations  before  enlistment  in  the  National  Guard,  both  of 
officers  and  men,  should  be  more  carefully  made,  and  I  recommend  that  all  offi- 
cers of  the  National  Guard  be  examined  physically  once  each  year,  as  is  now  the 
case  in  the  Regular  Army.  This  examination  should,  if  possible,  be  made  by 
Regular  Army  officers  of  the  Medical  Corps. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt. 
Raymond  Sheldon,  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of  —  -  July  6.> 

It  is  recommended  that  the  National  Guard,  when  it  is  again  in  normal  con- 
dition, shall  have  frequent  medical  inspections  by  regular  medical  officers,  par- 
ticularly that  National  Guard  officers  be  examined  physically  during  their  first 
year  of  service  as  such  and  at  intervals  thereafter  of  not  more  than  five  year*/ 
and  that  questions  of  waiver  of  physical  defects  found  be  considered  at  that  time 
and  not  at  the  time  of  mobilization.  The  absence  of  these  regulations  has 
brought  about  a  situation  by  which  officers  who  have  given  years  of  their  lives 
in  preparation  for  active  service  with  their  organizations,  have  been  thrown  out 
at  the  physical  examination  connected  with  muster  in.  This  has  resulted  also 
in  leaving  organizations  depleted  of  officers  at  the  very  time  when  they  most 
needed  them. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Col.  E.  M.  Lewis,  senior  mustering 
officer, ,  July  6.) 

Things  are  shaping  up  here  slowly,  but  on  the  whole  satisfactorily.  Ten  of 
the  troops  have  been  mustered  and  the  medical  examination  of  about  six  has 
been  completed.  The  latter  examination  has  demonstrated  how  useless  it  is  to 
expect  to  get  reliable  work  from  the  civilian  physicians,  and  it  would  be  a  keen 
delight  to  me  to  find  there  was  some  way  to  prevent  some  of  them  from  getting 
any  pay  for  examining  some  of  the  men  they  accepted  and  reported  as  normal 
in  every  respect.  The  principal  troubles  have  been  of  a  nature  that  would  not 
appear  to  the  casual  examiner,  such  as  myself  on  recognition,  but  which  must 
have  been  known  to  the  doctors  if  they  made  any  sort  of  an  examination. 

Some  of  the  troops  have  lost  a  great  many  men  from  flat  feet,  poor  chests ; 
there  were  quite  a  few  cases  of  gonorrhea,  and  even  a  number  of  cases  of 
syphilis  in  all  stages ;  it  seems  an  outrage  that  they  should  be  paid  for  such 
work,  and  they  should  be  published  as  being  unreliable  men.  The  troops  who 
lost  the  most  are  reduced  to  a  little  below  the  minimum,  but  I  do  not  believe 
there  will  be  any  trouble  in  recruiting,  as  the  regiment  still  appears  to  be  very 
popular. —  (Extract  from  letter  from  an  inspector-instructor  on  National  Guard 
of .) 

It  does  not  seem  advisable  to  defer  the  physical  examination  until  after 
muster  in  is  completed  as  contemplated  in  paragraph  24D.  Experience  with 
-  troops  has  demonstrated  that  even  in  a  State  that  has  adopted  the 
standard  of  medical  examination  prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army,  there  will 
be  a  great  number  of  men  found  defective.  In  that  State,  those  found  de- 
fective were  10.47  per  cent.  It  is  believed  that  the  physical  examination 
should  come  first  no  matter  whether  the  State  has  adopted  the  regular  standard 
or  not.  The  physical  examination  will  always  be  the  controlling  factor.  The 
examination  and  transfer  of  property  can  easily  be  accomplished  in  half  the 
time  that  it  takes  to  examine  the  men  physically.  The  property  need  not 
necessarily  be  taken  over  by  the  mustering  officer  for  the  Federal  Government 
until  the  result  of  the  physical  examination  reveals  the  fact  that  the  organiza- 
tion has  at  least  the  minimum  strength.  The  preparation  of  the  muster  rolls 
should  always  follow  the  physical  examination  and  only  the  names  of  those 
who  pass  the  examination  should  be  entered  on  the  rolls. 

In  the  -  -  camp  some  14,000  men  were  examined.  The  physical  ex- 
amination lasted  about  11  days.  Some  50  or  60  surgeons  were  occupied  under 
Maj.  Koerper  of  the  Medical  Corps,  United  States  Army.  It  was  conducted 
with  the  same  care  as  would  have  been  done  in  the  Regular  Army.  During  the 
first  two  days  the  examination  continued  night  and  day,  the  surgeons  working 
in  eight-hour  shifts.  Later  it  was  found  better  to  work  in  the  daylight  only 
and  only  two  shifts  of  eight  hours  were  occupied. 

72031—16 8 


114  MOBILIZATION    OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

While  the  physical  examination  was  being  conducted  Capt.  Leisenring  and 
myself  inspected  and  took  over  the  property  of  the  division.  We  commenced 
on  June  25  and  ended  on  the  afternoon  of  July  5.  Capt.  Castleman  had  entire 
rharge  of  the  muster  rolls  and  of  the  muster  in.  He  completed  his  work  on 
Sunday  morning  July  10  and  the  last  regiment  left  for  the  border  that  after- 
noon, the  entire  division  having  been  mustered  in  and  entrained  for  the  border 
in  two  weeks. —  (Extracts  from  report  of  Capt.  D.  H.  Biddle,  inspector-in- 
structor, July  20,  1916.) 

LACK  OF  TRAINING  AND  UNFITNESS  FOR  ACTIVE  SERVICE. 

The  amount  of  work  being  performed  by  some  of  the  organizations  was  not 
what  it  should  be.  This  matter  was  taken  up  with  the  camp  commander,  and 
I  believe  that  same  will  be  remedied  immediately.  It  is  recommended  that 
instructions  be  issued  to  all  camp  commanders  to  the  effect  that,  weather  per- 
mitting, a  minimum  of  eight  hours  per  day,  Sundays  and  holidays  excepted, 
strenuous  work  for  officers  and  men  is  expected. 

Officers  and  men  generally  are  not  well  set  up.  Slouchiness  and  lack  of  snap 
was  in  evidence.  To  remedy  this  defect  it  is  recommended  that  all  camp  com- 
manders be  directed  that  at  least  40  minutes  physical  drill  under  the  Koehler 
system  shall  constitute  a  part  of  the  daily  training.  This  in  addition  to  a 
short  period  of  exercises  after  reveille.  For  this  drill  an  officer  should  be 
selected  who  is  peculiarly  fitted  for  same,  otherwise  desired  results  will  not  be 
accomplished. 

No  instructions  in  signaling,  aiming  and  pointing,  or  gallery  practice.  In- 
struction in  first  aid  not  satisfactory. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Col.  J.  L. 
Chamberlain,  inspector  general,  department  inspector,  on  conditions  at  mobiliza- 
tion camp,  Fort  -  — ,  August  19,  1916. 

Col.  S.  W.  Miller,  Tenth  Infantry,  special  inspector,  reports,  July  15,  in  his 
report  of  inspection  of  mobilization  camp  of  the  National  Guard  of  -  — . 

"  The  various  units  of  the  ,  division  will  require  several  months  of 

field  training  to  prepare  them  for  service  under  war  conditions. 

INEFFICIENCY  OF  COMMAND  FOE  ACTIVE   SEE  VICE.' 

"As  the  command  reported  at  camp  they  were,  in  my  opinion,  in  no  way  pre- 
pared for  active  service.  There  is  a  very  large  percentage  of  entirely  new 
men,  and  the  older  men,  as  judged  by  the  manner  in  which  they  acted  at 
inspection,  do  not  appear  to  have  had  much  training. '  The  spirit  of  the  officers 
and  men  is  particularly  good,  and  they  all  seemed  very  anxious  to  learn.  Any 
suggestions  as  to  camp  sanitation,  instructions,  or  paper  work  is  eagerly 
sought,  and  as  far  as  possible  is  taken  advantage  of.  The  troops  are  now,  I 
believe,  very  well  equipped,  but  have  had  very  little  proper  training." 

None  of  the  organizations  of  the  —  —  National  Guard  are  ready  for  active 
service,  and  none  will  be  until  they  have  had  a  considerable  period  of  careful 
training  under  competent  instructors. 

As  may  be  inferred  from  the  above,  the  state  of  discipline  among  the  officers 
leaves  much  to  be  desired.  It  is  believed  to  be  better  among  the  enlisted  men, 
but  it  must  exist  among  the  officers  if  progress  of  any  kind  is  to  be  made. — 
(Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Simons,  inspector  general,  on  National  Guard 
of ,  July  13.) 

The  regiment  arrived  at  the  mobilization  camp  without  the  articles  required 
in  the  surplus  kit  bags,  and  the  men  suffered  from  the  lack  of  underclothing, 
as  there  was  none  on  hand  to  issue  to  them. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut. 
Ristine,  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of ,  July  20.) 

There  was  a  lack  of  intelligence  of  National  Guard  officers  as  to  how  to  dis- 
pose of  clothing  under  paragraph  460,  Army  Regulations,  section  5,  which  sug- 
gests a  handbook  of  property  accountability.  Our  present  system  of  property 
accountability  is  scattered  in  such  a  variety  of  places  that  National  Guard 
officers  have  neither  the  time  nor  knowledge  to  grasp  it. —  (Extract  from  re- 
port of  Lieut.  Farnum,  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of  -  — , 
July  18.) 

The  command  is,  in  my  opinion,  in  no  way  prepared  for  active  service.  There 
is  a  very  large  percentage  of  entirely  new  men,  many  of  them  immature  boys, 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   OKGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  115 

and  the  older  men,  as  judged  by  the  manner  in  which  they  conducted  themselves 
at  inspection,  do  not  appear  to  have  had  much  training.  The  spirit  of  the 
officers  and  men  is  very  good,  and  they  seemed  anxious  to  learn. —  (Extract  from 
report  of  Maj.  Simons,  inspector  general  on  National  Guard  of .) 

None   of  the   organizations   of  the  -         -  National   Guard   are   ready   for 

active  service,  and  none  will  be  until  they  have  had  a  considerable  period  of 

careful  training  under  competent  instructors. — (Extract  from  report  of  First 

Lieut.  James  W.  Everington,  Infantry  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of 

— ,  July  1,  1916.) 

While  every  request  of  mine  is  promptly  acted  upon  and  there  has  not  been 
the  slightest  friction,  it  is  evident  that  the  State  authorities  considered  this 
as  a  State  camp,  and  that  any  attempt  on  my  part  to  speed  up  the  muster  in 
will  not  be  of  much  avail.  They  have  just  awakened  to  a  realization  of  the 
imfitness  of  this  regiment  for  field  service  and  feel  that  they  owe  it  to  the 
"  boys  "  to  keep  them  here  until  they  have  learned  at  least  the  rudiments  of 
the  game  and  can  take  better  care  of  themselves.  The  work  of  reorganization, 
which  is  still  in  progress,  could  have  been  finished  within  a  few  hours  at  any 
time,  but  they  are  afraid  that  once  the  regiment  is  mustered  in  it  will  be 
immediately  sent  to  the  border. 

If  "an  emergency  arises  that  demands  that  untrained  troops  be  interposed 
between  the  Mexicans  and  unarmed  Americans,  they  are  ready  to  respond  at 
once,  but  it  is  believed  that  nothing  else  short  of  an  order  to  be  ready  for  muster 
in  within  a  specified  time,  or  not  at  all,  will  materially  hasten  the  muster  in. 
If  no  such  orders  are  given,  they  will  probably  be  ready  to  be  mustered  in  in 
about  two  weeks. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  W.  T.  Bates,  inspector- 
instruction,  National  Guard  of ,  July  3,  1916.) 

The  troops  are  practically  untrained,  and  a  recent  telegram  from  the  depart- 
ment commander  informs  me  that  Gen.  Funston  recommends  that  they  be  held 
here  for  the  purpose  of  training. 

Another  fact  that  has  been  demonstrated  beyond  question  is  that  State 
troops  coming  to  mobilization  camp  are  almost  always  poorly  equipped.  They 
lack  uniforms,  underwear,  shoes,  and,  in  fact,  must  be  fitted  out  to  a  very 
large  extent  from  the  property  which  is  only  available  after  their  muster  into 
service. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Sloan,  inspector-instructor,  on  National 
Guard  of ,  July  20.) 

The  large  number  of  physical  rejections  and  the  corresponding  number  of 
recruits  caused  the  regiment,  as  a  whole,  to  be  poorly  instructed  and  trained. 
Many  of  the  noncommissioned  officers  had  been  rejected  physically,  and  the  re- 
mainder were  not  efficient  noncommissioned  officers.  The  regiment  should 
have  been  kept  at  the  mobilization  camp,  under  an  intensive  training  schedule, 
for  at  least  a  month  before  it  would  have  been  even  fairly  efficient  in  field 
service. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  E.  W.  Niles,  inspector-instructor,  on 
National  Guard  of  -  — ,  Sept.  12.) 

The  necessity  for  hardening  the  men  by  marching  them  has  been  brought  to 
the  attention  of  the  regimental  commander  repeatedly,  beginning  with  the  first 
day  in  camp;  to  date  the  command  has  taken  one  march  3  miles  long.  A 
12-mile  march  with  full  equipment  could  not  be  made  by  the  command  to-day, 
after  practically  a  month  of  service.  The  little  training  they  have  received 
has  not  been  systematically  or  scientifically  conducted. —  (Extract  from  report 
of  Lieut.  James  W.  Everington,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  —  — , 
July  22.) 

NECESSITY   FOR  ADDITIONAL   OFFICERS   AND   NONCOMMIS- 
SIONED OFFICERS  AT  MOBILIZATION  POINTS. 

I  believe,  as  a  result  of  my  experience  in  this  camp,  that  a  field  officer  of 
the  Regular  Army  should  be  ordered  to  each  mobilization  camp  as  its  com- 
manding officer  and  that  he  should  be  given  the  necessary  administrative,  staff 
for  the  camp,  these  last  to  also  be  from  Regular  establishments.  It  seems 
almost  needless  to  say  that  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the  average  National 
Guard  officer,  no  matter  how  willing  he  may  be,  is  able  to  handle  the  admin- 
istrative problems  which  naturally  arise  in  a  mobilization  camp,  for  as  a  rule 
he  has  had  little  or  no  experience  in  such  things.  To  place  them  in  such  a 
position  means  added  expense  and  slow  work.  To  expect  the  mustering  officers, 


116  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

in  addition  to  their  other  duties,  difficult  at  best,  to  be  issuing  quartermasters, 
commissaries,  ordinance  officers,  and  the  like,  does  not  subserve  the  best  interest 
of  the  Government.  This  is  especially  true  where  they  must  either  do  all  of  the 
work  themselves,  even  to  the  making  out  of  memorandum  receipts,  invoices, 
and  other  necessary  papers,  or  else  have  the  major  part  of  it  done  wrong. 

As  a  result  of  my  inspection  of  four  mobilization  camps,  I  am  of  the  opinion 
that  there  should  be  two  mustering  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  on  duty  at 
each  of  these  camps,  at  least  during  the  most  active  period  of  the  mobilization. — 
(Extract  from   report   of  Capt.   Albert  B.    Sloan,   inspector-instructor,   - 
National  Guard,  Aug.  9,  1916.) 

Unless  an  officer  has  unusual  physical  vigor  and  capacity  for  work,  the  mental 
and  physical  strain,  together  with  loss  of  sleep,  is  certain  to  impair  his  effi- 
ciency and  delay  the  mobilization. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Col.  T.  Q.  Donald- 
son, inspector  general,  on  National  Guard  of  -  — .) 

In  a  large  mobilization  camp  of  this  kind  everything  could  be  expedited  very 
much  if  the  chief  of  staff  and  quartermaster  were  Regular  officers  of  ex- 
perience.—  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Mcllroy,  inspector-instructor,  on 
National  Guard  of ,  July  23.) 

I  believe  that  in  all  camps  of  this  character,  if  permitted  by  law,  the  camp 
commander,  camp  quartermaster,  and  camp  adjutant  should  be  Regular  officers 
detailed  by  the  department  commander,  a-s  much  friction  and  lost  motion  would 
in  this  way.  I  believe,  be  avoided.  My  experience  in  a  mobilization  camp  in 
1898  and  1899  convinces  me  of  this. 

Lack  of  knowledge  of  clerical  work,  and  in  some  cases  of  education,  on 
the  part  of  some  of  the  officers  is  adding  to  the  difficulty  attending  the  pre- 
liminary work  of  muster  in,  and  the  lack  of  sufficient  armory  instruction  in  the 
past  will  unquestionably  delay  the  period  when  these  troops  can  be  stated  to  be 
"reasonably  ready  for  field  service.'' — (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Sloan, 
inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  June  26.) 

A  post  quartermaster  sergeant  and  an  experienced  regimental  or  battalion 
sergeant  major  should  be  detailed  for  duty  with  the  senior  assistant  mustering 
officer  at  the  very  beginning  of  operations.  The  order  designating  the  senior 
assistant  mustering  officer  should  include  the  details  of  these  men.  The  reasons 
for  this  are  obvious. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Col.  Buck,  inspector-instructor, 
on  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  June  28.) 

It  is  thought  that  in  every  case,  upon  mobilization,  an  officer  of  the  Regular 
establishment  should  be  attached  to  each  regiment  for  the  purpose  of  in- 
struction along  administrative  lines. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  James  M. 
Love,  jr.,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  Aug.  1,  1916.) 

I  recommend  that  in  any  mobilization  camp  a  Regular  officer  of  high  rank  be 
assigned  as  camp  commander,  with  authority  to  enforce  proper  camp  sanitation 
and  regulate  the  system  of  supply,  and  that  as  many  detached  officers  of  the 
Regular  service  as  can  be  spared  be  detailed  as  instructors,  with  authority  to 
supervise  and  direct  the  instruction  in  administration  and  training  of  the 
National  Guard. — (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Simons,  inspector  general,  on 
National  Guard  of  .) 

I  believe  no  one  is  in  a  better  position  to  see  the  utter  hopelessness  of  the 
dual  system  of  control  than  the  mustering  officer,  the  terrific  needless  expense 
to  the"  Federal  Government,  through  destruction  and  loss  of  clothing,  equip- 
ment, and  arms,  and  payment  of  large  numbers  of  men  who  are  discharged  for 
physical  disability,  the  vast  amount  of  work  and  time  required  to  organize  a 
mob  of  this  kind. — Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Mcllroy,  inspector-instructor, 
on  National  Guard  of ,  July  23.) 

The  great  trouble  here  has  been  the  lack  of  a  strong  central  head  to  give 
orders  and  see  that  they  are  carried  out.  There  seem  to  be  at  least  four 
separate  and  distinct  chiefs  here — the  senior  assistant  mustering  officer,  the 
National  Guard  commander  of  the  camp,  the  chief  quartermaster,  and  the  ad- 
jutant general  of  —  — .  The  lowest  ranking  one  of  the  four  appears  to  be  the 
camp  commander. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Mcllroy,  inspector-instructor, 
on  National  Guard  of ,  July  23.) 

The  greatest  friction  which  arose  in  camp  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  officers 
were  not  sufficiently  trained  in  the  paper  work  required  for  the  Regular  Army, 


MOBILIZATION   OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  117 

and  the  execution  of  this  work,  which  runs  so  smoothly  in  the  Regular  Army, 
was  a  constant  puzzle  to  the  Militia  officers  and  absorbed  almost  the  major 
portion  of  the  mustering  officer's  time  in  giving  instruction  in  this  matter.  It 
is  believed  that  hereafter  the  Militia  Bureau  should  insist  more  rigidly  on  the 
use  of  all  forms  prescribed  by  the  Regular  Army  for  the  National  Guard  not  in 
the  service  of  the  United  States. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Hughes,  in- 
spector-instructor, on  National  Guard  of ,  July  16.) 

I  further  believe  that  every  regiment  should  have  an  inspector-instructor 
constantly  on  duty  with  it,  and  while  so  serving  he  should  be  commissioned  as 
the  de  facto  lieutenant  colonel,  and  have  complete  supervision  and  authority 
over  records  and  recruiting.  This  will  give  him  the  necessary  authority  to  keep 
the  records  in  shape,  while  in  no  way  making  him  responsible  for  the  procure- 
ment of  recruits. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Kemper,  inspector-instructor, 
on  National  Guard  of ,  July  11.) 

Mobilization,  course  of  instruction  for  officers  on. — The  mobilization  of  the 
troops  on  the  call  of  the  President  demonstrated  that  there  should  have  been  a 
course  of  instruction  given  to  the  officers  covering  the  duties  of  officers  at  time 
of  mobilization.  It  also  demonstrated  that  where  an  important  order,  such  as 
General  Order  39,  War  Department,  June  29,  1915,  is  issued  that  a  course  of 
study  for  all  officers  should  be  prescribed  covering  such  an  order. —  (Extract 

from  report  of  Capt.  H.  A.  Hanigan,  infantry,  inspector-instructor, ,  Aug. 

3,  1916.) 

In  this  connection  it  may  be  stated  that  there  was  published  to  the  Organized 
Militia  of  California  a  pamphlet  in  the  shape  of  a  general  order  (No.  14  of 
May  18,  1916)  embodying  "Rules  and  Regulations  for  the  Mobilization  of  the 
Organized  Militia  and  Volunteers  when  called  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States  by  the  President."  This  little  pamphlet  of  55  pages,  indexed,  gives 
a  most  excellent  outline  of  the  duties  of  all  connected  with  the  mobilization  of 
State  forces  and  reflects  credit  on  the  compiler,  as  it  contains  in  condensed 
form  data  pertaining  to  mobilization  in  constant  demand  by  officers  and  others 
connected  with  the  National  Guard. 

There  was  a  shortage  of  competent  clerks  to  prepare  the  important  records, 
and  being  badly  rushed,  as  we  were,  mistakes  were  bound  to  occur.  With  me 
there  was  one  sergeant,  Medical  Department,  and  two  privates,  Medical  De- 
partment of  the  Army,  the  services  of  whom  were  required  to  attend  to  the 
routine  hospital  records.  Repeated  requests  were  made  of  the  eastern  depart- 
ment for  additional  help,  but  without  avail.  All  of  the  sanitary  troops  belong- 
ing to  the  organizations  of  the  Massachusetts  Militia  called  into  the  Federal 
service  went  to  the  border  with  the  first  shipment,  so  none  were  available  to 
do  the  work  for  those  troops  left  behind  and  the  recruits,  which  numbered,  all 
told,  about  2,500.  I  was  able,  through  Adjt.  Gen.  Cole,  to  get  the  sanitary  troops 
belonging  to  the  Sixth  Massachusetts  Infantry  to  assist  me  in  my  clerical  work, 
but  these  were  all  untrained  men  and  in  many  instances  none  too  well  educated. 
They  were  employed  under  State  pay  until  authority  could  be  obtained  and 
other  delays  overcome  to  muster  them  into  the  Federal  service.  Although  the 
mustering  regulations  allowed  the  mustering  officer  to  employ  the  necessary 
<-lerks,  my  request  for  one  was  disapproved  at  department  headquarters. 

The  work  of  carrying  out  the  physical  examinations  and  completing  the  rec- 
ords at  the  Framingham  mobilization  camp  were  made  possible  through  the  un- 
tiring efforts  of  the  medical  officers  of  the  Massachusetts  Militia,  who  were  left 
behind  after  the  first  shipment  of  troops  for  the  border.  Without  this  assist- 
ance the  work  could  not  have  been  done. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Hall, 
Medical  Corps,  inspector-instructor  of  National  Guard  of  -  — .) 

Great  difficulty  was  experienced  by  me  in  keeping  up  the  office  work,  as  I 
had  no  assistant,  nor  were  any  of  the  officers  of  the  militia  competent  to  attend 
to  the  routine  and  thus  save  the  mustering  officer  much  time  and  labor  involved 
in  the  attending  to  details.  I  recommend  that  in  any  future  mobilization  a  com- 
petent adjutant  or  sergeant  major  be  detailed  to  each  camp  to  assist  the  muster- 
ing officer.  Authority  to  hire  a  civilian  clerk  does  not  solve  the  difficulty,  as 
such  a  clerk  is  ignorant  of  military  procedure.  Competent  quartermaster  ser- 
geants and  ordnance  sergeants  should  also  be  detailed  at  once,  as  the  property 
responsibility  is  great  and  time  is  a  great  element,  and  time  can  always  be 
saved  by  having  the  services  of  these  experienced  men. —  (Extract  from  report 
of  Capt.  Roberts  on  National  Guard  of  —  — ,  Sept.  18. ) 


118  MOBILIZATION    OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

I  believe  an  ideal  force  to  muster  in  a  division  would  be  approximately  as 
follows : 

One  senior  mustering  officer  as  executive  officer,  one  lieutenant  as  adjutant, 
two  officers  to  inspect  and  take  over  property,  one  officer  to  have  charge  of  the 
muster  rolls  and  muster  in,  one  surgeon,  preferably  a  major. —  (Extract  from 

report  of  Capt.  Biddle,  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of  , 

July  20.) 

At  every  mobilization  camp  a  Regular  officer  with  experience  in  the  work 
should  be  detailed  as  camp  quartermaster,  and  the  National  Guard  quartermas- 
ters, if  any  are  mustered  in,  should  be  assigned  as  assistants,  without  regard  to 
rank. 

A  Regular  officer  of  appropriate  rank  should  be  assigned  as  camp  commander, 
with  authority  to  issue  orders  in  the  name  of  the  department  commander  cover- 
ing all  details  as  to  camp  administration,  and  to  supervise  recruiting  in  the 
State.  It  is  thought  that  the  whole  time  and  attention  of  officers  belonging  to 
units  of  the  camp  should  be  devoted  to  instruction  and  organization. 

An  officer  of  the  Medical  Corps,  United  States  Army,  should  be  on  duty  at 
each  mobilization  camp  as  camp  surgeon  and  sanitary  inspector.  He  should 
supervise  all  matters  pertaining  to  sanitary  troops  as  an  inspector-instructor. — 
(Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  G.  M.  Holley,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor,  Na- 
tional Guard  of ,  Aug.  17,  1916. ) 

Letter  of  Col.  B.  B.  Buck,  Infantry,  mustering  officer  from  Framingham, 
Mass.,  June  28,  1916,  recommends  that  all  troops  be  held  at  armories  until 
the  mustering  officer  and  his  assistants  are  established  at  mobilization  camp. 
He  believes  it  a  great  mistake  to  rush  troops  from  their  home  stations  until  the 
mobilization  camp  is  thoroughly  prepared. 

Col.  Buck  recommends  that  a  post  quartermaster  sergeant  and  an  experienced 
regimental  or  battalion  sergeant  major  be  detailed  at  the  outset  to  help  the  mus- 
tering officer. 

Capt.  Kemper  reports  the  absence  of  experienced  clerks  and  stenographers 
for  his  office  and  that  of  the  proper  officer  at  a  time  when  they  were  greatly 
needed. — (Letter  of  Capt.  J.  B.  Kemper,  Infantry,  senior  mustering  officer, 
Mount  Gretna,  Pa.,  July  11,  1916.) 

All  the  sergeant  instructors  on  duty  in  Pennsylvania,  save  two,  were  put  on 
duties  under  the  property  officer  with  which  they  were  not  familiar. —  (Letter 
of  Capt.  J.  B.  Kemper,  Infantry,  senior  mustering  officer,  Mount  Gretna,  Pa., 
July  1,  1916.) 

LACK  OF  KNOWLEDGE   OF  FORMS,  BOOKS,  RETURNS,   ETC. 

Report  inspector-instructor,  Idaho,  July  22,  1916,  paragraph  5,  states  that  of- 
ficers of  the  National  Guard  of  —  -  were  exceptionally  weak  in  the  prepa- 
ration of  muster  rolls  and  other  papers.  In  some  cases  it  was  due  to  lack  of 
care  and  attention  on  their  part. 

Lieut.  Garber  recommends  that  a  brief  and  thorough  explanation  of  the 
relation  of  the  United  States  and  the  States,  their  powers  and  duties  with 
respect  to  the  National  Guard,  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  National  Guard  officials, 
as  they  know  little  regarding  military  law,  regulations,  terms,  and  usage. 

Lieut.  Garber  recommends  a  three-months'  school  for  quartermasters,  and 
that  instruction  in  the  preparation  of  muster  rolls  and  other  company  papers  be 
a  part  of  instruction  for  officers. —  (Letter  of  Lieut.  M.  B.  Garber,  inspector- 
instructor,  Idaho.) 

Report  inspector-instructor  from  -  — ,  July  6,  1916:  Capt.  Smith  noted 
much  delay,  confusion,  and  needless  repetition  because  of  lack  of  knowledge  of 
regular  forms  and  methods  of  procedure,  causing  officers  and  men  to  wear  them- 
selves out  over  simple  matters. 

The  more  apparent  shortcomings  at  the  mobilization  camp  were  lack  of 
familiarity  with  Army  regulations,  Army  orders,  methods  of  procuring  supplies, 
making  out  ration  returns. —  (Letter  of  Capt.  E.  T.  Smith,  Field  Artillery,  in- 
spector-instructor. ) 

Capt.  Hobbs  reports  that  officers  and  men  are  ignorant  of  administrative  paper 
work,  and  papers  will  be  in  bad  shape.  Same  officer  reports  in  letter,  July  11, 
1916,  paragraph  7,  it  is  hard  to  make  officers  read  instructions  on  blank  forms 
and  comply  with  same. —  (Letter  of  Capt.  H.  P.  Hobbs,  inspector-instructor.) 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   OKGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  119 

Letter  of  Lieut.  P.  Remington,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor  -  —  ,  July 
14,  1916,  paragraph  15,  reports  that  Form  No.  2  was  distributed  to  the 
Third  Infantry,  National  Guard  of  -  —  ,  at  2  p.  m.  one  day  with  instruc- 
tions to  make  them  out  immediately,  but  at  6  p.  m.  only  two  or  three  companies 
had  started  work  on  the  forms.  It  was  necessary  to  assemble  all  the  officers 
and  give  them  direct  orders  before  they  would  start  to  work. 

OBJECTIONS   TO   SIGHT-SEERS  AND   NONCOMBATANTS. 

As  soon  as  the  Second  Infantry  arrived  at  the  camp  it  seemed  as  though 
every  relative  of  every  officer  and  enlisted  man  was  present  in  the  camp.  There 
was  a  general  feeling  that  war  was  certain  and  that  these  troops  were  going 
into  actual  service.  The  scenes  at  times  were  pathetic;  mothers  and  wives 
were  everywhere  in  evidence  and  constantly  showing  their  concern.  I  was 
harassed  from  morning  until  night  by  mothers  and  wives  seeking  the  release 
of  their  sons  and  husbands  from  Militia  duty.  —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt. 
H.  A.  Hanigan,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  •  —  , 
Aug.  4,  1916.  ) 

Mustering  officers  receive  instructions  to  attend  to  duties  which  in  their  va- 
riety and  quantity  would  all  but  swamp  a  well-regulated,  long-established  bri- 
gade headquarters,  with  trained  personnel  and  office  room,  facilities,  and 
materials  at  hand.  If  his  duties  are  to  be  properly  discharged,  he  must  be  given 
a  little  time  at  least  to  prepare  for  their  proper  performance.  The  especial 
significance  of  this  lies  in  the  fact  that  everybody  whom  he  calls  to  his  assist- 
ance is  put  to  work  on  matters  which  are  new  to  him  and  which  are  governed 
by  new  instructions  hourly  received.  Windstorms  blowing  the  papers  away, 
anxious  mothers  demanding  the  release  of  their  sons  of  tender  age,  newspaper 
reporters  using  every  known  resource  to  secure  the  basis  upon  which  to  write 
stories,  orderlies  sent  to  find  people  they  do  not  know,  lights  which  burn  low 
and  finally  fail  altogether,  telephones  choked  with  messages  official  and  unoffi- 
cial, sight-seeing  crowds,  etc.,  come  with  the  rush  of  an  avalanche,  until  a  little 
time  to  organize  and  prepare  for  business  intervenes  to  exhaust  the  curious  pub- 
lic and  return  them  to  their  homes.  —  (Extract  from  report  of  Col.  Buck, 
inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of  -  —  ,  June  28,  1916.) 

I  do  not  think  the  above  troops  are  at  all  fit  for  field  service,  by  lack  of 
training.  However,  I  consider  it  wise  that  they  were  sent  to  the  border  as  soon 
as  they  were,  for  with  the  floods  of  visitors  in  camp  every  day  and  other  dis- 
tractions, it  would  be  out  of  the  question  to  train  and  harden  them  where  they 
were.  —  (Extract  from  report  of  Col.  C.  G.  Morton,  special  inspector,  on  Na- 
tional Guard  of  -  ,  July  5,  1916.) 

Training.  —  Discipline  and  training  are  far  from  satisfactory. 

Discipline.  —  I  carefully  observed  the  enlisted  men  in  camp  and  on  the  street, 
and  I  failed  to  see  a  single  case  of  drunkenness  or  disorder,  and  their  good  be- 
havior was  a  subject  of  favorable  comment  generally  on  the  part  of  civilians. 
I  am  of  the  opinion,  however,  that  the  colonel  will  never  be  able  to  put  his 
regiment  in  good  shape  until  he  gets  it  away  from  its  home  surroundings,  and 
I  recommend  that  it  be  sent  to  a  training  camp  as  soon  as  practicable.  —  (Ex- 
tract from  report  of  Col.  Donaldson,  inspector  general,  on  National  Guard  of 


On  Sunday,  July  2,  the  camp  was  crowded  with  visitors,  variously  estimated 
at  from  25,000  to  50,000.  All  the  surrounding  areas  were  polluted  with  excreta, 
as  there  was  no  provision  in  this  respect  for  such  crowds.  —  (Extract  from  re- 
port of  Maj.  Truby,  Medical  Corps,  on  sanitary  conditions  in  camp  of  National 
Guard  -  —  .) 

VALUE    OF    CORRESPONDENCE    SCHOOLS. 

This    camp    has    amply    proven    the    value    of    the    correspondence    schools. 
has   a   very   poor   medical  personnel,   and   of   all   the  southern    States 


none  has  been  more  unsatisfactory  than  this  in  the  correspondence  schools. 
Despite  this  I  am  amazed  to  find  that  these  officers  have  a  degree  of  proficiency 
that  I  never  imagined  possible.  The  sanitary  work  of  regimental  surgeons 
is  very  good,  while  my  assistant  as  sanitary  inspector  has  so  profited  by  my 
training  in  camp  three  years  ago  that  I  find  he  can  be  trusted  to  do  all  of 
this  work  alone.  The  camp  hospital  is  providing  satisfactorily  for  the  sick. 


120  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

This  is  fortunate,  as  the  medical  skill  of  many  of  the  regimental  surgeons  is 
not  entirely  satisfactory.  The  forms  and  papers  required  seem  to  be  fairly 
well  understood  by  all  surgeons,  particularly  those  who  attended  camp  at 
Tobyhanna,  Pa.,  last  year.  I  have  had  no  chance  as  yet  to  look  into  the  train- 
ing of  the  Hospital  Corps  men.  They  are  inostly  new  men,  but  are  of  excellent 
quality. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Col.  Page.  Medical  Corps,  inspector- 
instructor,  on  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  July  9.) 

In  preparing  the  first  copy  of  the  muster-in  roll  of  the  various  companies 
of  the  Third  Infantry.  Wisconsin  National  Guard,  I  assembled  the  clerks  and 
first  sergeants  and  formed  a  class  of  them.  I  gave  them  full  instructions  cov- 
ering each  step  in  the  preparation  of  the  rolls  and  answered  questions  and 
had  corrections  made  on  the  spot.  Excellent  progress  was  made  in  this  way. 
Bad  weather  made  it  necessary  to  allow  the  clerks  to  work  in  their  tents 
for  the  preparation  of  the  other  two  copies  of  the  roll.  Much  better  progress 
would  have  been  made  undoubtedly  had  it  been  possible  to  keep  the  class 
together  for  the  preparation  of  all  three  rolls,  and  in  future  I  would  certainly 
advise  any  mustering  officer  whenever  possible  to  assemble  all  of  the  clerks 
of  organizations  to  be  mustered  in  and  to  have  them  do  all  their  work  in  his 
presence.  They  will  thus  be  free  from  all  interruptions  from  company  com- 
manders and  can  be  kept  from  many  errors. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt. 
R.  H.  Wescott,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor.  National  Guard  of  —  — ,  July  4, 
1916. ) 

Letter  of  Capt  H.  A.  Hanigan,  Infantry,  inspector-Instructor,  -  — ,  Aug.  3, 
1916.  Capt.  Hanigan  believes  that  National  Guard  officers  should  have  a 
course  of  instruction  covering  the  duties  of  officers  at  the  time  of  mobilization. 
Capt.  Hanigan  found  difficulty  in  getting  requisitions  for  the  property  needed 
from  organization  commanders. 

As  a  result  of  my  observations  here  I  would  recommend  that : 
(a)  That  the  relation  of  the  United  States  and  the  States,  their  powers  and 
duties  with  respect  to  the  National  Guard,  be  more  fully  defined.  The  average 
State  official  knows  little  regarding  military  law.  regulations,  terms,  and 
usages,  and  will  devote  but  little  time  to  this  study.  A  brief  and  thorough  ex- 
planation will  remove  many  difficulties. 

(I))  That  a  three  months'  school  for  regimental  quartermasters  be  estab- 
lished and  all  quartermasters  be  required  to  attend. 

(c)  That  instruction  in  the  preparation  of  muster  rolls  and  other  company 
papers  be  included  in  the  course  of  instruction  for  officers. 

(d)  That  officers  be  thoroughly  instructed  and  impressed  with  the  idea  that 
enlistment  in  the  Guard  means  something,  and  that  their  rolls  should  be  free 
from  dead  wood. 

(e)  That  the  strength  of  Guard   companies   shall   not  exceed  100  enlisted 
men. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Garber,  inspector-instructor,  on  National 
Guard  of . ) 

Were  I  free  of  my  duties  as  mustering  officer  there  are  many  things  I  could 
do  to  help  the  situation — one  plan  I  had  was  to  establish  a  bureau  of  informa- 
tion in  the  center  of  the  camp,  with  one  or  more  young  guard  officers  with  me — 
another  to  start  and  superintend  schools  for  field  officers,  company  officers,  and 
noncommissioned  officers  in  camp.  Yet  one  man  can  do  so  little  compared  to 
what  is  needed  that  it  seems  sometimes  scarcely  worth  while  to  make  an 
effort. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Lieut.  Mcllroy,  inspector-instructor,  on  Na- 
tional Guard  of  —  — ,  Aug.  8.) 

The  absence  of  experienced  clerks  and  stenographers  for  my  office  and  that  of 
the  property  officer  greatly  hampered  and  annoyed  us  while  under  terrific 
strain. 

I  believe  that  in  the  future  operation  of  the  defense  act  of  June  3.  1916, 
rigid  supervision  should  be  exercised  to  see  that  all  organizations  should  be 
compelled  to  use  and  keep  posted,  completely  and  to  date,  similar  forms  and 
records  to  those  used  in  the  Army,  and  all  others  should  be  prohibited.  This 
should  be  a  necessary  qualification  for  recognition.  This  will  obviate  the 
necessity  of  making  out  Forms  2,  10,  and  11  in  mobilization  camps. —  (Extract 
from  report  of  Capt.  Kemper,  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of 
— ,  July  11.) 

So  far  as  preparation  for  the  United  States  service  is  concerned  I  consider 
the  mobilization  a  lesson  worth  10  summer  camps  for  all  concerned.  Should 


ETC.  121 

a  second  mobilization  take  place  within  the  next  few  years  it  would  be  ac- 
complished with  one-half  the  trouble.  Hereafter  I  think  the  correspondence 
schools  held  by  inspector-instructors  should  have  a  thorough  course  in  mobiliza- 
tion.—  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Gibson,  inspector-instructor,  on  National 
Guard  of  -  — .) 

When  the  first  organizations  returned  to  their  State  mobilization 
camps  for  muster  out,  incomplete  and  inaccurate  records,  for  which 
inefficient  regimental  and  company  .  commanders  were  responsible, 
caused  serious  delays,  in  order  to  obviate  which  in  troops  whose 
muster-out  was  to  follow,  the  following  telegraphic  instructions  were 
sent  to  the  commanding  general.  Southern  Department,  on  October 
14,  1916: 

No.  4354.  Commanding  general.  Eastern  Department,  reports  inspections 
National  Guard  organizations  returning  to  Eastern  Department  for  muster  out 
show  that  in  most  instances  pay  rolls  and  other  official  records  organizations 
are  in  poor  condition,  being  incomplete  and  inaccurate,  and  that  these  con- 
ditions have  greatly  delayed  muster  out  these  organizations,  as  it  has  been 
necessary  to  make  out  new  papers,  in  some  cases  as  far  back  as  original  muster-in 
papers.  Department  commander  reports  principal  causes  delay  in  mustering 
out  organizations  returned  to  Eastern  Department  as  follows :  No  descriptive 
lists  of  men  kept.  No  settlements  between  company  commanders  and  'supply 
officers.  Bad  condition  of  records.  Ignorance  on  part  of  officers  and  men  of 
requirements  as  to  records,  settlements,  etc.  t 

In  most  cases  muster-out  officers  had  to  begin  on  records  from  time  of  original 
entry  of  men  into  Federal  service.  Department  commander  requests  you  be 
advised  of  these  conditions,  with  view  to  having  special  attention  paid  by  all 
National  Guard  organizations  in  your  department  to  bringing  their  paper  work 
up  to  date,  as  there  is  no  sufficient  reason  for  almost  complete  failure  to  cor- 
rect and  bring  up  to  date  necessary  organization  records. 

Department  commander  adds  it  has  been  necessary  to  detail  large  number 
officers  to  aid  in  muster  out  regiments,  and  practically  all  of  it  is  work  that 
reasonably  competent  company  and  regimental  officers  should  be  able  to  do 
without  assistance  Federal  officers.  It  is  suggested  that  you  cause  all  records 
National  Guard  organizations  now  in  your  department  to  be  immediately  in- 
spected, and,  where  incorrect,  corrected  and  brought  up  to  date  in  every  par- 
ticular, and  have  pay  and  muster  rolls  of  organizations  correctly  prepared  in 
your  department  under  supervision  officers  Regular  Army  detailed  for  that 
purpose,  leaving  blank  day  of  muster  out,  in  order  that  these  pay  rolls  may  be 
expeditiously  completed  upon  arrival  troops  at  mobilization  camps  or  home 
rendezvous  and  organizations  promptly  and  properly  mustered  out  of  Federal 
service. 

MCCAIN. 

EXCESSIVE  AMOUNT  OF  PAPER  WORK. 

The  present  system  of  transfer  of  property  from  the  State  to  the  Federal 
Government  is  cumbersome,  requires  an  enormous  amount  of  paper  work,  and  is 
certainly  unbusinesslike.  It  is  done  under  pressure  of  haste  and  there  is  of 
necessity  a  great  deal  of  confusion ;  clothing  must  be  inventoried  while  worn  by 
the  men,  and  with  all  the  care  possible  it  is  not  possible  to  get  all  the  property 
brought  to  camp.  This  is  unjust  to  the  organization  commander,  who  is  still 
accountable  to  the  State  for  any  that  may  have  escaped  inventory. 

I  found  that  the  Federal  forms  and  returns  required  to  be  used  and  made 
after  muster  in  were  not  understood. 

The  muster  rolls,  pay  rolls,  descriptive  lists,  company  returns,  etc.,  and  the 
manner  of  making  them  out  properly  was  all  new  and  had  to  be  learned  from  the 
first,  requiring  a  great  deal  of  the  time  of  all  officers  that  should  have  been  spent 
in  other  ways. 

These  records  should  all  be  kept  in  peace  time.  Reports  and  returns  of  all 
kinds  should  be  made  to  the  militia  bureau  as  now  required  by  Regular  troops 
to  the  War  Department. 

If  left  to  the  State  military  department,  the  inspection  and  correction  of  the 
returns  will  not  be  carefully  made.  States  are  notoriously  lax  in  accounting 
for  the  personnel. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Frank  L.  Wells,  Infantry, 
senior  mustering  officer,  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  Sept.  5,  1916.) 


122  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

The  mustering  officer  should  have  detailed  with  him  a  competent  clerk  as  chief 
clerk  who  is  conversant  with  the  Army  methods  of  business  and  paper  work. 
It  was  found  impossible  to  get  a  civilian  clerk  at  this  camp  who  had  the  neces- 
sary requirements  for  a  chief  clerk — the  men  who  could  fill  the  position  being^ 
employed  and  not  willing  to  give  up  their  positions  for  temporary  employment. — 
(Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  J.  C.  Waterman,  Infantry,  senior  mustering  officer, 
National  Guard  of  -  — ,  Sept.  5,  1916. ) 

The  one  thing,  in  my  opinion,  that  is  vastly  more  detrimental  to  rapidity  and 
efficiency  in  mobilization  than  everything  else  put  together  is  the  avalanche  of 
papers  and  forms  to  be  made  out  incident  to  muster  in,  these  requirements  being 
suddenly  launched  upon  officers  and  men  unaccustomed  thereto  and  unfamiliar 
with  the  particularity  insisted  upon. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  A.  M.  Shipp, 
Infantry,  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  Sept.  6,  1916. ) 

As  I  have  been  on  duty  from  19  to  21  hours  a  day  since  arrival  at  this  camp 
(excepting  the  last  day  or  so),  it  has  been  impracticable  to  render  the  first 
weekly  report  desired  by  the  department. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Ray- 
mond Sheldon,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of  - ,  July  6, 

1916.) 

Three  months'  bitter  experience  with  National  Guard  officers  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  Medical  Department  records  and  returns  have  convinced  all  of  the  regu- 
lar medical  officers  in  this  district  of  the  futility  of  expecting  even  approximate 
correctness. 

This  office  has  become  a  huge  clearing  house  for  the  correction  of  papers  and 
records,  and  only  by  making  out  the  required  forms  for  the  militia  medical 
officers  to  sign  can  the  demands  of  the  War  Department  be"  satisfied.  Gross 
stupidity  on  the  one  hand  and  utter  indifference  on  the  other  are  the  factors  in- 
volved, and  yet  one  can  not  but  feel  sympathy  for  these  officers  suddenly  con- 
fronted with  an  overwhelming  mass  of  unfamiliar  papers. 

Both  the  militia  and  reserve  officers  complain  loudly  of  the  clerical  work  of 
our  department,  and  many  have  informed  me  of  their  intention  to  separate  them- 
selves from  the  service  solely  on  account  of  the  regulations  governing  prepara- 
tion of  papers  which  they  claim  they  can  not  master. 

The  worst  of  it  is,  many  state  their  intention  to  advise  other  medical  men 
not  to  enter  our  service  until  a  simplified  set  of  forms  is  adopted. 

We  have  done  our  best  at  conferences  and  in  individual  conversations  to  im- 
press upon  these  reactionary  officers  the  necessity  for  correctness  in  papers 
and  the  ease  of  mastery,  if  one  will  only  intelligently  study  the  manual,  but  I 
fear  our  efforts  are  futile.  The  sick  and  wounded  report  is  the  great  stumbling 
block,  and  the  cards  of  some  organizations  are  enough  to  give  one  blind 
staggers. 

Despite  the  preparation  of  a  set  of  model  cards  for  each  organization,  no 
improvement  is  apparent,  and  we  have  abandoned  hope  of  teaching  these  men 
anything.  Some  have  the  affrontery  to  state  their  knowledge  of  our  papers  is 
equal  to  or  superior  to  ours,  and  to  prove  their  contention  produce  evidence 
that  so-and-so  taught  them  to  do  this  way  or  that. 

This  naturally  brings  up  the  question,  what  have  the  inspector-instructors 
assigned  the  militia  for  some  years  been  doing?  You  may  lead  a  horse  to  water 
but  you  can  not  make  him  drink,  and  I  fear  we  can  never  make  these  militia- 
men realize  the  responsibility  attached  to  their  commissioners,  unless  we  adopt  a 
simpler  form  of  records  which  require  but  little  study. —  (Extract  from  a  per- 
sonal letter,  Oct.  4,  1916,  from  an  officer  of  the  Medical  Corps  who  is  an 
inspector-instructor. ) 

Any  system  which  in  time  of  peace  permits  militia  officers  to  attain  posi- 
tions of  rank  which  involve  functions  of  command  which  in  time  of  war  they 
are  imperfectly  fitted  to  perform  is  a  system  so  harmful  to  the  Nation's  defense, 
so  universally  criticized  by  students  of  military  history,  as  to  require  no  further 
criticism.  Yet  the  present  mobilization  witnesses  its  application  on  a  scale 
never  before  reached  in  the  history  of  our  country. —  (Extract  from  report  of 
First  Lieut.  B.  E.  Grey,  Infantry,  inspector-instructor,  National  Guard  of 
— ,  Sept  7,  1916.) 

MORE   TIME   NEEDED   FOR  MOBILIZATION. 

Additional  time  should  be  allowed  for  the  training  of  troops  before  leaving 
their  State.  Of  the  many  recommendations  of  the  inspectors-instructors 
which  I  have  seen  on  this  subject,  none  has  stated  less  than  three  months  as 


ETC.  123' 

the  necessary  period.  This  time  is  required  for  administrative,  as  well  as 
for  tactical  training.  Company  officers  should  learn  how  to  handle  questions 
relating  to  rations,  clothing,  etc. ;  staff  officers  should  learn  their  various  duties ; 
and  all  should  learn  something  about  discipline,  so  that  the  machinery  of 
the  command  may  be  in  smooth  working  order  when  called  upon  to  meet 
unusual  situations. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Ralph  McCoy  on  National 
Guard  of  . ) 

All  reports  of  inspectors-instructors  indicate  that  a  minimum  of  three  months 
should  intervene  between  the  call  for  the  National  Guard  and  the  sending  of 
them  to  the  front. 

It  Is  a  great  mistake  to  rush  troops  from  their  home  stations  (armories) 
to  mobilization  camp  before  the  mobilization  camp  is  ready  to  receive  them, 
as  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  establishing  and  organizing  a  working  force  in 
the  office  of  the  mustering  officer  are  so  great  that  the  essentials  are  apt  to 
be  overlooked  in  attending  to  the  multitude  of  minor  though  insistent  duties 
which  spring  up  every  30  seconds  during  the  day. — Extract  from  report  of  Col. 
Buck,  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  June  28. ) 

With  the  idea  of  perhaps  preventing  similar  errors  in  future  it  is  believed 
that  mounted  organizations  of  the  militia  should  not  be  sent  from  place  of 
company  rendezvous  to  concentration  point  without  first  being  placed  in  a 
mobilization  camp  for  a  reasonable  time.  This  was  forcibly  brought  to  my 
attention  by  the  difference  in  the  condition  of  troops  leaving  from  Van  Court- 
land  Park  and  those  leaving  from  Camp  Whitman.  In  the  first  instance  there 
was  no  mobilization,  horses  were  purchased  hurriedly,  equipment  was  lacking 
for  recruits,  and  the  paper  work  connected  with  the  muster  in  was  necessarily 
hurried  too  much.  In  the  other  instance  a  wrell-organized  camp,  with  plenty 
of  equipment  and  supplies,  made  the  orderly  muster  in,  equipment,  and  en- 
training of  troops  possible.  It  is  realized  that  rush  orders  were  received  for 
the  troops  hurried  out  of  New  York  City,  but  the  advantage  gained  in  time  by 
not  permitting  them  to  effect  mobilization  was  largely  offset,  I  believe,  by  the 
advantages  and  quicker  efficiency  to  be  gained  by  less  haste  at  the  beginning. — 
(Extract  from  report  of  First  Lieut.  Dawson  Olmstead,  Field  Artillery,  in- 
spector-instructor, on  National  Guard  of  -  — ,  Aug.  22,  1916.) 

Everyone  was  working  under  great  pressure — time  appeared  to  be  a  factor — 
and,  in  my  opinion,  this  great  rush  defeated  one  of  the  objects  of  a  mobiliza- 
tion camp,  the  proper  equipping  of  the  troops  for  the  duty  for  which  intended. — 
(Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  W.  H.  Wilson,  inspector-instructor,  on  National 
Guard  of  -  — ,  Sept.  5.) 

COMMENDATION. 

Where  there  is  so  much  to  be  criticized  it  is  a  pleasure  to  note  what 
inspectors  have  to  say  in  a  different  vein — that  of  commendation. 

During  the  encampment  the  discipline  was  excellent.  The  absence  of  drunk- 
enness w^as  remarkable;  both  officers  and  men  appeared  to  be  earnest  and  will- 
ing to  do  all  that  was  required  of  them. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Hani- 
gan,  inspector-instructor,  on  mobilization  of  National  Guard  of  California.) 

Maj.  Phalen,  Medical  Corps,  United  States  Army,  inspector- 
instructor,  commends  Lieut.  Col.  Jacob  Frank,  chief  surgeon,  Illinois 
National  Guard,  and  states  that  the  fact  that  the  Illinois  troops  were 
protected  from  smallpox  and  typhoid  before  leaving  camp  was 
largely  due  to  his  energy  and  administrative  ability. 

I  have  a  pleasant  report  to  make  to  you,  and  you  can  verify  it  later.  We  are 
told  that  we  have  the  best  camp  in  this  district,  60  miles  long,  and  we  were  told 
this  by  Gens.  Bliss,  Plninmer,  and  Lewis.-- (Extract  from  report  of  Capt. 
Deems,  inspector-instructor,  on  Indiana  Battalion  of  Field  Artillery.) 

I  wish  to  record  that  all  possible  assistance  was  given  me  by  the  State 
authorities.  *  *  *  A  motor  car  and  driver  was  placed  at  my  disposal  at 
any  hour,  day  or  night.  *  *  The  senior  medical  officer  of  the  State,  Col. 

Harlow  Brooks,  a  man  of  the  highest  professional  accomplishments,  assisted 
me  in  every  way  in  maintaining  a  sanitary  camp  and  in  the  care  of  the  sick.  It 
required  only  a  suggestion  from  me  to  secure  the  purchase  of  a  new  motor  am- 
bulance for  the  transfer  of  the  seriously  sick  and  operative  cases  to  the  nearest 


124  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

civil  hospital,  25  miles  away.  *  *  *  The  State  board  of  health  sent  a  rep- 
re-entative  to  the  camp  and  established  a  temporary  laboratory,  where  all  nec- 
essary bacteriological  work  and  water  analysis  were  made.  *  *  *  This 
spirit  of  cooperation  and  cheerful  desire  to  assist  in  every  possible  manner  fur- 
nishes in  retrospect  the  most  encouraging  recollection  in  what  was  otherwise  a 
most  trying  experience. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Maj.  Wadhams,  Medical 
Corps,  on  physical  examinations  in  New  York  National  Guard.) 

Capt.  Hanigan  commends  the  performance  of  duty  by  Lieut.  Col. 
D.  A.  Smith,  Quartermaster  Corps,  National  Guard  of  California. 
He  states  that  Lieut.  Col.  C.  A.  Dukes,  Medical  Corps,  and  Capt.  E. 
S.  Loizeaux,  Medical  Corps,  California  National  Guard,  per- 
formed their  duties  faithfully  and  well.  He  also  commends  First 
Lieut.  R.  K.  Barry,  Medical  Corps,  National  Guard  of  California. 

Letter  of  Capt.  R.  L.  Hamilton,  retired,  Lincoln,  Nebr.,  July  15, 
1916,  commends  the  service  of  the  adjutant  general  of  Nebraska, 
Gen.  P.  L.  Hall;  his  assistant,  A.  D.  Falconer;  the  chief  surgeon, 
Maj.  C,  W.  Walden. 

Both  Lieut.  Col.  David  S.  Hill,  Quartermaster  Corps,  and  Lieut.  Col.  William 
G.  Schauffler,  surgeon  general,  were  untiring  in  their  cooperation  with  the  mus- 
tering officers. 

The  personnel  of  both  these  departments  of  the  National  Guard  had  been  care- 
fully trained  by  their  chiefs  and  rendered  very  efficient  service. —  (Extract  from 
report  of  Col.  Styer,  inspector-instructor,  on  mobilization  of  National  Guard  of 
,  Oct.  38.1 

All  matters  connected  with  the  encampment  and  mobilization,  Wisconsin 
National  Quard,  have  been  ably  managed  by  the  adjutant  general  of  the  State, 
who  is  entitled  to  full  measure  of  credit  for  the  excellent  conditions  noted  in 
this  report. —  (Indorsement  of  department  commander,  July  22,  on  report  of 
Col.  George  K.  Hunter,  Inspector  General,  on  inspection  of  National  Guard  of 
Wisconsin. ) 

Capt.  Hughes  states  that  the  Ordnance  Department  supplies  arrived  not  only 
without  requisition  but  as  soon  as  the  troops  did,  and  requisitions  on  this  depart- 
ment have  been  completely  and  promptly  filled.  The  highest  praise  is  due  them 
for  this  efficient  service. —  (Letter  of  Capt.  W.  N.  Hughes,  jr.,  Infantry,  inspector- 
instructor,  Nashville,  Tenn.,  July  16,  1916.) 

Commendatory  mention  should  be  made  of  Lieut.  Col.  Benton  Long,  of  the 
governor's  staff,  who  reported  in  camp,  without  pay  or  status,  and  volunteered 
as  an  assistant  to  the  property  officer  and  worked  night  and  day  without  re- 
gard to  hours.  His  services  as  well  as  those  of  Maj.  George  H.  Smith,  Quarter- 
master Corps,  who  also  volunteered  to  assist  the  property  officer,  were  invalu- 
able.—  (Extract  from  report  of  Capt.  Kemper.  inspector-instructor,  National 
Guard  of  Pennsylvania,  July  11.) 

I  feel  that  it  is  due  the  officers  and  men  of  the  National  Guard  of  Rhode 
Island  that  I  comment  on  the  excellent  discipline  that  was  maintained  during 
the  whole  camp.  As  far  as  I  know,  there  were  but  two  cases  during  the  camp 
that  called  for  even  troop  discipline,  and  no  summary  court  was  even  appointed. 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  much  liberty  was  given  to  the  troops,  this  record  seems 
to  me  to  be  most  commendable. —  (Report  of  Capt.  T.  A.  Roberts,  Cavalry,  in- 
spector-instructor, on  mobilization  of  Organized  Militia  of  Rhode  Island,  Sept. 
18,  1916.) 

The  spirit  manifested  by  the  enlisted  men  was  good.  In  very  few  cases  did 
they  seek  to  avoid  service  by  seeking  their  discharge  on  any  excuse. —  (Extract 
from  report  of  Capt.  Hamilton,-  inspector-instructor,  on  National  Guard  of 
Nebraska,  July  15.) 

The  Organized  Militia  of  Iowa  I  believe  tried  faithfully  to  do  its  share  in 
the  tentative  divisional  organization.  It  mustered  out  an  extra  regiment  of 
Infantry  and  started  its  proportion  of  Cavalry,  etc.  By  this  it  has  actually 
promoted  out  of  the  service  some  of  the  most  able  men  in  the  guards  who  took 
rank  in  the  division,  thus  losing  rank  in  the  brigade.  As  they  are  enthusiasts 
for  the  service,  it  is  probable  that  they  will  be  found  in  it  again ;  but  it  is  recom- 
mended that  if  the  divisions  are  formed  for  drill  in  the  higher  requirements  of 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    OKGANIZED    MILITIA,   ETC.  125 

an  Army  that  these  men  be  recognized.  I  especially  recommend  Maj.  David  S. 
Fair-child,  chief  surgeon,  and  Maj.  Elliot  E.  Lambert,  Quartermaster  Depart- 
ment. 

We  were  at  first  many  times  out  of  forms,  due  partly  to  the  extreme  careless- 
ness of  the  militia  clerks.  The  State  adjutant  general  gave  me  great  assistance 
in  every  way,  even  to  the  printing  of  forms  required.  He  is  an  able  man  and 
willing  to  assume  necessary  responsibility. 

The  assistant  mustering  officers  were  of  great  assistance  and  worked"  unceas- 
ingly to  accomplish  the  work  properly  in  the  shortest  space  of  time.  They  gen- 
erally retained  pleasant  relations  with  the  several  officers  with  whom  they  had 
contact. —  (Extract  from  report  of  Col.  George  H.  Morgan,  Cavalry,  senior  mus- 
tering officer,  National  Guard  of  Iowa,  July  16,  1916.) 

REPORTS  OF  DEPARTMENT  COMMANDERS. 

Extract  from  report  of  the  commanding  general,  Eastern  Depart- 
ment, on  the  mobilization  of  the  militia  in  the  Eastern  Department, 
June  19  to  July  17,  1916 : 

*  *  *  Of  the  men  mobilized  not  more  than  25  per  cent  can  be  considered 
as  reasonably  well-instructed  soldiers  (64  per  cent  of  the  militia  have  had  one 
year  or  more  of  service ;  36  per  cent  less  than  one  year ) .  A  considerable  num- 
ber of  the  long-service  men  have  had  to  drop  out,  some  because,  of  age,  some 
because  of  business  or  family  reasons,  and  many  because  of  physical  unfitness. 
Only  a  small  proportion  of  the  recruits  have  had  previous  military  training. 
Very  few  are  prepared  for  immediate  field  service,  and  'practically  all  were 
without  sufficient  experience  in  fieldwork  to  take  care  of  themselves  under 
campaign  conditions. 

The  number  of  really  effective  organizations  is  very  small.  There  is  a  fine 
spirit  of  willingness  among  officers  and  men  in  most  organizations,  but  un- 
fortunately this  can  not  take  the  place  of  organization  and  training,  nor  can  it 
replace  the  lack  of  trained  noncommissioned  officers  and  officers  in  sufficient 
numbers. 

The  percentage  of  rejections  varied  greatly,  but,  generally  speaking,  has  been 
heavy  and  has  indicated  the  physical  standards  required  by  the  Government 
had  not  been  insisted  upon.  The  percentage  of  rejections  runs  from  over  50  per 
cent  in  some  organizations  to  perhaps  as  low  as  2  per  cent  in  others,  but  in  gen- 
eral the  number  of  rejections  has  been  excessive.  Many  organizations  have  lost 
so  many  men  that  their  mobilization  has  been  more  or  less  indefinitely  post- 
poned. A  very  large  percentage  of  loss  has  characterized  many  of  the  recruit 
detachments  brought  in,  indicating  the  need  of  much  more  careful  examination. 

SUPPLIES    AND   EQUIPMENT. 

The  officer  in  charge  of  the  Philadelphia  depot  and  his  assistant  have  done  all 
that  men  could  do  to  overcome  the  handicap  of  a  faulty  system,  and  whatever 
delay  there  has  been  in  the  distribution  of  supplies  is,  so  far  as  I  can  learn,  in 
no  way  chargeable  to  them. 

I  am  informed  that  there  was  some  delay  in  furnishing  the  depot  with  a  copy 
of  the  call. 

The  mobilization  thus  far  has  demonstrated  beyond  question,  to  all  who  have 
been  charged  with  the  responsibility  of  forwarding  supplies  and  preparing 
troops  to  be  moved  to  the  front,  the  undesirability  and  short-sightedness  of 
storing  the  reserve  supplies  for  the  bulk  of  the  militia  of  this  department  in 
one  depot.  Never  again  should  it  be  possible  to  permit  so  unsound  an  arrange- 
ment to  be  made.  It  has  been  pointed  out  repeatedly  that  it  would  be  a  physical 
impossibility  to  ship  the  supplies  from  one  depot  and  get  them  out  with  any 
degree  of  promptness  or  with  such  equality  of  distribution  as  to  time  as  would 
make  a  prompt  and  orderly  mobilization  possible.  Hereafter,  if  the  system  is 
to  be  continued,  every  militia  regiment  and  separate  organization  which  has  a 
fireproof  armory  and  reasonably  secure  storage  rooms  should  have  with  it  the 
additional  supplies  necessary  to  bring  it  to  full  war  strength.  The  supplies 
and  equipment  for  those  which  have  not  such  facilities  should  be  stored  in  the 
nearest  arsenal,  depot,  or  post,  so  that  a  prompt  distribution  of  equipment  may 
be  made  possible.  Under  the  present  system  at  least  three  times  more  time  was 
used  in  getting  supplies  to  the  organizations  than  would  have  betMi  required 
had  a  system  been  in  force  which  was  based  upon  an  appreciation  of  the  value 
of  time  as  an  element  in  mobilization. 


126  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

TRANSPORTATION. 

Nearly  all  organizations  have  had  to  be  furnished  with  a  certain  amount  of 
transportation  in  the  way  of  draft  animals,  and  all  mounted  organizations 
have  had  to  be  furnished  with  mounts.  Generally  speaking,  the  organizations 
were  without  animals.  Here  and  there,  an  organization  was  found  with  a 
few  animals.  The  result  of  this  method  of  providing  animals  is  that  green 
and  unbroken  animals,  soft  and  without  preparation  for  work,  have  been  hur- 
riedly bought  and  turned  over  to  organizations  made  up  of  green  men,  without 
any  knowledge  of  caring  for  animals  in  the  field  or  elsewhere,  a  procedure  and 
a  condition  which  in  combination  insure  a  high  degree  of  inefficiency  and  a 
great  loss  of  animals.  All  organizations  should  have  in  future  some  of  the 
transportation  elements.  For  the  infantry  and  some  of  the  auxiliary  troops 
these  elements  may  be  maintained  in  the  form  of  light  motor  trucks,  with  a 
limited  number  of  animals.  For  the  mounted  arms,  a  nucleus  of  suitable 
mounts  should  be  maintained,  and  an  option  should  be  secured  on  a  sufficient 
number  of  suitable  animals  to  bring  the  command  promptly  to  war  strength. 
The  mounted  arms  should  also  have  at  all  times  a  certain  amount  of  motor 
transport,  for  moving  supplies,  etc.  We  can  not  afford  to  hold  a  full  equip- 
ment of  animals  through  the  long  intervals  of  peace,  but  we  can  and  should 
make  some  arrangement  for  promptly  securing  through  an  option  suitable 
animals.  These  animals  should  be  used  during  the  summer  encampments,  and 
their  fitness  tried  out.  Of  course,  this  all  means  a  considerable  outlay  of 
money,  but  if  we  are  to  have  any  degree  of  military  efficiency  for  our  mounted 
troops,  this  or  a  similar  system  must  be  adopted.  The  present  system  of 
mobilization  and  supply  of  animals  would  have  meant  disaster,  so  far  as  the 
mounted  arms  are  concerned,  had  we  had  actual  contact  with  an  enemy. 

RESERVES    OF    MEN    FOR   THE    MOBILIZATION. 

These  must  be  provided.  The  present  regiments,  troops,  batteries,  and  other 
units  which  are  going  to  the  front,  with  few  exceptions,  are  not  effective  organi- 
zations of  fairly  well-trained  soldiers ;  they  are  men  in  uniform,  largely  un- 
trained, wearing  an  equipment  and  carrying  arms  with  which  they  are  little 
familiar.  They  are  unprepared  to  meet  trained  troops  and  are  lacking  in  that 
solid  foundation  of  training  and  experience  in  practical  work  and  exercise, 
which  are  imperative  in  the  making  of  good  troops.  The  press  and  people  of  the 
country  note  the  trains  going  to  the  front  filled  with  men  in  uniform,  and  are 
unaware  of  the  fact  that  they  are  not  a  trained,  effective  fighting  force.  Months 
of  hard  work  will  be  required  before  these  troops  will  be  fit  to  take  the  field 
against  an  enemy. 

V.'lien  the  regiments  are  brought  to  full  war  strength  the  forces  on  the  border 
will  be  made  up  largely  of  untrained  men,  probably  to  the  extent  of  75  or  80 
per  cent.  There  is  beginning  to  be  an  inadequacy  of  supplies,  even  at  this  early 
stage  of  the  mobilization. 

These  conditions  and  others  pointed  out  are  those  which  have  been  foreseen  by 
all  who  have  been  familiar  with  conditions  existing  in  the  Organized  Militia. 
It  is  not  the  fault  of  officers  or  men,  but  the  natural  result  of  an  unsound  sys- 
tem. Fortunately,  the  military  situation  which  confronts  the  country  is  one  in 
which  the  element  of  danger  from  an  attacking  force  is  relatively  small,  and  the 
element  of  time  one  which  we  can  to  a  large  extent  control. 

The  delays  in  shipment  are  in  no  way  chargeable  to  the  railroads,  as 'they 
have  proceeded  as  rapidly  as  possible.  The  men  and  officers  of  the  militia 
have  been  willing  and  in  most  instances  enthusiastic.  The  blame  for  existing 
conditions  does  not  rest  upon  them.  They  have  done  what  they  could  to  over- 
come the  defects  of  a  system  which  has  always  rendered  a  high  degree  of  effi- 
ciency unattainable. 

It  will  be  at  least  six  weeks  or  two  months  after  the  organizations  have 
reached  the  border  before  they  will  have  reached  full  war  strength  and  be 
completely  equipped,  and  it  is  safe  to  say  that  it  will  be  fully  three  months  after 
muster  in  before  they  are  as  a  whole  able  to  render  reasonably  effective  service 
in  campaign  against  our  present  possible  enemy.  It  would  be  much  longer  if 
they  were  required  to  meet  first-class  troops. 

Taking  the  militia  of  the  department  as  a  whole  it  can  be  stated  that  the 
best  of  the  militia  has  gone  to  the  front,  while  the  remaining  regiments  will 
require  a  good  deal  of  time  for  preparation.  Recruiting  is  going  to  be  slow 


MOBILIZATION  OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC.  127 

and  difficult,  and  from  the  present  outlook  it  will  be  very  hard  to  fill  the  regi- 
ments up  to  full  strength.  This  is  due  very  largely  to  the  change  of  condi- 
tions on  the  border  and  the  increasing  improbability  of  immediate  active  service. 

I  believe  that  no  further  organizations  should  go  forward  until  thoroughly 
prepared  and  equipped,  including  the  full  complements  of  animals  for  draft 
and  riding.  If  it  has  been  decided  to  provide  the  animals  on  the  border,  then 
the  organizations  should  be  sent  to  the  border  as  soon  as  possible  in  order  that 
they  may  take  over  their  animals  and  begin  to  receive  instruction  in  their  use 
and  care. 

The  mobilization  to  date  indicates  that  the  militia  system  as  conducted  is 
wholly  inadequate  and  can  not 'be  depended  upon  to  produce  promptly  an  effec- 
tive military  force.  To  rely  upon  it  in  time  of  real  war  would  be  to  insure 
disaster.  When  it  is  remembered  that  we  have  already  spent  four  weeks  of 
intense  effort  in  assembling  54,000  troops,  out  of  a  call  for  131,000,  on  the  border, 
and  that  these  troops  are  as  yet  unprovided  with  transport  or  mounts,  and, 
further,  that  fully  75  per  cent  of  them  are  without  needed  instruction ;  that  our 
cavalry  is  largely  without  training  as  such,  and  that  much  of  our  artillery  has 
had  little  or  no  training,  the  imperative  necessity  for  a  radical  change  of  sys- 
tem is  apparent. 

MUSTERING   OFFICERS. 

Mustering  officers  have  rendered  excellent  service.  The  plan  of  turning  over 
the  inspector-instructors  to  the  department  commander  for  use  as  mustering 
officers  has  been  thoroughly  satisfactory.  The  officer  in  charge  of  militia 
affairs  has  through  these  officers  been  able  to  conduct  very  efficiently  the  many 
and  complex  details  arising  at  mobilization  camps. 

MOBILIZATION    CAMPS. 

The  mobilization  camps  on  the  whole  have  been  satisfactory ;  some  of  them 
were  not  well  chosen,  but  this  was  a  matter  which  only  experience  could  dem- 
onstrate. The  mobilization  camps  for  recruits  for  organizations  at  the  front 
have  been  and  are  being  transferred  to  military  posts,  where  the  recruits  can  be 
received,  equipped,  and  given  some  training  before  being  sent  to  the  front. 
This  will  result  in  a  saving  in  money  and  in  personnel  and  will,  I  believe,  in- 
crease efficiency,  as  it  would  be  difficult  to  maintain  working  organizations  at 
the  State  mobilization  camps  without  mustering  into  the  United  States  service 
a  larger  number  of  officers  than  will  be  necessary  for  the  proposed  system. 

RAILROAD   TRANSPORTATION. 

There  has  been  considerable  difficulty  in  securing  tourist  sleepers,  and  a 
large  portion  of  the  troops  have  had  to  make  a  considerable  part  of  the  move 
in  day  coaches.  While  this  has  been  uncomfortable,  there  has  been  no  serious 
hardship.  Generally  speaking,  the  railroad  companies  have  promptly  responded 
to  calls  for  transportation.  Care  has  been  taken  to  have  cars  provided  with 
light  and  water,  and  all  trains,  so  far  as  known,  have  been  carefully  inspected. 

TRAVEL   RATIONS    IN    CAMP. 

Rations  in  camp  have  been  reported  generally  as  satisfactory. 

TRAVEL  RATIONS   EN    ROUTE. 

Almost  without  exception  sections  have  been  provided  with  kitchen  cars  or 
improvised  cooking  cars,  so  that  men  exercising  ordinary  intelligence  and  in- 
itiative could  prepare  coffee  and  the  necessary  food.  There  have  been  a  con- 
siderable number  of  instances  of  alleged  shortage  of  food,  but  thus  far  indica- 
tions are  that  the  shortage,  whenever  it  existed,  was  due  to  inexperience  or 
carelessness.  The  travel  ration  is  sufficient,  and  ample  has  been  provided  for 
the  journey. 

The  handling  of  the  ration  by  the  militia,  both  at  mobilization  camps  and  en 
route,  indicated  the  need  of  developing  trained  field  cooks  in  militia  organiza- 
tions. 


128  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

PURCHASE  OF   ANIMALS. 

Boards  were  organized  under  the  emergency  orders  to  hurry  troops  to  the 
front,  and  large  numbers  of  animals  were  purchased  for  troops  of  New  Jersey, 
New  York,  Connecticut,  Rhode  Island,  and  Massachusetts,  and  small  numbers  of 
animals  sufficient  to  furnish  troops  with  the  necessary  wagon  transportation 
for  use  about  camp  were  purchased  for  several  other  States.  This  was  neces- 
sary because  organizations  were  practically  without  animals.  At  present  the 
bulk  of  the  militia  in  camp  is  asking  for  draft  animals,  and  all  the  mounted 
organizations  are  requesting  that  mounts  be  furnished  them  before  going  to 
the  frontier. 

The  general  price  for  animals  has  been  satisfactory,  and  it  has  been  com- 
paratively easy  to  secure  good  animals  from  agencies  which  have  been  collect- 
ing for  foreign  Governments. 

SHORTAGE    OF    QUARTERMASTER'S    SUPPLIES. 

The  shortage  of  quartermaster's  supplies  in  a  considerable  number  of  lines 
developed  during  the  second  week,  and  purchases  of  certain  articles  had  to  be 
made  in  the  open  market. 

THE   CLERICAL  FORCE. 

The  clerical  force  of  the  department  has  rendered  signally  efficient  service, 
working  from  16  to  18  hours  a  day  in  many  instances. 

BLANK    FORMS. 

There  has  been  considerable  difficulty  in  securing  certain  classes  of  blank 
forms.  This  has  been  remedied. 

*  *  ***** 

A  full  report  will  be  submitted  on  completion  of  the  mobilization.     The  pres- 
ent report  is  intended  simply  to  outline  briefly  the  general  situation  and  to 
indicate  that  much  must  not  be  expected  of  these  troops  until  they  have  had* 
several  months'  training. 

LEONARD  WOOD, 
Major  General  United  States  Army. 

[Indorsements.] 

1.  The  following  supplementary  report  to  the  one  forwarded  July  17,  1916,  is 
submitted : 

2.  Briefly  reviewing  the  situation  presented,  attention  is  particularly  invited 
to  the  following  salient  points: 

(a)  Thirty  per  cent  of  the  number  of  enlisted  men  in  the  State  service  at  the 
date  of  the'call  of  the  President,  June  18,  1916,  were  discharged  because  of 
physical  disability.  Such  a  proportion  of  ineffectives  is  amazing  when  it  is 
considered  that  Delaware  and  North  Carolina  are  the  only  States  in  this  de- 
partment that  have  not  adopted  the  standards  of  the  Regular  Army  physical 
examination  prior  to  entry  into  the  service.  The  lax  methods,  in  this  connec- 
tion that  must  have  been  employed  are  w7ell  demonstrated  in  the  cases  of  Geor- 
gia and  Kentucky,  both  of  which  States  average  for  each  organization  pre- 
sented 50  per  cent  physical  rejections  and  the  unnecessary  monetary  loss  inci- 
dent thereto  in  the  way  of  "  pay,  clothing,  and  keep  "  of  such  men.  they  being 
entitled  to  such  from  the  date  they  responded  to  the  call  of  the  President,  will 
be  a  considerable  item.  As  the  mobilization  has  proceeded,  the  paramount  idea 
seems  to  have  been  on  the  part  of  the  States  to  simply  supply  men  regardless 
of  their  physical  qualifications  or  disqualifications.  In  many  instances  a  strong 
effort  has  been  made  to  bring  about  the  mustering  into  the  service  of  physically 
unfit  men  and  to  prevent  the  mustering  out  of  the  service  of  those  who  are 
physically  unfitted  for  active  duty. 

(6)  Of  the  total  number  responding  to  the  call  of  June  18,  on  July  31  there 
remained  in  mobilization  camps  in  this  department  practically  34  per  cent. 
Departures  have  been  delayed  primarily  because  of  lack  of  equipment,  and, 
secondarily,  the  inability  of  organizations  to  recruit  to  the  authorized  minimum 
peace  strength.  This  feature,  as  well  as  the  number  of  recruits  received  for 
organizations  that  have  been  forwarded  to  the  Southern  Department,  which  is 
7.5  per  cent  of  the  number  required  to  recruit  such  organizations  to  war 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  129 

strength,  is  believed  to  be  a  result  of  increasing  improbability  of  immediate 
active  service,  but  regardless  of  the  cause,  the  facts  as  stated  remain. 

(c)  With  reference  to  shortages,  especially  in  the  Ordnance  and  Quarter- 
master Departments,  this  developed  early  in  the  mobilization  and  has  indi- 
cated a  condition  of  serious  shortage  in  these  departments.      The  Adjutant 
General  on  June  27  telegraphed  these  headquarters  as  follows : 

"  With  reference  to  your  request  for  authority  to  communicate  directly  with 
depots  in  matter  of  ordnance  material,  Chief  of  Ordnance  reports  mobilization 
of  militia  has  practically  exhausted  small  reserve  supply  in  hands  of  his  de- 
partment, and  that  it  is  essential  that  limited  amount  of  stores  remaining  on 
hand  should  be  held  subject  to  order  of  War  Department  to  meet  most  urgent 
needs." 

This  statement  is  significant  and  indicates  very  clearly  what  would  have 
happened  had  we  occasion  to  meet  an  enemy  who  was  prepared  or  meet  a  force 
of  any  strength.  This  matter  will  be  handled  more  in  detail  in  the  final  report. 
Serious  shortages  also  developed  in  the  Quartermaster  Department  in  the  very 
early  stages  of  the  mobilization,  and  indicated  the  department  was  almost 
wholly  unready  to  meet  the  demands  of  war  even  under  conditions  of  minor 
gravity,  in  the  military  sense,  which  characterized  our  possible  clash  with 
Mexico. 

(d)  The  system  of  furnishing  horses  through  collecting  them  in  the  Middle 
WTest  and  sending  them  to  the  frontier  to  be  assigned  to  untrained  mounted 
organizations  on  arrival  has  been  a  pronounced  failure  and  should  never  be 
resorted  to  again.     Mounted  organizations  have  been  held  for  months  without 
horses  awaiting  shipment  to  the  border.     On  arrival  it  will  require  additional 
months  to  train  the  men  for  the  mounted  service,  and  an  equally  long  time  to 
train  the  mounts.     These  organizations  should  have  had  their  horses  assigned 
to  them  in  camp  and  their  training  conducted  there.    To  assemble  the  men  andl 
animals  of  mounted  organizations  in  the  theater  of  wrar  and  in  the  immediate* 
presence  of  a  presumptive  enemy,  in  my  opinion,  is  a  most  unwise  and  hazard- 
ous procedure. 

3.  The  evidence  as  gathered  for  the  period  as  covered  by  this  report  serves 
only  to  emphasize  the  correctness  of  the  statements  made  in  the  previous  report, 
and  has  fully  justified  the  recommendations  made  in  preceding  years  to  the 
effect  that  reserves  of  men  and  animals  must  be  provided  in  time  of  peace. 
Arms  and  equipment  sufficient  to  arm  and  equip  regiments  at  war  strength 
must  be  kept  in  the  armories  or  in  depots  under  Government  control  as  near  as 
possible  to  the  troops  concerned.  The  present  system  of  concentrating  supplies 
has  'been  an  absolute  failure,  has  caused  much  delay  and  a  great  and  unneces- 
sary outlay  of  money  incident  to  shipping  by  express,  etc.  This  department  has 
been  stripped  of  medical  officers,  cooks,  bakers,  and  technical  troops  in  a  desper- 
ate effort  to  take  care  of  and  render  more  efficient  this  largely  untrained,  largely 
unequipped  force  of  militia.  This  mobilization  has  demonstrated  a  condition 
\vhich  should  never  be  allowed  to  occur  again,  and  has  shown  conclusively 
that  we  could  not  have  possibly  met  even  a  small  well-prepared  force  with  any 
hope  of  success.  It  is  not  the  men  and  officers  in  the  militia  who  are  at  fault, 
but  rather  the  system.  If  this  demonstration  of  the  entire  unreliability  and 
workability  of  our  present  militia  system  proves  to  be  sufficient  to  bring  about 
the  adoption  of  a  sound,  rational  system,  the  lesson  will  be  well  worth  what 
it  cost. 

LEONARD  WOOD, 
Major  General,  United  States  Army. 


HEADQUARTERS  CENTRAL  DEPARTMENT, 

Chicago,  III.,  October  19,  1016. 
From :  Department  commander. 
To  :  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
Subject:  Report  concerning  recent  National  Guard  mobilization. 

In  compliance  with  letter  from  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  dated 
September  18,  1916,  the  following  report  on  the  National  Guard  mobilization  in 
the  Central  Department  is  submitted : 

(a)  The  degree  of  promptness  with  which  these  troops  have  assembled,  andl 
where  they  have  been  slow,  the  reasons  for  such  tardiness. 

72031- 


130  MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC. 

1.  The  assembly  of  the  troops  at  their  respective  State  mobilization  camps 
was  practically,  and  in  some  cases  entirely,  completed  as  follows  : 

By  June  23,  Missouri,  Wisconsin. 

By  June  24,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Kansas. 

By  June  25,  Colorado,  Michigan,  Nebraska,  North  Dakota. 

By  June  26,  Wyoming. 

By  June  28,  Iowa,  Minnesota,  South  Dakota. 

By  July  2,  Ohio. 

2.  The  desirability,  or  in  some  cases  the  necessity,  of  recruiting  certain  or- 
ganizations to  minimum  strength  was  the  main  reason  for  the  delay  in  the 
assembling  of  such  troops  as  reached  their  mobilization  camps  on  June  25,  26, 
and  28.     The  delay  in  the  case  of  Ohio  was  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
site  selected  for  mobilization  camp  was  absolutely  unsuitable  and  secondarily,  to 
the  fact  that  the  State  authorities  considered  it  necessary  to  construct  a  semi- 
permanent camp  with  shelters,  sewer  systems,  etc.,  all  of  which  resulted  in 
unusual  expense  for  work  of  no  permanent  value,  and  much  of  which  was 
entirely  unnecessary.     Every  effort  was  made  by  department  headquarters  to 
expedite  the  assembling  of  the  Ohio  troops,  but  it  was  impossible  to  get  the 
State  authorities  to  hasten  assembly.     It  was  10  days  after  the  call  before  the 
first  Ohio  regiment  arrived  at  camp.    Before  this  time  two  Illinois  regiments  had 
already  left  for  the  border,  and  the  troops  in  several  other  States  of  this  depart- 
were  practically  ready  to  leave,  having  been  mustered  and  physically  examined 
and  their  property  checked. 

3.  In  all  interests,  especially  those  of  economy,  National  Guard  troops  should 
be  mustered  in  at  their  respective  armories,  thus  saving  the  transportation  of 
rejected  officers  and  men  to  the  mobilization  camps  and  return,  the  great  loss  of 
time  to  the  individuals  concerned,  unusual  delay  in  replacing  them,  and  their 
pay  during  that  period. 

(6)  The  degree  of  preparedness  evinced  upon  assembly,  covering  organization, 
supplies,  equipment,  etc.,  so  far  as  lies  within  the  responsibility  of  the  State. 

1.  Orfjfinhiitiou    as   (tffccthu?  preparedness.- — In  no   State   was   the  National 
Guard  prepared  to  take  the  field  at  once.     In  most  cases  this  unpreparedness 
was  mainly  due  to  the  faulty  system  under  which  the  National  Guard  is  organ- 
ized, supplied,  and  controlled.     In  others,  the  State  authorities  were  partially 
responsible. 

Tne  _ r_j  due  to  lack  of  proper  organization,  could  not  be  sent  to 

the  border  until  July  9,  and  even  then  it  was  without  a  machine-gun  company. 
A  machine-gun  company  was  later  organized,  but  it  was  not  complete  and  did 
not  join  its  regiment  until  the  latter  returned  from  the  border  in  September. 
The  —  -  regiment  had  practically  to  be  reorganized  after  arrival  at 

its  mobilization  camp,  thereby  greatly  delaying  its  preparation  for  the  field. 

In  many  States — notably  in  Colorado,  Minnesota,  South  Dakota,  and  Wyo- 
ming— the  various  units  of  State  organizations  were  not  up  to  minimum 
strength,  or  were  so  close  to  minimum  strength  that  the  discharge  of  the  physi- 
cally disqualified  brought  them  in  many  cases  far  below  the  minimum.  This 
lack  of  strength  was  in  many  cases  a  cause  of  delay  in  assembling,  and  of  still 
greater  delay  before  the  troops,  after  arrival  at  camp,  could  be  considered  even 
reasonably  ready  for  the  field.  The  Wyoming  battalions  were  still  below  mini- 
mum strength  on  July  31,  when  .they  were  sent  to  the  border.  In  Colorado  it 
was  so  difficult  to  get  recruits  that  many  units,  months  after  their  assembly, 
were  still  little  more  than  skeleton  organizations. 

Proper  supervision,  inspection,  and  instruction  of  National  Guard  companies, 
batteries,  and  troops,  coupled  with  proper  and  efficient  command  thereof,  should 
suggest  that  each  such  unit  should  have,  first  and  foremost  among  its  enlisted 
strength,  competent  cooks  and  bakers  who  can  properly  prepare  the  rations,  and 
in  mounted  units  equally  important  requisites  are  competent  blacksmiths  and 
farriers,  with  the  necessary  farriers'  and  blacksmiths'  tools,  etc.,  on  hand  to 
shoe  and  care  for  the  animals. 

2.  Supplies  and  equipment  as  affecting  preparedness. — The  lack  of  animals 
in  mounted  organizations  and  of  draft  animals  in  all  was  not  the  fault  of  the 
various  States.     Similarly  the  lack  in  many  regiments  of  machine  guns  and  per- 
taining equipment  does  not  lie  within  the  responsibility  of  the  States.     The 
completeness  and  condition  of  equipment  in  the  various  States,  and  even  in 
the  various  organizations'  of  a  single  State,  varied  from  excellent  to  very  poor. 
The  arms,  generally  speaking,  were  in  good  condition.     The  clothing  on  hand 
for  peace  strength  of  the  organization  was  in  most  cases  serviceable,  though 
naturally  more  or  less  worn. 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  131 

The  Wisconsin  troops  as  a  whole  were,  upon  date  of  call,  better  equipped  for 
immediate  field  service  than  were  the  troops  of  any  other  State.  The  contrast 
between  the  Wisconsin  troops  and  those  of  some  of  \he  other  States,  with  refer- 
ence to  completeness  of  equipment,  was  in  many  cases  very  marked. 

There  was  a  general  shortage  of  engineer  and  signal  equipment.  Some  of 
this  shortage  already  existed  before  the  troops  were  called  out  in  Federal  serv- 
ice, and  hence  was  probably  the  fault  of  the  State  authorities.  How  much  of 
the  total  shortage  is  the  fault  of  the  State  authorities  and  how  much  is  the 
fault  of  the  Federal  authorities  it  is  impossible  to  state.  It  proved  very  diffi- 
cult, however,  and  in  some  cases  impossible  to  get  requisitions  for  such  prop- 
erty filled  after  the  troops  had.  been  mustered  into  the  Federal  service.  Suffi- 
cient supplies  were  not  on  hand  in  the  Federal  depots  to  meet  the  demand. 

Except  in  the  matter  of  machine  guns  and  equipment  and  ammunition,  the 
troops  were  in  most  cases  well  supplied  with  ordnance  equipment  for  ordinary 
peace  strength,  and  there  was  comparatively  little  difficulty  or  delay  in  supply- 
ing the  balance  of  the  equipment  necessary  to  equip  troops  to  war  strength.  In 
some  cns?s  two  or  more  different  types  of  equipment  were  supplied  to  a  single 
organization,  and  some  troops  were  equipped  partly  with  revolvers  and  partly 
with  automatic  pistols. 

Many  National  Guard  organizations  were  deficient  in  shoes  and  blankets,  as 
well  as  in  many  less  important  articles  of  uniform  and  equipage.  The  State 
authorities,  however,  can  only  in  part  be  blamed  for  these  deficiencies,  as  the 
Federal  authorities  did  not  have  sufficient  on  hand  to  supply  the  needs  of  the 
National  Guard  when  it  was  called  into  that  service.  Khaki  clothing  was  also 
conspicuous  by  its  absence.  In  most  organizations,  at  date  of  call,  soldiers  were 
not  provided  witli  more  than  an  average  of  1  blanket,  1  woolen  uniform,  1 
O.  D.  shirt,  1  pair  of  shoes,  and  1  suit  of  underwear. 

No  militia  organization  appeared  at  mobilization  camp  completely  armed, 
clothed,  equipped,  and  ready  to  take  the  field.  The  lack  of  equipment  ran  all 
the  way  from  a  shortage  of  a  few  minor  articles  to  a  serious  shortage  of  essen- 
tials, such  as  rifles,  ordnance  equipment,  clothing,  etc. 

(c)  The  degree  of  progress  made  in  training  by  the  troops  thus  mobilized, 
"ders  given  or  measures  taken  for  the  instruction  of  National  Guard  troops 

their  mobilization  camps  after  muster  into  the  service  of  the  United  States : 

1.  The  degree  of  progress  made  by   the  organizations   in   this  department 
varied  between  wide  limits.     Some  regiments,  after  several  weeks  in  the  mobili- 
zation camps,  were  still  practically  ignorant  of  the  most  ordinary  duties  of 
the  soldier.     In  others  the  progress  made  was  most  gratifying.     On  account 
of  this  wide  variation  in  training,  no  fixed  schedule  of  training  was  ordered 
from  these  headquarters,  it  being  considered  that  the  senior  Regular  Army 
line  officer  on  the  ground,  acting  as  instructor  as  well  as  mustering  officer,  was 
the  best  judge  of  what  was  needed  in  the  particular  case.     During  the  early 
days  of  the  mobilization,  any  attempt  at  progressive  training  would  have  been 
worse  than  useless,  as  the  energies  of  all  were  fully  occupied  in  attending  to 
the  physical  needs  of  the  troops  and  pushing  the  arrangements  to  expedite 
departure  for  the  border.     The  troops  remaining  in  mobilization  camps  after 
the  first  rush  of  troops  to  the  border  had  passed  were  given  regular  drill  and 
instruction — the  amount  and  kind  varying  in  the  different  camps. 

2.  The  Wisconsin  troops  end  some  of  the  Illinois,  Iowa,  Minnesota,  Missouri, 
and  Kansas  organizations  were  probably  the  best  trained  at  the  tame  of  muster 
in.     The  South  Dakota  Regiment,  Colorado  troops,  and  the  two  Wyoming  bat- 
talions were  probably  in  the  poorest  shape  as  regards  both  organization  and 
training. 

(d)  Criticisms  and  comments  on  regulations  and  methods,  with  suggestions 
and  recommendations  which  will  enable  the  department  to  inaugurate  such 
changes  as  will  insure  greater  smoothness  and  expedition  in  future  mobiliza- 
tion. 

The  chief  lesson  taught  by  the  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  in  1916 
is  the  utter  impossibility  of  maintaining  an  efficient  military  machine  under 
the  dual  control  of  the  State  and  National  governments.  It  has  also  brought 
home  to  us  very  forcibly  the  futility  of  prescribing  rules  and  regulations  to  be 
followed  by  the  National  Guard  when  the  Federal  Government  has  no  power 
to  enforce  these  rules  and  regulations.  The  entire  mobilization  emphasizes  the 
absolute  necessity  of  some  form  of  universal  training  and  service  and  of  having 
the  military  forces  of  the  country  under  sole  Federal  control  at  all  times.  Vol- 
untary service  is  undemocratic,  unreliable,  and  expensive,  while  divided  con- 
trol means  divided  responsibility  and  consequent  inefficiency. 


132  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    OKGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

The  National  Guard  as  now  organized  and  controlled  is  not  as  a  whole  a 
dependable  or  efficient  force,  can  never  be  made  so,  and  is  excessively  expensive. 
A  like  amount  of  money  expended  on  the  Regular  Army  would  increase  it  in 
numbers  sufficient  to  meet  all  emergencies  and  form  an  effective  first  line  ready 
for  immediate  call  and  dispatch  anywhere. 

This  recent  mobilization  constrains  the  opinion  that  there  should  be  no  Na- 
tional Guard  unit  above  the  regiment  which  will  eliminate  all  National  Guard 
line  general  officers,  very  few,  if  any,  of  whom  are  competent  to  properly  exer- 
cise the  functions  of  even  brigade  command,  and  if  the  adjutants  general  of 
the  several  States  could  be  appointed  and  selected  on  some  system  of  exami- 
nation of  them — their  records  and  service — and  not  be  appointed  for  political 
reasons,  great  improvement  would  come  in  the  administration  of  their  offices, 
in  competent  advice  to  their  respective  governors  and  efficient  control  of  the 
State  forces. 

Criticisms  and  comments  on  the  mobilization  and  suggestions  for  future 
changes  are  given  below  under  the  headings — "  Personnel,"  "  Recruiting,"  "  Mo- 
bilization points,"  "  Supply,"  "  Instruction,"  and  "Administration." 

1.    PERSONNEL. 

All  States  in  the  Central  Department  have,  theoretically,  adopted  the  physical 
standard  prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army.  Practically  no  effort  has  been  made 
in  any  State  to  enforce  or  properly  apply  this  standard  in  enlisting  men  for  the 
National  Guard.  The  percentages  of  rejection  upon  physical  examination  held 
after  muster  into  the  United  States  service  are  as  follows:  Colorado,  10  per 
cent;  Illinois,  11  per  cent;  Indiana,  21  per  cent;  Iowa,  8  per  cent;  Kansas,  16 
per  cent ;  Michigan,  15  per  cent ;  Minnesota,  13  per  cent ;  Missouri,  12  per  cent ; 
Nebraska,  15  per  cent;  North  Dakota,  12  per  cent;  Ohio,  26  per  cent;  South 
Dakota,  11  per  cent;  Wisconsin,  17  per  cent;  Wyoming,  25  per  cent.  In  a  num- 
ber of  individual  companies  the  percentage  of  rejections  ran  from  30  to  35  per 
cent  and  higher.  One  Indiana  battery,  recently  recognized  by  the  Federal 
Government  and  accepted  into  service  under  the  President's  call,  came  to 
mobilization  camp  with  137  enlisted  men,  of  whom  52  were  rejected  upoa 
physical  examination  held  the  day  following  muster  in. 

Under  the  law  no  unit  can  be  accepted  into  the  Federal  service  under  a 
certain  fixed  minimum  strength  prescribed  by  the  President.  At  the  same  time 
the  law  prescribes  that  any  unit  having  the  required  minimum  must,  if  called 
out,  be  mustered  into  the  Federal  service  prior  to  the  physical  examination  that 
is  made  under  the  supervision  of  the  regular  mustering  officer.  Companies  of 
the  National  Guard  averaging  about  40  men  at  the  time  of  the  President's  call 
on  June  18  were  recruited  to  minimum  strength  by  going  into  the  highways 
and  byways  and  enlisting  any  men  obtainable.  The  officers  concerned  ap- 
preciated the  fact  that  many  of  the  men  who  were  enlisted  under  these  cir- 
cumstances would  undoubtedly  be  rejected  upon  the  physical  examination  which 
would  follow  the  muster  in,  but  under  the  provisions  of  the  law  they  had  to 
attain  a  certain  minimum  strength,  and  in  order  to  do  so  were  practically 
forced  to  enlist  any  applicants  whose  physical  defects  were  not  strikingly  ap- 
parent to  the  most  casual  observer.  One  regiment  (Eighth  Ohio  Infantry)  had 
approximately  500  men,  who  were  so  enlisted,  rejected  upon  physical  examina- 
tion held  after  muster  in. 

No  advantage  whatever  was  derived  either  by  Federal  or  State  Government 
from  having  organizations  report  at  mobilization  camps  with  a  fictitious 
strength  caused  by  the  influx  of  such  hastily  enlisted  and  physically  unfit 
recruits.  Under  the  law,  however,  it  was  necessary  that  all  such  men  (even 
though  absolutely  and  evidently  unfit  for  service),  having  once  been  enlisted  by 
State  authorities,  should  at  Federal  expense  be  transported  to  the  mobilization 
camp,  fed,  cared  for,  and  paid  for  a  period  of  time  varying  from  a  few  days 
to  several  weeks,  examined  physically,  which  took  time  and  required  the  services 
of  a  large  number  of  medical  officers,  only  to  be  then  discharged  and  returned 
to  their  homes.  This  expensive  procedure  was  necessarily  followed  out  in  the 
case  of  over  9,000  National  Guardsmen  in  this  department  alone.  The  money 
necessarily  paid  out  for  them  by  the  Federal  Government  was  absolutely 
wasted, 

I  recommend  that  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  National  Guard  be 
examined  physically  at  least  once  a  year  by  medical  officers  of  the  United 
States  Army,  and  that  men  found  physically  unfit  be  discharged  at  once. 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  133 

Some  modification  should  be  made  in  the  physical  requirements  for  admis- 
sion of  National  Guard  officers  and  men  when  the  organizations  are  transferred 
to  Federal  service.  It  is  unreasonable  to  require  the  same  physical  standard 
of  a  field  officer  of  20  years'  service  as  is  required  for  a  young  recruit.  Many 
excellent  officers  can  not  pass  the  required  eye  tost  without  their  glasses,  but 
can  see  perfectly  with  glasses.  Regulations  should  lie  prepared  showing  the 
deviation  from  'the  standard  permitted  under  certain  circumstances.  The 
requirements  should  also  be  modified  for  officers  and  men  of  mature  years  and 

° Whether  or  not  the  physical  requirements  governing  acceptance  of  officers 
and  enlisted  men  are  modified  as  above  suggested,  it  is  highly  desirable  that 
department  commanders  be  given  authority  to  waive  minor  defects  in  weight, 
height  eyesight,  etc.  The  fact  that  elm-ing  the  early  part  of  the  past  mobiliza- 
tion all  such'  applications  for  waiver  had  to  go  to  the  War  Department  resulted 
in  the  loss  of  many  desirable  officers  and  men  and  in  considerable  delay  and 
dissatisfaction  all  around. 

If  the  National  Guard  is-  in  any  sense  of  the  word  to  be  what  its  name  im- 
plies, steps  must  be  taken  to  obviate  discharging,  after  the  guard  is  called  out, 
a  large  proportion  of  the  enlisted  men  on  account  of  their  dependent  families 
or  for  other  reasons.  Members  of  the  guard  who,  in  time  of  peace,  become 
residents  of  another  State,  should  be  at  once  discharged.  The  company  rolls 
should  contain  the  names  of  only  such  men  as  are  actually  doing  service  with 
the  guard  when  called  out  in  time  of  national  emergency.  The  appointment  of 
officers  selected,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  by  the  men  whom  they  are  to 
command  is  a  vital  fault  still  existing  in  many  States. 

The  fact  that  as  a  rule  fully  one-third  of  the  members  of  the  various  organi- 
zations were,  upon  muster  in,  untrained  recruits  or  men  of  but  a  few  months' 
service  made  it  impossible  to  regard  any  unit  as  properly  trained.  The  influx 
of  raw  recruits  at  any  time  cuts  down  very  greatly  the  efficiency  even  of 
well-trained  regular  organizations.  In  the  case  of  National  Guard  organiza- 
tions it  is  especially  necessary  that  in  time  of  emergency  such  influx  be  not 
permitted,  and  they  should  not  be  accepted  into  Federal  service  unless  up  to 
minimum  strength  at  time  of  call. 

2.    RECRUITING. 

Whatever  the  duty  assigned  to  the  National  Guard,  and  whether  or  not  it 
be  mustered  into  the*  Federal  service,  it  continues  to  remain  essentially  a  State 
force.  In  this  it  differs  from  other  Federal  troops. 

In  filling  vacancies  this  essential  difference  must.be  considered  if  the  best 
results  are  to  be  obtained. 

To  recruit  for  the  Regular  Army  all  that  is  necessary  is  for  a  recruiting 
officer  at  any  station  to  enlist  a  suitable  man.  At  once  he  becomes  available 
to  fill  any  vacancy  in  the  Regular  Army.  The  Regular  Army  is  in  no  way  local. 
The  recruit  loses  all  local  interest  and  his  home  largely  loses  interest  in  him. 

With  the  State  troops  regiments  in  large  cities  and  companies  in  smaller 
communities  are  essentially  local ;  the  personnel  of  any  such  organization 
belong  to  a  limited  neighborhood.  The  home  town  entertains  an  intense 
interest  in  them;  the  men  of  the  organization  retain  interest  in  the  town;  and 
to  maintain  proper  strength  the  recruits,  due  to  local  pride,  are  most  easily 
obtained  locally. 

To  recruit  for  such  organizations  the  best  results  are  most  likely  to  be 
obtained  by  men  well  acquainted  in  the  various  neighborhoods  whence  come 
the  organizations ;  they  know  the  population  and -by  what  feeling  it  is  animated. 
Methods  successful  in  one  State  may  not  succeed  in  another.  Of  these  and 
other  conditions  the  State  authorities  are  best  informed  and  they  can  best 
take  advantage  of  them. 

Recruiting  for  the  National  Guard  should  be  conducted  by  the  State  author- 
ities, they  to  secure  applicants  for  enlistment  through  solicitation  by  National 
Guard  retired  or  reserve  officers,  county  and  other  officials,  or  by  such  other 
methods  as  may  be  deemed  expedient  and  to  send  all  accepted  applicants  to 
a  previously  selected  and  centrally  located  State  recruit  depot.  At  this  depot 
the  Federal  authority  begins  and  the  applicants  will  before  enlistment  be 
physically  examined  by  a  medical  officer  of  the  Regular  Army.  The  State  to 
bear  expense  of  securing  and  sending  all  applicants  to  the  depot  and  of 
rejected  applicants  back  to  their  homes,  and  then  the  State  to  be  reimbursed 


134  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED    MILITIA,    ETC. 

by  the  Federal  Government  for  each  recruit  enlisted  in  a  sum  of  money  equal 
to  the  average  cost  of  a  recruit  for  the  Regular  Army  delivered  and  enlisted 
at  the  regular  United  States  Army  recruiting  depots. 

After  enlistment  the  Federal  Government  to  have  full  charge  of  instruction, 
equipage,  etc.,  the  recruits  being  forwarded  for  this  purpose  to  the  mobiliza- 
tion camp  designated  for  troops  of  that  State.  All  recruits  will  there  be  fully 
equipped  and  given  all  necessary  training  before  being  assigned  to  units  or 
forwarded  to  the  front  for  assignment.  Individual  preferences  should,  of 
course,  be  considered  so  far  as  possible,  as  it  would  tend  to  make  recruiting 
easier  if  recruits  were  assigned  to  home  organizations. 

By  the  above  plan  the  forces  best  calculated  to  appeal  to  the  people  would 
be  used  to  stimulate  recruiting,  and  it  would  cost  the  Federal  Government  only 
for  accepted  recruits.  The  State  loses  nothing  provided  reasonable  care  is 
exercised  in  securing  suitable  applicants,  and  the  Federal  Government  is  fully 
protected. 

3.    MOBILIZATION   POINTS. 

The  mobilization  camps  in  many  States  of  this  department  were  not  at  all 
suited  to  the  purpose.  The  site  at  Columbus,  Ohio,  was  unsuitable  and  most 
of  the  money  spent  in  preparation  of  this  camp  was  wasted.  The  camp  was 
abandoned  as  soon  as  the  troops  left. 

The  Infantry  of  the  Illinois  National  Guard  were  mobilized  at  the  State 
Fair  Grounds  at  Springfield.  This  site  proved  convenient  enough  under  the 
circumstances,  but  wras  unsuited  for  more  than  temporary  use. 

The  mobilization  point  for  the  Nebraska  troops  was  the  State  Fair  Grounds 
at  Lincoln,  a  site  entirely  unsuited  for  the  purpose,  having  no  room  for  drill 
ground  and  being  situated  on  low  ground,  subject  to  overflow. 

The  South  Dakota  mobilization  camp,  near  Redfield,  is  inconvenient  of  access 
and  unsuited  for  camp  purposes.  The  South  Dakota  regiment  and  the  Nebraska 
troops  might  much  better  have  been  mobilized  together  at  Fort  Crook.  Simi- 
larly the  North  Dakota  regiment  should  have  been  mobilized  at  Fort  Snelling 
with  the  Minnesota  troops.  This  would  have  simplified  supply  and  been  less 
expensive  than  to  have  a  separate  camp,  as  was  required  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment orders. 

The  Wyoming  National  Guard  should  have  been  mobilized  at  Fort  D.  A. 
Russell  instead  of  just  outside  the  reservation.  Similarily  the  Colorado  troops 
should  have  been  mobilized  at  Fort  Logan  rather  than  at  their  rifle  range  at 
Golden,  where  the  water  supply  was  uncertain  in  quantity. 

Except  in  the  comparatively  rare  cases  where  suitable  tracts  of  land  are 
owned  by  States  and  set  aside  for  the  training  and  mobilization  of  the  National 
Guard,  existing  Army  posts  and  United  States  reservations  within  the  State 
should  have  been  utilized  wherever  practicable.  This  would  greatly  have  ex- 
pedited the  mobilization  of  1916. 

Sites  for  future  mobilization  should  be  selected  with  the  utmost  care  by  a 
board  of  specially  qualified  officers.  Accessibility,  good  railroad  connections,  a 
reasonable  amount  of  drill  ground  and  a  target  range  permitting  practice  up  to 
600  yards  are  absolutely  essential.  The  fact  that  the  mobilization  camp  would 
be  the  logical  place  for  the  assembling  and  training  of  newly  formed  regiments 
and  of  unassigned  recruits  should  also  be  considered  and,  if  practicable,  the 
ground  available  should  include  areas  of  varied  terrain  suitable  for  field  train- 
ing of  recruits  and  small  units. 

Upon  the  selected  site  should  be  built  the  necessary  office  buildings  and 
suitable  storehouses  for  ordnance,  quartermaster,  and  other  stores.  These 
buildings  should  be  permanent. 

4.    SUPPLIES. 

Under  present  regulations  the  equipment,  needed  to  cover  the  difference  be- 
tween peace  and  war  footing  is  supposedly  shipped  automatically  to  the  various 
National  Guard  organizations  at  their  designated  mobilization  camps.  Prac- 
t-cally,  however,  this  does  not  work.  The  stores  should  be  available  at  the 
armory  or  mobilization  camp  at  all  times. 

Complete  supplies  for  the  entire  National  Guard  of  a  State  (less  the  equip- 
ment and  clothing  actually  in  the  hands  of  the  men  or  at  their  armories) 
should  be  kept  throughout  the  year  in  the  proper  storehouses  at  the  respective 
mobilization  camps.  Each  of  these  camps  should  be  in  charge  of  a  regular 
officer,  whose  duty  it  would  be  to  see  that  the  prescribed  amount  of  supplies 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  135 

is  kept  on  hand  at  all  times.  The  storehouses  at  mobilization  camps  would  in 
effect  be  subdepots  or  distributing  points  of  the  existing  quartermaster,  en- 
gineer, signal,  and  ordnance  depots.  All  National  Guard  requisitions  for  equip- 
ment and  camp  equipage  should  be  filled  from  these  subdepots  and  the  stores 
issued  replaced  promptly  by  shipment  from  one  of  the  main  central  depots. 
This  would  result  in  the  supplies  on  hand  being  constantly  "  turned  over," 
thereby  preventing  deterioration.  The  quantity  of  supplies  kept  on  hand 
should  be  based  on  actual  needs  of  the  troops  with  reasonable  provision  made 
lor  equipment  of  recruits. 

A  complete  supply  of  blank  forms  needed  upon  muster  in  and  for  the  routine 
administration  and  supply  of  the  entire  State  National  Guard  after  its  muster 
into  the  Federal  service  should  be  kept  on  hand  at  all  times  in  the  various 
armories  or  mobilization  camps. 

In  the  recent  mobilization  ordnance  and  quartermaster  supplies  were,  so  long 
as  they  lasted,  shipped  direct  from  the  various  War  Department  depots  to  States 
with  view  to  cover  anticipated  increase  from  peace  to  war  strength.  Many 
States  received  supplies  far  in  excess  of  their  needs,  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
troops  remained  practically  at  minimum  strength,  while  other  States  were- badly 
nandieapped  by  a  failure  to  receive  sufficient  supplies  to  equip  troops  actually 
in  camp.  Supplies  received  at  any  camp  in  excess  of  needs  had  to  be  repacked 
and  shipped  back  to  the  depots  before  they  could  be  redistributed  and  reshipped 
to  States  in  need  of  them. 

Most  of  the  National  Guard  organizations  were  fairly  well  provided  with 
harness  and  wagons,  but  practically  none  had  horses  or  mules.  They  were 
immobile  units  so  far  as  field  service  was  concerned.  In  many  cases  suitable 
horses  were  obtained  locally.  Under  more  elastic  regulations  governing  the 
purchase  of  animals,  suitable  horses  could  in  many  cases  have  been  secured 
at  or  near  home  stations  and  mobilization  camps  and  the  regiments  could 
have  gone  to  the  border  completely  equipped  with  transportation.  It  is  of  the 
highest  importance  that  regulations  governing  the  purchase  of  animals  be  so 
modified  as  to  make  it  not  only  possible  but  eminently  practicable  to  purchase 
horses  locally  in  open  market. 

The  issuing  of  32  horses  to  each  National  Guard  battery  or  troop  is  a  step  in 
the  right  direction.  In  addition,  the  commanding  officer  of  each  mounted 
National  Guard  organization  should  be  required  to  have  and  to  keep  up  to  date 
at  all  times  a  list  of  suitable  horses  available  locally  and  sufficient  in  number 
to  completely  fill  requirements  of  the,  organization.  These  horses  should  be  in- 
spected annually  by  regular  officers  and  an  option  taken  on  each  at  an  agreed 
price,  the  owner  agreeing  to  bring  him,  upon  demand,  to  mobilization  camp  or 
other  designated  point  and  turn  him  over  to  proper  authorities  at  the  price 
agreed. 

Machine  guns  were  lacking  for  a  number  of  regiments  in  this  department. 
This  lack  was  in  part  supplied  before  regiments  left  for  the  border,  but  in  most 
cases  machine  guns  and  equipment  were  not  received  before  leaving  this  depart- 
ment. Every  infantry  and  cavalry  regiment  should  at  all  times  have  its  full 
quantity  of  machine  guns,  and  the  men  who  are  to  operate  the  guns  should  be 
thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  same  and  should  know  how  to  make  the  usual 
and  necessary  repairs. 

In  case  of  future  mobilizations  taking  place  before  complete  supplies  are  on 
hand  for  all  National  Guard  troops,  more  latitude  should  be  allowed  the  senior 
mustering  officer,  or  camp  quartermaster,  who  should  be  authorized  to  purchase 
locally  articles  needed  by  the  troops  and  which  can  not  be  supplied  by  the  Army 
depots.  Nonuniform  articles  might  just  as  well  be  purchased  locally  as  be 
purchased  at  distant  points  and  then  shipped  to  mobilization  camp,  as  was  done 
in  many  instances  in  the  mobilization  of  1916. 

The  supply  of  uniform  clothing  on  hand  in  the  depots  was  entirely  insufficient 
to  meet  the  demands.  The  depot  quartermasters  did  their  best  to  supply  defi- 
ciencies by  making  open-market  purchases,  but  in  some  cases  articles  purchased 
were  unsuitable.  Nebraska  troops,  for  instance,  were  furnished  light-weight 
and  light-colored  cotton  blankets  purchased  by  the  St.  Louis  depot  in  open 
market  when  heavy  \voolen  blankets,  similar  to  regulation,  could  have  been  pur- 
chased in  Nebraska  at  a  reasonable  price  and  furnished  promptly  to  troops. 
Ohio  troops  had  at  this  time  more  blankets  than  were  needed  and  later  returned 
a  large  quantity  to  St.  Louis. 

In  some  cases  troops  were  delayed  at  their  mobilization  camp  by  the  latt 
arrival  of  hats,  shoes,  or  underclothes.  In  some  cases  authority  was  obtained 
to  make  local  purchases,  but  in  others  the  troops  had  to  await  shipment  of 


136  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

same  from  far  distant  points.  On  July  14  the  senior  mustering  officer  at  Fort 
Spelling,  Minn.,  reported  having  received  for  one  organization  on  the  previous 
day  "  hats  from  Philadelphia,  shoes  from  San  Francisco,  and  woolen  breeches 
from  St.  Louis." 

In  the  early  days  of  the  mobilization  large  quantities  of  clothing  and  equi- 
page were  shipped  by  express  from  the  various  Federal  depots  to  the  several 
mobilization  camps.  This  method  of  shipment  was  expensive,  as  the  depots  were 
usually  at  great  distances  from  mobilization  camps. 

5.    INSTRUCTION. 

The  position  of  inspector-instructor  should  be  abolished.  There  should  be  two 
classes  of  officers  on  regular  duty  with  the  National  Guard ;  one,  instructors, 
and  the  other,  inspectors. 

An  instructor  should  be  assigned  from  the  Regular  Army  to  each  regiment, 
or  other  independent  unit  of  the  National  Guard.  When  suitable  mobilization 
camps  are  selected  and  the  administrative  staff  of  such  camps,  composed  of 
regular  officers,  assisted  by  staff  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  of  the 
National  Guard,  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  taking  instructors  away  from 
their  regiments  in  order  to  perform  staff  duties  at  mooilization  camps  just  at 
the  time  when  their  services  are  most  needed  with  their  organizations.  The 
instructor  should  accompany  the  organization  wherever  it  goes,  and  might  be 
given  suitable  rank  therein  when  the  organization  is  called  into  Federal  service. 

Inspectors  of  the  National  Guard  should  be  carefully  selected  from  officers 
on  the  active  list  of  the.Regular  Army.  They  should  be  assigned  to  department 
headquarters,  and  their  sole  duty  should  be  to  inspect  the  National  Guard 
organizations  within  the  department  and  the  instructors  thereof. 

Only  by  having  these  two  classes — instructors  and  inspectors — will  it  be 
possible  to  make  anything  like  an  efficient  machine  out  of  the  various  and  vary- 
ing units  of  the  National  Guard. 

5.  ADMINISTRATION. 

If  practicable  a  regular  officer  of  suitable  rank  should  be  assigned  to  the 
command  of  each  mobilization  camp,  thereby  insuring  uniformity  in  training 
and  avoiding  the  frequent  changes  in  commanding  officers. 

Staff  and  supply  officers  and  noncommissioned  officer  of  the  National  Guard 
should  be  assembled  at  least  annually  at  mobilization  camps,  where  instructions 
should  be  given  and  practice  actually  had  in  the  making  out  of  muster-in 
records,  property  returns,  etc.,  thereby  keeping  all  up  to  date  on  matters  relat- 
ing to  equipment,  supply,  administration,  etc.  The  expense  attending  this 
annual  assembly  of  officers  would  amount  to  little  as  compared  with  the  tre- 
mendous expense  and  delay  that  would  otherwise  result  in  time  of  emergency, 
due  to  lack  of  familiarity  with  the  essentials  of  administration  and  supply. 

Considerable  delay  was  caused  at  various  times  and  in  various  States  during 
the  recent  mobilization  by  reason  of  inability  to  obtain  the  necessary  blanks 
for  use  of  troops  and  mustering  officers.  It  is  considered  essential  that  com- 
plete supply  of  all  needed  blanks  be  kept  on  hand  at  all  times,  preferably  dis- 
tributed to  permanent  mobilization  camps,  as  previously  recommended.  Proper 
supply  of  blank  forms  should  be  sent  to  department  headquarters,  and  there 
kept  in  readiness  for  mailing  to  the  various  camps. 

The  ordinary  channels  of  communication  from  the  War  Department  to  those 
under  control  of  department  commanders  must  invariably  be  observed,  or  else 
confusion  and  working  at.  cross-purposes  inevitably  result.  During  the  past 
mobilization  orders  were  occasionally  sent  by  the  War  Department  directly  to 
mustering  officers  or  others,  even  relieving  them  from  duty  and  ordering  them 
elsewhere. 

The  Militia  Bureau  in  Washington  was,  in  like  manner,  sending  directly  to 
mobilization  camps  instructions,  etc.,  about  which  these  headquarters  were 
either  not  at  all  informed  or  informed  indirectly  and  with  much  delay. 

CONCLUSION. 

There  is  but  one  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  what  goes  before,  and  that  is 
that  the  National  Guard  as  now  dually  organized  and  administered  is  not 
efficient  or  dependable,  can  not  be  made  so  in  any  reasonable  time,  and  it  should 
therefore  remain  solely  as  a  State  force,  under  State  control  and  for  State 
purposes,  except  as  otherwise  provided  in  the  Constitution. 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  137 

The  Regular  Army  should  be  increased  sufficiently  to  meet  all  emergencies 
and  requirements  and  be  kept  up  to  maximum  strength  by  enlistments  that  will 
be  available  should  a  proper  system  of  universal  compulsory  training  :md  service 
be  required  of  all  citizens  of  suitable  age  under  proper  laws  to  be  enacted  by 
Congress. 

T.  H.  BARRY, 
Major  General,  Commanding. 

The  following  are  extracts  from  report  of  November  1  of  Col. 
Frederick,  the  chief  mustering  officer  of  the  Central  Department : 

The  mobilization  points  for  National  Guard  in  this  department  were  desig- 
nated by  the  War  Department;  in  many  cases  they  were  unsuitable  for  more 
than  temporary  use.  Apparently,  in  the  designation  of  these  mobilization 
points,  the  factors  of  an  area  large  enough  for  drill  and  instruction,  as  well  as 
for  camping,  accessibility,,  transportation,  good  roads,  sanitation,  and  water 
supply,  were  overlooked  in  whole  or  in  part.  Except  in  the  cases  of  Missouri, 
Wisconsin,  and  possibly  Michigan,  existing  Army  posts  and  United  States  reser- 
vations should  have  been  utilized.  The  North  Dakota  troops  should  have  been 
mobilized  at  Fort  Snelling,  Minn. ;  South  Dakota  and  Nebraska  at  Fort  Crook, 
Nebr.,  etc.  A  list  of  the  mobilization  points  in  this  department,  with  dates  of 
arrival  of  the  units  of  the  National  Guard  thereat  and  the  date  of  completion 
of  muster  in  of  the  organizations,  is  hereto  attached  and  marked  "  B-l  "  and 
"  B-2." 

The  muster  in  of  the  National  Guard  of  this  department  was  greatly  handi- 
capped by  the  shortage  of  necessary  blank  forms  and  delay  in  the  receipt  of 
additional  blank  forms  requested  by  telegraph.  Telegrams  showing  the  num- 
bers and  amounts  of  forms  required  were  sent  your  office  on  June  20,  June  21, 
and  June  24.  Some  of  the  forms  asked  for  did  not  arrive  at  these  headquarters 
until  July  20.  This  office  appreciates  the  fact  that,  due  to  the  urgency  of  the 
situation  and  the  large  number  of  troops  ordered  mustered  in,  the  delay  in  re- 
ceipt of  forms  was  unavoidable,  but  for  future  mobilization  there  should  be  kept 
on  hand  at  all  times  at  department  headquarters  or  at  designated  mobilization 
points  the  maximum  number  of  blank  forms  that  can  be  used. 

This  office  was  required  to  render  numerous  decisions  upon  points  where  the 
mustering  regulations  were  not  clear  or  where  telegrams  or  instructions  were 
capable  of  two  or  more  interpretations.  Many  of  these  questions  should  prop- 
erly have  been  decided  in  Washington,  as  they  involved  matters  of  policy  or  the 
interpretation  of  general  instructions ;  but  in  view  of  the  urgent  orders  received 
to  expedite  muster  in  in  every  possible  manner,  there  was  no  time  for  reference 
to  your  office.  Out  of  several  hundred  decisions  made  in  this  office  there  is  but 
one  which  has  not  later  been  confirmed  by  you  or  by  the  Judge  Advocate  Gen- 
eral. The  one  exception  was  that  this  office  decided  that  the  President  alone 
had  authority  to  commission  National  Guardsmen  already  in  Federal  service. 

The  results  of  the  physical  examination  of  the  National  Guardsmen  called 
into  service  on  June  18  is  shown  by  States  herewith  and  marked  "  D-l  to  14," 
inclusive.  The  remarkable  variation  in  the  number  of  rejections  in  different 
units,  running  from  a  minimum  of  zero  to  a  maximum  of  34  per  cent,  shows 
that  there  is  no  uniform  physical  standard  in  the  National  Guard.  This  is  a 
matter  that  should  receive  immediate  and  serious  consideration,  and  the  Na- 
tional Guard  should  be  rigidly  held  to  the  same  standard  as  is  prescribed  for 
the  Regular  Army. 

The  National  Guard  should  have  a  system  of  annual  physical  inspection  by 
regular  medical  officers,  so  that  the  large  percentage  of  rejections  could  be  done 
away  with  upon  muster  in  to  Federal  service  and  the  efficiency  and  strength  of 
prsonnel  be  kept  up  approximately  to  that  required  iri  orders.  All  members  of 
the  National  Guard  should  be  kept  up  to  date  on  smallpox  and  typhoid  prophy- 
laxis, so  that  the  administration  of  these  vaccinations  be  not  required  upon 
mobilization  for  Federal  service,  and  the  resulting  delay  and  confusion  at  mo- 
bilization camp  be  done  away  with.  The  physical  standard  of  the  National 
Guard  is  not  the  same  as  in  the  Regular  Army.  The  standard  should  be  the 
same,  and  some  steps,  either  by  annual  examination  or  by  a  system  of  penaliz- 
ing the  State,  should  be  placed  in  effect  to  keep  out  of  the  National  Guard 
officers  and  men  who  are  not  fitted  for  field  service.  The  high  percentage  of 
rejections,  which  in  one  organization — Company  A,  Signal  Corps,  Nebraska — 
reached  34  per  cent,  shows  a  lamentable  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  physical 
requirements  of  a  soldier. 


138 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    OKGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 


The  system  of  responsibility  and  accountability  for  Government  property  in 
the  hands  of  the  National  Guard  should  be  the  same  as  that  in  vogue  in  the 
Regular  Army.  The  present  system  of  transferring  all  property  in  the  hands  of 
the  State  to  the  United  States  upon  the  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  is 
cumbersome  and  useless.  It  results  in  confusion  and  an  undue  amount  of  work 
at  the  mobilization  camps,  as  well  as  in  more  or  less  delay  in  dispatching  troops 
to  concentration  camps. 

HEADQUARTERS  SOUTHERN  DEPARTMENT, 
Fort  Sam  Houston,  Tex.,  November  //,  19 J 6. 
From:  Commanding  general,  .Southern  Department. 
To :  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Subject :  Report  concerning  recent  National  Guard  mobilization. 

1.  Replying  to  letter  (2461974)  from  your  office,  dated  September  18,  1916,  I 
report  as  follows  concerning  the  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  of  States 
within  this  territorial  department : 

(a)  Promptness  of  assembly. — Assembly  is  deemed  to  have  been  completed  by 
muster  in. 


State. 

Called. 

Muster 
began. 

Muster 
com- 
pleted. 

Degree  of 
promptness. 

Arizona  

May     9 

May  21 

June  13 

V  r     1  w 

New  Mexico  

do 

Juno    8 

July  13l 

Do 

Texas  

do 

May   16 

May   19 

Good 

Arkansas 

June  18 

July     6 

lulv     Q 

Louisiana  

do 

June  25 

July     8 

Do 

Oklahoma  

.    do 

June  28 

July     4 

Do 

1  Except  sanitary  detachment. 

Reasons  for  slowness : 

Arizona :  Mobilization  point  changed  after  the  call  (to  facilitate  supply  and 
instruction).  Principal  delay  caused  by  withdrawal  of  Federal  recognition 
from  some  organizations.  They  had  to  remedy  defects,  be  reinspected,  and  await 
reinstatement.  Majority  of  the  companies  arrived  at  mobilization  point  under 
minimum  strength. 

New  Mexico:  Mobilization  point  changed  after  the  call  (to  facilitate  supply 
and  instruction).  When  personnel  was  examined  at  mobilization  point  the 
rejections  for  physical  unfitness  threw  out  35  to  50  per  cent  of  each  company. 
These  had  to  be  replaced  by  recruitment  to  minimum  strength  of  65  men  before 
muster  in. 

Texas :  Promptness  of  movement  was  commendable.  Mobilization  point  was 
changed  after  the  call  (to  facilitate  supply  and  instruction). 

Arkansas :  Principal  delay  caused  by  withdrawal  of  Federal  recognition  from 
13  organizations.  They  had  to  remedy  defects,  be  reinspected,  and  await  rein- 
statement. The  2  regiments  finally  came  to  the  border  with  about  60  per  cent 
of  minimum  strength. 

Louisiana :  Delay  caused  by  withdrawal  of  Federal  recognition  from  some 
organizations.  They  had  to  remedy  defects,  be  reinspected,  and  await  rein- 
statement. 

Oklahoma:  Principal  difficulties  arose  from  shifting  of  mobilization  point. 
Chandler  dropped  as  unsanitary ;  units  ordered  to  Oklahoma  City ;  later  to  Fort 
Sill,  Okla. 

(b)  Degree  of  preparedness  evinced  upon  assembly,  covering  organization, 
supplies,  equipment,  etc.,  so  far  as  lies  within  the  responsibility  of  the  State. — 
Detailed  information  was  wired  to  the  War  Department  immediately  upon  com- 
pletion of  muster  in  for  each  regiment,  separate  battalion,  or  other  separate  unit. 

This  is  not  repeated  now,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  understood  that  a  report  is 
desired  which  will  be  unincumbered  by  such  details  and  which  will  present  the 
subject  in  general  terms. 

Organization:  Generally  the  State  troops  which  arrived  at  the  mobilization 
points  were  organized  like  corresponding  units  of  the  Regular  Army,  except 
that  there  was  an  absence  of  provisional  organizations;  that  is  to  say,  they 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED    MILITIA,    ETC.  139 

were  organized  in  conformity  with  the  Federal  statutes  that  were  in  force  prior 
to  the  approval  of  the  national-defense  act. 

The  personnel  of  the  New  Mexico  regiment  was  weak  and  the  organization  was 
unstable.  It  almost  went  to  pieces  when  the  physical  standards  were  applied. 
There  was  urgent  need  for  the  services  of  this  regiment.  As  finally  mustered 
in,  its  enlisted  membership  included  at  least  40  per  cent  of  men  who  would 
not  have  been  acceptable  for  the  Regular  Army.  The  main  efforts  of  the 
organizers  had  been  directed  to  obtaining  65  men  for  each  company,  and  the 
dragnet  had  brought  in  many  that  were  manifestly  unfit.  The  result  was  an 
organization  of  the  required  strength  on  paper,  but  with  the  weakness  of  a  mere 
paper  organization. 

In  a  lesser  degree  this  padding  process  was  evident  in  the  composition  of  the 
Arizona  regiment,  and  the  elimination  of  the  physically  unfit  made  serious 
inroads  on  their  paper  strength.  In  the  four  other  States  physical  defects  were 
not  so  general  nor  so  flagrant,  but  the  organization  was  weakened  by  the  large 
number  of  men  who  were  subsequently  to  be  discharged  on  account  of  dependent 
relatives,  etc. 

Supplies  and  equipment  were  generally  on  hand  in  quantities  sufficient  for 
the  minimum  peace  strength  and  as  prescribed  by  Circular  10,  Division  Militia 
Affairs,  1915.  This  circular  does  not  require  organizations  to  keep  on  hand 
all  of  the  articles  prescribed  for  equipment  C.  Many  organizations  arrived  in 
this  department  without  sufficient  tentage,  cots,  mosquito  bars,  and  other  articles 
of  the  equipment  C  class,  which  are  not  included  in  the  circular  referred  to  above. 
Very  few  organizations  reached  this  department  equipped  for  service  in  a  hot 
climate.  Nearly  all  arrived  in  the  department  with  olive  drab  winter  clothing. 
As  concentration  took  place  in  the  hot  season,  this  worked  considerable  hard- 
ship on  the  troops  and  necessitated  the  issue  of  supplies  and  equipment  which 
should  have  been  furnished  at  the  mobilization  point  instead  of  at  the  concen- 
tration point.  There  was  a  serious  lack  of  blank  forms  of  all  kinds,  which 
resulted  in  delays  in  the  preparation  of  records  and  reports  and  in  the  instruc- 
tion of  the  National  Guard  in  the  use  of  these  forms. 

(c)  Degree  of  progress  in  training  troops  thus  mobilized  and  measures  taken 
for  their  instruction  at  mobilization  camps. — Three  States  of  this  department 
were  mobilized  at  permanent  camps  or  stations  of  Regular  Army  organizations 
and  were  instructed  by  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army  on 
duty  at  these  camps  and  stations.     The  other  three  States  were  mobilized  at 
State  mobilization  camps  or  ungarrisoned  military  posts  where  troops  were  not 
available  for  instructional  purposes.     At  these  latter  points  special  details  of 
Regular  officers  were  made  to  assist  in  the  instruction  of  the  National  Guard. 
In  either  case  the  instruction  of  the  National  Guard  was  necessarily  slow  and 
incomplete,  as  the  organization  of  new  units  and  their  equipment,  the  recruitment 
and  enlistment  of  the  number  of  men  necessary  to  bring  the  National  Guard 
organizations  up  to  the  required  strength,  and  the  inspection,  transfer,  and  issue 
of  equipment  took  most  of  the  time  that  the  organizations  were  held  in  mobili- 
zation camps. 

Under  the  conditions  mentioned  above  the  degree  of  progress  was  as  good  as 
could  be  expected. 

(d)  Comments  on  the  mustering  regulations. — These  were  found  generally 
workable.     They  have  been  modified  and  improved  as  a  result  of  the  solution 
of  difficulties  arising  in  their  application.     There  was  not  at  first  a  sufficient 
distribution  of  the  pamphlet,  and  many  organizations  are  still  without  a  copy. 

The  main  fault  which  still  remains,  and  which  demands  radical  treatment,  is 
the  process  of  muster  in,  which  is  too  complicated  and  takes  too  much  time  and 
labor.  The  mere  fact  that  there  are  so  many  regulations  condemns  it.  The 
process  must  be  simplified  so  as  to  be  applicable  in  a  real  emergency.  The  troops 
when  called  out  should  be  ready  for  muster  in.  An  emergency  being  real,  the 
troops  offered  by  the  State  should  be  accepted  at  once  and  sworn  into  Federal 
service.  It  would  seem  that  this  desirable  condition  can  be  brought  about  by  an 
insistence  in  peace  times  on  the  physical  requirements  and  by  the  abolishment  of 
the  present  complicated  property  accountability  and  transfer.  Federal  inspec- 
tion in  peace  times  should  include  a  physical  examination.  With  the  new  provi- 
sions of  the  national-defense  act  as  to  pay  and  property  responsibility,  it  would 
seem  that  a  peace  accountability  could  be  devised  which  would  avoid  any  inspec- 
tions, inventories,  and  transfers  of  property  on  mobilization. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  there  should  be  on  hand  at  all  times  and  kept 
up  to  date  in  each  company  office  a  separate  muster-in  roll  for  each  member. 
The  record  of  each  officer  and  man  should  be  entered  on  a  standard  mobiliza- 


140 

tion  form  similar  to  a  descriptive  list.  Space  should  be  provided  for  the  use 
of  the  medical  examiner  of  the  Regular  Army.  The  national-defense  oath 
should  be  found  somewhere  on  this  roll.  These  ready-to-use  muster-in  rolls 
should  be  in  triplicate  (one  original  and  two  carbons),  and  the  three  held 
together  in  a  perforated  sheet.  Checking  of  these  muster-in  rolls  and  of  the 
descriptive  lists  should  be  a  duty  of  the  organization  commander  and  of  the 
Federal  inspector.  The  latter  should  also  examine  and  check  the  enlistment 
papers  on  file  in  the  company  office. 

The  basis  for  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard  should  be  the  practical  divi- 
sions into  which  the  State  troops  are  organized.  A  mobilization  point  for 
each  tactical  division  should  be  selected  to  \vhich  each  organization  thereof 
should  be  sent  from  its  rendezvous  point.  The  intermediate  step  of  State 
mobilization,  which  has  to  be  followed  by  divisional  mobilization,  would  thereby 
be  avoided.  This  became  apparent  in  this  department  when  the  National 
Guard  was  sent  to  the  border  by  States  instead  of  by  divisions.  This  procedure 
resulted  in  a  disruption  of  the  divisional  organization,  which  could  not  be 
avoided,  as  the  National  Guard  organizations  had  to  be  utilized  in  accord- 
ance with  the  situation  existing  at  the  time  of  their  arrival  in  this  department. 
Whereas  if  these  organizations  had  been  mobilized  as  divisions  before  they 
were  sent  to  the  border  they  could  have  been  utilized  with  such  an  organization 
in  mind. 

Numerous  other  recommendations  have  been  submitted  with  reference  to 
the  mustering  system.  Some  of  those  which  were  brought  to  my  attention 
were  embraced  in  a  report  dated  June  30,  1916,  rendered  by  Maj.  Orrin  R. 
Wolfe,  chief  mustering  officer,  Southern  Department.  A  copy  of  that  report 
was  furnished  the  Militia  Bureau. 

FKEDERICK  FUNSTON, 
Major  General,  U.  S.  Army,  Commanding. 


WAR   DEPARTMENT, 
HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN   DEPARTMENT, 

Kan  Francisco,  October  28,  1916. 
From :  The  department  commander. 

To:  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Subject :  Report  concerning  recent  National  Guard  mobilization. 

1.  Referring  to  No.  2461974,  A.  G.  O.,  September  18,  1916,  the  following  report 
is  submitted  on  recent  mobilization  in  this  department : 

Question,  (a}  The  degree  of  promptness  with  which  these  troops  have  as- 
sembled, and  where  they  have  been  slow  the  reasons  for  such  tardiness? 

Answer,  (a)  The  War  Department,  by  letter  of  May  11,  1916,  notified  these 
headquarters  of  a  probable  call  for  the  militia  of  this  department.  The  neces- 
sary blank  forms  for  muster  in  were  at  the  same  time  furnished.  Upon  receipt 
of  notification  a  mustering  officer  was  selected  for  each  State  and  a  chief 
mustering  officer  for  department  headquarters.  These  officers  were  furnished 
copies  of  mustering  regulations  and  were  directed  to  study  them  so  as  to 
familiarize  themselves  with  their  duties.  Upon  receipt  of  the  Presidents'  callr 
on  the  night  of  *  June  18,  1916,  mustering  officers  and  officers  in  charge  of  supply 
departments  were  at  once  notified.  The  necessary  blank  forms  were  mailed 
to  mustering  officers  at  mobilization  camps.  Federal  supply  departments 
shipped  at  once  without  requisition  to  State  mobilization  points  sufficient 
arms,  clothing,  and  equipment  for  supplying  completely  the  increase  of  Na- 
tional Guard  organizations  from  peace  to  war  strength.  Mustering  officers, 
medical  officers,  and  representatives  of  the  supply  depots  were  ordered  to. 
mobilization  points  to  arrange  for  and  establish  camps.  Governors  of  States 
promptly  ordered  organization  commanders  to  assemble  their  commands  at 
their  company  rendezvous  and  commence  recruiting  to  war  strength.  The 
State  headquarters  officers  were  assembled,  and  such  officers  of  the  Medical, 
Ordnance,  and  Quartermaster  Corps  as  necessary  and  authorized  by  the  Presi- 
dent's call  were  examined  and  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States 
for  duty  as  camp  staff  officers.  The  various  duties  devolving  upon  the  gov- 
ernors of  States  and  others  in  connection  with  recruiting,  transportation,  and 
subsistence,  during  the  mobilization,  were  promptly,  harmoniously,  and  suc- 
cessfully carried  out. 

The  following  organizations  were  included  in  the  President's  call : 


141 

California :  One  brigade  of  three  regiments  of  infantry,  one  squadron  of 
cavalry,  one  battalion  of  field  artillery,  one  company  of  signal  corps,  one 
ambulance  company,  one  field  hospital. 

Idaho :  One  regiment  of  infantry. 

Montana :  One  regiment  of  infantry. 

Oregon:  One  regiment  of  infantry,  one  troop  of  cavalry,  one  battery  of  field 
artillery. 

Utah :  One  squadron  and  two  separate  troops  of  cavalry,  one  battery  of  field 
artillery. 

Washington:  One  regiment  of  infantry,  one  troop  of  cavalry,  one  company 
of  signal  corps. 

Organizations  were  required  to  recruit  to  the  minimum  prescribed  by  the 
President's  call  before  leaving  company  rendezvous.  The  necessary  equipment, 
funds,  quartermaster,-  ordnance,  and  medical  stores,  furnished  by  Federal 
supply  departments,  were  so  promptly  delivered  that  in  many  instances  they 
reached  State  mobilization  .^amps  before  the  troops  began  to  arrive. 

In  no  case  could  it  be  said  that  troops  of  this  department  were  slow  in  assem- 
bling. The  dates  of  departure  of  organizations  for  the  Mexican  border  will 
indicate  the  degree  of  promptness  with  which  troops  of  the  different  States  of 
this  department  assembled,  transferred  property,  and  were  mustered  into  the 
Federal  service.  As  above  stated  the  call  was  received  on  the  night  of  June 
18  and  was  made  known  to  all  concerned  on  June  19.  Organizations  entrained 
and  left  for  the  border  fully  equipped  for  field  service  as  follows : 

Utah :  One  battery  of  Field  Artillery  left  June  27 ;  six  troops  of  Cavalry  mus- 
tered in  June  29  and  left  July  3. 

Oregon :  One  battery  of  Field  Artillery  left  June  27 ;  Third  Battalion  Infan- 
try left  June  27 ;  Second  Battalion,  June  28 ;  headquarters  and  First  Battalion, 
June  29,  1916 ;  one  troop  of  Cavalry  left  June  28. 

Washington:  One  regiment  of  Infantry  left  June  26;  signal  company  and 
sanitary  troops  left  June  30. 

California :  One  squadron  of  Cavalry  left  June  29 ;  Second  Infantry  and  one 
battalion  of  Field  Artillery,  July  1;  Fifth  and  Seventh  Infantry,  July  3; 
brigade  headquarters,  signal  company,  ambulance  company,  and  field  hospital 
left  July  4,  1916. 

Montana :  One  regiment  of  Infantry  mustered  in  June  29  and  left  for  border 
July  2,  1916. 

Idaho :  One  regiment  of  Infantry  in  camp  June  26,  mustered  in  July  3  and 
left  July  7,  1916. 

Washouts  on  the  railroad  caused  several  days'  delay  for  companies  of  Mon- 
tana troops,  but  all  organizations  were  at  the  mobilization  camps  seven  days 
after  date  of  call. 

Question.  (&)  The  degree  of  preparedness  evinced  upon  assembly,  covering 
organizations,  supplies,  equipment,  etc.,  so  far  as  lies  within  the  responsibility 
of  the  State. 

Answer.  (b)  All  troops  brought  to  camp  their  equipment  to  include  minimum 
strength.  Such  shortages  as  existed  in  equipment  were  at  once  supplied  by 
the  States  from  State  arsennls.  Some  confusion  existed  due  to  the  fact  that 
several  officers  in  some  organizations  had  been  found  physically  disqualified 
for  service  and  their  places  had  to  be  filled  by  others  with  little  or  no  military 
experience  or  knowledge  of  the  duties  required  of  them. 

Several  companies  had  been  declared  deficient  by  the  Militia  Bureau  as  a 
result  of  1916  Federal  inspections  and  had  to  be  reorganized. 

The  transformation  from  peace  or  below  peace  strength  to  war  strength 
created  confusion. 

The  supplies,  equipment,  etc.,  so  far  as  lies  within  the  responsibility  of  the 
State,  were  generally  ample  and  indicated  a  proper  degree  of  preparedness. 

Question,  (c)  The  degree  of  progress  made  in  training  by  the  troops  thus 
mobilized.  Orders  given  or  measures  taken  for  instruction  of  National  Guard 
troops  at  their  mobilization  camp  after  muster  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States. 

Answer,  (c)  Training  orders  were  published  by  most  States,  but  no  attempt 
was  made  to  carry  them  out.  The  organizations  were  held  at  State  camps  for 
a  short  time  only,  during  which  the  members  of  the  commands  were  physically 
examined,  inoculated  for  typhoid  and  smallpox  and  were  called  upon  to  perform 
various  other  duties  in  connection  with  the  establishment  of  camp  so  that  but 
little  progress  was  made  in  training.  The  State  of  California  published  a  very 


142  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

complete  order  for  the  mobilization  of  United  States  Militia,  which  included  a 
schedule  of  instruction. 

Question,  (d)  Criticisms  and  comments  on  regulations  and  methods  with 
suggestions  and  recommendations  winch  will  enable  tlie  department  to  inaugu- 
rate such  changes  as  will  insure  greater  smoothness  and  expedition  in  future 
mobilization. 

Answer,  (d)  The  United  States  Mustering  Regulations  appear  to 
have  answered  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  intended  until  the  passage 
of  the  national-defense  act.  The  changes  in  laws,  methods  of  pro- 
cedure, and  the  adoption  of  new  blank  forms  have  rendered  the  pres- 
ent mustering  regulations  practically  useless  and  have  been  the  source 
of  much  confusion,  delay,  and  extra  paper  work  on  the  part  of  those 
connected  with  the  work  of  mobilization.  The  mustering  regulations 
should  be  revised  to  conform  to  the  new  law,  modifications  in  forms, 
and  other  changes  which  the  War  Department  has,  through  expe- 
rience, found  necessary  to  make  by  telegraphic  orders. 

Physical  examination. — It  should  be  specifically  stated  in  the  mus- 
tering regulations  what  the  physical  examination  for  muster  in  shall 
consist  of  and  what  blank  forms  are  to  be  used.  Questions  regard- 
ing finger  prints,  outline  finger  cards,  typhoid  inoculations,  vacci- 
nation, kinds  of  forms  to  be  used,  etc.,  have  been  the  source  of  much 
telegraphic  correspondence. 

21ransportation.' — The  travel  pay  or  transportation  to  be  furnished 
upon  muster  out  should  be  clearly  stated  in  regulations.  The  va- 
rious interpretations  placed  upon  War  Department  telegraphic 
orders  on  these  subjects  have  given  rise  to  much  unnecessary  corre- 
spondence. 

Companies  should  be  recruited  to  war  strength  before  leaving  com- 
pany rendezvous. 

Several  new  units  were  organized  after  the  departure  of  troops 
included  in  the  first  call. 

2.  The  entire  work  of  mobilization  was  promptly  and  successfully 
accomplished. 

WM.  L.  SIBERT, 
Brigadier  General,  U.  S.  Army. 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 


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MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC 


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MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   OKGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC.  145 

INSTRUCTION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD. 

1.  The  instruction  of  the  National  Guard  may  be  divided  into  two 
periods;  first,  that  received  at  the  mobilization  camps,  and,  second, 
that  received  at  the  border. 

2.  The  periods  of  time  during  which  organizations  were  at  mobili- 
zation camps  varied  from  a  few  days  to  several  months.     For  those 
organizations  at  the  mobilization   camps,   two   weeks  or   less,   the 
amount  of  instruction  received  was  negligible,  due  to  several  reasons, 
among  which  may  be  mentioned  that  the  time  of  officers  of  the 
Regular  Army,  who  were  their  instructors  normally,  was  wholly 
occupied  in  mustering  duties  involving  the  supervision  of  paper  work 
and  the  inspection  and  transfer  of  property.    Had  additional  Regular 
Army  officers  been  detailed  to  mustering  duty  leaving  the  inspector- 
instructors  to  continue  their  duty  with  the  National  Guard  in  their 
capacity  of  instructors,  not  much  better  results  would  have  been 
attained,  for  the  reason  that  the  time  of  the  National  Guard  officers 
was  almost  wholly  absorbed  in  preparing  the  necessary  muster-in 
papers,  in  equipping /and  handling  the  large  influx  of  recruits  for 
which  they  had  no  prior  records.    A  little  was  learned,  no  doubt,  in 
the  nature  of  messing,  interior  economy,  camp  sanitation,  personal 
hygiene,  and  perhaps  individual  instruction  not  beyond  the  school 
of  the  squad  and  company. 

3.  For  those  organizations  at  the  mobilization  camps  more  than 
two  weeks,  the  instruction  in  general  was  still  unsatisfactory,  due 
primarily  to  the  lack  of  Regular  Army  officers  to  act  as  instructors; 
to  the  unsuitability  of  the  ground  in  the  vicinity  for  tactical  instruc- 
tion, the  organizations  being  confined  to  the  roads;  the  lack  of  suit- 
able target  ranges ;  and  in  the  case  of  mounted  troops,  to  the  lack  of 
animals  for  mounted  instruction. 

4.  The  organizations  arriving  on  the  border  were  in  different  stages 
of  instruction,  though  the  difference  was  not  very  great  due  to  the 
large  number  of  recruits  without  prior  service  in  all  organizations. 
It  was  therefore  necessary  to  devote  a  large  amount  of  time  to  the 
elementary  recruit  instruction.    The  standardization  of  the  subjects 
and  methods  for  the  necessary  instruction  in  the  different  arms  was. 
not  available  for  ready  reference  with  regard  to  troops  in  the  status 
of  approximately  one-fourth  partially  trained  troops,  three-fourths; 
recruits,  and  many  of  the  officers  only  partially  trained.     Even  with 
an  exact  and  approved  method  of  training,  the  results  will  always 
depend  upon  the  individual  experience,  energy,  and  ability  of  the 
instructors. 

5.  These  organizations  were  not  sent  to  the  border  in  their  partially 
trained  condition  for  the  purpose  of  instruction.     They  were  sent 
for  duty  there  in  a  grave  emergency,  because  they  were  the  only  troops 
available,  even  though  not  yet  ready  and  fit  for  active  field  service. 
The  instruction  that  could  be  given  at  that  time  was  incidental  to 
service.     However,  it  was  soon  realized  that  additional  instruction 
should  be  undertaken,  and  a  number  of  Regular  Army  officers  were 
assigned  to  the  organizations  as  instructors.     At  least  one  to  each 
battalion  or  squadron  was  needed,  but  that  number  could  not  be 
spared  from  the  regular  organizations.     Instruction  and  responsi- 
bility for  discipline  and  efficiency  go  hand  in  hand.     Neither  these 

72031—16 10 


146  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

instructors  nor  the  few  Regular  Army  officers  commissioned  in  the 
National  Guard,  the  latter  in  general  from  a  lack-  of  sufficient  rank, 
were  in  a  position  of  authority  to  carry  into  full  effect  their  plans  of 
instruction. 

6.  In  general  the  instruction  on  the  border  can  not  be  said  to  have 
been  satisfactory,  for  the  reasons  already  given  and  due,  in  addi- 
tion, to  the  lack  of  suitable  target  ranges  for  small  arms  and  service 
practice;  and  the  limited  amount  of  ammunition  available  for  such 
practice;  to  the  excessive  heat,  which  in  the  summer  months  reduced 
the  hours  available  for  instruction;  to  the  divided  duties  of  service 
and  instruction;  to  the  friction  and  time  due  to  inexperience  spent 
in  paper  work;  interior  economy  and  property  responsibility.  The 
greatest  fault  was  the  lack  of  systematic  instruction,  which,  covering 
8  or  10  hours  a  day,  should  commence  first  with  the  individual  and 
progress,  upon  proficiency,  by  successive  steps  to  the  squad,  platoon, 
company,  battalion,  regiment,  brigade,  and  division.  In  many  cases 
this  was  undertaken,  yet  the  progress  made  was  too  fast — was  not 
based  on  proficiency.  Precision,  uniformity,  and  thoroughness  were 
lacking  in  the  successive  stages,  and  the  final  result  could  not  be  other 
than  unsatisfactory.  In  general  at  the  end  of  five  months'  service, 
with  few  exceptions,  the  organizations  as  a  whole  were  reported  as 
still  not  ready  and  fit  for  active  field  service  against  a  well-trained 
enemy. 

Field  Artillery. — None  of  the  States  having  Field  Artillery,  with 
the  possible  exceptions  of  Colorado  and  Kansas,  have  mobilization 
camps  that  afford  adequate  facilities  for  the  training  of  Feld  Artil- 
lery in  field  exercises  and  target  practice.  When  the  mobilization  was 
ordered  many  of  the  batteries  had  difficulty  in  recruiting  to  the  peace 
strength,  and  as  a  result  they  were  not  in  a  condition  to  be  sent  to  the 
Southern  Department  before  the  shipment  of  troops  was  discon- 
tinued. In  the  meantime  horses  for  all  batteries  were  purchased  and 
concentrated  in  the  Southern  Department,  with  a  view  to  issuing 
the  animals  when  the  batteries  arrived.  As  a  result  of  these  condi- 
tions 25  of  the  batteries  embraced  in  the  original  call  were  left  in 
State  camps  without  their  quota  of  horses  and  without  other  facili- 
ties for  field  training.  More  than  half  of  the  inspector-instructors 
and  eight  of  the  sergeant- instructors  of  Field  Artillery  received  State 
commissions,  and  the  majority  of  them  joined  the  troops  in  the 
Southern  Department.  The  remaining  inspector-instructors  and 
sergeant-instructors  were  not  sufficient  to  supply  all  of  the  State 
camps.  As  a  partial  remedy  for  this  situation  eight  batteries  were 
sent  to  Tobyhanna,  Pa.,  and  supplied  with  sufficient  horses  for  train- 
ing. Four  of  them  were  composed  of  students  and  graduates  of  Yale 
University.  Under  the  able  administration  of  Col.  Robert  M.  Dan- 
ford,  Tenth  Militia  Field  Artillery  ( first  lieutenant,  Fifth  United 
States  Field  Artillery)  these  batteries  made  remarkable  progress. 
The  students  and  the  men  at  the  camp  who  were  not  students  applied 
themselves  with  a  willingness  that  was  highly  creditable,  and  their 
zeal  did  not  cease  when  they  learned  that  they  would  not  go  to  the 
Mexican  border,  and  that  the  entire  summer  would  be  spent  in  the 
routine  of  a  training  camp.  In  the  technical  service  of  the  guns  and 
in  the  mounted  duties  they  were  developed  in  accordance  with  the 
best  practices  of  the  Regular  regiments.  A  conspicuous  feature  of 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 


147 


the  training  at  this  camp  was  the  course  in  physical  exercises  con- 
ducted by  First  Lieut.  O.  A.  Dickinson,  Twenty-fifth  Infantry. 
While  Lieut.  Dickinson's  success  was  due  in  a  measure  to  his  superior 
qualifications  as  an  instructor  his  work  demonstrated  the  value  of 
this  training  for  the  National  Guard.  It  is  believed  that  it  should 
form  an  important  part  of  armory  training,  and  with  skilled  instruc- 
tors it  would  be  of  great  benefit  to  the  men  and  would  serve  as  an  at- 
tractive feature  of  the  drills.  This  camp  was  not  only  a  demonstra- 
tion of  what  can  be  accomplished  in  preparing  our  young  men  for 
the  service  of  the  country  but  it  was  a  tribute  to  the  patriotism  and 
the  democracy  of  the  great  university  whose  sons  came  forth  at  their 
country's  call.  They  took  upon  themselves  the  burden  of  practical 
preparedness,  and  by  so  doing  they  qualified  themselves  by  experi- 
ence to  perform  their  part  in  arriving  at  a  rational  solution  of  a 
problem  that  is  vital  to  the  ^elfare  of  the  nation. 

Horses  were  sent  to  the  First  Battalion,  Colorado  Field  Artillery, 
and  the  training  of  these  batteries  progressed  satisfactorily.  At 
the  remaining  camps  there  were  no  horses  except  such  as  were  hired 
by  the  States  or  were  on  hand  at  the  time  of  the  mobilization.  The 
Alabama  and  the  Georgia  batteries  were  entirely  without  horses.  On 
August  29,  1916,  the  Chief  of  the  Militia  Bureau  invited  attention 
to  the  conditions,  with  reference  to  artillery,  and  requested  that  all 
batteries  in  the  State  camps,  with  the  exception  of  those  composed 
of  students  of  colleges  and  schools,  be  sent  to  the  Southern  Depart- 
ment and  supplied  with  horses  as  promptly  as  possible.  This  action 
was  taken  September  27,  1916.  In  view  of  the  great  loss  of  time  that 
resulted  from  leaving  batteries  in  State  camps,  in  the  future  all 
Field  Artillery  units  should  be  mobilized  at  the  established  Field 
Artillery  training  camps,  and  horses  should  be  furnished  them  at 
these  camps  as  promptly  as  practicable  after  the  call  is  made.  In- 
spector-instructors and  sergeant-instructors  can  then  be  utilized  as 
far  as  their  numbers  permit  for  all  batteries,  and  the  training  can 
proceed  in  accordance  with  the  methods  provided  by  the  War  De- 
partment for  the  annual  camps  of  instruction. 

MISCELLANEOUS. 


LIST  OF  PROPERTY  FOUND  SHORT  AT   MOBILIZATION. 

The  remarks  of  the  inspectors  general  that  the  governors  of  States 
have  not  kept  their  organizations  fully  equipped — the  Dick  law 
required  States,  from  funds  allotted  to  them,  to  keep  their  forces 
"  sufficiently  armed,  uniformed,  and  equipped  for  active  duty  in  the 
field,"  a  requirement  set  forth  in  detail  in  Circular  No.  10,  Division 
of  Militia  Affairs,  1915. 

A  list  of  all  the  various  articles  short  is  published  in  table  17, 
accompanying  the  Keport  on  the  National  Guard  for  1916,  the  main 
items  of  which  are  as  follows: 


First-aid  packets 2,992 

Litters  with  slings 181 

Bridles,  Cavalry 274 

Bridles,  watering 631 

Canteens 1,  278 

Canteen  straps 3,  702 


Cartridge  belts,  caliber  .30 212 

Cartridge-belt  suspenders 216 

Currycombs 207 

First-aid  pouches 1,289 

Knives 157 

Lariats—  237 


148 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 


Magazine  pockets,  web,  double-  338 

Pistols 351 

Pistol  belts 1, 152 

Pistol   holsters  ____* 128 

Sabers 168 

Saber   scabbards 158 

Saddles,  Cavalry 179 

Saddlebags 173 

Saddle  blankets 225 

Spurs,  pairs 247 

Spur  straps,  pairs 245 

Surcingles 272 

Bolos 917 

Bolo  scabbards 1,416 

Shovel  carriers 402 

Shovels,  intrenching 373 

Wire  cutters 1,590 

Wire-cutter  carriers 2,  060 


Blankets,   woolen 234 

Breeches,   olive-drab,    woolen 182 

Overcoats,  olive-drab 3,  255 

Ponchos 497 

Shirts,  olive-drab 479 

Slickers 585 

Tents,  shelter  halves 289 

Waist  belts 19,  562 

Bugles  with  slings 268 

March  kits 524 

Surplus  kit  bags 1.952 

Tents,  pyramidal,  large 1, 163 

Tents,  pyramidal,  small 237 

Whistles  and  chains 1,018 

Kit  flags,  2-foot,  Infantry 126 

Kit  flags,  2-foot,  semaphore 817 

Watch  compasses 1,  366 


MUSTEK  OUT. 


inspector- instructor,   on 


Extracts   from   report   of   Capt.  - 
the  muster  out  of  the  -         -  Infantry : 

All  of  the  property  was  in  a  poor  condition.  A  large  percentage  of  it  was 
unserviceable.  All  of  the  property  showed  neglect  and  an  absolute  lack  of  care. 
The  small  arms  were  in  a  specially  poor  condition.  Nearly  all  of  the  rifles 
were  very  rusty  and  dirty.  All  of  the  rifle  stocks  were  scratched  and  battered. 
An  effort  \vas  made,  through  the  commanding  officer,  to  have  the  rifles  cleaned, 
but  there  was  no  apparent  results. 

In  spite^of  over  four  months'  Federal  service,  the  accountable  officers,  with  one 
exception,  knewr  very  little  about  how  to  keep  property  records  or  render 
returns.  No  returns  for  property  had  been  made. 

I  found  the  officers,  with  a  very  few  exceptions,  to  be  inefficient,  indifferent, 
and  practically  worthless  as  officers.  They  had  very  little  control  over  the 
enlisted  men.  Most  of  them  had  to  be  prompted  several  times  before  they 
would  prepare  any  of  the  required  forms.  The  companies  drilled  better  in  close 
and  extended  order,  but  aside  from  this  the  regiment  as  a  whole  wTas  apparently 
no  more  efficient  than  when  it  left  —  — .  Discipline  was  much  more  lax  than 
it  was  in  June. 

Gapt.  -  — ,  Infantry  inspector-instructor,  on  duty  with  the 
-  reports  from  Camp  -  -  certain  riotous  and  disgraceful 
proceedings  which  occurred  upon  the  muster  out  of  that  regiment. 
He  states  that  written  instructions  were  sent  the  colonel  concerning 
police  of  camp  and  disposition  of  Government  and  State  property, 
etc.,  and  when  the  time  had  arrived  that  these  orders  should 
have  been  executed  Capt.  -  -  got  the  colonel  to  accompany 

him  in  an  inspection  of  the  camp.  They  found  that  practically  noth- 
ing had  been  done,  as  ordered;  that  men  were  gambling  in  plain 
view  of  the  colonel  and  many  were  drunk.  He  ordered  the  colonel  to 
have  the  camp  cleaned  up  at  once,  and  stated  that  he  would  make 
another  inspection  in  an  hour  or  so. 

The  colonel  had  "  officers'  call  "  sounded,  with  a  view  to  having  this 
done.  This  was  about  dark,  and  although  orders  had  been  given  that 
all  automatic  pistols  and  ammunition  be  called  in,  hundreds  of  rifle 
and  pistol  shots  were  fired  by  officers  or  men,  or  both,  and  the  night 
was  made  hideous  with  yells  and  cries.  One  shot  took  effect,  killing 
Cook  -  -  of  Company  -  — . 

Capt.  - 
seemed  to 


says  that  neither  the  colonel  nor  lieutenant  colonel 
have   any  control   over  their  men.     Col.   -  -  stated 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  149 

personally  that  he  had  discovered  and  sent  out  of  camp  two  wagoii- 
loads  of  liquor  in  the  morning,  but  that  much  had  since  been  intro- 
duced. He  said  that  if  his  men  got  much  liquor  no  one  would  be 
able  to  handle  them.  The  disorder  becoming  greater,  Capt.  - 
ordered  Col.  -  -  to  assemble  his  regiment  at  once  and  get  it 
out  of  camp,  so  as  to  prevent  more  serious  trouble  and  possible  clash 
between  the  white  and  colored  troops,  to  say  nothing  of  trouble 
between  the  townspeople  and  colored  troops. 

He  says  the  conduct  was  the  most  disgraceful  and  unsoldierly  he 
had  ever  known,  and  there  was  absolutely  no  discipline  after  dark, 
and  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  get  the  regiment  out  of  camp  and  on 
its  trains.  Much  of  the  trouble  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  men  had 
just  received  two  months'  pay. 

In  forwarding  the  report  the  department  commander  said  that  it 
was  apparent  that  the  officers  had  no  control  over  the  men. 

THE  NATIONAL  GUARD  AT  WAR  STRENGTH. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  system  of  voluntary  enlistments  mili- 
tates against  keeping  the  National  Guard  at  war  strength. 

One  of  the  leading  causes  of  inefficiency  is  the  maintaining  of 
organizations  normally  at  peace  strength  and  increasing  them  to 
"  war  strength  "  when  required  for  service.  The  guardsman  at  best 
can  be  but  imperfectly  trained,  and  to  fill  organizations  with  raw 
recruits  when  called  for  active  service  is  a  serious  handicap. 

If  the  guard  could  be  kept  at  war  strength  it  would  mean  a  saving 
of  expense,  for  the  pay  of  the  officers,  upkeep  of  armories,  etc.,  are 
the  same  whether  the  strength  be  minimum  or  maximum,  and  it  is  to 
the  interest  of  the  Federal  Government  to  give  military  training  even 
though  that  training  be  elementary  in  character  to  the  greatest 
number. 

With  the  National  Guard  kept  at  maximum  strength  the  problem 
of  storage  of  reserve  supplies  is  in  a  measure  solved  automatically, 
in  such  event  there  being  no  recruiting  to  war  strength  it  is  no  longer 
necessary  to  keep  reserve  supplies  to  outfit  the  number  of  men  added 
to  organizations  during  mobilization.  A  considerable  reserve  must 
of  course  be  kept  on  hand,  but  not  the  vast  quantities  needed  where 
only  about  the  minimum  strength  is  kept  enrolled.  * 

Lastly,  but  most  important  of  all,  if  war  strength  were  the  rule, 
organizations  would  presumably  go  from  the  mobilization  to  the 
concentration  points  with  ranks  filled  with  men  all  of  whom  will 
have  had  some  degree  of  training;  a  marked  contrast  with  the  mo- 
bilization just  completed  where  organizations  were  only  at  minimum 
strength  at  the  outset,  and  this  minimum  immediately  depleted  by— 

(a)  Men  found  physically  unfit. 

(b)  Men  who  immediately  sought  discharge  on  account  of  de- 
pendent relatives. 

(c)  Men  discharged  by  State  authorities  after  the  call. 

(d)  Men  who  refused  to  take  the  Federal  oath  and  were  permitted 
by  the  mustering  officers  to  return  to  their  homes. 

(e)  Men  who  failed  to  respond  to  the  call. 

When  all  the  above  deductions  were  made  there  was  in  a  great 
proportion  of  the  organizations  really  only  a  skeleton  of  trained  men 


150  MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC. 

left,  and  the  vacancies  were  necessarily  filled  by  the  enlistment  of 
raw  recruits. 

Such  makeshifts  in  the  way  of  preparation  will  surely  mean  dis- 
aster in  an  encounter  with  an  enterprising  enemy  who  has  only  a 
fair  degree  of  preparedness.  Ours  has  been  not  even  fair;  it  has 
unquestionably  been  poor. 

WHAT  SHOULD  CONSTITUTE.  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES.  FIRST-LINE  TROOPS. 


The  reports  from  inspector-instructors,  medical  officers,  special 
inspectors,  and  inspector  generals  amply  support  the  contention  that 
we  have  no  National  Guard  troops  really  fit  for  the  first  line  of  de- 
fense. This  naturally  brings  us  to  the  question  as  to  what  should  be 
the  qualifications  for  first-line  troops. 

A  few  illustrations  in  our  own  service  may  throw  some  light  on 
this  important  subject.  On  February  24,  1912,  the  Twenty-second 
United  States  Infantry  received  an  order  about  noon  to  leave  Fort 
Sam  Houston,  Tex.,  for  border  duty.  It  left  about  noon  the  next 
day  and  has  been  under  canvas  somewhere  on  the  border  ever  since. 

On  March  9,  1916,  the  Tenth  United  States  Cavalry  received  tele- 
graphic orders  at  11.30  a.  m.  to  proceed  from  its  station,  Fort  Hua- 
chuca,  for  Douglas,  Ariz.,  for  field  duty,  and  left  post  equipped  for 
field  service  four  hours  later  for  Douglas,  and  from  there  was  sent  on 
down  the  line  to  form  part  of  one  of  the  columns  of  the  punitive  expe- 
dition. It  marched  about  240  miles  in  the  first  eight  days,  making  108 
miles  in  the  two  days  following  the  crossing  of  the  line.  It  is  still  in 
Mexico  on  a  shelter-tent  basis,  without  cots;  has  been  in  several 
engagements,  and  in  fit  condition  to  continue  indefinitely. 

The  Eleventh  Cavalry  left  Fort  Oglethorpe,  Ga.,  in  May,  1914, 
by  rail  for  coal-strike  duty  in  Colorado  on  about  24  hours'  notice, 
and  was  absent  for  eight  months.  On  March  12,  1916,  it  entrained 
at  the  same  post  on  24  hours'  notice  to  proceed  by  rail  to  Columbus, 
N.  Mex.,  to  form  a  part  of  the  punitive  expedition  in  Mexico.  It  has 
made  an  excellent  record  for  marching  and  fighting  and  is  still  in 
shelter  tents  "  somewhere  in  Mexico." 

The  point  to  be  emphasized  in  these  cases,  and  in  innumerable 
similar  ones  which  could  be  mentioned,  is  that  the  troops  have  left 
their  stations  on  short  notice  with  trained  men,  fully  armed  and 
equipped,  prepared  to  immediately  encounter  an  enemy  and  to  re- 
main in  the  field  for  an  indefinite  period  of  time. 

This  is  the  degree  of  preparedness  which  from  experience  in  this 
country  has  been  found  to  be  absolutely  essential  to  meet  public 
demands — nothing  less  will  suffice. 

Indeed,  with  increased  facilities  for  transportation  and  for  the 
transmission  of  information,  the  tendency  is  toward  a  more  complete 
preparedness;  this  to  a  degree  that  can  be  expected  only  from  the 
professional  soldier. 

The  National  Guard  may  perhaps  be  likened  to  the  volunteer  fire 
departments  so  popular  years  ago  in  our  large  towns.  They  were 
composed  of  the  elite  of  the  young  men  of  the  town,  whose  generous 
public  spirit  in  so  giving  their  services  in  extinguishing  fires  can  not 
be  too  strongly  commended.  When  a  fire  broke  out,  whether  by  day 
or  night,  the  members  of  the  department,  no  matter  in  what  engaged, 


MOBILIZATION"    OF   THE    OKGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  151 

dropped  their  occupations  and  rushed  to  the  scene  of  action — often 
at  considerable  personal  inconvenience  and  loss. 

But  even  with  this  sacrifice  the  desired  end  was  frequently  not 
attained,  for  even  with  the  most  strenuous  efforts,  before  the  fire 
brigade  could  assemble  and  get  to  work  the  conflagration  would  have 
reached  a  point  beyond  control. 

Clearly  this  means  of  fire  protection,  particularly  as  towns  grew  in 
size,  was  unsatisfactory  and  it  became  apparent  that  the  saving  in 
insurance  rates  alone  would  amply  justify  the  employment  of  paid 
fire  departments,  having  constantly  on  hand  day  or  night  a  crew  of 
men  trained  in  the  use  of  the  latest  appliances  for  extinguishing  fires 
and  exercised  in  methods  of  getting  to  the  scene  of  fire  with  the  least 
possible  delay. 

The  paid  fire  department,  then,  corresponds  to -the  troops  required 
for  the  first  line  of  defense,  and  we  have  no  more  right  to  expect  from 
citizen  soldiers  the  degree  of  preparedness  absolutely  needed  for  first- 
line  troops  than  to  expect  that  volunteer  fire  departments  with  a  per- 
sonnel composed  of  young  men  daily  engaged  in  business  pursuits 
will  afford  adequate  fire  protection  under  existing  conditions  in  our 
great  cities. 

The  patriotism  and  self-sacrifice  of  the  National  Guardsman  no  one 
would  think  of  disputing;  all  honor  to  them,  for  they  form  a  valua- 
ble asset  in  our  scheme  of  national  defense;  but  the  role  which  they 
are  to  play  is  not  in  the  "  first  line,"  although  many  of  the  leaders  in 
their  extreme  advocacy  of  the  merits  of  the  National  Guard,  and  with 
rather  crude  ideas  as  to  what  should  constitute  first-line  troops,  would 
put  them  in  this  category,  a  place  for  which  the  recent  mobilization 
shows  these  troops  to  be  unqualified,  and  for  which,  from  the  very 
nature  of  the  case,  they  never  can  be  fitted.  The  sooner  this  idea  is 
abandoned  the  better  it  will  be  for  all  concerned. 

The  following  is  from  an  officer  of  wide  experience,  who  has  had 
exceptional  opportunities  for  observing  conditions  and  "  feeling  the 
pulse,"  as  it  were,  of  the  National  Guard  along  the  border : 

REPORT  ON  NATIONAL  GUARD  ALONG  THE  BORDER. 

[By .] 

At  the  present  time  practically  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  various 
National  Guard  units  along  the  border  are  primarily  interested  in  when  they 
are  to  be  sent  home.  Though  little  discontent  is  openly  expressed,  there  is  a 
considerable  amount  of  it.  This  discontent  is  apparently  due : 

1.  To  a  belief  that  they  have  not  been  properly  supplied. 

2.  That,  at  least  in  the  beginning,  they  were  not  properly  cared  for. 

3.  To  a  lack  of  proper  training. 

4.  To  a  lack  of  understanding  as  to  the  proper  functions  of  Federal  officers 
and  supply  department. 

5.  To  a  realization  that  the  present  system  unequally  distributes  the  burden 
of  military  service. 

6.  A  belief  on  the  part  of  many  that  the  troops  are  not  really  needed  along 
the  border. 

No.  1  is  due  (a)  to  the  ignorance  of  many  of  the  National  Guard  officers  as 
to  what  to  get,  how  to  get  it,  and  frequently  how  to  use  it  after  gotten;  (b) 
failure  of  the  Quartermaster  Department  and  Ordnance  Department  to  properly 
equip  all  individuals  and  units  with  the  latest  style  equipment  in  the  proper 
models  and  sizes. 

No.  2  is  due  (a)  to  the  unnecessary  inconveniences  caused  by  the  ignorance 
of  militia  officers  of  the  proper  methods  of  taking  care  of  their  men;  (b)  the 
belief  prevalent  amongst  the  majority  of  Americans  that  they  are  entitled  to 
every  comfort  and  that  any  deprivation  is  a  hardship.  They  do  not  understand 


152  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

what  field  service  really  is  and  consequently  are  prone  to  believe  that  the  living 
methods  and  exertions  demanded  by  such  service  is  unnecessary. 

No.  3  is  due  (a)  to  a  lack  of  proper  home  training  such  that  the  performance 
of  duty  comes  above  personal  interest  or  enjoyment.  Hence  in  too  many  cases 
the  proper  pitching  and  protection  of  camp  and  care  of  animals  prior  to  atten- 
tion to  the  personal  comforts  of  the  men  is  looked  upon  as  a  hardship;  (b)  an 
unwillingness  to  engage  in  the  careful  and  necessarily  tiresome  training  of  the 
individual  man  and  horse,  coupled  with  a  desire  to  be  immediately  used  and 
treated  as  fully  trained  troops.  When  this  desire  and  the  lack  of  time,  under 
existing  conditions,  causes  such  use  these  troops,  not  being  prepared  to  undergo 
either  the  physical  or  mental  efforts  required,  suffer  where  trained  troops 
would  not.  Also  due  to  this  lack  of  fundamental  training  a  large  amount  of 
otherwise  absolutely  avoidable  friction  and  trouble  arises,  which  inevitably 
tends  to  increase  the  physical  and  mental  strain,  already  excessive,  (c)  The 
privates,  being  largely  ignorant  of  their  duty,  a  disproportionate  amount  of 
work  is  required  from  the  noncommissioned  officers.  The  same  ignorance  on 
the  part  of  the  noncommissioned  officers  causes  a  disproportionate  amount  of 
work  to  fall  on  the  shoulders  of  the  company  officers.  The  ignorance  of  the  com- 
pany officers  operates  in  the  same  manner  with  respect  to  their  superiors,  and 
so  on  up,  causing  a  great  amount  of  effort  to  produce  a  meager  result,  with 
inevitable  consequent  disgust  amongst  all  grades.  With  few  exceptions  men 
and  officers  are  anxious  and  willing  to  learn.  Too  often  their  superiors  are 
unable  to  teach  them,  and  this  ignorance  is  readily  found  out,  causing  a  loss  of 
respect  and  discontent. 

No.  4:  On  the  whole  the  militia  expect  everything  to  be  shown  them  and 
everything  to  be  done  for  them.  The  Federal  officers  and  departments  natu- 
rally expect  that  the  militia  officers  should  reasonably  well  understand  the 
steps  necessary  to  supply  and  train  their  respective  units.  In  too  many  cases 
this  has  caused  inconvenience  and  worse  to  the  militia.  Many  militia  organiza- 
tions were  unable  to  enlist  competent  cooks  or  horseshoers,  with  the  result  that 
they  have  lived  poorly,  while  their  animals  have  gone  unshod.  In  many  cases 
they  are  inclined  to  blame  this  on  the  Federal  authorities  instead  of  realizing 
that  the  blame  lies  with  the  voluntary  system  of  enlistment. 

No.  5:  Had  immediate  action  of  some  kind  been  necessary,  the  resultant 
excitement  and  constant  movement  in  most  cases  would  have  compensated  the 
many  men  who  are  making  real  sacrifices.  Also  they  would  not  have  had  so 
much  time  to  think  about  their  personal  troubles.  As  it  is,  they  have  plenty 
of  time  to  think  of  the  family  and  business  troubles  constantly  being  told 
them  in  letters  from  home.  Many  firms  are  not  living  up  to  their  promises 
with  respect  to  the  payment  of  salaries  and  to  holding  open  of  positions. 
Promotions  are  being  made  which  men  on  the  border  know  they  would  have 
gotten  had  they  been  at  home.  Many  are  continually  receiving  letters  from 
their  wives  urging  them  to  come  back  and  saying  that  it  is  their  duty  to  do  so. 
All  this  serves  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  a  few  of  the  men  of  the  country  are 
making  a  real  sacrifice,  while  the  great  majority  are  not.  The  practically  com- 
plete failure  of  recruiting  shows  the  great  majority  to  be  unwilling,  and  con- 
sequently increases  the  disgust  of  those  now  in  the  service. 

No.  6:  The  great  majority  do  not  understand  the  necessity  which  caused 
them  to  be  brought  to  the  border,  consequently  they  are  inclined  to  believe  that 
it  was  a  political  move  and  that  they  are  making  sacrifices  for  nothing. 

All  this  causes  the  great  majority  of  the  men  and  officers  to  want  to  go 
home.  The  home-going  of  some  units  has  increased  this  desire. 

It  is  generally  considered  that  it  will  be  very  difficult  to  hold  the  majority 
of  the  men  on  their  return  to  their  home  stations,  and  equally  difficult  to  re- 
cruit men  to  take  their  places.  Some  of  those  now  in  service  will  move  out  of 
the  State;  others  live  in  towns  where  there  are  no  militia  organizations; 
others  belong  to  the  floating  population  of  mechanics  and  farm  laborers. 
Many  will  refuse  to  take  the  new  oath.  Also  it  is  considered  that  public 
opinion  will  be  against  any  attempt  to  compel  those  men  who  do  not  want  to  do 
so  to  report  should  the  Guard  again  be  called  out.  Many  of  the  officers  who 
will  stay  willingly  until  their  organizations  are  mustered  out  will  then  resign. 

With  very  few  exceptions  those  officers  who  were  the  most  ardent  sup- 
porters of  the  militia  provisions  of  the  present  national  defense  act  believe 
that  it  will  be  impossible  to  raise  the  numbers  required  by  this  act.  Most  of 
them  think  that  it  will  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  keep  units  now  in 
existence  above  the  prescribed  minimum. 

There  is  a  great  variety  of  opinions  as  to  what  steps  will  have  to  be  taken 
to  produce  a  proper  force.  There  is  a  practical  unanimity  of  opinion  that  the 


MOBILIZATION   OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 


153 


present  system  does  not  work.  The  indications  are  that  one  of  the  immediate 
results  will  be  the  authorization  of  the  raising  of  several  more  or  all  of  the 
increments  of  the  Regular  Army  now  provided  for  by  law.  This  primarily  for 
the  reason  that  the  National  Guard  does  not  wish  further  service  such  as  it  has 
just  had,  and  that  volunteers  can  not  be  called  for  until  the  National  Guard 
has  been  called  out. 

X umber  of  National  (Jmird  troops  transported  front  State  mobilization  camps, 
to  border  stations  and  the  number  returned  from  border  stations  to  mobiliza- 
tion camps  for  muster  out  of  the  Federal  service,  as  shown  by  report  of  the 
Quartermaster  General  of  the  Army,  to  Nov.  14,  1916,  inclusive. 


State  or  district. 

Number  of 
men  sent 
to 
border. 

Number  of 
men  re- 
turned from 
border. 

State  or  district. 

Number  of 
men  sent 
to 
border. 

Number  of 
men  re- 
turned from 
border. 

\labama 

3  627 

Nebraska  . 

1  910 

Arizona    

915 

New  Hampshire  

1*329 

Arkansas 

1  195 

New  Jersey  

4  348 

3  978 

California 

4  600 

3  046 

New  Mexico 

953 

Colorado       

1  133 

New  York  

18  761 

7  305 

Connecticut 

3  305 

2  578 

North  Carolina 

3  208 

Delaware 

872 

North  Dakota 

1  035 

District  of  Columbia 

2  067 

551 

Ohio       

7*456 

Florida 

1  208 

Oklahoma 

1  337 

Georgia    

3  892 

Oregon  

1  613 

1.146 

Idaho         .... 

1  145 

Pennsylvania      

15  098 

3  375 

Illinois 

9  216 

5  428 

Rhode  Island 

655 

643 

Indiana       

3?  640 

*237 

South  Carolina    

2.376 

Iowa 

4  653 

South  Dakota 

1  016 

Kansas 

2  288 

1  788 

Tennessee 

2  580 

Kentucky  

2*395 

Texas         

3  762 

Louisiana 

1  619 

1  128 

Utah 

779 

296 

Maine 

1  043 

964 

Vermont 

906 

893 

3*189 

1  880 

3  031 

Massachusetts 

8  314 

7  595 

Washington 

2*078 

1  626 

Michigan 

4*363 

West  Virginia 

1  182 

Minnesota 

4*379 

176 

Wisconsin     

4  288 

254 

Mississippi 

1  292 

Wyoming 

491 

4*  802 

1  904 

Montana 

1*070 

*916 

156  414 

47,  707 

Table  showing,  by  States,  the  aggregate  strength  of  National  Guard  mustered 
into  the  Federal  service,  the  war  strength  of  the  organizations  called  into  serv- 
ice, number  furnished,  number  short  of  war  strength,  and  per  cent  of  war 
strength  furnished. 


State. 

War 

strength. 

Number 
of  men 
furnished. 

Number 
short  of  war 
strength. 

Per  cent  of 
war 
strength 
furnished. 

1    Washington  . 

2,100 

2,078 

22 

98.9 

2   Rhode  Island 

672 

655 

17 

97.4 

3.  Massachusetts  . 

9,762 

8,314 

1,448 

85.1 

4   Delaware 

1,158 

872 

286 

75.3 

5.  Oregon  

2,194 

1,613 

581 

73.5 

6  Utah 

1,081 

779 

302 

72.0 

7   Connecticut 

5  467 

3,891 

1,576 

71.1 

8.  Wisconsin    

6,204 

4,288 

1,916 

69.1 

9    Mississippi 

1,915 

1,292 

623 

67.4 

10   District  of  Columbia 

3  104 

2,067 

1,037 

66.5 

11.  Iowa  .                                 

7,043 

4,653 

2,390 

66.0 

12  California 

7,125 

4,600 

2,525 

64.5 

13.  Michigan  

6,801 

4,363 

2,438 

64.1 

14.  Illinois                                          

14,  395 

9,216 

5,179 

64.0 

15    Minnesota 

6,941 

4,379 

2,562 

63.0 

6  932 

4,  348 

2,584 

62.7 

17.  West  Virginia                         

1,915 

1,182 

733 

61.7 

18   New  York 

30,  499 

18,  761 

11,  738 

61.5 

19   Louisiana 

2,641 

1,619 

1,022 

61.3 

20    Florida                                  

1,988 

1,208 

780 

60.7 

21    Tennessee 

4,296 

2,580 

1,716 

60.0 

22   Alabama 

7,646 

4,573 

3,073 

59.8 

23   Idaho   .                   .              

1,915 

1.145 

770 

59.7 

24   Virginia 

5,298 

3,031 

2,267 

57.2 

25    South  Carolina 

4,177 

2,376 

1,801 

56.8 

26.  Colorado  .  .  . 

2,621 

1,  487 

1,134 

56.7 

154 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 


Table  showing,  by  States,  the  aggregate  strength  of  National  Guard  mustered 
into  the  Federal  service,  etc. — Continued. 


State. 

War 

strength. 

Number 
of  men 
furnished. 

Number 
short  of  war 
strength. 

Per  cent  of 
war 
strength 
furnished. 

27.  New  Hampshire  

2,349 

1,329 

1,020 

56.5 

28   Georgia 

6  891 

3  892 

2  999 

56.4 

29.  Missouri 

8,556 

4,802 

3,754 

56.1 

30   Texas 

6  756 

3  762 

2  994 

55  6 

31.  Kansas                      .         .  .             .                   

4,191 

2,288 

1,903 

54.5 

32.  Oklahoma 

2,449 

1  337 

1  112 

54.5 

33.  Maine  

1,915 

1,043 

872 

54.4 

34    Ohio 

13  722 

7  456 

6  266 

54.3 

35.  North  Dakota.  .                         

1,915 

1,035 

880 

54.0 

36.  Maryland 

6,185 

3  329 

2,856 

53.8 

37.  South  Dakota  .  .                           

1,915 

1,016 

899 

53.0 

38.  Montana 

2,018 

1  070 

948 

53.0 

39.  Pennsylvania  

28,  550 

15,  098 

13,452 

52.9 

40.  Indiana 

6,871 

3,640 

3,231 

52.8 

41.  North  Carolina  ...     .                    

6,454 

3,208 

3,246 

49.7 

42.  Vermont 

2  331 

1,130 

1,201 

48.4 

43.  Nebraska  

3,985 

1,910 

2,075 

47.9 

44.  Arizona 

1,915 

915 

1,000 

47.7 

45.  New  Mexico    

2,091 

953 

1,138 

45.5 

46.  Wyoming  . 

1,158 

491 

667 

42.4 

47.  Kentucky  

5,988 

2,395 

3,593 

39.9 

48.  Arkansas 

3,830 

1,195 

2,635 

31.2 

267,  925 

158,  664 

108,361 

59.2 

Strength  of  National  Guard  organizations  not  called  into  service  of  the  United 

States. 


State. 

Organization. 

Strength. 

Florida 

INFANTRY  REGIMENTS. 

Fir  st  Infantry                               .  .          

748 

Illinois 

Fifth  Infantry  

606 

Sixth  Infantry                                         

420 

Massachusetts 

Sixth  Infantry 

84& 

New  Jersey 

Second  Infantry                          .           

731 

Third  Infantry 

656 

New  York 

First  Infantry                             

767 

Tenth  Infantry 

784 

Forty-seventh  Infantry                     

602 

Ohio 

First  Infantry 

667 

Seventh  Infantry                            

624 

Virginia 

Fourth  Infantry                                                .  - 

698 

West  Virginia 

First  Infantry  "                 .             

68~0 

Georgia  .  . 

BATTALIONS  OF  INFANTRY. 

Third  Separate  Battalion  

8,831 
209 

Massachusetts 

First  Battalion  (First  Corps  Cadets)  

258 

Ohio  

Ninth  Separate  Battalion  — 

238 

Connecticut 

SEPARATE  INFANTRY  COMPANIES. 

705 

58 

Iowa 

do                                        

60 

do                

56 

Mississippi 

do                                        

67 

59 

Do  

.....do  
do      

55 
65 

Wisconsin 

59 

Wyoming 

.do  

69 

548 
10,084 

COAST  ARTILLERY. 

654 

13  companies            

823 

District  of  Columbia 

75 

Georgia  .  . 

4  companies...                            

206 

MOBILIZATION   OF   THE   ORGANIZED  MILITIA,  ETC. 


155 


Strength  of  National  Guard  organizations  not  called  into  service  of  the  United 

States — Continued. 


State. 

Organization. 

Strength. 

Maine 

COAST  AETILLERY—  continued. 
13  companies  . 

624 
75 

889 
187 
2,111 
370 
565 
1,098 
415 

Maryland 

1  company 

Massachusetts  ..     .  .             

12  companies  

New  Hampshire 

3  companies 

New  York  

34  companies  

North  Carolina  . 

6  companies  .•.. 

Oregon 

8  companies 

Rhode  Island  ...                   

17  companies  

South  Carolina 

5  companies.                                           ... 

Total  

1£5  companies  ,  

8,092 
18,176 

Aggregate  

By   November  1,   1916,   16,856  men  of  the  National   Guard   and   Organized 
Militia  in  the  Federal  service  were  discharged  for  the  following  causes: 

For  physical  disability 10, 182 

On  account  of  dependent  relatives,  etc 6,  323 

For  fradulent  enlistment 84 

For  return  to  Government  positions 191 

Dishonorably 46 

To  enter  United  States  Military  Academy 2 

Sentence  of  civil  court  and  illegal  enlistment  (1  each) 2 

Paragraph  75,  Mustering  Regulations,  and  by  order  of  Secretary  of  War_  2 

Unsuited  to  service  and  other  causes 24 


Total 16,  856 

New  organizations  recognized  by  the  War  Department  between  June  IS,  1916 
(date  of  call),  and  Dec.  1,  1916,  and  mustered  into  the  Federal  service. 


State. 

Organization. 

Date  recog- 
nized. 

Alabama 

First  Cavalry  ... 

Sept.  21,  1916 
July   10.1916 
Do. 
July   27,1916 
June  27,1916 
June  28,1916 
July  25,1916 
Aug.  22,1916 
July   10.1916 
Oct.    12,1916 
July     7,  1916 
July   10,1916 
July   17,1916 
July     4,  1916 
July   17,1916 
July   31,1916 
June  26,1916 
June  28,1916 

June  29,1916 
Do. 
July     4.  1916 
Sept.  16,1916 
Aug.  23,1916 
Sept.  11,1916 
Sept.  15,1916 
Aug.     9,  1916 
Aug.  21,1916 
Aug.  10,1916 

July   12,1916 
July  21,1916 
Aug.  10,1916 
Aug.  23,1916 
Julv   21,1916 
Aug.  31,1916 
July     8,  1916 
June  21,1916 

July  25,1916 
July     8,1916 

California 

Ambulance  Company  No  1 

Field  Hospital  No.  1  

Company  A,  Engineers.   . 

Colorado...          

Troop  A  .First  Squadron  Cavalry  

Florida 

Battery  C,  First  Battalion  Field  Artillery... 

Field  Hospital  No.  1.. 

Indiana  .            

Batterv  D  ,  Field  Artillery  

Kansas 

Ambulance  Company  No.  2  

Field  Hospital  No.  2 

Troop  A,  Cavalry  .  .  . 

Louisiana 

Field  Hospital  No.  1  

Massachusetts 

Ambulance  Company  No.  2 

Montana  . 

Field  Hospital  ^so  2 

Troop  A  Cavalry  

New  HaiTipshire 

Field  Hospital  No.  1  ... 

New  Jersey  .  .  , 

BattervC,  Field  Artillery  

New  York 

Third*  Field  Artillery  (formerly  Sixty-fifth  In- 
fantry). 
First  Field  Bakerv  Company 

North  Carolina 

Division  Supplv  Train  

First  Aero  Company  .                                 

Field  Hospital  No  4 

Companv  A  Engineers 

Oklahoma  

Company  B,  Engineers        

Ambulance  Company  No.  1  

Pennsylvania 

Second  Field  Artillery  (formerly  Second  Infantry). 
Third  Field  Artillery  (formerly  Ninth  Infantry)... 
Company  C.  Engineers  (formerly  Company  F, 
Fourth  Infantry). 
Company  A.  Engineers  

South  Carolina 

Tennessee 

First  Field  Hospital    .                   ... 

Troop  C  Cavalry 

Texas 

Troop  D,  Cavalry  

Company  A,  Engineers  

Utah... 

Company  B  Engineers 

Field  Hospital  No.  1  

Virginia 

First   Squadron,  Cavalry   (formerly   Richmond 
Light  Infantry  Blues  Battalion). 
Company  A  Engineers 

Wisconsin                                .      .  . 

Troop  B,  Cavalrv  ..    .              .         

156  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

Number  of  National  Guardsmen  mustered  out  of  the  Federal  service  to  Dec 

1,  1916. 


California 3,  024 

Colorado 354 

Connecticut 3, 163 

District  of  Columbia 619 

Illinois 5,  445 

Indiana 231 

Kansas 1,  704 

Louisiana 1,  201 

Maine 963 

Maryland 1,  992 

Massachusetts 7,  556 

Minnesota 177 


Missouri l,  922 

Montana 901 

New  Jersey 3,  951 

New  York 7,  621 

Oregon 1, 152 

Pennsylvania 3,  471 

Rhode  Island 641 

Utah 283 

Vermont 967 

Washington 1,  534 

Wisconsin  __  254 


Total 49,126 

Aggregate  strength  of  National  Guard  troops  in  the  service  of  the  United  States. 

June  30,  1916 82, 927         82,  927 

July  31,  1916 : 

On  border  duty 110,957 

In  State  mobilization  camps 40, 139 

151, 096 

Aug.  31,  1916 : 

On  border  duty 111,954 

In  State  mobilization  camps 26,  643 

138,  597 
Sept.  30,  1916 : 

On  border  duty , 108,  018 

In  State  mobilization  camps 35,  684 

— .      143,702 
Oct.  31,  1916: 

On  border  duty 102,527  . 

At  home  stations  for  muster  out 19,  711 

122,  238 
Nov.  30,  1916: 

On  border  duty 96,  447 

At  home  stations  for  muster  out 4, 181 

100, 628 

EXTRACTS  FROM  NATIONAL  DEFENSE  ACT. 

The  following  are  sections  (57  to  119,  inclusive)  of  the  act  of  June 
3, 1916,  which  relate  to  militia  and  are  here  appended  for  convenience 
of  reference : 

SEC.  57.  COMPOSITION  OF  THE  MILITIA. — The  militia  of  the  United  States  shall 
consist  of  all  able-bodied  male  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  all  other  able- 
bodied  males  who  have  or  shall  have  declared  their  intention  to  become  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  who  shall  be  more  than  eighteen  years  of  age  and,  except 
as  hereinafter  provided,  not  more  than  forty-five  years  of  age,  and  said  militia 
shall  be  divided  into  three  classes,  the  National  Guard,  the  Naval  Militia,  and 
the  Unorganized  Militia. 

SEC.  58.  COMPOSITION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD. — The  National  Guard  shall 
consist  of  the  regularly  enlisted  militia  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty- 
five  years  organized,  armed,  and  equipped  as  hereinafter  provided,  and  of  com- 
missioned officers  between  the  ages  of  twenty-one  and  sixty-four  years. 

SEC.  59.  EXEMPTIONS  FROM  MILITIA  DUTY. — The  Vice  President  of  the  United 
States;  the  officers,  judicial  and  executive,  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  several  States  and  Territories ;  persons  in  the  military  or 
naval  service  of  the  United  States ;  customhouse  clerks ;  persons  employed  by 
the  United  States  in  the  transmission  of  the  mail ;  artificers  and  workmen  em- 
ployed in  the  armories,  arsenals,  and  navy  yards  of  the  United  States ;  pilots ; 
mariners  actually  employed  in  the  sea  service  of  any  citizen  or  merchant  within 
the  United  States,  shall  be  exempt  from  militia  duty  without  regard  to  age, 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  157 

and  all  persons  who  because  of  religious  belief  shall  claim  exemption  from  mili- 
tary service,  if  the  conscientious  holding  of  such  belief  by  such  person  shall  be 
established  %nder  such  regulations  as  the  President  shall  prescribe,  shall  be 
exempted  from  militia  service  in  a  combatant  capacity ;  but  no  person  so  ex- 
empted shall  be  exempt  from  militia  service  in  any  capacity  that  the  President 
shall  declare  to  be  noncombatant. 

SEC.  60.  ORGANIZATION  OF  NATIONAL  GUARD  UNITS. — Except  as  otherwise  spe- 
cifically provided  herein,  the  organization  of  the  National  Guard,  including  the 
composition  of  all  units  thereof,  shall  be  the  same  as  that  which  is  or  may  here- 
after be  prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army,  subject  in  time  of  peace  to  such 
general  exceptions  as  may  be  authorized  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  And  the 
President  may  prescribe  the  particular  unit  or  units,  as  to  branch  or  arm  of 
service,  to  be  maintained  in  each  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia 
in  order  to  secure  a  force  which,  when  combined,  shall  form  complete  higher 
tactical  units. 

SEC.  61.  MAINTENANCE  OF  OTHER  TROOPS  BY  THE  STATES. — No  State  shall  main- 
tain troops  in  time  of  peace  other  than  as  authorized  in  accordance  with  the 
organization  prescribed  under  this  act :  Provided,  That  nothing  contained  in  this 
act  shall  be  construed  as  limiting  the  rights  of  the  States  and  Territories  in  the 
use  of  the  National  Guard  within  their  respective  borders  in  time  of  peace: 
Provided  further,  That  nothing  contained  in  this  act  shall  prevent  the  organiza- 
tion and  maintenance  of  State  police  or  constabulary. 

SEC.  62.  NUMBER  OF  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD. — The  number  of  enlisted  men  of 
the  National  Guard  to  be  organized  under  this  act  within  one  year  from  its 
passage  shall  be  for  each  State  in  the  proportion  of  two  hundred  such  men  for 
each  Senator  and  Representative  in  Congress  from  such  State  and  a  number  to 
be  determined  by  the  President  for  each  Territory  and  the  District  of  Columbia, 
and  shall  be  increased  each  year  thereafter  in  the  proportion  of  not  less  than 
fifty  per  centum  until  a  total  peace  strength  of  not  less  than  eight  hundred 
enlisted  men  for  each  Senator  and  Representative  in  Congress  shall  have  been 
reached :  Provided,  That  in  States  which  have  but  one  Representative  in  Con- 
gress such  increase  shall  be  at  the  discretion  of  the  President:  Provided  fur- 
ther, That  this  shall  not  be  construed  to  prevent  any  State,  Territory,  or  the 
District  of  Columbia  from  organizing  the  full  number  of  troops  required  under 
this  section  in  less  time  than  is  specified  in  this  section,  or  from  maintaining 
existing  organizations  if  they  shall  conform  to  such  rules  and  regulations  re- 
garding organization,  strength,  and  armament  as  the  President  may  prescribe: 
And  provided  further,  That  nothing  in  this  act  shall  be  construed  to  prevent  any 
State  with  but  one  Representative  in  Congress  from  organizing  one  or  more 
regiments  of  troops,  with  such  auxiliary  troops  as  the  President  may  prescribe, 
such  organizations  and  members  of  such  organizations  to  receive  all  the  benefits 
accruing  under  this  act  under  the  conditions  set  forth  herein :  Provided  further, 
That  the  word  Territory  as  used  in  this  act  and  in  all  laws  relating  to  the  land 
militia  and  National  Guard  shall  include  and  apply  to  Hawaii,  Alaska,  Porto 
Rico,  and  the  Canal  Zone,  and  the  militia  of  the  Canal  Zone  shall  be  organized 
under  such  rules  and  regulations,  not  in  conflict  with  the  provisions  of  this  act, 
as  the  President  may  prescribe. 

SEC.  63.  Any  corps  of  Artillery,  Cavalry,  or  Infantry  existing  in  any  of  the 
States  on  the  passage  of  the  act  of  May  eighth,  seventeen  hundred  and  ninety- 
two,  which  by  the  laws,  customs,  or  usages  of  said  States  has  been  in  continuous 
existence  since  the  passage  of  said  act,  under  its  provisions  and  under  the  pro- 
visions of  section  two  hundred  and  thirty-two  and  sections  sixteen  hundred  and 
twenty-five  to  sixteen  hundred  and  sixty,  both  inclusive,  of  title  sixteen  of  the 
Revised  Statutes  of  eighteen  hundred  and  seventy-three,  and  the  act  of  January 
twenty-first,  nineteen  hundred  and  three,  relating  to  the  militia,  shall  be  allowed 
to  retain  its  ancient  privileges,  subject,  nevertheless,  to  all  duties  required  by  law 
of  militia  :  Proridcd,  That  said  organizations  may  be  a  part  of  the  National 
Guard  and  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  of  this  act,  and  shall  conform  in  all 
respects  to  the  organization,  discipline,  and  training  of  the  National  Guard  in 
time  of  war  :  Provided  further,  That  for  purposes  of  training  and  when  on  active 
duty  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  they  may  be  assigned  to  higher  units, 
as  the  President  may  direct,  and  shall  be  subject  to  the  orders  of  officers  under 
whom  they  shall  be  serving. 

SEC.  64.  ASSIGNMENT  OF  NATIONAL  GUARD  TO  BRIGADES  AND  DIVISIONS. — For  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  appropriate  organization  and  to  assist  in  instruction 
and  training,  the  President  may  assign  the  National  Guard  of  the  several  States 
and  Territories  and  the  District  of  Columbia  to  divisions,  brigades,  and  other 


158  MOBILIZATION    OF   THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

tactical  units,  and  may  detail  officers  either  from  the  National  Guard  or  the 
Regular  Army  to  command  such  units :  Provided,  That  where  complete  units  are 
organized  within  a  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia  the  commanding 
officers  thereof  shall  not  be  displaced  under  the  provisions  of  this  section. 

SEC.  65.  CHIEFS  OF  STAFF  OF  NATIONAL  GUARD  DIVISIONS. — The  President  may 
detail  one  officer  of  the  Regular  Army  as  chief  of  staff  and  one  officer  of  the 
Regular  Army  or  the  National  Guard  as  assistant  to  the  chief  of  staff  of  any 
division  of  the  National  Guard  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  as  a  National 
Guard  organization :  Provided,  That  in  order  to  insure  the  prompt  mobilization 
of  the  National  Guard  in  time  of  war  or  other  emergency,  the  President  may,  in 
time  of  peace,  detail  an  officer  of  the  Regular  Army  to  perform  the  duties  of 
<;hief  of  staff  for  each  fully  organized  tactical  division  of  the  National  Guard. 

SEC.  66.  ADJUTANTS  GENERAL  OF  STATES,  AND  so  FORTH. — The  adjutants  gen- 
eral of  the  States,  Territories,  and  the  District  of  Columbia  and  the  officers  of 
the  National  Guard  shall  make  such  returns  and  reports  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  or  to  such  officers  as  he  may  designate,  at  such  times  and  in  such  form  as 
the  Secretary  of  War  may  from  time  to  time  prescribe :  Provided,  That  the  ad- 
jutants general  of  the  Territories  and  of  the  District  of  Columbia  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  President  with  such  rank  and  qualifications  as  he  may  prescribe, 
and  each  adjutant  general  for  a  Territory  shall  be  a  citizen  of  the  Territory  for 
which  he  is  appointed. 

SEC.  67.  APPROPRIATION,  APPORTIONMENT,  AND  DISBURSEMENT  OF  FUNDS  FOR  THE 
NATIONAL  GUARD. — A  sum  of  money  shall  hereafter  be  appropriated  annually,  to 
be  paid  out  of  any  money  in  the  Treasury  not  otherwise  appropriated,  for  the 
support  of  the  National  Guard,  including  the  expense  of  providing  arms,  ord- 
nance stores,  quartermaster  stores,  and  camp  equipage,  and  all  other  military 
supplies  for  issue  to  the  National  Guard,  and  such  other  expenses  pertaining  to 
said  guard  as  are  now  or  may  hereafter  be  authorized  by  law. 

The  appropriation  provided  for  in  this  section  shall  be  apportioned  among 
the  several  States  and  Territories  under  just  and  equitable  procedure  to  be  pre- 
scribed by  the  Secretary  of  War  and  in  direct  ratio  to  the  number  of  enlisted 
men  in  active  service  in  the  National  Guard  existing  in  such  States  and  Ter- 
ritories at  the  date  of  apportionment  of  said  appropriation,  and  to  the  District 
of  Columbia,  under  such  regulations  as  the  President  may  prescribe :  Provided, 
That  the  sum  so  apportioned  among  the  several  States,  Territories,  and  the 
District  of  Columbia  shall  be  available  under  such  rules  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  the  Secretary  of  War  for  the  actual  and  necessary  expenses  incurred  by 
officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army  when  traveling  on  duty  in  con- 
nection with  the  National  Guard;  for  the  transportation  of  supplies  furnished 
to  the  National  Guard  for  the  permanent  equipment  thereof ;  for  office  rent  and 
necessary  office  expenses  of  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  on  duty  with  the 
National  Guard ;  for  the  expenses  of  the  Militia  Bureau,  including  clerical  serv- 
ices, now  authorized  for  the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs;  for  expenses  of  en- 
listed men  of  the  Regular  Army  on  duty  with  the  National  Guard,  including 
quarters,  fuel,  light,  medicines,  and  medical  attendance ;  and  such  expenses  shall 
constitute  a  charge  against  the  whole  sum  annually  appropriated  for  the  sup- 
port of  the  National  Guard  and  shall  be  paid  therefrom  and  not  from  the  allot- 
ment duly  apportioned  to  any  particular  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of 
Columbia ;  for  the  promotion  of  rifle  practice,  including  the  acquisition,  con- 
struction, maintenance,  and  equipment  of  shooting  galleries  and  suitable  target 
ranges;  for  the  hiring  of  horses  and  draft  animals  for  the  use  of  mounted 
troops,  batteries,  and  wagons ;  for  forage  for  the  same ;  and  for  such  other  inci- 
dental expenses  in  connection  with  lawfully  authorized  encampments,  maneu- 
vers, and  field  instruction  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  deem  necessary;  and 
for  such  other  expenses  pertaining  to  the  National  Guard  as  are  now  or  may 
hereafter  be  authorized  by  law. 

The  governor  of  each  State  and  Territory  and  the  commanding  general  of  the 
National  Guard  of  the,  District  of  Columbia  shall  appoint,  designate,  or  detail, 
subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  an  officer  of  the  National 
Guard  of  the  State,  Territory,  or  District  of  Columbia  who  shall  be  regarded  as 
property  and  disbursing  officer  for  the  United  States.  He  shall  receipt  and 
account  for  all  funds  and  property  belonging  to  the  United  States  in  possession 
of  the  National  Guard  of  his  State,  Territory,  or  District  and  shall  make  such 
returns  and  reports  concerning  the  same  as  may  be  required  by  the  Secretary 
of  War.  The  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized,  on  the  requisition  of  the  governor 
of  a  State  or  Territory  or  the  commanding  general  of  the  National  Guard  of  the 
District  of  Columbia,  to  pay  to  the  property  and  disbursing  officer  thereof  so 


MOBILIZATION    OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  159 

much  of  its  allotment  out  of  the  annual  appropriation  for  the  support  of  the 
National  Guard  as  shall,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  be  necessary 
for  the  purposes  enumerated  therein.  He  shall  render,  through  the  War  De- 
partment, such  accounts  of  Federal  funds  intrusted  to  him  for  disbursement  as 
may  be  required  by  the  Treasury  Department.  Before  entering  upon  the  per- 
formance of  his  duties  as  property  and  disbursing  officer  he  shall  be  required 
to  give  good  and  sufficient  bond  to  the  United  States,  the  amount  thereof  to  be 
determined  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  for  the  faithful  performance  of  his  duties 
and  for  the  safe-keeping  and  proper  disposition  of  the  Federal  property  and 
funds  intrusted  to  his  care.  He  shall,  after  having  qualified  as  property  and 
disbursing  officer,  receive  pay  for  his  services  at  a  rate  to  be  fixed  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  and  such  compensation  shall  be  a  charge  against  the  whole  sum 
annually  appropriated  for  the  support  of  the  National  Guard:  Provided,  That 
when  traveling  in  the  performance  of  his  official  duties  under  orders  issued  by 
the  proper  authorities  he  shall  be  reimbursed  for  his  actual  necessary  traveling 
expenses,  the  sum  to  be  made  a  charge  against  the  allotment  of  the  State,  Ter- 
ritory, or  District  of  Columbia:  Provided  further,  That  the  Secretary  of  War 
shall  cause  an  inspection  of  the  accounts  and  records  of  the  property  and  dis- 
bursing officer  to  be  made  by  an  inspector  general  of  the  Army  at  least  once 
each  year :  And  provided  further,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  empowered  to 
make  all  rules  and  regulations  necessary  to  carry  into  effect  the  provisions  of 
this  section. 

SEC.  68.  LOCATION  OF  UNITS. — The  States  and  Territories  shall  have  the  right 
to  determine  and  fix  the  location  of  the  units  and  headquarters  of  the  National 
Guard  within  their  respective  borders:  Provided,  That  no  organization  of  the 
National  Guard,  members  of  which  shall  be  entitled  to  and  shall  have  received 
compensation  under  the  provisions  of  this  act,  shall  be  disbanded  without  the 
consent  of  the  President,  nor,  without  such  consent,  shall  the  commissioned 
or  enlisted  strength  of  any  such  organization  be  reduced  below  the  minimum 
that  shall  be  prescribed  therefor  by  the  President. 

SEC.  69.  ENLISTMENTS  IN  THE  NATIONAL  GUAED. — Hereafter  the  period  of 
enlistment  in  the  National  Guard  shall  be  for  six  years,  the  first  three  years 
of  which  shall  be  in  an  active  organization  and  the  remaining  three  years  in 
the  National  Guard  Reserve,  hereinafter  provided  for,  and  the  qualifications  for 
enlistment  shall  be  the  same  as  those  prescribed  for  admission  to  the  Regular 
Army  :  Provided,  That  in  the  National  Guard  the  privilege  of  continuing  in  active 
service  during  the  whole  of  an  enlistment  period  and  of  reenlisting  in  said 
service  shall  not  be  denied  by  reason  of  anything  contained  in  this  act. 

SEC.  70.  FEDEKAL  ENLISTMENT  CONTRACT. — Enlisted  men  in  the  National  Guard 
of  the  several  States,  Territories,  and  the  District  of  Columbia  now  serving 
under  enlistment  contracts  which  contain  an  obligation  to  defend  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  and  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  shall  be  recognized  as  members  of  the  National  Guard  under  the  provi- 
sions of  this  act  for  the  unexpired  portion  of  their  present  enlistment  contracts. 
When  any  such  enlistment  contract  does  not  contain  such  obligation,  the  enlisted 
man  shall  not  be  recognized  as  a  member  of  the  National  Guard  until  he  shall 
have  signed  an  enlistment  contract  and  taken  and  subscribed  to  the  following 
oath  of  enlistment,  upon  signing  which  credit  shall  be  given  for  the  period 
already  served  under  the  old  enlistment  contract :  "  I  do  hereby  acknowledge 

to  have  voluntarily  enlisted  this  —  day  of  ,  19 — ,  as  a  soldier  in  the 

National  Guard  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  State  of  -  — ,  for  the  period  of 
three  years  in  service  and  three  years  in  the  reserve,  under  the  conditions 
prescribed  by  law,  unless  sooner  discharged  by  proper  authority.  And  I  do 
solemnly  swear  that  I  will  bear  true  faith  and  allegiance  to  the  United  States 

of  America  and  to  the  State  of ,  and  that  I  will  serve  them  honestly  and 

faithfully  against  all  their  enemies  whomsoever,  and  that  I  will  obey  the  orders 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  governor  of  the  State  of  -  — , 
and  of  the  officers  appointed  over  me  according  to  law  and  the  rules  and  articles 
of  war." 

SEC.  71.  Hereafter  all  men  enlisting  for  service  in  the  National  Guard  shall 
sign  an  enlistment  contract  and  take  and  subscribe  to  the  oath  prescribed  in  the 
preceding  section  of  this  act. 

SEC.    72.    DlSCHAEGE    OF    ENLISTED    MEN    FEOM    THE    NATIONAL    GlTAED. An    en- 

listed  man  discharged  from  service  in  the  National  Guard  shall  receive  a  dis- 
charge in  writing  in  such  form  and  with  such  classification  as  is  or  shall  be 
prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army,  and  in  time  of  peace  discharges  may  be  given 


160  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED  MILITIA,   ETC. 

prior  to  the  expiration  of  terms  of  enlistment  under  such  regulations  as  the 
President  may  prescribe. 

SEC.  73.  FEDEEAL  OATH  FOK  NATIONAL  GUAKD  OFFICERS. — Commissioned  officers 
of  the  National  Guard  of  the  several  States,  Territories,  and  the  District  of 
Columbia  now  serving  under  commissions  regularly  issued  shall  continue  in 
office,  as  officers  of  the  National  Guard,  without  the  issuance  of  new  commis- 
sions:  Provided,  That  said  officers  have  taken,  or  shall  take  and  subscribe  to  the 
following  oath  of  office :  "  I,  -  — ,  do  solemnly  swear  "that  I  will  support  and 
defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the  constitution  of  the  State 
of  -  — ,  against  all  enemies,  foreign  and  domestic ;  that  I  will  bear  true  faith 
and  allegiance  to  the  same;  that  I  will  obey  the  orders  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  governor  of  the  State  of  —  — ;  that  I  make  this 
obligation  freely,  without  any  mental  reservation  or  purpose  of  evasion,  and 

that  I  will  well  and  faithfully  discharge  the  duties  of  the  office  .of in  the 

National  Guard  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  State  of  -  -  upon  which 
I  am  about  to  enter,  so  help  me  God." 

SEC.  74.  QUALIFICATIONS  FOR  NATIONAL  GUARD  OFFICERS. — Persons  hereafter 
commissioned  as  officers  of  the  National  Guard  shall  not  be  recognized  as  such 
under  any  of  the  provisions  of  this  act  unless  they  shall  have  been  selected  from 
the  following  classes  and  shall  have  taken  and  subscribed  to  the  oath  of  office 
prescribed  in  the  preceding  section  of  this  act:  Officers  or  enlisted  men  of  the 
National  Guard  ;  officers  on  the  reserve  or  unassigned  list  of  the  National  Guard  ; 
officers,  active  or  retired,  and  former  officers  of  the  United  States  Army,  Navy, 
and  Marine  Corps;  graduates  of  the  United  States  Military  and  Naval  Acad- 
emies and  graduates  of  schools,  colleges,  and  universities  where  military  science 
is  taught  under  the  supervision  of  an  officer  of  the  Regular  Army,  and,  for  the 
technical  branches  and  staff  corps  or  departments,  such  other  civilians  as  may  be 
especially  qualified  for  duty  therein. 

SEC.  75.  The  provisions  of  this  act  shall  not  apply  to  any  person  hereafter 
appointed  an  officer  of  the  National  Guard  unless  he  first  shall  have  successfully 
passed  such  tests  as  to  his  physical,  moral,  and  professional  fitness  as  the 
President  shall  prescribe.  The  examination  to  determine  such  qualifications  for 
commission  shall  be  conducted  by  a  board  of  three  commissioned  officers  ap- 
pointed by  the  Secretary  of  War  from  the  Regular  Army  or  the  National  Guard, 
or  both. 

SEC.  76.  FILLING  OF  VACANCIES  WHEN  DRAFTED  INTO  FEDERAL  SERVICE. — All  va- 
cancies occurring  in  any  grade  of  commissioned  officers  in  any  organization  in  the 
military  service  of  the  United  States  and  composed  of  persons  drafted  from  the 
National  Guard  under  the  provision  of  this  act  shall  be  filled  by  the  President, 
as  far  as  practicable,  by  the  appointment  of  persons  similarly  taken  from  said 
guard,  and  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law  for  filling  similar  vacancies  occurring 
in  the  volunteer  forces. 

SEC.  77.  ELIMINATION  AND  DISPOSITION  OF  OFFICERS. — At  any  time  the  moral 
character,  capacity,  and  general  fitness  for  the  service  of  any  National  Guard 
officer  may  be  determined  by  an  efficiency  board  of  three  commissioned  officers, 
senior  in  rank  to  the  officer  whose  fitness  for  service  shall  be  under  investigation, 
and  if  the  findings  of  such  board  be  unfavorable  to  such  officer  and  be  approved 
by  the  official  authorized  to  appoint  such  an  officer,  he  shall  be  discharged.  Com- 
missions of  officers  of  the  National  Guard  may  be  vacated  upon  resignation, 
absence  without  leave  for  three  months,  upon  the  recommendation  of  an  efficiency 
board,  or  pursuant  to  sentence  of  a  court-martial.  Officers  of  said  guard  ren- 
dered surplus  by  the  disbandment  of  their  organizations  shall  be  placed  in  the 
National  Guard  Reserve.  Officers  may,  upon  their  own  application,  be  placed  in 
the  said  reserve. 

SEC.  78.  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD  RESERVE. — Subject  to  such  rules  and  regula- 
tions as  the  President  may  prescribe,  a  National  Guard  Reserve  shall  be  or- 
ganized in  each  State,  Territory,  and  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  shall  con- 
sist of  such  organizations,  officers,  and  enlisted  men  as  the  President  may  pre- 
scribe, or  members  thereof  may  be  assigned  as  reserves  to  an  active  organiza- 
tion of  the  National  Guard :  Provided,  That  members  of  said  reserve,  when  en- 
gaged in  field  or  coast-defense  training  with  the  active  National  Guard,  shall 
receive  the  same  Federal  pay  and  allowances  as  enlisted  men  of  like  grade  on 
the  active  list  of  said  guard  when  likewise  engaged :  Provided  further,  That, 
except  as  otherwise  specifically  provided  in  this  act,  no  commissioned  or  enlisted 
reservist  shall  receive  any  pay  or  allowances  out  of  any  appropriation  made  by 
Congress  for  National  Guard  purposes. 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  161 

SEC.  79.  RESERVE  BATTALIONS  FOR  RECRUIT  TRAINING. — When  members  of  the 
National  Guard  and  the  enlisted  reserve  thereof  of  any  State,  Territory,  or  the 
District  of  Columbia  shall  have  been  brought  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States  in  time  of  war,  there  shall  be  immediately  organized,  either  from  such 
enlisted  reserve,  or  from  the  unorganized  militia,  in  such  State,  Territory,  or 
District,  one  reserve  battalion  for  each  regiment  of  Infantry  or  Cavalry,  or  each 
nine  batteries  of  Field  Artillery,  or  each  twelve  companies  of  Coast  Artillery, 
brought  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  and  such  reserve  battalion  shall 
constitute  the  fourth  battalion  of  any  such  regiment  or  twelve  companies  of 
Coast  Artillery.  Reserve  .battalions  shall  consist  of  four  companies  of  such 
strength  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States.  When  the 
members  of  three  or  more  regiments  of  the  National  Guard  of  any  State, 
Territory,  or  District  shall  have  been  brought  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  the  reserve  battalions  of  such  regiments  may  be  organized  into  pro- 
visional regiments  and  higher  units.  If  for  any  reason  there  shall  not  be  enough 
voluntary  enlistments  to  keep  the  reserve  battalions  at  the  prescribed  strength, 
a  sufficient  number  of  the  unorganized  militia  shall  be  drafted  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States  to  maintain  each  of  such  battalions  at  the  proper  strength. 
As  vacancies  occur  from  death  or  other  causes  in  any  organization  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States  and  composed  of  men  taken  from  the  National  Guard,  men 
shall  be  transferred  from  the  reserve  battalions  to  the  organizations  in  the  field 
so  that  such  organizations  may  be  maintained  at  war  strength.  Officers  for  the 
reserve  battalions  provided  for  herein  shall  be  drafted  from  the  National  Guard 
Reserve  or  Coast  Artillery  companies  of  the  National  Guard  or  the  Officers'  Re- 
serve Corps,  such  officers  to  be  taken,  if  practicable,  from  the  States,  respec- 
tively, in  which  the  battalions  shall  be  organized.  Officers  and  noncommis- 
sioned officers  returned  to  their  home  stations  because  of  their  inability  to  per- 
form active  field  service  may  be  assigned  to  reserve  battalions  for  duty,  and  all 
soldiers  invalided  home  shall  be  assigned  to  and  carried  on  the  rolls  of  reserve 
battalions  until  returned  to  duty  or  until  discharged. 

SEC.  80.  LEAVES  OF  ABSENCE  FOR  CERTAIN  GOVERNMENT  EMPLOYEES. — All  officers 
and  employees  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  District  of  Columbia  who  shall 
be  members  of  the  National  Guard  shall  be  entitled  to  leave  of  absence  from 
their  respective  duties  without  loss  of  pay,  time,  or  efficiency  rating  on  all  days 
during  which  they  shall  be  engaged  in  field  or  coast-defense  training  ordered 
or  authorized  under  the  provisions  of  this  act. 

SEC.  81.  MILITIA  BUREAU  OF  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT. — The  National  Militia 
Board  created  by  section  eleven  of  the  act  of  May  twenty-seventh,  nineteen 
hundred  and  eight,  amending  section  twenty  of  the  act  of  January  twenty-first, 
nineteen  hundred  and  three,  shall,  from  the  date  of  the  approval  of  this  act,  be 
abolished.  The  Militia  Division  now  existing  in  the  War  Department  shall 
hereafter  be  known  as  the  Militia  Bureau  of  said  department,  shall,  like  other 
bureaus  of  said  department,  be  under  the  immediate  supervision  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  and  shall  not  form  a  part  of  any  other  bureau,  office,  or  other 
organization,  but  the  Chief  of  the  Militia  Bureau  shall  be  ex  officio  a  member 
of  the  General  Staff  Corps :  Provided,  That  the  President  may,  in  his  discre- 
tion, assign  to  duty  in  the  Militia  Bureau  as  assistants  to  the  chief  thereof  not 
to  exceed  one  colonel  and  one  lieutenant  colonel  of  the  National  Guard  for 
terms  of  four  years,  and  any  such  officer  while  so  assigned  shall,  subject  to 
such  regulations  as  the  President  may  prescribe,  receive  out  of  the  whole  fund 
appropriated  for  the  support  of  the  militia  the  pay  and  allowances  of  a  Regular 
Army  officer  having  the  same  rank  and  length  of  service  as  said  National  Guard 
officer  whose  prior  service  in  the  Organized  Militia  shall  be  counted  in  ascer- 
taining his  rights  under  this  proviso. 

SEC.  82.  ARMAMENT,  EQUIPMENT,  AND  UNIFORM  OF  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD. — The 
National  Guard  of  the  United  States  shall,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  uniformed, 
armed,  and  equipped  with  the  same  type  of  uniforms,  arms,  and  equipments 
as  are  or  shall  be  provided  for  the  Regular  Army. 

SEC.  83.  The  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  procure,  under  such 
regulations  as  the  President  may  prescribe,  by  purchase  or  manufacture, 
within  the  limits  of  available  appropriations  made  by  Congress,  and  to  issue 
from  time  to  time  to  the  National  Guard,  upon  requisition  of  the  governors 
of  the  several  States  and  Territories  or  the  commanding  general  of  the  National 
Guard  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  such  number  of  United  States  service  arms, 
with  all  accessories,  field-artillery  materiel,  engineer,  coast  artillery,  signal, 
and  sanitary  materiel,  accouterments,  field  uniforms,  clothing,  equipage,  pub- 

72031—16 11 


162  MOBILIZATION    OF   THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

lications,  and  military  stores  of  all  kinds,  including  public  animals,  as  are 
necessary  to  arm,  uniform,  and  equip  for  field  service  the  National  Guard  in 
the  several  States,  Territories,  and  the  District  of  Columbia :  Provided,  That  as 
a  condition  precedent  to  the  issue  of  any  property  as  provided  for  by  this 
act,  the  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia  desiring  such  issue  shall 
make  adequate  provision,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  for  the 
protection  and  care  of  such  property :  Provided  further.  That  whenever  it 
shall  be  shown  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Secretary  of  War  that  the  National 
Guard  of  any  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia  is  properly  organized, 
armed,  and  equipped  for  field  service,  funds  allotted  to  that  State,  Territory, 
or  District  for  the  support  of  its  National  Guard  may  be  used  for  the  purchase 
from  the  War  Department  of  any  article  issued  by  any  of  the  supply  depart- 
ments of  the  Army. 

SEC.  84.  Under  such  regulations  as  the  President  may  prescribe,  whenever  a 
new  type  of  equipment,  small  arm,  or  field  gun  shall  have  been  issued  to  the 
National  Guard  of  the  several  States.  Territories,  and  the  District  of  Columbia, 
such  equipment,  small  arms,  and  field  guns,  including  Jill  accessories,  shall  be 
furnished  without  charging  the  cost  or  value  thereof  or  any  expense  connected 
therewith  against  the  appropriations  provided  for  the  support  of  the  National 
Guard. 

SEC.  85.  Each  State,  Territory,  and  the  District  of  Columbia  shall,  on  the 
receipt  of  new  property  issued  to  replace  obsolete  or  condemned  prior  issues, 
turn  in  to  the  War  Department  or  otherwise  dispose  of,  in  accordance  with  the 
directions  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  all  property  so  replaced  or  condemned,  and 
shall  not  receive  any  money  credit  therefor. 

SEC.  86.  Any  State.  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia  may,  with  the 
approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  purchase  for  cash  from  the  War  Department 
for  the  use  of  the  National  Guard,  including  the  officers  thereof,  any  stores,  sup- 
plies, material  of  war,  and  military  publications  furnished  to  the  Army,  in  addi- 
tion to  those  issued  under  the  provisions  of  this  act,  at  the  price  at  which  they 
shall  be  listed  to  the  Army,  with  cost  of  transportation  added.  The  funds  re- 
ceived from  such  sale  shall  be  credited  to  the  appropriation  to  which  they  shall 
belong,  shall  not  be  covered  into  the  Treasury,  and  shall  be  available  until 
expended  to  replace  therewith  the  supplies  sold  to  the  States  in  the  manner 
herein  authorized :  Provided,  That  stores,  supplies,  and  materiel  of  war  so  pur- 
chased by  a  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia  may,  in  time  of  actual 
or  threatened  war,  be  requisitioned  by  the  United  States  for  use  in  the  military 
service  thereof,  and  when  so  requisitioned  by  the  United  States  and  delivered 
credit  for  the  ultimate  return  of  such  property  in  kind  shall  be  allowed  to  such 
State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia. 

SEC.  87.  DISPOSITION  AND  KEPI.ACKMENT  OF  DAMAGED  PROPKKTY,  AND  so  FORTH. — 
All  military  property  issued  to  the  National  Guard  as  herein  provided  shall 
remain  the  property  of  the  United  States.  Whenever  any  such  property  issued 
to  the  National  Guard  in  any  State  or  Territory  or  the  District  of  Columbia 
shall  have  been  lost,  damaged,  or  destroyed,  or  becoming  unserviceable  or  unsuit- 
able by  use  in  service  or  from  any  other  cause,  it  shall  be  examined  by  a  dis- 
interested surveying  officer  of  the  Regular  Army  or  the  National  Guard,  detailed 
by  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  the  report  of  such  surveying  officer  shall  be  for- 
warded to  the  Secretary  of  War,  or  to  such  officer  as  he  shall  designate  to  receive 
such  reports ;  and  if  it  shall  appear  to  the  Secretary  of  War  from  the  record  of 
survey  that  the  property  was  lost,  damaged,  or  destroyed  through  unavoidable 
causes,  he  is  hereby  authorized  to  relieve  the  State  or  Territory  or  the  District  of 
Columbia  from  further  accountability  therefor.  If  it  shall  appear  that  the  loss, 
damage,  or  destruction  of  property  was  due  to  carelessness  or  neglect,  or  that 
its  loss,  damage,  or  destruction  could  have  been  avoided  by  the  exercise  of 
reasonable  care  the  money  value  of  such  property  shall  be  charged  to  the 
accountable  State,  Territory,  or  District  of  Columbia,  to  be  paid  from  State, 
Territory,  or  District  funds,  or  any  funds  other  than  Federal.  If  the  articles 
so  surveyed  are  found  to  be  unserviceable  or  unsuitable,  the  Secretary  of  War 
shall  direct  what  disposition,  by  sale  or  otherwise,  shall  be  made  of  them ;  and 
if  sold,  the  proceeds  of  such  sale,  as  well  as  stoppages  against  officers  and  en- 
listed men,  and  the  net  proceeds  of  collections  made  from  any  person  or  from 
any  State,  Territory,  or  District  to  reimburse  the  Government  for  the  loss, 
damage,  or  destruction  of  any  property,  shall  be  deposited  in  the  Treasury  of 
the  United  States  as  a  credit  to  said  State.  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, accountable  for  said  property,  and  as  a  part  of  and  in  addition  to  that 
portion  of  its  allotment  set  aside  for  the  purchase  of  similar  supplies,  stores,  or 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  163 

material  of  war :  Provided  further,  That  if  any  State,  Territory,  or  the  District 
of  Columbia  shall  neglect  or  refuse  to  pay,  or  to  cause  to  be  paid,  the  money 
equivalent  of  any  loss,  damage,  or  destruction  of  property  charged  against  such 
State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia  by  the  Secretary  of  War  after 
survey  by  a  disinterested  officer  appointed  as  hereinbefore  provided,  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  debar  such  State,  Territory,  or  the  District 
of  Columbia  from  further  participation  in  any  and  all  appropriations  for  the 
National  Guard  until  such  payment  shall  have  been  made. 

SEC.  88.  The  net  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  condemned  stores  issued  to  the 
National  Guard  and  not  charged  to  State  allotments  shall  be  covered  into  the 
Treasury  of  the  United  States,  as  shall  also  stoppages  against  officers  and  en- 
listed men,  and  the  net  proceeds  of  collections  made  from  any  person  to  reim- 
burse the  Government  for  the  loss,  damage,  or  destruction  of  said  property  not 
charged  against  the  State  allotment  issued  for  the  use  of  the  National  Guard. 

SEC.  89.  HORSES  FOR  CAVALRY  AND  FIELD  ARTILLERY  OF  NATIONAL  GUARD. — 
Funds  allotted  by  the  Secretary  of  War  for  the  support  of  the  National  Guard 
shall  be  available  for  the  purchase,  under  such  regulations  as  the  Secretary  of 
War  may  prescribe,  of  horses  conforming  to  the  Regular  Army  standards  for 
the  use  of  Field  Artillery  and  Cavalry  of  the  National  Guard,  said  horses  to 
remain  the  property  of  the  United  States  and  to  be  used  solely  for  military 
purposes. 

Horses  so  purchased  may  be  issued  not  to  exceed  thirty-two  to  any  one 
battery  or  troop,  under  such  regulations  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  pre- 
scribe; and  the  Secretary  of  War  is  further  authorized  to  issue,  in  lieu  of 
purchase,  for  the  use  of  such  organizations,  condemned  Army  horses  which  are 
no  longer  fit  for  service,  but  which  may  be  suitable  for  the  purposes  of  instruc- 
tion, such  horses  to  be  sold  as  now  provided  by  law  when  said  purposes  shall 
have  been  served. 

SEC.  90.  Funds  allotted  by  the  Secretary  of  War  for  the  support  of  the  Na-  •. 
tional  Guard  shall  be  available  for  the  purchase  and  issue  of  forage,  bedding, 
shoeing,  and  veterinary  services,  and  supplies  for  the  Government  horses  issued 
to  any  battery  or  troop,  and  for  the  compensation  of  competent  help  for  the 
care  of  the  material,  animals,  and  equipment  thereof,  under  such  regulations 
as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  prescribe:  Provided,  That  the  men  to  be  compen- 
sated, not  to  exceed  five  for  each  battery  or  troop,  shall  be  duly  enlisted  therein 
and  shall  be  detailed  by  the  battery  or  troop  commander,  under  such  regula- 
tions as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  prescribe,  and  shall  be  paid  by  the  United 
States  disbursing  officer  in  each  State,  Territory,  and  the  District  of  Columbia. 

SEC.  91.  DISCIPLINE  TO  CONFORM  TO  THAT  OF  REGULAR  ARMY. — The  discipline 
(which  includes  training)  of  the  National  Guard  shall  conform  to  the  system 
which  is  now  or  may  hereafter  be  prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army,  and  the 
training  shall  be  carried  out  by  the  several  States,  Territories,  and  the  District 
of  Columbia  so  as  to  conform  to  the  provisions  of  this  act. 

SEC.  92.  TRAINING  OF  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD. — Each  company,  troop,  battery, 
and  detachment  in  the  National  Guard  shall  assemble  for  drill  and  instruction, 
including  indoor  target  practice,  not  less  than  forty-eight  times  each  year,  and 
shall,  in  addition  thereto,  participate  in  encampments,  maneuvers,  or  other  exer- 
cises, including  outdoor  target  practice,  at  least  fifteen  days  in  training  each 
year,  including  target  practice,  unless  such  company,  troop,  battery,  or  detach- 
ment shall  have  been  excused  from  participation  in  any  part  thereof  by  the 
Secretary  of  War:  Pro  rifled,  That  credit  for  an  assembly  for  drill  or  for  indoor 
target  practice  shall  not  be  given  unless  the  number  of  officers  and  enlisted 
men  present  for  duty  at  such  assembly  shall  equal  or  exceed  a  minimum  to  be 
prescribed  by  the  President,  nor  unless  the  period  of  actual  military  duty  and. 
instruction  participated  in  by  each  officer  and  enlisted  man  at  each  such  assem- 
bly at  which  he  sha.ll  be  credited  as  having  been  present  shall  be  of  at  least  one 
and  one-half  hours'  duration  and  the  character  of  training  such  as  may  be  pre- 
scribed by  the  'Secretary  of  War. 

SEC.  93.  INSPECTIONS  OF  THE  NATIONAL  GUARD. — The  Secretary  of  War  shall 
cause  an  inspection  to  be  made  at  least  once  each  year  by  inspectors  general 
JUKI,  if  necessary,  by  other  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  detailed  by  him  for 
that  purpose,  to  determine  whether  the  amount  and  condition  of  the  property 
in  the  hands  of  the  National  Guard  is  satisfactory;  whether  the  National 
Guard  is  organized  as  hereinbefore  prescribed  ;  whether  the  officers  and  enlisted 
men  possess  the  physical  and  other  qualifications  prescribed ;  whether  the  .or- 
ganization and  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  thereof  are  sufficiently  armed, 
uniformed,  equipped,  and  being  trained  and  instructed  for  active  duty  in  the 


164  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

field  or  coast  defense ;  and  whether  the  records  are  being  kept  in  accordance 
with  the  requirements  of  this  act.  The  reports  of  such  inspections  shall  serve 
as  the  basis  for  deciding  as  to  the  issue  to  and  retention  by  the  National  Guard 
of  the  military  property  provided  for  by  this  act  and  for  determining  what 
organizations  and  individuals  shall  be  considered  as  constituting  parts  of  the 
National  Guard  within  the  meaning  of  this  act. 

SEC.  94.  ENCAMPMENTS  AND  MANEUVEKS. — Under  such  regulations  as  the 
President  may  prescribe,  the  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized  to  provide  for  the 
participation  of  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  National  Guard  in  encampments, 
maneuvers,  or  other  exercises,  including  outdoor  target  practice,  for  field  or 
coast-defense  instruction,  either  independently  or  in  conjunction  with  any  part 
of  the  Regular  Army,  and  there  may  be  set  aside  from  the  funds  appropriated 
for  that  purpose  and  allotted  to  any  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, such  portion  of  said  funds  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  payment,  sub- 
sistence, transportation,  and  other  proper  expenses  of  such  portion  of  the  Na- 
tional Guard  of  such  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia  as  shall  par- 
ticipate in  such  encampments,  maneuvers,  or  other  exercises,  including  outdoor 
target  practice,  for  field  and  coast-defense  instruction ;  and  the  officers  and 
enlisted  men  of  such  National  Guard  while  so  engaged  shall  be  entitled  to  the 
same  pay,  subsistence,  and  transportation  as  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  cor- 
responding grades  of  the  Regular  Army  are  or  hereafter  may  be  entitled  by  law. 
SEC.  95.  When  any  part  of  the  National  Guard  participates  in  encampments, 
maneuvers,  or  other  exercises,  including  outdoor  target  practice,  for  field  or 
coast-defense  instruction  at  a  United  States  military  post,  or  reservation,  or 
elsewhere,  if  in  conjunction  with  troops  of  the  United  States,  the  command  of 
such  military  post  or  reservation  and  of  the  officers  and  troops  of  the  United 
States  on  duty  there  or  elsewhere  shall  remain  with  the  commander  of  the 
United  States  troops  without  regard  to  the  rank  of  the  commanding  or  other 
officer  of  the  National  Guard  temporarily  engaged  in  the  encampments,  ma- 
neuvers, or  other  exercises. 

SEC.  96.  USE  OF  REGULAR  ARMY  PERSONNEL. — The  Secretary  of  War  may  de- 
tail one  or  more  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army  to  attend  any 
encampment,  maneuver,  or  other  exercise  for  field  or  coast-defense  instruction 
of  the  National  Guard,  who  shall  give  such  instruction  and  information  to  the 
officers  and  men  assembled  for  such  encampment,  maneuver,  or  other  exercise 
as  may  be  directed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  or  requested  by  the  governor  or  by 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  National  Guard  there  on  duty. 

SEC.  97.  Under  such  regulations  as  the  President  may  prescribe  the  Secretary 
of  War  may  provide  camps  for  the  instruction  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  of 
the  National  Guard.  Such  camps  shall  be  conducted  by  officers  of  the  Regular 
Army  detailed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  for  that  purpose,  and  may  be  located 
either  within  or  without  the  State,  Territory,  or  District  of  Columbia  to  which 
the  members  of  the  National  Guard  designated  to  attend  said  camps  shall 
belong.  Officers  and  enlisted  men  attending  such  camps  shall  be  entitled  to  pay 
and  transportation,  and  enlisted  men  to  subsistence  in  addition,  at  the  same 
rates  as  for  encampments  or  maneuvers  for  field  or  coast-defense  instruction. 

SEC.  98.  When  any  portion  of  the  National  Guard  shall  participate  in  encamp- 
ments, maneuvers,  or  other  exercises,  including  outdoor  target  practice,  for  field 
or  coast-defense  instruction,  under  the  provisions  of  this  act,  it  may,  after  being 
duly  mustered,  be  paid  at  any  time  after  such  muster  for  the  period  from  the 
date  of  leaving  the  home  rendezvous  to  date  of  return  thereto  as  determined  in 
advance,  both  dates  inclusive;  and  such  payment,  if  otherwise  correct,  shall 
pass  to  the  credit  of  the  disbursing  officer  making  the  same. 

SEC.  99.  NATIONAL  GUARD  OFFICERS  AND  MEN  AT  SERVICE  SCHOOLS,  AND  so 
'FORTH. — Under  such  regulations  as  the  President  may  prescribe,  the  Secretary 
of  War  may,  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  governor  of  any  State  or  Terri- 
tory or  the  commanding  general  of  the  National  Guard  of  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, authorize  a  limited  number  of  selected  officers  or  enlisted  men  of  the 
National  Guard  to  attend  and  pursue  a  regular  course  of  study  at  any  military 
service  school  of  the  United  States,  except  the  United  States  Military  Academy ; 
or  to  be  attached  to  an  organization  of  the  same  arm,  corps,  or  department  to 
which  such  officer  or  enlisted  man  shall  belong,  for  routine  practical  instruction 
at  or  near  an  Army  post  during  a  period  of  field  training  or  other  outdoor  exer- 
cises ;  and  such  officer  or  enlisted  man  shall  receive,  out  of  any  National  Guard 
allotment  of  funds  available  for  the  purpose,  the  same  travel  allowances  and 
quarters,  or  commutation  of  quarters,  and  the  same  pay,  allowances,  and  sub- 
sistence to  which  an  officer  or  enlisted  man  of  the  Regular  Army  would  be 


MOBILIZATION   OF   THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  165 

entitled  for  attending  such  school,  college,  or  practical  course  of  instruction 
under  orders  from  proper  military  authority,  while  in  actual  attendance  at  such 
school,  college,  or  practical  course  of  instruction:  Provided,  That  in  no  case 
shall  the  pay  and  allowances  authorized  by  this  section  exceed  those  of  a 
captain. 

SEC.  100.  DETAIL  OF  OFFICEKS  OF  REGULAR  ARMY  TO  DUTY  WITH  THE  NATIONAL 
GUARD. — The  Secretary  of  War  shall  detail  officers  of  the  active  list  of  the 
Army  to  duty  with  the  National  Guard  in  each  State,  Territory,  or  District  of 
Columbia,  and  officers  so  detailed  may  accept  commissions  in  the  National 
Guard,  with  the  permission  of  the  President  and  terminable  in  his  discretion, 
without  vacating  their  commissions  in  the  Regular  Army  or  being  prejudiced  in 
their  relative  or  lineal  standing  therein.  The  Secretary  of  War  may,  upon  like 
application,  detail  one  or  more  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army  with  each 
State,  Territory,  or  District  of  Columbia  for  duty  in  connection  with  the 
National  Guard.  But  nothing  in  this  section  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  prevent 
the  detail  of  retired  officers  as  now  provided  by  law. 

SEC.  101.  NATIONAL  GUARD,  WHEN  SUBJECT  TO  LAWS  GOVERNING  REGULAR 
ARMY. — The  National  Guard  when  called  as  such  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States  shall,  from  the  time  they  are  required  by  the  terms  of  the  call  to  respond 
thereto,  be  subject  to  the  laws  and  regulations  governing  the  Regular  Army,  so 
far  as  such  laws  and  regulations  are  applicable  to  officers  and  enlisted  men 
whose  permanent  retention  in  the  military  service,  either  on  the  active  list  or 
on  the  retired  list,  is  not  contemplated  by  existing  law. 

SEC.  102.  SYSTEM  OF  COURTS-MARTIAL  FOR  NATIONAL  GUARD. — Except  in  organi- 
zations in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  courts-martial  in  the  National  Guard 
shall  be  of  three  kinds,  namely,  general  courts-martial,  special  courts-martial, 
and  summary  courts-martial.  They  shall  be  constituted  like  and  have  cogni- 
zance of  the  same  subjects,  and  possess  like  powers  except  as  to  punishments  as 
similar  courts  provided  for  by  the  laws  and  regulations  governing  the  Army 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  proceedings  of  courts-martial  of  the  National 
Guard  shall  follow  the  forms  and  modes  of  procedure  prescribed  for  said 
similar  courts. 

SEC.  103.  General  courts-martial  of  the  National  Guard  not  in  the  service  of 
the  United  States  may  be  convened  by  orders  of  the  President,  or  of  the  gov- 
ernors of  the  respective  States  and  Territories,  or  by  the  commanding  general 
of  the  National  Guard  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  such  courts  shall  have 
the  power  to  impose  fines  not  exceeding  $200;  to  sentence  to  forfeiture  of  pay 
and  allowances;  to  a  reprimand;  to  dismissal  or  dishonorable  discharge  from 
the  service ;  to  reduction  of  noncommissioned  officers  to  the  ranks ;  or  any  two 
or  more  of  such  punishments  may  be  combined  in  the  sentences  imposed  by 
such  courts. 

SEC.  104.  In  the  National  Guard,  not  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  the 
commanding  officer  of  each  garrison,  fort,  post,  camp,  or  other  place,  brigade, 
regiment,  detached  battalion,  or  other  detached  command  may  appoint  special 
courts-martial  for  his  command ;  but  such  special  courts-martial  may  in  any 
case  be  appointed  by  superior  authority  when  by  the  latter  deemed  desirable. 
Special  courts-martial  shall  have  power  to  try  any  person  subject  to  military 
law,  except  a  commissioned  officer,  for  any  crime  or  offense  made  punishable  by 
the  military  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  such  special  courts-martial  shall 
have  the  same  powers  of  punishment  as  do  general  courts-martial,  except  that 
fines  imposed  by  such  courts  shall  not  exceed  $100. 

SEC.  105.  In  the  National  Guard,  not  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  the 
commanding  officer  of  each  garrison,  fort,  post,  or  other  place,  regiment  or  corps, 
detached  battalion,  company,  or  other  detachment  of  the  National  Guard  may 
appoint  for  such  place  or  command  a  summary  court  to  consist  of  one  officer, 
who  shall  have  power  to  administer  oaths  and  to  try  the  enlisted  men  of  such 
place  or  command  for  breaches  of  discipline  and  violations  of  laws  governing 
such  organizations ;  and  said  court,  when  satisfied  of  the  guilt  of  such  soldier, 
may  impose  fines  not  exceeding  $25  for  any  single  offense;  may  sentence  non- 
commissioned officer  to  reduction  to  the  ranks ;  may  sentence  to  forfeiture  of 
pay  and  allowances.  The  proceedings  of  such  court  shall  be  informal,  and  the 
minutes  thereof  shall  be  the  same  as  prescribed  for  summary  courts  of  the  Army 
of  the  United  States. 

SEC.  106.  All  courts-martial  of  the  National  Guard,  not  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States,  including  summary  courts,  shall  have  power  to  sentence  to  con- 
finement in  lieu  of  fines  authorized  to  be  imposed:  Provided,  That  such  sen- 
tences of  confinement  shall  not  exceed  one  day  for  each  dollar  of  fine  authorized. 


166  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

SEC.  107.  No  sentence  of  dismissal  from  the  service  or  dishonorable  discharge, 
imposed  by  a  National  Guard  court-martial,  not  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  shall  be  executed  until  approved  by  the  governor  of  the  State  or 
Territory  concerned,  or  by  the  commanding  general  of  the  National  Guard  of  the 
District  of  Columbia. 

SEC.  108.  In  the  National  Guard,  not  in  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
presidents  of  courts-martial  and  summary  court  oilicers  shall  have  power  to 
issue  warrants  to  arrest  accused  persons  and  to  bring  them  before  the  court  for 
trial  whenever  such  persons  shall  have  disobeyed  an  order  in  writing  from  the 
convening  authority  to  appear  before  such  court,  a  copy  of  the  charge  or 
charges  having  been  delivered  to  the'  accused  with  such  order,  and  to  issue 
subpoenas  and  subpoenas  duces  tecnm  and  to  enforce  by  attachment  attendance 
of  witnesses  and  the  production  of  books  and  papers,  and  to  sentence  for  a 
refusal  to  be  sworn  or  to  answer  as  provided  in  actions  before  civil  courts. 

All  processes  and  sentences  of  said  courts  shall  be  executed  by  such  civil 
officers  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  laws  of  the  several  States  and  Territories, 
and  in  any  State  where  no  provision  shall  hfive  been  made  for  such  action,  and 
in  the  Territories  and  the  District  of  Columbia,  such  processes  and  sentences 
shall  be  executed  by  a  United  States  marshal  or  his  duly  appointed  deputy,  and 
it  shall  be  the  duty  of  any  United  States  marshal  to  execute  all  such  processes 
and  sentences  and  make  return  thereof  to  the  officer  issuing  or  imposing  the 
same. 

SEC.  109.  PAY  FOR  NATIONAL  GUARD  OFFICERS. — Certain  commissioned  officers 
on  the  active  list  belonging  to  organizations  of  the  National  Guard  of  each  State, 
Territory,  and  the  District  of  Columbia  participating  in  the  apportionment  of 
the  annual  appropriation  for  the  support  of  the  National  Guard  shall  receive 
compensation  for  their  services,  except  during  periods  of  service  for  which 
they  may  become  lawfully  entitled  to  the  same  pay  as  officers  of  corresponding 
grades  of  the  Regular  Army,  as  follows,  not  to  include  longevity  pay :  A  captain 
$500  per  year  and  the  same  pay  shall  be  paid  to  every  officer  of  higher  rank 
than  that*  of  captain,  a  first  lieutenant  $240  per  yenr,  and  a  second  lieutennnt 
$200  per  year.  Regulations  to  be  prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  shall 
determine'the  amount  and  character  of  service  that  must  be  rendered  by  officers 
to  entitle  them  to  the  whole  or  specific  parts  of  the  maximum  pay  hereinbefore 
authorized:  Provided,  That  all  staff  officers,  aids-de-camp,  and  chaplains  shall 
receive  not  to  exceed  one-half  of  the  pay  of  a  captain,  except  that  regimental 
adjutants,  and  majors  and  captains  in  command  of  machine-gun  companies, 
ambulance  companies,  field  hospital  companies,  or  sanitary  troops  shall  receive 
the  pay  hereinbefore  authorized  for  a  captain. 

SEC.  110.  PAY  FOR  NATIONAL  GUARD  ENLISTED  MEN. — Each  enlisted  man  on  the 
active  list  belonging  to  an  organization  of  the  National  Guard  of  a  State,  Terri- 
tory, or  the  District  of  Columbia,  participating  in  the  apportionment  of  the 
annual  appropriation  for  the  support  of  the  National  Guard,  shall  receive  com- 
pensation for  his  services,  except  during  periods  of  service  for  which  he  may 
become  lawfully  entitled  to  the  same  pay  as  an  enlisted  man  of  corresponding 
grade  in  the  Regular  Army,  at  a  rate  equal  to  twenty-five  per  centum  of  the 
initial  pay  now  provided  by  law  for  enlisted  men  of  corresponding  grades  of  the 
Regular  Army  :  Provided,  That  such  enlisted  man  shall  receive  the  compensation 
herein  provided  if  he  shall  have  attended  not  less  than  forty-eight  regular  drills 
during  any  one  year,  and  a  proportionate  amount  for  attendance  upon  a  lesser 
number  of  such  drills,  not  less  than  twenty-four ;  and  no  such  enlisted  man  shall 
receive  any  part  of  said  compensation  except  as  authorized  by  this  proviso  and 
the  three  'provisos  next  following :  Provided  further,  That  the  compensation 
provided  herein  shall  be  computed  for  semiannual  periods,  beginning  the  first 
day  of  January  and  the  first  day  of  July  of  each  year,  in  proportion  to  the 
number  of  drills  attended ;  and  no  compensation  shall  be  paid  to  any  enlisted 
man  for  the  first  semiannual  period  of  any  year  unless  he  shall  have  attended 
during  said  period  at  least  twenty-four  drills,  but  any  lesser  number  of  drills 
attended  during  said  period  shall  be  reckoned  with  the  drills  attended  during 
the  second  semiannual  period  in  computing  the  compensation,  if  any,  due  him  for 
that  year :  Provided  further,  That  when  any  man  enters  into  an  enlistment  other 
than  an  immediate  reenlistment  he  shall  be  entitled  to  proportional  compensation 
for  that  year  if  during  the  remainder  of  the  year  he  shall  attend  a  number 
of  drills  whose  ratio  to  twenty-four  is  not  less  than  the  ratio  of  the  part  of  the 
year  so  served  to  the  whole  year ;  and  when  any  man's  enlistment  shall  expire 
the  compensation,  if  any,  to  which  he  may  be  entitled  shall  be  determined  in 


MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC.  167 

like  manner :  Provided  further,  That  periods  of  any  actual  military  duty  equiva- 
lent to  the  drills  herein  prescribed  (except  those  periods  of  service  for  which 
members  of  the  National  Guard  may  become  lawfully  entitled  to  the  same  pay 
as  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  corresponding  grades  in  the  Regular  Army) 
may  be  accepted  as  service  in  lieu  of  such  drills  when  so  provided  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War. 

All  amounts  appropriated  for  the  purpose  of  this  and  the  last  preceding  sec- 
tion shall  be  disbursed  and  accounted  for  by  the  officers  and  agents  of  the 
Quartermaster  Corps  of  the  Army,  and  all  disbursements  under  the  foregoing 
provisions  of  this  section  shall  be  made  as  soon  as  practicable  after  the  thirty- 
first  day  of  December  and  the  thirtieth  day  of  June  of  each  year  upon  pay 
rolls  prepared  and  authenticated  in  the  manner  to  be  prescribed  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  War :  Provided,  That  stoppages  may  be  made  against  the  compensation 
payable  to  any  officer  or  enlisted  man  hereunder  to  cover  the  cost  of  public 
property  lost  or  destroyed  by  and  chargeable  to  such  officer  or  enlisted  man. 

Except  as  otherwise  specifically  provided  herein,  no  money  appropriated  under 
the  provisions  of  this  or  the  last  preceding  section  shall  be  paid  to  any  person 
not  on  the  active  list,  nor  to  any  person  over  sixty-four  years  of  age,  nor  to  any 
person  who  shall  fail  to  qualify  as  to  fitness  for  military  service  under  such 
regulations  as  the  Secretary  of  War  shall  prescribe,  nor  to  any  State,  Territory, 
or  District,  or  officer  or  enlisted  man  in  the  National  Guard  thereof,  unless  and 
until  such  State,  Territory,  or  District  provides  by  law  that  staff  officers,  in- 
cluding officers  of  the  Pay,  Inspection,  Subsistence,  and  Medical  Departments, 
hereafter  appointed  shall  have  had  previous  military  experience  and  shall  hold 
their  positions  until  they  shall  have  reached  the  age  of  sixty-four  years,  unless 
retired  prior  to  that  time  by  reason  of  resignation,  disability,  or  for  cause  to 
be  determined  by  a  court-martial  legally  convened  for  that  purpose,  and  that 
vacancies  among  said  officers  shall  be  filled  by  appointment  from  the  officers  of 
the  militia  of  such  State,  Territory,  or  District:  Provided  further,  That  the 
preceding  proviso  shall  not  apply  to  any  State,  Territory,  or  District  until  sixty 
days  next  after  the  adjournment  of  the  next  session  of  its  legislature  held 
after  the  approval  of  this  act. 

SEC.  111.  NATIONAL  GUARD  WHEN  DRAFTED  INTO  FEDERAL  SERVICE. — When 
Congress  shall  have  authorized  the  use  of  the  armed  land  forces  of  the  United 
States,  for  any  purpose  requiring  the  use  of  troops  in  excess  of  those  of  the 
Regular  Army,  the  President  may,  under  such  regulations,  including  such 
physical  examination,  as  he  may  prescribe,  draft  into  the  military  service  of 
the  United  States,  to  serve  therein  for  the  period  of  the  war  unless  sooner  dis- 
charged, any  or  all  members  of  the  National  Guard  and  of  the  National  Guard 
Reserve.  All  persons  so  drafted  shall,  from  the  date  of  their  draft,  stand  dis- 
charged from  the  militia,  and  shall  from  said  date  be  subject  to  such  laws  and 
regulations  for  the  government  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States  as  may  be  ap- 
plicable to  members  of  the  Volunteer  Army,  and  shall  be  embodied  in  organiza- 
tions corresponding  as  far  as  practicable  to  those  of  the  Regular  Army  or  shall 
be  otherwise  assigned  as  the  President  may  direct.  The  commissioned  officers 
of  said  organizations  shall  be  appointed  from  among  the  members  thereof, 
officers  with  rank  not  above  that  of  colonel  to  be  appointed  by  the  President 
alone,  and  all  other  officers  to  be  appointed  by  the  President  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  Officers  and  enlisted  men  in  the  service  of 
the  United  States  under  the  terms  of  this  section  shall  have  the  same  pay  and 
allowances  as  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army  of  the  same  grades 
and  the  same  prior  service. 

SEC.  112.  RIGHTS  TO  PENSIONS. — When  any  officer  or  enlisted  man  of  the 
National  Guard  drafted  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  war 
is  disabled  by  reason  of  wounds  or  disability  received  or  incurred  while  in  the 
active  service  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  war,  he  shall  be  entitled  to  all 
the  benefits  of  the  pension  laws  existing  at  the  time  of  his  service,  and  in  case 
such  officer  or  enlisted  man  dies  in  the  active  service  of  the  United  States  in 
time  of  war  or  in  returning  to  his  place  of  residence  after  being  mustered  out 
of  such  service,  or  at  any  other  time  in  consequence  of  wounds  or  disabilities 
received  in  such  active  service,  his  widow  and  children,  if  any,  shall  be  en- 
titled to  all  the  benefits  of  such  pension  laws. 

SEC.  113.  ENCOURAGEMENT  OF  RIFLE  PRACTICE. — The  Secretary  of  War  shall 
annually  submit  to  Congress  recommendations  and  estimates  for  the  estab- 
lishment and  maintenance  of  indoor  and  outdoor  rifle  ranges,  under  such  a 
comprehensive  plan  as  will  ultimately  result  in  providing  adequate  facilities  for 


168  MOBILIZATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED   MILITIA,   ETC. 

rifle  practice  in  all  sections  of  the  country.  And  that  all  ranges  so  established, 
and  all  ranges  which  may  have  already  been  constructed  in  whole  or  in  part, 
with  funds  provided  by  Congress  shall  be  open  for  use  by  those  in  any  branch 
of  the  military  or  naval  service  of  the  United  States  and  by  all  able-bodied 
males  capable  of  bearing  arms,  under  reasonable  regulations  to  be  prescribed 
by  the  controlling  authorities  and  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  That 
the  President  may  detail  capable  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  of  the 
Regular  Army  and  National  Guard  to  duty  at  such  ranges  as  instructors  for 
the  purpose  of  training  the  citizenry  in  the  use  of  the  military  arm.  Where 
rifle  ranges  shall  have  been  so  established  and  instructors  assigned  to  duty 
thereat,  the  Secretary  of  War  shall  be  authorized  to  provide  for  the  issue  of  a 
reasonable  number  of  standard  military  rifles  and  such  quantities  of  ammunition 
as  may  be  available  for  use  in  conducting  such  rifle  practice. 

SEC.  114.  TEMPORARY  VACANCIES  IN  REGULAR  ARMY  DUE  TO  DETAILS  TO  THE 
NATIONAL  GUARD. — In  time  of  war  the  temporary  vacancies  created  in  any  grade 
not  above  that  of  colonel  among  the  commissioned  personnel  of  any  arm,  staff 
corps,  or  department  of  the  Regular  Army,  through  appointments  of  officers 
thereof  to  higher  rank  in  organizations  composed  of  members  taken  from  the 
National  Guard,  shall  be  filled  by  temporary  promotions  according  to  seniority 
in  rank  from  officers  holding  commissions  in  the  next  lower  grade  in  said 
arm,  staff  corps,  or  department,  and  all  vacancies  created  in  any  grade  by 
such  temporary  promotions  shall  be  in  like  manner  filled  from,  and  thus  cre- 
ate temporary  vacancies  in,  the  next  lower  grade,  and  the  vacancies  that  shall 
remain  thereafter  in  said  arm,  staff  corps,  or  department,  and  that  can 
not  be  filled  by  temporary  promotions,  as  prescribed  in  this  section,  may  be 
filled  by  the  temporary  appointment  of  officers  of  such  number  and  grade  or 
grades  as  shall  maintain  said  arm,  corps,  or  department  at  the  full  commis- 
sioned strength  authorized  by  law:  Provided,  That  in  the  staff  corps  and  de- 
partments subject  to  the  provisions  of  sections  twenty-six  and  twenty-seven  of 
the  act  of  February  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  and  acts  amendatory 
thereof,  temporary  vacancies  that  can  not  be  filled  by  temporary  promotions  as 
hereinbefore  prescribed  shall  be  filled  by  temporary  details  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed in  said  sections  twenty-six  and  twenty-seven  and  acts  amedatory 
thereof,  and  the  resulting  temporary  vacancies  in  the  branches  of  the  Army 
from  which  the  details  shall  be  so  made  shall  be  filled  as  hereinbefore  in  this 
section  prescribed :  Provided  further,  That  officers  temporarily  promoted  or 
appointed  under  the  terms  of  this  section  shall  be  promoted  or  appointed  by  the 
President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  for  terms  that 
shall  not  extend  beyond  the  war  or  the  passing  of  the  emergency  for  which 
additional  forces  were  brought  into  the  military  service  of  the  United  States, 
and  at  the  termination  of  the  war  or  the  passing  of  the  emergency  said  officers 
shall  be  discharged  from  the  positions  held  by  them  under  their  temporary 
commissions  or  appointments,  and  officers  detailed  as  herein  authorized  shall 
be  relieved  from  their  temporary  details:  And  provided  further  That  officers 
temporarily  promoted  under  the  provisions  of  this  section  shall  not  vacate 
their  permanent  commissions  nor  be  prejudiced  in  their  relative  or  lineal  stand- 
ing in  the  Regular  Army. 

SEC.  115.  PHYSICAL  EXAMINATION. — Every  officer  and  enlisted  man  of  the 
National  Guard,  who  shall  be  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  as 
such,  shall  be  examined  as  to  his  physical  fitness  under  such  regulations  as  the 
President  may  prescribe,  without  further  commission  or  enlistment:  Provided, 
That  immediately  preceding  the  muster  out  of  an  officer  or  enlisted  man  called 
into  the  active  service  of  the  United  States  he  shall  be  physically  examined 
under  rules  prescribed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  the  record 
thereof  shall  be  filed  and  kept  in  the  War  Department. 

SEC.  116.  NONCOMPLIANCE  WITH  FEDERAL  ACT. — Whenever  any  State  shall, 
within  a  limit  of  time  to  be  fixed  by  the  President,  have  failed  or  refused  to 
comply  with  or  enforce  any  requirement  of  this  act,  or  any  regulation  promul- 
gated "thereunder  and  in  aid  thereof  by  the  President  or  the  Secretary  of  War, 
the  National  Guard  of  such  State  shall  be  debarred,  wholly  or  in  part,  as  the 
President  may  direct,  from  receiving  from  the  United  States  any  pecuniary 
or  other  aid/benefit,  or  privilege  authorized  or  provided  by  this  act  or  any 
other  law. 

SEC.  117.  APPLICABLE.  TO  LAND  FORCES  ONLY. — The  provisions  of  this  act  in 
respect  to  the  militia  shall  be  applicable  only  to  militia  organized  as  a  land  force 
and  not  to  the  Naval  Militia,  which  shall  consist  of  such  part  of  the  militia  as 


169 

may  be  prescribed  by  the  President  for  each  State,  Territory,  or  District: 
Provided,  That  each  State,  Territory,  or  District  maintaining  a  Naval  Militia, 
as  herein  prescribed,  may  be  credited  to  the  extent  of  the  number  thereof  in 
the  quota  that  would  otherwise  be  required  by  section  sixty-two  of  this  act. 

SEC.  118.  NECESSARY  RULES  AND  REGULATIONS. — The  President  shall  make  all 
necessary  rules  and  regulations  and  issue  such  orders  as  may  be  necessary  for 
the  thorough  organization,  discipline,  and  government  of  the  militia  provided  for 
in  this  act. 

SEC.  119.  ANNUAL  ESTIMATES  REQUIRED. — The  Secretary  of  War  shall  cause 
to  be  estimated  annually  the  amount  necessary  for  carrying  out  the  provisions 
of  so  much  of  this  act  as  relates  to  the  militia,  and  no  money  shall  be  expended 
under  said  provisions  except  as  shall  from  time  to  time  be  appropriated  for 
carrying  them  out. 

o 


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